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CAPTAIN IN THE 1ST REGIMENT OF BOMBAY NATIVE INFANTRY,
AND LATE POLITICAL RESIDENT AT SATARA.

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HISTORY

OF

THE MAHRATTAS.

CHAP. I.

FROM A.D. 1772 TO A.D. 1775.

The Court of Directors appoint a resident envoy to Poona—intention of that mission.—Capture of Baroach.—Resolution of the Bombay government upon the receipt of intelligence from Poona during the campaign of Rugonath Rao against Nizam Ally.—Negotiations with Rugonath Rao—resolution to support him—he refuses to accede to the terms.—Capture of Tannah.—Rugoba, deserted by Sindia and Holkar, renews the negotiation with Bombay.—State of the Gaekwar family after the death of Dummajee.—Treaty between Rugoba and the English.

THE Court of Directors, in a despatch to the Presidency of Bombay, of the 1st of April 1772, A.D. 1772. directed that a resident envoy should be appointed to the Peishwa's court; and Mr. Thomas Mostyn, of the Bombay civil service, who had formerly been at Poona in the situation of assistant to Mr. Price's mission, was selected by the Court of Directors for this important duty.

The declared intention of the East India Company in appointing an envoy was for the purpose of acquiring,

from time to time, upon safe and honorable terms, such privileges and rights as might be beneficial to their commerce, and of security to their possessions, by maintaining a friendly intercourse with all the native powers; but carefully abstaining from active alliance with any. The resident was instructed to communicate to Madras and Bengal direct all intelligence he could procure relative to the designs of the Mahrattas, of a nature likely to affect those presidencies; but the principal objects of the mission were to obtain possession of the island of Salsette, the port of Bassein, and the small islands of Kennerly, Hog Island, Elephanta, and Caranja. The advantage of these islands, was justly considered of great importance, in order to preclude other nations from having access to the spacious and excellent harbour of Bombay, by far the most commodious port in India. It was already celebrated for its dockyard, and was well adapted to become the mart, not only for the supply of the interior of Western India, but the emporium of the trade with China, the coasts of Persia, Arabia, and the Red Sea. The occupation of Salsette likewise secured the principal inlet to the Mahratta country, for woollens and other staples of England, which are said to have been at that time supplied, to the amount of 14 lakhs of rupees annually. The expenses of the Bombay establishment far exceeded the receipts, and it was hoped that, by the possession of those places, and the Mahratta share of the revenue of Surat, the balance would be nearly equal.

Permission for the envoy to reside at Poona was granted by Mahdoo Rao; and Mr. Mostyn arrived there a few days prior to that Peishwa's death; otherwise, it was Mr. Mostyn's opinion, the succeeding administration would not have allowed him to remain.

Some time elapsed before any event favourable to the views of the Company occurred. The Bombay presidency, in consequence of certain claims on the Nabob of Baroach, due by right of sovereignty to the government of Surat, sent a force, just before the rains of the year 1771, to enforce their demand; but, as the expedition failed, preparations were made for the renewal of hostilities after the monsoon. This armament was countermanded in consequence of the arrival of the Nabob at Bombay, whose object appears to have been merely to obtain a cessation of arms by trusting to the generosity of the English, in hopes that the confidence he had shown might operate in his favour, either by inducing the Bombay government to relinquish their claims, or by affording him time to cement an alliance with the family of Gaekwar. A treaty was concluded on the 30th November at Bombay; but as the terms did not come up to the full extent of the Nabob's hopes, the English chief at the Baroach factory was in a short time treated with great disrespect, on which he was desired to retire to Surat. The expedition, as before projected, was carried into effect; and Baroach, with the loss of the gallant and accomplished General David Wedderburn, was taken by storm on the 18th November 1772—the same day on which Mahdoo Rao died.

When the resident at Poona was first sent for on business by the new Peishwa, the exchange, or an equivalent for Baroach, was one of the few things discussed; but no offer was made which could lead to the subject most important to his mission.

After the murder of Narain Rao, during the progress of
A.D. 1773. Rugonath Rao's warfare with the Nizam
in the neighbourhood of Beder, the reports
circulated by his enemies of his probable death or deposi-

tion induced the Bombay government to deliberate on what would then be the state of their relations with the Mahrattas. They concluded that the family of the Peishwa, with whom only they had existing treaties, must become extinct by the demise of Rugoba; and they conceived that their engagements with the Poona government only existed whilst that family continued at the head of the administration. Accordingly, without further scruple, they determined that, should either of the events alluded to take place, they would possess themselves of Salsette by force of arms.* The ready credit given to those unfavourable rumours at Bombay, and a subsequent hasty belief in the rising fortunes of Rugoba, are attributable to the same bias—a desire of the president and council to fulfil the object of their employers, and court their favour by possessing themselves, and that too, at all events, of the long-coveted islands.

When Rugonath Rao, instead of marching with bold confidence to Poona, shaped his course to
 A.D. 1774. the northward, he clearly exposed his situation to men less under the influence of interested hopes than the members of the Bombay government, and betrayed his alarm to the resident at Poona by sending an agent with hurried and indefinite applications for a great deal of money and a great many troops;† which only showed that he stood in much need of aid, but had a very confused idea of what plan he should follow to obtain it, or how to extricate himself from difficulty.

The Bombay government were willing to assist him with some men, conditionally: but further negotiation through Mr. Mostyn at Poona could not be prosecuted, owing

* Bombay Secret Consultations.

† Mr. Mostyn's letters. (Bombay Records.)

to the distant retreat of Rugoba, who continued his march as far as Malwa. There, after he had recruited his forces, he determined to recross the Nerbuddah, and accordingly advanced to a position on the Taptee, where, as already alluded to, he renewed his overtures to the English through Mr. Robert Gambier, the acting chief or civil governor of Surat. His agent informed Mr. Gambier that Rugoba was desirous of entering on a treaty for the purpose of being furnished with a sufficient force "to carry him to Poona, and establish him in the government; for which he would defray the charges of the expedition, make very considerable grants to the company, and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance the president and council at Bombay might choose."*

September 6.

acceptable proposal was received at Bombay on the 6th September, when the president and council agreed to assist Rugoba with all the troops they could spare, which, including a portion of artillery, amounted to about 2,500 men, on condition that he should advance 15 or 20 lakhs of rupees; and, on being established in the government at Poona, cede to the honorable company, in perpetuity, Salsette, the small islands contiguous to Bombay, and Bassein with its dependencies. The Mahratta share of revenue in Surat and Baroach was, if possible, to be obtained; and also protection from Mahratta inroads into the Bengal provinces, and the possessions of the nabob of the Carnatic.

The original of the above resolution is signed by Mr. William Hornby, governor and president, Mr. Daniel Draper, Mr. William Tayler, of the civil service, and Mr. John Watson, commodore of the Bombay marine, who

* Mr. Gambier's letters. (Bombay Records.)

were the counsellors present on that memorable occasion. In the course of the consultation a doubt arose whether the president and members had a legal right to enter on any treaty without the concurrence of the governor-general in council, as the operation of the Act of Parliament of 1773, which rendered the presidencies of Madras and Bombay subordinate to Bengal, was to have effect in India from the 1st of August; but as intimation had not been received of the arrival of the members appointed from Europe, without whom the supreme parliamentary council could not be constituted, their proceeding, on mature deliberation, was deemed unobjectionable.

The offers of Rugoba, however, in answer to the proposals of the Bombay government, fell very far short of what was expected. He positively refused to cede Salsette—a condition so indispensable, that Mr. Gambier, without delay, replied to his proposals in such terms as he conceived himself authorized to offer, without wasting the time necessary for a reference to Bombay—of which the president and council approved. Rugoba adhered to his original declaration of not relinquishing Bassein and Salsette; he also stated his inability to raise the large advance of cash, but offered to cede districts and claims of much greater value in Guzerat, amounting, in all, to eleven lakhs annually; to pay six lakhs of rupees in advance and one lakh and a half monthly, for the expense of 1,000 Europeans, 2,000 sepoy, and 15 guns. The government agreed to part of these propositions; and, on condition of his making the cession up to $18\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs, they even consented to waive the grand acquisition of Salsette; but at this stage of the negotiation they were alarmed by the receipt of intelligence from their envoy at Goa, that the Portuguese government had sent a formidable arma-

ment from Europe, for the avowed purpose of recovering their lost possessions, including Salsette and Bassein.

Offers to surrender the fort of Tannah, by the Mahratta officer in charge, for the sum of 2,60,000 rupees, had been made to Mr. Hornby, as early as the preceding months of February or March, at a time when the greatest confusion prevailed at Poona, and, with the consent of his council, Mr. Hornby offered one lakh. The Mahratta authorities were disposed to betray their trust for 1,20,000 rupees, which would have been complied with, but, on considering the state of the Mahratta government, and the probability of obtaining possession by other means, the negotiation with the killidar was suspended. On receipt, however, of the intelligence from Goa, the scheme was renewed, and Mr. Mostyn was instructed, in case of their obtaining possession, to use every possible endeavour to reconcile it to the ministerial party, as a measure of precaution to prevent the island from falling into the hands of the Portuguese; and to Rugoba similar assurances were to be given. In the meantime, information of the preparations at Goa had been received at Poona, and had induced the ministers to reinforce the garrison of Tannah with 500 men; which circumstance, and the strict watch kept up, effectually obstructed the designs of the Mahratta party disposed to make it over.

In consequence of this disappointment, and the additional obstacles with which they should have to contend in attempting to reduce it by force, the matter was again
deliberated on the 9th December, when
December 9. the president in council determined, at all events, that they ought to anticipate the Portuguese. An expedition, consisting of 620 Europeans, including artillery, 1,000 sepoys, and 200 gun-lascars, was accordingly

prepared under the command of Brigadier-General Robert Gordon; and although the situation of Tannah was such as to preclude the employment of the larger vessels of the company's marine, as the governor expressed a wish that Commodore Watson should superintend the naval part of the enterprize, and have joint authority with General Gordon, the commodore, on the general's acquiescence in the arrangement, cheerfully complied. The troops pro-

December 12.

ceeded on the 12th of December, and on the ensuing day a part of the Portuguese fleet anchored in the mouth of the harbour of Bombay, and formally protested against their proceedings. The president and council used many arguments in justification of their measures; they declared they would issue no

December 20.

countermand, and batteries were opened against Tannah on the 20th December. On the eighth day the breach was considered practicable, but it was necessary to fill up the ditch before they could advance to the assault. They attempted this operation on

December 27.

the night of the 27th December, when they were forced to retire with the loss of 100 Europeans, including officers killed and wounded; but next evening the fort was carried by assault, when the soldiers, exasperated by their loss, put the greater part of the garrison to the sword. Among the sufferers at Tannah was Commodore John Watson, a brave and experienced officer, who was mortally wounded* on the third day of the siege.

A separate detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating was sent to take possession of the

* His wounds were most painful, but rather singular to occasion death. A cannon-shot struck the sand close to him, and drove the particles into his body.

fort of Versova, on the northern extremity of Salsette. The island of Caranja (or Oorun, according to the Mahrattas) was also occupied, and the whole of Salsette reduced, before New Year's Day.*

In the meantime the negotiations with Rugoba were continued, but the ministers having secretly engaged Sindia and Holkar in their interests, and collected an army of about 30,000 men, quitted Poorundhur on the 27th November, and advanced towards the Taptee. Rugonath Rao was apprized of the secession of Holkar and Sindia in sufficient time to escape from being surrounded, and, having thrown a strong garrison into Talneir, he retired toward Guzerat; but, in consequence of the advanced state of the pregnancy of his wife Anundee Bye, he left her in the fort of Dhar, where she was shortly after delivered of Bajee Rao Rugonath,† destined to become the last of the Peishwas.

Rugoba continued his retreat towards Baroda, at which place he arrived on the 3rd January, with
 A. D. 1775. about 10,000 horse and 400 infantry.
 Hurry Punt Phurkay, after reducing Talneir, was sent in pursuit of him; but Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees returned to the fort of Poorundhur, where all affairs continued to be transacted.

Rugoba's design in retiring to Guzerat was obviously to conclude his negotiation with the English, and to obtain the aid of Govind Rao Gaekwar. The latter, at the period of Rugoba's arrival, was besieging his brother Futih Sing in Baroda, assisted by his uncle Khundee Rao Gaekwar, jagheerdar of Neriad.

The reader may recollect that Govind Rao Gaekwar was

* Bombay Records.

† Mr. Mostyn's letter, Mahratta MSS., and oral information.

sent by his father Dummajee to support Rugonath Rao against Mahdoo Rao in the rebellion of 1768. Shortly after its suppression, Dummajee died, leaving four sons—Syajee, Govind Rao, Manikjee, and Futih Sing. The two last were the youngest and full brothers by the third wife. Syajee was the eldest son, but by Dummajee's second wife. Govind Rao was his second son, but by the first married wife. Such a claim to succession as that of Syajee and Govind Rao always occasions disputes among Mahrattas, as there are precedents for the superiority of either party. Govind Rao was at Poona at the time of his father's death, a prisoner at large, in consequence of having supported Rugonath Rao. His claim to the succession and to his father's rank of Sena Khas Kheyl does not, in the first instance, appear to have been disputed. Upon his paying a fine of upwards of 23 lakhs of rupees for his late delinquency, a nuzur of 21 lakhs, and other exactions amounting in all to upwards of $50\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs;* and having also agreed to pay a tribute of 7,79,000 rupees annually, to keep 3,000 horse constantly in the service at Poona, and

* The following is the exact account, as extracted from the Poona state papers :—

	Rs.
Tribute of last year	5,25,000
Fine for <i>non-attendance</i> in 1768.....	23,25,000
Nazur, for confirmation in the title of Sena Khas Kheyl, with the districts and jagheer, according to ancient custom	21,00,000
Babey babut ¹	1,00,000
On account of the amount levied, in addition to the assignment given to Mokhund Kasseer.	2,630
	<hr/> 50,52,630 0
On account of gold received in part	3,715 2
	<hr/> Rupees 50,48,914 14

¹ Probably on account of the districts conquered from Juwan Murd Khan Babey by Dummajee, of which Rugonath Rao promised to exact no share.

4,000 when the Peishwa was at war, the title and possessions of his father were conferred upon Govind Rao.

Syajee Gaekwar, the eldest son, was an idiot, but his youngest brother, Futih Sing, urged the claim of Syajee to the succession ; and in the year 1771 Futih Sing came to the Peishwa's court, where he prosecuted Syajee's pretensions, and at last succeeded. Ram Shastree is said to have decided the suit in favour of Syajee ; and as Mahdoo Rao's policy was directed to circumscribe the power of the Gaekwar family, he could not have taken a more effectual means, short of absolute reduction, than that which he adopted by acceding to the views of Futih Sing in appointing him mootaliq to his brother Syajee, now Sena Khas Kheyl, which, of course, occasioned an irreconcilable difference between Futih Sing and Govind Rao. On representations, probably, of the necessity of keeping his whole force in Guzerat, to enable him to resist any insurrection caused by the partizans of his brother Govind Rao, Futih Sing was permitted to withdraw the contingent of horse, on agreeing to pay at the rate of rupees 6,75,000 a year during their non-attendance. But Futih Sing had other views. In his own schemes for supporting Syajee, he did not overlook the motives which induced Mahdoo Rao to give him the preference as mootaliq, and he returned to Baroda, determined to strengthen himself against any designs the Peishwa might meditate. For this purpose he made overtures to the Bombay government early in the year 1772, offering to enter on an offensive and defensive alliance, on terms advantageous to the company ; but his proposal was rejected as at variance with the orders of the Court of Directors. Except a short contract, concluded with Futih Sing by Mr. Price, on the 12th January 1773, respecting the Gaekwar's dividend of the revenues of

Baroach, which was to continue on the same footing as when under the government of the nabob, no other agreement of any sort existed between him and the East India Company.

After Narain Rao's murder, and Rugoba's accession to the office of Peishwa, Govind Rao's claim was again recognised, and, prior to Rugoba's departure for the Carnatic, whilst his army was encamped at Kulburga, Govind Rao was invested as Sena Khas Kheyl, and immediately set off for Guzerat in order to endeavour to wrest the government from Futih Sing. From that time the two brothers had been in a state of constant warfare until Rugonath Rao's arrival, who, as already noticed, found Govind Rao engaged in the siege of Baroda.

As soon as Rugoba came into Guzerat, he renewed the negotiation with Mr. Gambier, but it was temporarily impeded, owing to a misfortune which befel his accredited agent, Nowruttundass, who was taken prisoner by Futih Sing's troops, when employed with a party of Govind Rao's horse in raising revenues from the districts south of Surat. Various drafts for a treaty had been tendered on both sides, and much time lost by the dilatory preciseness, rather than the indecision, of the Bombay government.

March 6. The treaty when finally concluded, on the

6th March, consisted of 16 articles, by which all former treaties between the two governments were confirmed, and neither party was to assist the enemies of the other. The Bombay government engaged to send immediately 500 Europeans and 1,000 sepoy, with a due proportion of artillery, to assist Rugoba, and pledged themselves to make up the number to 700 or 800 Europeans and 1,700 sepoy, with gun-lascars, artificers, and pioneers, the whole amounting to 3,000 men. Rugoba

engaged to pay, on account of 2,500 men, one lakh and a half of rupees monthly, with a proportionate increase or decrease according to the number of men ; and, as a security for the payment, he made over temporarily the districts of Amod, Hansot, Versaul, and a part of Oklaseer. He ceded in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of Salsette and the other islands, the districts of Jumbooseer, Oolpar, and an assignment of 75,000 rupees annually upon Oklaseer, the whole amounting to 19,25,000 rupees. He engaged to procure the cession of the Gaekwar's share of the Baroach revenue, and to pay all expenses the company might incur in obtaining possession of the specified cessions, which were to be considered as belonging to them from the date of the treaty. As Rugonath Rao was destitute of other funds, he deposited jewels, valued at upwards of six lakhs,* as a security for the promised advance, pledging himself to redeem them. The protection of the company's possession in Bengal, and those of their ally the nabob of Arcot, as long as the latter adhered to the existing engagement with the Mahrattas, was also provided for ; and all British ships, or vessels sailing under the protection of the British flag, which might have the misfortune to be wrecked on the Mahratta coast, were, as far as practicable, to be restored to the owners, together with such cargoes and stores as might be saved.

Such was the substance of a treaty between the Bombay government and Rugoba, which occasioned infinite discussions amongst the English in India and in Europe, and led to what is generally termed the first Mahratta war.

* About 28 years afterwards, on Bajee Rao's restoration in 1803, these jewels were delivered to him as a free gift from the honorable company.

CHAP. II.

A. D. 1775.

Expedition, under Colonel Keating, sails for Guzerat.—Defeat of Rugonath Rao—flees to Surat—is joined by Colonel Keating—lands at Cambay—approbation of the Bombay government—dissent of Mr. Draper.—Instructions to Colonel Keating—he forms a junction with Rugoba's troops—march to Neriad—detail of operations.—Colonel Keating negotiates—his envoy derided and insulted—Rugonath Rao is persuaded to move towards the Deccan.—Battle of Arass.—Surprise at Bowpeer.—Treaty with Futih Sing.—Prospects of the belligerents at the close of the season.

THE Bombay government, before the treaty was finally settled, had prepared a force of 80 European artillery, 350 European infantry, 800 sepoy, and 160 gun-lascars, which, with their complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, made up the 1,500 men for immediate service. A reinforcement was to follow on the arrival of the troops expected from Madras.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Keating, commandant of the artillery and engineers under the Bombay presidency, was selected for the command in preference to Colonel Egerton, who was the next senior officer to General Gordon, but whose health was supposed to disqualify him for active service.

Lieutenant-Colonel Keating's detachment sailed from Bombay in the end of February, but in February. the meantime the army under Hurry Punt Phurkay, accompanied by a part of the troops of Holkar and Sindia, amounting in all to about 30,000 men, had entered Guzerat in pursuit of Rugonath Rao, which obliged him and Govind Rao to raise the siege of Baroda, and retire beyond the Myhie, near to which, at the village of Wassud, he was encamped, when, on February 17. the 17th February, the ministerial army arrived in his neighbourhood.

According to a plan suggested by the local knowledge of Futih Sing, the ministerial army, on the afternoon of the same day, suddenly crossed the river in three divisions at separate fords; and whilst Rugonath Rao's army was preparing to repel the centre attack, before Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, who were encamped on the plain at a short distance in the rear, could come to his assistance, the other divisions took him in both flanks; a body of Arabs, whom he had lately entertained, refused to fight without pay; Mannajee Phakray* and Sukaram Hurry, two of his best officers, were wounded in the commencement; the ground was confined, the confusion universal, and Rugoba, fancying that he was about to be seized by his own troops, suddenly set off from the field of battle, and fled with about 1,000 horse to Cambay. The nabob of that place, who had before intended to unite with him, was now apprehensive of the consequences of affording protection to a fugitive. Rugoba, therefore, applied to Mr. Charles Malet, at that time chief of the English factory, who had

* Mannajee Phakray was one of the legitimate Sindias of Kunneir-kheir, and in consequence was more respected among the old Mahratta families than the great Mahadajee Sindia. We shall have frequent occasion to mention Mannajee Sindia, surnamed Phakray, or the heroic.

only heard by common report of the pending negotiation between Rugonath Rao and the Bombay government, but readily assisted to get him conveyed to Bhownuggur, whence he embarked for Surat, and had been four days at that place, when the vessels, on board of which were Lieutenant-Colonel Keating's detachment, anchored at

February 27. Surat bar on the 27th February. In the

meantime the defeated army of Rugoba, under Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Sewdasho Ramchundur, Mannajee Phakray, and Sukaram Hurry, retired to Kupperwunj, and thence to Pulhanpoor. For the purpose of forming a junction with those chiefs, it was proposed to disembark the British troops at Cambay. The members of the Bombay government approved of that plan, with the exception of Mr. Daniel Draper, one of the

March 7. members of council, who, at a consultation on the 7th March, dissented, because, as

no formal change or ratification of the treaty had taken place, he conceived the circumstances to be so much altered, and their means so inadequate to the end proposed, that delay was both justifiable and advisable, at least until it could be ascertained what number of Rugoba's party was likely to re-assemble, and what resources of money and of troops could be afforded from the other presidencies. Mr. Draper recommended that the detachment should remain with Rugoba at Surat to protect that place and Baroach, to give confidence to his cause, and, with Rugoba's concurrence, to secure the revenues of the districts to be ceded.

It so happened that the treaty was signed at Surat by Rugoba on the 6th March—the day before this dissent was made; but the president and the other members at once decided that it was more advisable to proceed; in short,

that inaction would be tantamount to desertion of the cause, and equally impolitic and spiritless. Governor Hornby seems to have had an idea that his 1,500 men might overcome the whole Mahratta army; nor is the confidence and inexperience of Colonel Keating less apparent, for, on meeting the forlorn Rugoba at Surat, he congratulates the Bombay government on their good fortune at finding the ex-Peishwa so entirely dependent on them for his future success. The British detachment, accompanied by Rugoba, proceeded to Cambay, where they

March 17.

landed on the 17th March; Colonel Keating, however, before he quitted Surat, probably in order to show their new ally his alacrity—for it could be attended with no other advantage—commenced the war by attacking a party of horse belonging to the ministerial army, which appeared in the neighbourhood. The Mahrattas withdrew and awaited his embarkation, when they took ample revenge, by plundering all within their reach who acknowledged the English authority.

Colonel Keating's instructions were far from precise, but almost exclusively of a military nature. The object of the expedition which he was appointed to command was briefly stated; he was sent, according to the words, "for the assistance of Rugoba against all his enemies, the ministerial party and their adherents; to move with his army, and to do everything for bringing the war to a speedy and happy issue, that he (Rugoba) may desire, and which he (Colonel Keating) may think the force under his command able to effect." Strict discipline among his troops, and particular attention to the prejudices of the natives; regular and constant information, both of his own proceedings, and of the views, expectations, and designs of their

ally, were the leading points particularly enjoined by government.

Colonel Keating was not authorized to act in any political capacity beyond the tenor of these orders; but, from an injudicious and excessive zeal, often as prejudicial to the public service as its opposite defect, he was ambitious of distinguishing himself as a politician, and entered into a correspondence with Futih Sing, shortly after he landed at Cambay, for the purpose of detaching him from the ministerial party, by persuading him that it was for his benefit. But those who do not perceive their real interest before it is pointed out by an enemy, are not likely to be convinced by mere reasoning. Colonel Keating had no personal knowledge of Futih Sing, no direct overtures had been made, and the British detachment had as yet gained neither advantage nor reputation. Nothing under these circumstances was to be expected from negotiating, especially with a Mahratta, but humiliation and disappointment. Before quitting Cambay, Colonel Keating's detachment was reinforced by the arrival of two companies of European grenadiers, and one battalion of sepoys, from Madras, which made up the stipulated complement of 2,500 men. On the 19th of April the

April 19.

detachment formed a junction with the fugitive army of Rugoba at the village of Durmuj, eleven miles north-east from Cambay, where Rugoba's late followers assembled, principally, it would appear, in hopes of receiving their arrears. Mannajee Phakray and Sukaram Hurry were officers of reputation, and faithful to Rugoba's cause; but their own followers, amounting to 6,000 or 8,000, were without pay, mutinous and clamorous: the whole multitude which assembled in their camp, estimated at upwards of 20,000 men, were worse than useless.

Colonel Keating, pleased with the formidable spectacle which the tents, and flags, and crowd of a Mahratta camp present, congratulated himself and the presidency on their prospects, but in the same despatch earnestly solicits a supply of treasure, and informs the government of his having advanced what he could from his military chest, that the spirit of *such* an army might not be damped.

The ministerial party had succeeded in detaching Khundee Rao Gaekwar from the cause of Rugoba, but were considerably weakened by the return of Holkar and Sindia, with about 12,000 horse, to Malwa, for reasons which are nowhere satisfactorily shown. Rugoba's party interpreted their departure as a secession in his favour, and it probably did proceed, on the part of Sindia, from his being called upon by Sukaram Bappoo to account for arrears due to the Peishwa—a circumstance to which may be attributed the enmity which subsisted between Mahadajee Sindia and Sukaram even after this period, but could have occasioned no material alteration in Sindia's policy, as both Sindia and Holkar were at Poona a few months afterwards.

It was, however, confidently asserted by Rugoba's party that Sindia intended to join them, and that Holkar would never act against Mahadajee Sindia. The whole army under Hurry Punt, when joined by Futih Sing, amounted to about 25,000 men, of which 5,000 were infantry. Hurry Punt, in permitting the crowd to assemble about Rugoba at such a distance from the capital, after the season when the revenues were collected, and when the rains might be expected in the course of six weeks, acted more judiciously than if he had harassed his own troops to prevent the junction of his enemies.

On the 23rd of April, the army of Rugoba, the strength of which lay in the British detachment, moved from Durmuj to Wursura, and from thence to the Sabürmattee. They then moved northward towards Kaira, but did not reach Mahtur, a village 30 miles north of Cambay, until the 3rd May.

This inactivity, in the first instance, was unavoidable; the reinforcements had not arrived, and the commissariat of the Bombay troops was extremely defective; the delay in advancing was attributed to the numerous carts, baggage, and bazar; but, no doubt, was partly owing to the want of arrangement on the part of the commanding officer; and, above all, to the indecision of Rugoba, who was inclined to proceed to Ahmedabad and remain in Guzèrat during the monsoon; but the Bombay government disapproved of this intention, and strongly recommended him to push on to Poona at once.

Before the army arrived at Mahtur, they had two partial actions with Hurry Punt; the first took place on the 28th April, at the village of Ussaumlée, and was entirely maintained by the English detachment, with very trifling loss; the second was four days afterwards, when 50 or 60 of Rugoba's army were killed or wounded—a loss which dispirited them ever after; but the enemy experienced a much greater, having made an attempt on the left of the English line, where they met with a severe repulse.

Colonel Keating, at length, by positive orders from Bombay, prevailed on Rugoba to change the direction of his route, and proceed towards Poona. They accordingly moved on the 5th; and before they reached Neriad, on the 8th, were again twice opposed—once in the mode usual for Mahratta horse, and a second time in the same manner.

but supported by some pieces of cannon. As Neriad was a considerable town in possession of Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Rugoba, to punish his defection, and administer to his own necessities, imposed a contribution of 60,000 rupees : but, after wasting one week, he could only collect 40,000. On the 14th the army crept forward three miles further to the westward, and expected to have a decisive action at the Myhie ; as it was known in the Mahratta camp that Hurry Punt Phurkay had received orders from Poona to attack Rugoba in case he should attempt to pass that river.

Colonel Keating, in the meantime, had continued his correspondence with Futih Sing Gaekwar ; and although aware that it had been discovered by Hurry Punt Phurkay from the first, he still persuaded himself that he should be able to bring over Futih Sing. He even entered into a treaty on the 22nd April, secret as he supposed, and as Futih Sing pretended ; and Colonel Keating was so credulous as to send an agent, Lieutenant George Lovibond, to the camp of Futih Sing, for the purpose of having it ratified. The agent was very grossly insulted, and the mission must have furnished a subject for ridicule in every Mahratta Kutha and Ukhbar* of the day. But Colonel Keating knew so little of the people as to be insensible of the derision to which his notable diplomacy exposed him. The circumstances of the mission are too characteristic to be passed over. The agent, attended by the wukeel of Futih Sing, was carried to the camp of Hurry Punt ; and, on expressing his surprise at being brought there, was merely told by the wukeel that his master had joined. During the evening some inferior people about Hurry Punt

* Ukhbars are native newspapers ; for an explanation of Kuthas, the reader may refer to page 17.

and Futih Sing were sent to visit the British envoy. Early next morning the wukeel told Mr. Lovibond that a tent was pitched for his reception, where he must meet Futih Sing and his dewan to execute the treaty. In this tent he was kept the whole day, not without expressing his impatience; but Mr. Lovibond, by not bursting into a passion, which would be expected in a European, probably disappointed them of half their mirth. At last, at 5 o'clock in the evening, a single horseman rode up to the door of the tent, and desired the gentleman to follow the army to Dubhaun. On his complying, the palanquin in which he travelled was surrounded by a party of Hurry Punt's horse, and he was thus exposed as a prisoner to their whole army. At this time the wukeel coming up, with much seeming concern, confirmed the truth of his being a prisoner, and earnestly begged of him to save his master by destroying the treaty and his other credentials. The good-natured Englishman contrived to do this most effectually, and, after the horsemen had brought him to the middle of Futih Sing's camp bazar, they rode off, and there left him. The wukeel immediately urged him not to lose an opportunity so favourable, but to follow him. He was then carried to the tent of the dewan, where, after one hour, came Futih Sing himself. He expressed great gratitude for the precaution Mr. Lovibond had taken in his favour by destroying the treaty, which he begged to excuse himself from renewing at that time, owing to the vigilance of Hurry Punt and the other great officers, but that he would soon be able to elude their jealousy, and make his escape to Baroda.* The envoy of Colonel Keating, after having thus furnished subject for what would, if well told, occasion as much laughter to Mahrattas as the story of the sleeper

* Mr. Lovibond's letter to Colonel Keating is on the Bombay Records.

awakened among Arabs, was escorted back to the British camp. There are certain kinds of ridicule which are peculiarly national, and the full force of this imposture, practised by two personages in such high authority as Futih Sing and Hurry Punt Phurkay, would probably, from its seeming puerility, be at that time little understood, except by Mahrattas; but the Bombay government, in their judgment, disapproved of Colonel Keating's proceedings, and ordered Mr. Mostyn to join his army for the purpose of transacting its political affairs. The troops, however, had advanced too far from Cambay, through a hostile country, to enable Mr. Mostyn to overtake them.

The army, after passing Neriad, continued their march towards the Myhie, and arrived at Nappar on the 17th.

May 17. From Neriad their route lay through a highly cultivated country, along a narrow, deep, sandy road, which only admits one cart abreast, being enclosed on both sides by high milk-bush hedges. Numerous topes, or groves, appear in every direction; the country on both sides is generally a succession of enclosed fields, the borders of which are lined by stately trees, such as the mountain neem, the tamarind, the moura, and the mango. Guzerat, from Barreah and Godra, to Kattywar, is in general a perfect flat; between Neriad and Myhie there are a few undulations, which add considerably to the beauty of the country, but tend to obstruct the progress of an army by confining the line of wheeled carriage to the narrow road just described. After passing Nappar about a mile and a half, the country opens on a fine plain, interspersed with trees, extending from Arass to near the banks of the river, which are full of extensive and deep ravines.

Rugoba's horse, after their first skirmish on leaving

Cambay, instead of acting on the flanks, and guarding the baggage, used constantly to intermix with it, and, with the characteristic feeling of Mahrattas depressed by previous discomfiture, on occasions of the smallest danger crowded for safety towards the British detachment. Colonel Keating, at Rugoba's request, in order to give them a little confidence, had formed two guards, consisting each of 200 rank and file, 100 Europeans, and 100 native infantry, supported by two guns. One of these guards was posted in the rear, and one on the reverse flank of the whole army; the front and rear of the British detachment were composed of European grenadiers; and the orders were, that in case of an attack on the flank, the rear-guard should move to its support, whilst the division of grenadiers occupied their place; but in case the attack should be made on the rear-guard, the division of grenadiers should fall back and join it.

On the morning of the 18th May, when marching in
this order towards the Myhie, about a mile
May 18. and a half from Nappar, a smart canno-
nade from six guns suddenly opened on their rear from
behind a grove on the left side of the road, where a large
body of the enemy were advancing. Colonel Keating
immediately halted the line, rode back, found Captain
Myers, who commanded the division of grenadiers, moving
according to the instructions, and having ordered down
another gun and a howitzer, soon silenced the artillery of
the enemy, and drove back the advancing body. Two of
the enemy's cannon were not withdrawn with the rest, and
Captain Myers, with some of the other officers, proposed
"having a dash at their guns;" to which Colonel Keating
assented, and sent for the other company of grenadiers.
The object of attack was in an enclosed field, the road to

which was of the same kind as that already described, between two high milk-bush hedges. As soon as both companies of grenadiers were formed with the rear-guard, they were directed to advance with order and regularity—an injunction which Colonel Keating found it necessary to repeat; Captain Myers, however, again quickened his pace, until he got near the guns. He then halted, and had just formed for the attack, when a body of the enemy's horse charged him; but being supported by the artillery, which Colonel Keating directed in person, they were driven back with great slaughter. The division had re-formed to prosecute their object, when another charge, more desperate than the first, was again made and repulsed, though many of the grenadiers were cut down, and, among the rest, the gallant captains, Myers and Serle. This was certainly the crisis which generally gains or loses an action; Colonel Keating performed the duty of a good captain of artillery, but, as a commander, he neglected to support his exhausted men with fresh troops. The Mah-rattas took advantage of the oversight, placed two elephants to block up the narrow road, and, being encouraged by a treacherous carcoon in Rugoba's army, charged the rear of the division, thus completely cut off from the main body. But the troops, as yet undismayed, facing about, attacked and routed them. By this time a body of Arabs and Sindians in Rugoba's army were advancing in their irregular manner, and Rugoba's horse, by careering about between the advanced body and the British line, occasioned infinite confusion, and could scarcely be distinguished from the enemy, who, for a moment, seemed to have relinquished the attack; when, suddenly, one of the companies of European grenadiers, without any apparent reason, went to the right-about, and retreated at a quick

pace; this retrograde movement, as was afterwards discovered by a court of inquiry, was partly the fault of their officer, whose word of command to face to the right, for the purpose of retiring, was mistaken for "right about face." Without orders from Colonel Keating, the retreat was, at all events, inexcusable, and, as might have been expected, was attended with disastrous consequences. The sepoy immediately fancied themselves defeated, they also turned, and the rest of the Europeans followed their example. Some order was preserved until they gained the milk-bush hedges, when, in spite of all the exertions of their officers, they broke their ranks, and ran towards the line in the greatest confusion, whilst the enemy came amongst them, sword in hand, and made a great slaughter. Colonel Keating in vain attempted to rally the grenadiers; those men who had a few minutes before fought with all the ardour and constancy of British troops, now fled disgracefully; but the support of the line, and the fire of the whole artillery, within 40 yards, again drove back the Mahrattas, who finally sustained a severe defeat. Such was the battle of Arass; and, notwithstanding the circumstances attending it, which are related principally from the candid narrative of Colonel Keating, it is a victory recorded by the best of testimony, the enemy, in terms highly creditable.* But it was dearly purchased. The loss on the part of Colonel Keating's detachment amounted to 222 men, of whom 86 were Europeans, and 11 of them officers.†

* Mahratta MSS.

† The officers killed were Captains Myers and Serle; Lieutenants Morris, Henry, Prosser, Anderson, and Young.

The officers wounded were Captain Frith, Lieutenant Dawson, and Ensigns Danon and Torin. Rugoba's Arabs were also severe sufferers, but they wreaked their vengeance on the treacherous carcoon, whom they seized, and, contrary to Rugoba's express orders, put him to instant death, by literally cutting him in pieces with their swords.

Colonel Keating arrived at Baroach on the 29th May, where he deposited his wounded. On the
May 29. 8th June he again marched, intending to
June 8. cross the Nerbuddah ; but as the proposed
ford was found impracticable, the army on the 10th moved
June 10. up the river towards Bowpeer. After a
march of about 20 miles, at five o'clock in
the evening, Colonel Keating received intelligence that
Hurry Punt was still on the north side of the river, about
eight or ten miles further on. Having now less respect for
his enemy, and having found the simple secret in Mahratta
warfare of always being the first to attack, Colonel Keating
resolved on moving forward, as soon as he had allowed his
men some refreshment. Accordingly, he was again in
motion before one o'clock in the morning ; but the troops
of Rugoba, like their ill-omened master, whose presence
seemed to blight the fairest prospect in every affair in
which he was engaged, on this occasion, for the first time
since their former slight check, stimulated by the hope of
plunder, and elated by having received a little pay, part of
a lakh of rupees advanced to Rugoba by the Baroach
factory, showed an inclination to advance, crowded the
road, broke through Colonel Keating's line of march in
several places, and at last obliged him to halt till daylight.
The enemy, therefore, saw him long before he could get
near, struck their camp in the greatest confusion, threw
their guns into the river, sent their heavy baggage across
the Nerbuddah, and retreated along the north bank with
the loss of an elephant and few camels, which were
plundered by Rugoba's horse.

Colonel Keating's intention of proceeding to the south-
ward, according to repeated orders from Bombay,
was now set aside, for many judicious military reasons

urged by Rugoba, of which the presidency afterwards approved; and it was therefore determined to retire to Dubhoy, 19 miles south-east of Baroda, whilst Rugoba's troops were encamped at Bheelapoor, a village on the Dadhur, between these places.

Colonel Keating then proposed to the Bombay Government, at the repeated solicitation of Govind Rao Gaekwar, to reduce Baroda as soon as the violence of the monsoon abated, to which they assented. In the meantime preparations were in progress at the presidency for the purpose of reinforcing Colonel Keating's detachment, replenishing their ammunition, and completing their stores.

Futih Singh was now in earnest in his desire to enter into a treaty; and Colonel Keating, foreseeing more advantage to the cause by admitting his overtures than by reducing him, recommended to Rugoba the conclusion of such an agreement as might reconcile Govind Rao to the measure, secure the alliance of Futih Sing, and insure relief to Rugoba's urgent necessities by a supply of treasure.

Futih Singh agreed to furnish 3,000 horse, to be at all times kept at Rugoba's service; but, if required, 2,000 more were to be provided, for which pay was to be allowed: a jagheer of three lakhs, which Futih Singh, by his agreement with Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was bound to reserve in Guzerat for his brother Govind Rao, was no longer to be required; but, in lieu of it, Rugonath Rao agreed to bestow a jagheer of ten lakhs on Govind Rao Gaekwar in the Deccan. Twenty-six lakhs of rupees were to be paid to Rugoba in 61 days; and the East India Company, as guaranties and negotiators between the parties, were to receive the Gaekwar's share of the revenue in Baroach, and several villages in perpetuity, estimated at (2,13,000) two lakhs and thirteen thousand rupees.

This pacification, effected through Colonel Keating's management, was, as circumstances then stood, politic; for, although Govind Rao afterwards seceded from the agreement, he declared himself satisfied at the time.*

The war, thus waged in Guzerat, was also prosecuted

* From Colonel Keating's reports to the Bombay government, which are my chief authority for the above, it is evident that there must have been considerable modifications in the treaty of which the following production is the only copy that I have found either in English or Mahratta. It is, however, from very high authority, being an enclosure of a letter of 30th January 1802 from Mr. Jonathan Duncan, when governor of Bombay, to Sir Barry Close, resident at Poona.

"Translate of the copy of the treaty between Rugonath Bajee Rao Pundit Purdan on one part, and Futti Sing and Seajee Rao Shumsher Buhadur on the other part.

That Seajee and Futti Sing Shumsher Buhadur had disobeyed and joined with the rebels, but now by the means of Colonel Thomas Keating, for and in behalf of the united English East India Company, have, by promising presents, accommodated matters with Pundit Purdan, the following are the articles of the Gaekwar's proposals. :—

Article I.—That Seajee and Futti Sing Gaekwar Shumsher Buhadur, do hereby agree to pay the sum of eight lakhs of rupees every year to the Sircar.

II. That they are to attend, as usual with a troop of 3,000 good horse and men, which number is not to be lessened.

III. In the late Madoo Rao's time they used to pay every year three lakhs of rupees to Govind Rao Gaekwar Sena Keskel Shumsher Buhadur, which sum is settled not to be paid him in future, about which Govind Rao is to make no claim against Seajee and Futti Sing.

IV. Conde Rao Gaekwar Hemut Buhadur is to be continued on the same footing, and agreeable to the agreement made in the time of the late Damajee, deceased.

V. That the government and revenue of the purgunnahs of Baroach have been wholly ceded to the company, agreeable to the agreement made between them and Sreemunt Pundit Purdan, about which Seajee and Futti Sing are not to make any dispute.

VI. The purgunnahs Chickaly Veriow, near Surat, and Coral, near the Nerbuddah river, and about 15 coss distant from Baroach, which together make three purgunnahs, the Gaekwar has ceded to the honorable company for ever, on account of the peace they have made between the Gaekwar and Sreemunt Punt Purdan.

VII. That in the court of Sreemunt Punt Purdan the Gaekwar must pay a due attention to everything that is reasonable, without having any communication with its enemies.

VIII. That for the confirmation and compliance of the above articles, the honorable company stand security, and should the Gaekwars appear any way false, the honorable company is not to protect them. Rugoba is also to fulfil the above articles without any difference.

by sea. The Mahratta navy in the ministerial interest, at the commencement of the war, consisted of six ships—one of 46 guns, one of 38, one of 32, and two of 26 guns, with 10 armed vessels, mounting each from two to nine guns, besides swivels. This fleet was met at sea by Commodore John Moor in the *Revenge*, frigate, and the *Bombay*, grab. Though the Mahrattas were formidable in appearance, the commodore stood down to attack them, when they bore away with all sail set; but having singled out their largest ship, the *Shumsher Jung*, of 46 guns, both the English vessels gave her chase, and at last the grab, being an excellent sailer, brought her to action. The *Revenge* came up to the assistance of the *Bombay*, and, after an engagement of three hours, the *Shumsher Jung* blew up, her commander, with most of the crew, perished, and the ship was totally destroyed.

On the side of Rugoba everything seemed favourable; elated by the successful exertions of his allies, he presented the company with the permanent cession of the valuable districts of Hansot and Amod, then estimated at 2,77,000 rupees of annual revenue. The whole amount acquired by the war, including cessions by Futih Sing, was valued at 24,15,000 rupees, of all which the Bombay government had obtained possession, excepting Bassein and its dependencies.

The state of the young Peishwa's affairs wore an aspect proportionally unpromising. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after the surprise at Bowpeer, left Gunnessh Punt Beeray in command of a detachment for the protection of Ahmedabad and returned to the Deccan by a ford about 100 miles above where his heavy baggage had crossed. Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees were much disheartened in consequence of his defeat, and dreaded the consequences

which generally follow disaster in India, by the defection of allies. Moodajee Bhonslay had, a few months before, prevailed over his brother Sabajee ; and although, whilst Rugonath Rao was a fugitive in Guzerat, the former had solicited and obtained, through Nana Furnuwees, from the young Peishwa, a confirmation of the rights and honors of Sena Sahib Soobeh for his son Rughoojee, together with such privileges for himself as pertained to the guardianship, yet the ministers were apprehensive that the rising fortunes of Rugoba would ensure him the support of the raja of Berar. Several men of consequence already began to turn their eyes on Rugoba ; and Nizam Ally, in hopes of being able to exact something additional from the one party or the other, or at least to retain what he had already recovered, opened a negotiation with Rugoba, which greatly alarmed the ministers, especially as the death of Rookun-ud-Dowlah, happening about this period, obstructed their former correct intelligence of his master's real designs. Nizam Ally augmented their uncertainty by pretending to disbelieve the truth of Mahdoo Rao Narain's legitimacy, and by proposing, as a conciliatory measure to all parties, that Amrut Rao, the adopted son of Rugonath Rao, should be made Peishwa. By this means Nizam Ally exacted a further cession from the ministers of nearly 18 lakhs of rupees* of annual revenue. Great promises were also made to Sindia and Holkar ; nor did any sacrifice that could ensure the exclusion of Rugoba appear too great to the ruling Bramins at Poona. The cause of Rugoba was extremely unpopular ; of the generality of the Bramins in Poona, even those who were disposed to acquit him of the atrocity of having conspired against the life of his nephew,

* He obtained rupees 17,84,576-8-0. (State accounts, Poona Records.)

remembered with indignation the criminal opposition he had always shown to the wise and virtuous Mahdoo Rao ; they reflected with regret on his losses to the state, and on the unfortunate issue of all his measures ; the weakness and folly of his whole conduct they viewed with contempt ; and his present connection with the usurping and impure Europeans they regarded with jealousy and detestation. Others, and such were probably the majority of the Mahratta nation, true to no party, and guided by no principle, hitherto considered Rugoba as an unfortunate person, with whom it was unwise to be connected ; but the defeat of Hurry Punt, the subsequent discomfiture of his deputy Gunnessh Punt by Ameen Khan, an officer of Rugoba, the siege of Ahmedabad carried on by the same officer, the preparations of the English, the doubts of the young Peishwa's legitimacy, and the desire of many of the Mahratta chiefs to become independent of the Bramin ministry, occasioned a revolution in the opinions of many, and an anxiety in the minds of all. In short, such was at this period the state of the Mahratta country, that it is generally believed that any success of equal importance to that at Arass, on the opening of the expected campaign, would have brought the ministry into the terms of Rugonath Rao ; and as the fact of Mahdoo Rao Narain's legitimacy would have been proved to the satisfaction of the English, Rugoba appeared certain of being established as regent. But fortune was preparing a change far different from such a prospect.

CHAP. III.

FROM A. D. 1774 TO A. D. 1778.

The supreme council in Bengal assume the powers of general administration.—Correspondence with Bombay relative to their late proceedings—disapprove of the connection with Rugoba.—Death of Sabajee Bhonslay—Violent condemnation of the Bombay measures—peremptory orders in consequence.—Lieutenant-Colonel Upton despatched to Poona as envoy plenipotentiary.—Remonstrances of the Bombay government—they vindicate their conduct—their belief in Rugoba's innocence accounted for.—Reflections on the precipitate interference of the supreme government—evils of which it was the cause.—Mr. Hastings' opinion—letter to Sukaram Bappoo.—Colonel Upton's negotiation broken off—proceedings at Bengal on receipt of this intelligence.—The ministers in the meantime sign the treaty of Poorundhur—its conditions—disappointment and indignation of the Bombay government.—Offers of Rugoba—reprehensible conduct of the Bombay government.—Insurrection of the impostor Suddaba.—The Bombay measures approved by the Court of Directors—resolution in consequence—dissent of Mr. Draper—motives which appear to have actuated the Directors.—Progress of Suddaba—defeat—seizure—and execution.—Colonel Upton recalled.—Mr. Mostyn re-appointed resident.—Evasive conduct of the ministry.—An agent of the French government is received

with distinction at Poona.—The Concan restored to order.—Conquests of Hyder.—Retrospective view of the history of Kolapoor—depredations and piracies.—Progress of Hyder.—Successful artifice of Hurry Punt Phurkay.—Death of Ram Raja, and of the Pritee Needhee.—Affairs of Moodajee Bhonslay—and of Futih Sing Gaekwar.—The son of Trimbuckjee Raja Bhonslay is selected as raja of Satara.—Curious artifice of the Bramins with regard to the intermarriage of the imprisoned rajas.

THE supreme council in Bengal assumed the powers of general administration in the affairs of
 A. D. 1774. British India on the 20th October 1774 ; and during the ensuing month addressed a letter to the Bombay government, requiring an account of the state of that presidency. This letter was received at Bombay on the 7th December ; but as the president and members were then in the midst of preparations for the expedition to Salsette, they deferred the consideration of the Bengal letter until after the troops had proceeded on their destination, and sent no reply until the last day of the year.

Three months afterwards, or on the 31st March, the Bombay government further reported to Bengal their proceedings up to that date. But early in February intelligence of the siege of Tannah reached the governor-general in council, by the way of Tellicherry and Madras, before they received the reply from Bombay of the 31st December. The delay on the part of the Bombay government, certainly, to say the least, wore the semblance of a premeditated evasion, and, as new authority is generally tenacious, the governor-general and council addressed another letter on the
 A. D. 1775. 3rd February, censuring the Bombay presidency for

having gone to war with the Mahrattas, and peremptorily requiring immediate and special information of the causes and motives of their conduct. On the 21st May the Bombay government received the reply to their first letter of the 31st December, wherein the supreme government offered no opinion respecting the capture of Salsette, but disapproved of the intention of joining Rugoba, not because Rugoba was making war against his lawful prince, and was generally obnoxious in the Mahratta country, or because the Bombay government had unjustly espoused the cause of a man branded with the crime of murder—circumstances of which the Bombay government, it is justice to them to say, were never well informed, and of which the supreme government were ignorant—but they disapproved, because, to use their own words, “it was inconsistent with your negotiations with the ruling powers at Poona, and with the authority of this government.” They also expressed apprehensions that the measure might involve them in hostilities with Sabajee Bhonslay, the enemy of Rugoba, and their neighbour. To which the Bombay government replied that they neither have, nor ever had, any negotiations with the ministry at Poona, and that they need be under no apprehension in regard to Sabajee Bhonslay, as he had been killed in action by Moodajee, the friend of Rugoba, who was now the acknowledged guardian of Rughoojee, and the ruler of Berar; all which was perfectly true,—victory had declared for Sabajee; Moodajee was surrounded by his brother’s troops, and on the point of being made prisoner, when Sabajee, in the exultation of the moment, drove his elephant up to that on which Moodajee was riding, and called out to him to submit. Moodajee replied by the discharge of a pistol, which laid his brother dead, and left

him undisputed regent and guardian of the young Raghoojee, who, it will be remembered, was his son.*

To the report of their proceedings up to the 31st March, the Bombay government, on the 12th August, received a reply from Bengal dated on the 31st May. Long before that time the minds of the president and members of the supreme government were in a state of strong excitement, caused by those well-known controversies between Warren Hastings and his council, which afterwards occupied so much of the time and attention of the British Parliament. But on the present occasion, president and members united in a violent condemnation of the Bombay measures; they declared the treaty with Rugoba invalid, and the Mahratta war "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust;" they protested against the Bombay government for all consequences, and peremptorily required them "to withdraw their forces to their own garrisons, in whatsoever state their affairs might be, unless their safety should be endangered by an instant retreat." The governor-general and council also intimated their intention of sending an agent of their own to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Mahratta state, and desired the Bombay government to retain possession of Salsette and Bassein, but on no account to form any treaty without their previous sanction.

The Bombay government stated, in reply, that the negotiations, which led to the measures thus hastily condemned, had been begun before the controlling administration was formed; they defended their conduct on the grounds of the necessity of determining with promptitude,

* Mahratta MSS. Where I do not expressly acknowledge my authorities from A. D. 1774 to 1783, I beg the reader to understand that I write from the records of the Bombay government.

and recapitulated their reasons for deciding and acting in the manner they had done; pointed out the evils prevented by the capture of Salsette, and the fair and honorable advantages secured to their employers and their country by the treaty with Rugonath Rao. They dwelt on the shame and degradation which must be the consequence of retracting a solemn treaty in support of an object equally just and practicable, and pledged themselves, on their own responsibility, to fulfil their engagements. They sent Mr. William Tayler, a member of their council, to Bengal, who advocated their cause with much ability; and his report on Bombay affairs, dated 9th October 1775, displays, at that early period, a very considerable knowledge of the history and character of the Mahrattas.

The supreme government, however, adhered to their opinion of the expediency of the orders which they had transmitted. Lieutenant-Colonel John Upton, of the Bengal establishment, was selected by Mr. Hastings as envoy plenipotentiary, and instructed to repair to Poona, and conclude a treaty between the Mahratta state and the Bombay government. The president and council of that establishment, being excluded from all participation, strongly remonstrated against this proceeding as a wanton degradation of their authority, and their representations were supported with energy by their deputy at Bengal. "I trust," says Mr. Tayler, "that it will appear to your Honors, &c., that at the time it pleased the wisdom of Parliament to arm you with controlling powers over the presidencies, it was by no means their intention that they should appear so much degraded, and so contemptible in the eyes of the native government, as the presidency of Bombay must be unless you will commit the treaty of peace to their management.

“Our honorable employers, and the whole British nation, may be naturally led to suppose that, in your opinion, the members of that government are devoid, in every degree, of integrity and abilities, which would be the most cruel and unjust of all imputations; for I can dare to affirm, not a person who concluded that treaty was actuated by any other motive than their obedience and duty to their employers, whose interests appeared to them to be most materially benefited by their engagements.”

Such was the language then held by the Bombay government, with apparent sincerity as well as spirit, and, as far as we have yet retailed of their conduct and prospects, certainly with no inconsiderable degree of reason. It must be recollected that the president and members, throughout the whole of the rise and progress of their connection with Rugoba, were strongly impressed with the belief of his being innocent of the murder of his nephew. Many of our countrymen, who, by long residence in the Deccan, have become acquainted with the notoriety of the fact, although perhaps represented with exaggeration, have, from this circumstance alone, entertained strong doubts of the integrity of Mr. Hornby and his council; and some inveigh, with a feeling far from reprehensible, against Englishmen who could seek by such an instrument to attain their ends and gratify their ambition. But to account for this belief on the part of the Bombay government, it is necessary to state that Sukaram Bapoo was originally concerned in Rugoba's conspiracy against the liberty, though not the life, of Narain Rao. After the murder, as it was deemed by the ministers generally—a measure of prudence to affect a disbelief of Rugonath Rao's participation—of course Sukaram Bappoo had stronger reasons than any of them for professing that

opinion. It was this impression, from the reports first circulated at Poona, which the members of the Bombay government received from their envoy, Mr. Mostyn; and before it was possible for them to ascertain the real circumstances, they were engaged as a party hostile to the ministers, when it was as much the interest of the one to uphold Rugoba's innocence, as it was of the other to aggravate his guilt. Parties so influenced diverge from the truth in all countries, more especially in India, where an evidence is so apt to suit the word to the wish of his auditor. The same reasons operated in creating a belief that the child named Mahdoo Rao Narain was supposititious.

The Bengal presidency, where they had Mahratta connections, received their first information through the government of Sabajee Bhonslay, a partizan of the ministers. They were also, no doubt, irritated at the neglect of their orders, and the apparent contempt of their authority; and as we find men, in all situations, too often influenced by their feelings when they should be guided only by their judgment, we may suppose that they saw, in their full force, the evils of inordinate ambition, and the wisdom of that Parliament which had so opportunely vested them with power to control such an unjustifiable enterprize by interposing in behalf of justice and moderation. The clause in the Act of Parliament was not sufficiently specific; the intention of establishing a uniform plan of action with respect to peace and war required, at a distance so remote as India from England, the strongest authority in the supreme council; but, as their powers were not clearly defined, the members of government should have perceived that a firm but calm exercise of power for a long period was the best way of establishing

an efficient control, unless they could obtain an amendment of the statute. But they violently stretched their power in support of what they deemed propriety, and issued mandates characteristic of an inexperienced and arbitrary government, which, to gratify temporary resentments, or forward its impatient selfish will, weakens much more than it strengthens the efficiency of distant authority.

Mr. Hornby and his council were not blameless, even in what has already been mentioned, and their subsequent conduct accelerated rather than averted the misfortunes which ensued. But the precipitate interference of the governor-general and council was attended by effects pernicious to the interests of their country—effects which, but for the weak government of France, might, together with the loss of the American colonies, have proved a fatal blow to Great Britain. Confining reflections, however, to the boundary of Maharashtra, suffice it to say that it depressed the Bombay presidency, lowered its political importance, and obstructed that advancement and prosperity which, from its situation and maritime advantages, it would otherwise naturally have attained; it immediately tended to strengthen the hands of the ministers at Poorundhur, and it ultimately cemented the tottering confederacy of the Mahrattas, under the administration of Nana Furnuwees.

The president and council of Bombay, on receiving the Bengal order of the 31st May, directed an immediate cessation of hostilities; and as soon as the roads permitted, Colonel Keating, accompanied by Rugoba, returned towards Surat. But instead of strictly retiring within the company's districts, Colonel Keating, on the earnest recommendation of Rugoba, was permitted by the Bombay government to encamp at Karod, a village about 25 miles

east of Surat, which, although a deviation from the orders of the supreme government, was afterwards acknowledged as a useful support in facilitating their negotiations at Poorundhur, at which place Colonel Upton arrived on the 28th December.

Mr. Hastings was sensible that the condemnation of the Bombay measures was unnecessarily violent, but he had been one of the first to recommend a controlling authority in India, which, in that remote empire, considered of itself, was an object in the highest degree important. The mandate issued was now irrevocable; Sukaram Bappoo had been informed, by a letter from the governor-general, that the conduct of the Bombay government was contrary to the company's order, "because they have directed all their officers not to make any war, nor enter on any dispute. My employer, the king of England," says the governor-general, "has directed that all the company's governors in India should obtain mine and my council's permission, as king's governor and council of Bengal, either to make war or peace." In short, that he had therefore issued orders to desist from hostilities, requested of the ministers to do the same, and intimated his intention of sending an envoy to negotiate a peace. If the governor-general of British India had then said "to dictate a peace," and shown a determination to maintain that ground, however bold the words may sound, he would probably, at that moment, have succeeded with Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees.

After the despatch of the first letters, the supreme government, even for the sake of consistency, would have been obliged to regulate their future measures by the tenor of those orders. Advices having been received of the successes in Guzerat, it seemed not improbable that a

revolution might have taken place before Colonel Upton's arrival at Poona. Adopting, therefore, the same equitable principle with which they had professed to set out, that a substantive state has a right to make any change in its internal government which only affects itself, the envoy was instructed to negotiate a peace with either party whom he might find the acknowledged authority in the empire. But the governor-general and council had in effect already become parties; and the members of the Bombay government who felt and wrote as if the supreme government had ranged themselves on the side of their enemies, remark, with some justice, in one of their despatches to the Court of Directors, "they have acknowledged the legitimacy of the government of the ministers, before they could have any competent knowledge of the justice of their pretensions."

The ministers soon perceived the advantages thus placed in their hands; and as Bramins, in politics, A. D. 1776. misconstrue moderation, and attribute concession solely to fear, they assumed a high tone of demand and menace, which Colonel Upton, judging by himself, believed to be firm and sincere. The supreme government were under a mistake in imagining that Bassein as well as Salsette was in possession of the Bombay presidency. The envoy was enjoined to require the cession both of these and of the islands in Bombay harbour, and also of the Mahratta shares of revenue in the city of Baroach, with such other advantages for the company as circumstances might enable him to obtain.

Colonel Upton's correspondence bears ample testimony of sincerity and moderation; but he was ill-qualified to conduct a negotiation with Mahratta Bramins. The ministers greatly extolled the just and honorable motives which "had

determined the great governor of Calcutta to order peace to be concluded." But when Colonel Upton proposed retaining Salsette, &c., the cession of Bassein, and the revenues of Baroach, they affected to consider such an application as perfectly unauthorized, and pertinently asked the envoy, "how the Bengal government, who had so justly condemned the war, could yet be so ready to avail themselves of its advantages." The only reply to this was, that Salsette had been taken possession of as a precautionary measure, long deemed necessary to the safety of Bombay, and the prosperity of its commerce; but the ministers persisted in their language, and expressed a wish "that they had not, on a supposed confidence of the power of the governor of Calcutta over the people of Bombay, suspended hostilities, and thereby, at an enormous expense, maintained a vast army inactive, with which they should otherwise long since have settled the business." They demanded the immediate surrender of the delinquent Rugoba, and the entire restoration of the territory occupied by the Bombay government since the commencement of the war, on which they would, as a favour to the governor-general, agree to pay 12 lakhs of rupees, in order to reimburse the East India Company for the expenses incurred by the Bombay government. They seconded their arguments with threats, and mistook the mild remonstrances of the envoy for timidity. Colonel Upton, conceiving the negotiation at an end, expressed this opinion to the governor-general and council in a letter, dated 7th February, when they immediately determined to support the cause of Rugoba with the utmost vigour. They prepared troops for embarkation, ordered a large supply of treasure to be transmitted to Bombay, and directed troops to be sent from Madras. They wrote letters to Rugoba, to Nizam Ally,

and Hyder; and endeavoured, in the same manner, to induce Moodajee Bhonslay, Mahadajee Sindia, and Tookajee Holkar to embrace their cause, or at all events to engage their neutrality.

The favourable change in the sentiments of the Bengal government towards himself reached Rugoba almost as soon as it got to Bombay, and raised his spirits and expectations; but the ministers, almost immediately after they had carried their menaces to the highest pitch, acceded at once to the greater part of Colonel Upton's original demands, and, before accounts had time to reach Calcutta that the negotiation was broken off, the treaty of Poorundhur was settled. It was signed on the 1st March, and consisted of 19 articles, but two of them were afterwards erased by mutual consent, and an additional clause signed. The treaty was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton on the part of the company's government, and by Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees on that of the Peishwa's; but the titles of Rao Pundit Purdhan are only mentioned in the treaty, the name of the Peishwa having been omitted.

The substance of the articles was a general peace between the English East India Company and the Mahrattas. Salsette to be retained or restored at the pleasure of the governor-general and council; if restored, the Peishwa's government agreed to relinquish territory worth three lakhs of rupees of annual revenue as an equivalent. To this exchange the supreme government could not be expected to accede, although Nana Furnuwees afterwards pretended that it had been referred with perfect confidence as a question of equity, from a reliance upon the justice of Mr. Hastings. All claims on the revenue of the city of Baroach, together with territory in its neighbourhood, producing three lakhs of rupees, was ceded, as the treaty

states, "by way of friendship to the English Company." Twelve lakhs of rupees were also yielded in payment of the expenses incurred by the Bombay government. The cessions made by Futih Sing Gaekwar were to be restored to him, provided it could be proved that he had no authority to make such alienations without the consent of the Peishwa's government. The treaty between the Bombay government and Rugoba was formally annulled. The English troops to return to their garrisons, and the army of Rugoba to be disbanded within a month. A general amnesty to be proclaimed to all the followers of Rugoba, four only excepted, whom the ministers knew to be particularly implicated in the murder of Narain Rao. If Rugonath Rao should refuse to disband his army, the English agreed not to assist him. On condition of his assenting to the prescribed terms, the Peishwa and his ministers consented to afford him an establishment of 1,000 horse, to allow him 200 domestics, to be chosen by himself, and to pay him 25,000 rupees monthly for his other expenses, but his residence was fixed at Kopergaum on the Godavery. It was particularly specified that no assistance should be afforded to Rugonath Rao, or to any subject or servant of the Peishwa who should excite disturbance or rebellion in the Mahratta dominions. The treaties of 1739 and 1756, and all other agreements not suspended or dissolved by the present articles, were confirmed. It was mutually agreed to assist the crews and restore the wrecks and cargoes of vessels of the respective nations, thrown on each other's coasts.

Nothing could exceed the disappointment of the Bombay government when they learnt the terms of the treaty. They seemed to consider their own interest and dignity sacrificed to a jealous assumption of authority. They had

no power to protest, and could therefore only vent their indignation by entering dissents on their own records against almost every article, with the view of ultimately submitting their objections to the Court of Directors. They certainly had cause for irritation in the manner which their conduct had been condemned, and their power in a great degree suspended ; but they seem to have been determined to find objections, and even petulantly hinted that Colonel Upton must have been in bodily fear, or he never would have consented to terms so derogatory to the English nation : they, however, with more propriety, ask—“Who is this Rao Pundit Purdhan ? Why is his name omitted ? If Colonel Upton has had proof of the legitimacy of the child, said to be the son of Narain Rao, why is that circumstance left in doubt ? or if not proved, why is Rugonath Rao, the rightful Peishwa, wholly excluded” ?*

Rugoba could never entirely comprehend the nature of the interference on the part of the governor-general and council ; but under a supposition that it arose from their deeming the advantages he had granted inadequate, he proposed, not only to confirm the treaty of Surat by a new agreement with the Bengal government, but, with the single exception of Viziadroog (Gheriah), to cede the whole Concan, to put the company's troops in possession of one of the passes in the Ghauts, to purchase annually 10 lakhs of rupees' worth of their woollens and metals, at an advance of 15 per cent. on the prime cost, including all charges ; he also proposed that they should unite to subdue Nizam Ally ; and made several other offers, of

* Although the circumstance is nowhere explained by the Mahrattas, the omission, on the part of the ministers, of the name of Mahdoo Rao Narain, was most likely a precaution, as, in case of the child's death, it probably was their intention to get Gunga Bye to adopt a son.

which, as none could be accepted, a further enumeration is unnecessary, but one inducement was too remarkable to be passed over, as, with his Mahratta ideas, it must have appeared irresistible. Rugoba offered to cede 10 per cent. of all the jagheers in the Mahratta empire; including, of course, the Mahratta possessions in the Deccan, and those of Holkar, Sindia, and Gaekwar in Hindostan and Guzerat, which would have placed the East India Company, with respect to those jagheers, precisely on the footing of surdeshmookh.

Rugoba, on hearing of the terms stipulated for him by the treaty declared that he would rather maintain the war himself than submit to them. He pretended to have received overtures from Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, and Dhonsa,* one of the officers of Nizam Ally. Mahadajee Sindia had always sent the most friendly assurances to Rugoba, to which he was induced, partly from enmity to Sukaram Bappoo, but principally in order to preserve his own consequence, and place himself as umpire between the Bramin factions—a situation to which Mahadajee Sindia, with remarkable political sagacity, early aspired. After the terms of the treaty were promulgated, he continued an intercourse with Rugoba, not avowed, but sufficiently known to alarm the ministers. Rugoba, however, whatever he might pretend, was not deceived by these professions; none of his Indian allies afforded him any substantial aid, excepting Hyder, who sent him 80,000 rupees as a present.†

* The bye-name by which Ibrahim Beg Zafur-ud-Dowlah Sabit Jung was best known. Dhonsa is the Hindoostanee name for one of the drums usually carried by parties of horse.

† Large sums are said to have been sent by Hyder Ally to Rugoba, but except the 82,000 rupees above mentioned, no other money appears by the Bombay records to have been received, and it could hardly have escaped the vigilance of that government, at a time when they had the greatest difficulty in supplying even a pittance to Rugoba.

The Bombay government magnified everything that could tend to forward their own views, or verify their predictions. Instead of submitting as became them; instead of using every endeavour to give effect to the spirit of the orders from the supreme government, and to a solemn engagement under the constituted authorities of their country, every symptom of commotion, and every prospect of obstructing the treaty of Poorundhur, was hailed with a satisfaction which they had the caution not to express, but scarcely the decency to conceal.

An impostor, already mentioned, who had assumed the name of Sewdasheo Chimnaje, eight or nine years after the battle of Panniput, was made prisoner during the lifetime of Mahdoo Rao, and, after being confined in different places, was finally delivered over to the custody of Ramchunder Naik Paranspey, soobehdar of Rutnaguiry, in the Concan. Paranspey, perceiving the distracted state of affairs at Poona, the dissensions among the heads of the state, and the probability of attaining a sovereignty for himself, released his prisoner, and proclaimed him as Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, unjustly imprisoned by the traitorous ministers. The impostor is known to have been a Kanoja Bramin from Hindostan, a man of some abilities, and of the same caste as the famous Kuvée Kulus of Sumbhajee. His story obtained immediate credence, and the Bombay government, to whom he very soon sent wukeels and addressed letters, received the overtures of *Suddaba*, as they called him, with complacency, and were evidently hopeful that this fresh insurrection would work in their favour.

Rugoba from the date of the treaty, was allowed the space of one month to disband his army—a period which was afterwards prolonged; but perceiving that there was

no immediate chance of inducing the governor-general to assist him, he asked and obtained an asylum from the Bombay government in Surat, where he was admitted with merely his baggage and 200 domestics. From Surat he appealed to the Court of Directors, and, following the example of his brother, Ballajee Rao, addressed a letter to the king of England. Colonel Upton remonstrated against the breach of treaty occasioned by the protection afforded to Rugoba. The Bombay government declared it no breach of the treaty: they justified their conduct on a former letter from Bengal, dated in the preceding October, which permitted them to afford an asylum to Rugoba, in case his personal safety should be endangered; and they declared that nothing but absolute necessity should compel them to give up the unfortunate man to his persecutors; that Colonel Upton must know little of Asiatics in the situation of the ministers, if he was not aware that, until they had rid themselves of so just an object of dread, they would never consider themselves safe, and that common humanity, as well as the law of nations and good policy, dictated the propriety of what they had done, even if unsupported by authority from Bengal.

The army of Rugoba, before it disbanded, encamped, for a short time after the final period allowed had expired, close to Surat, waiting, as they said, for the payment of their arrears. Hurry Punt Phurkay, in a letter to Poona, intimated his intention of attacking them; but, from the position in which they were allowed to remain, he could not but apprehend that the English intended to support them. The Bombay government, on the plea of apprehending danger from the contiguity of the contending Mahratta armies, but in reality to await events, threw their field army into Surat and Baroach.

It was in vain that Colonel Upton complained, or the ministers threatened in consequence of these proceedings; the Bombay government paid little attention to the one, and they treated the other with scorn; they expressed their astonishment and surprise that the envoy of the British nation should suffer the Mahratta ministers to declare that they should be induced to follow the example of Hyder, who had secured a peace on terms very honorable to himself, and that, in case of a renewal of the war, they would carry fire and sword to every part of the company's possessions in India. Such a menace was indeed derogatory to the British character, and highly discreditable, not to Colonel Upton, but to those of his nation, who, by a perverse conduct, provoked the threat, and compelled their envoy to admit that the measures they pursued were not regulated in that spirit of good faith which should certainly have actuated them from the moment a treaty was concluded.

The language used in vindication of the protection afforded to Rugoba was specious. The measure had its supporters in the council at Bengal, but the majority condemned it, as well as the pernicious nature of the opposition which was practised by the Bombay government.

Mr. Hastings, although he ratified the act of his envoy, did not approve of the treaty of Poorundhur, as terms more suitable might have been obtained. Several of the articles were certainly far from specific, and the ministers afterwards took every opportunity, not merely of putting the most constrained interpretations on doubtful passages, but of contravening what they must have known was really intended, in the articles to which they had subscribed. The consequence was that, though hosti-

lities had had ceased, peace could not be considered as established.

Whilst affairs were in this unsettled state, a despatch was received at Bombay, on the 20th August, from the Court of Directors, dated 5th April 1776, in which they approved, "under every circumstance," of the treaty of Surat; and recommended that the Bombay government should retain possession of the districts ceded. It being likewise known that, prior to the date of that despatch, the Court of Directors had received information of Colonel Upton's being deputed to treat with the ministers, the president and council of Bombay at first came to a resolution of keeping possession of all such districts as were not given up. This determination was tantamount to a renewal of the war, and several of the members stating their belief that very great commotions were about to take place, in which their own safety would require them to bear an active part, expressed their satisfaction at having obtained this sanction to their measures, and recommended a vigorous prosecution of their former intentions. But Mr. Draper, who was not present at the first consultation, entered a dissent, which gave a different interpretation to the Court's despatch, and induced the government to alter their resolution. Mr. Draper was of opinion that the Court of Directors, only meant that they should retain possession whilst the negotiation by Colonel Upton was pending, but that, after a treaty was concluded, under the sanction of the governor-general and council, it could never be intended that the terms should not be exactly fulfilled.

The Court of Directors could not be insensible to the advantage of a supreme authority in India; but the control over themselves, established by the new Act of

Parliament, had not perhaps quite ceased its operation on their minds ; their feelings were enlisted against the innovation, and the natural bias, occasioned by a prospect of great advantages on the west of India from the treaty with Rugonath Rao, prevented their fully perceiving the dangerous tendency of supporting men in the situation of the Bombay government. They might have withdrawn censure from them, and condemned the precipitancy of the governor-general and council, but they should have supported constituted authority, and insisted on an adherence to one plan and one interest. The Court, by their approval of the first measures of the Bombay government, encouraged the members to persevere in their covert opposition, when the circumstances, by the conclusion of the treaty of Poorundhur, were entirely changed.

Before the opening of the season the pretended Suddaba was at the head of 20,000 men, and had got possession of upwards of 20 forts in the Concan. A very great proportion of the vulgar among the Mahratta population, with whom impostors of that description are always dangerous, believed that he was the real Séwdasheo Chimnajeo, and the Bombay government were equally convinced of the reality. They countenanced his cause in various ways ; and, although they did not actually join in the insurrection, they permitted one of their surgeons to attend and accompany this Suddaba, and Mr. Dick, the commercial resident at Fort Victoria, waited upon him to pay his respects. After the impostor had possessed himself of the greater part of the Concan, he ascended the Ghauts in the month of October. He was opposed at the Bhore Ghaut, and his troops were temporarily checked, when he headed them himself with spirit, and speedily carried the pass.*

* Letter from Dr. Blakeman, who saw the action.

The fort of Rajmachee shortly after sent him offers of submission. Pretended overtures of accommodation were made to him by the ministers, by which he was for a short time amused, until Ramjee Patell, one of Sindia's officers, and Bhew Rao Phansay, came suddenly upon him in the neighbourhood of Rajmachee, when his whole force fled precipitately into the Concan, closely pursued by Sindia's troops. Some of the insurgents were sheltered under the walls of Tannah, and the impostor, having embarked at Bellapoor, fled to Bombay, where he would have been allowed to land, but as Mr. Hornby was absent on Salsette at the time, the pretended Sewasheo Rao, who probably judged it better to make another effort before finally abandoning his party, excused himself from landing, promised to come back on the return of Mr. Hornby, and repaired to Kolabah. On his arrival at that place, he was seized and confined by Rughoojee Angria, to whom the Bombay government made an unsuccessful application for his release; but Angria conveyed him as a prisoner to Poona, where he was bound to the foot of an elephant, and trampled to death.*

* The Bramins of Poona have two stories respecting the fate of this criminal, both intended as apologies for the execution of a Bramin under a Bramin government. One is, that the impostor was not a Bramin, but a goldsmith; and the other is, that he was secretly removed and immured in a dungeon at Ahmednuggur, where he was starved to death, and a condemned criminal, by trade a goldsmith, substituted to deceive the populace. Starvation, insufficient, unwholesome food, and a damp dungeon, was really the dreadful execution frequently reserved for Bramins, and practised by the Bramin government by way of evading the inextinguishable sin of depriving one of that sacred class of life. Amongst other stories raised by the Peishwas to prejudice the vulgar against the race of Sivajee, it was pretended that the boon of the goddess Bhowanee, the truth of which no one could deny, which granted the Mahratta sovereignty to his lineal descendants for 27 generations, had been taken away because Sivajee killed two Bramin spies with his own hand, having shot them with arrows, by means of that unerring aim which was one of the gifts of the goddess, and impiously hit them in the forehead, right through the distinguishing mark of their caste.

The countenance shown to the impostor naturally occasioned complaints from the ministers, but their remonstrances became still more strong when they received information that Rugonath Rao had, on the 11th November, repaired to Bombay, where he had been received, and an allowance settled upon him of 10,000 rupees a month. Rugonath Rao had, in the month of August, refused a fresh offer of five lakhs of rupees annually with permission to reside at Benares, which was made through Colonel Upton; and it appeared that he had quitted Surat as if he had intended to join the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, but, having been obliged to seek shelter in the fort of Tarrapoor, he requested of the commander of one of the company's cruizers to give him a passage to Bombay, which the officer did not consider it proper to refuse.

At last, Colonel Upton having received an order of recal from Bengal, and the Bombay government having been directed to send a resident envoy to Poona, Mr. Mostyn was selected by them for this purpose. The ministers objected to that gentleman's appointment, as they conceived that he was the person who suggested the capture of Salsette, and that he was their enemy; but this objection was overruled.

Mr. Mostyn was of opinion that the Poona ministers were able to maintain themselves in power, and that the object of the British government should therefore be directed to keep well with them whilst they could support an efficient authority. He appears to have had a sincere desire to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, and to settle every point in an equitable manner; but the ministers were prejudiced against him, and he was determined to uphold the dignity of his situation. He repaired to Poona about the middle of March,

A. D. 1777.

and immediately entered upon the adjustment of the articles, which remained nearly in the same unsettled state as when the treaty was signed.

It was evident that "a country of three complete lakhs of rupees," as expressed in the treaty, meant territory producing annually a revenue amounting to three lakhs of rupees complete ; but the Persian word *kumal* or *kamil*, which was employed to express 'complete,' is also a revenue term which, though variously explained, may be said to signify the highest assessment ever known to have been fixed ; and to this interpretation the ministry adhered, although the Bombay government offered to accept the cession at an average of a certain number of years.

The article in regard to Futih Sing Gaekwar was artfully designed on the part of the ministers, to induce the Gaekwar to declare not only his dependence on the Peishwa, but his having no right to make any alienation, or to conclude any treaty, without the express approbation of the Mookh Purdhan. Futih Sing readily acknowledged his dependence ;* but, as he perceived the design of the ministers, he evaded the other concessions, and claimed restitution from the Bombay government, not as the ministers wished, but because Rugonath Rao had failed to perform the agreement for which the cessions were made ; these and some other points continued in dispute ; the ministers offered to settle five lakhs of rupees to be paid annually to Rugoba, through the governor-general and council, provided he would retire to Benares. But a new impediment soon presented itself.

* This acknowledgment on the part of Futih Sing was not an admission that he had no right to alienate the districts ; one of the agreements produced by the ministers rather inferred that the Gaekwar's share of Guzerat was at his own disposal.

The mere suspicion of a French intrigue always awakened the most active vigilance of the English government in India, and an ostensible agent of France, received with distinction by the ministers at Poona—a distinction more pointedly marked by studied neglect towards the British envoy—aroused the attention of the governor-general; and, as a war with France was expected, the circumstance naturally excited very considerable anxiety.

A French merchant ship arrived at Choule in the middle of March, with a cargo consisting of military and marine stores, cloth, and other staples of European exportation. From that ship several Frenchmen landed and proceeded towards Poona. One of the strangers had announced himself as ambassador from the court of France, and in that character he was received by the Mahratta court in the beginning of May.* But before entering on the object or proceedings of this mission, which are interwoven with the progress of the British nation in India, and are reserved for a future chapter, it is requisite to mention a few circumstances relative to Mahratta history, both to account for what may immediately follow, and to preserve a link in the chain of other events, which will be explained at a future period.

The peace of Poorundhur was of the greatest consequence to the ministers, and the suppression of the insurrection, under the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, added materially to the stability of their government; they detached Bhew Rao Yeswunt Phansay into the Concan, who speedily reduced the forts garrisoned by the forces of the late insurgent; but their

* Bombay Records, and the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, from which last, for the ensuing five years, there is very complete information, as far as the British government was concerned.

affairs to the southward were in a less prosperous state. Hyder had occupied the whole of the Peishwa's districts south of the Toongbuddra ; Bellary, in possession of a chief originally under the authority of Busalut Jung, had been taken by treachery ; Gooty, after a respectable defence, was also acquired in a dishonorable manner, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was shamefully immured in the noxious atmosphere of an unhealthy hill fort, where he perished. Under a pretended authority from Rugonath Rao,* Hyder advanced for the purpose of taking possession of the whole Mahratta country to the southward of the Kistna ; and, before the rains of 1776, he had pushed his conquests as far as the territory of the nabob of Savanoor, but withdrew the greater part of his army to the south of the Toongbuddra during the monsoon. The ministers sent a small force under Konier Punt Putwurdhun to drive Hyder's garrison from Savanoor ; but his troops were defeated, and Pandoorung Punt Putwurdhun,† the second-in-command, was taken prisoner by Mohummud Ally and Bajee Punt Burway ;‡ the former, one of Hyder's officers, the latter, the agent of Rugoba, in command of a body of auxiliary Mahrattas,§ who acted in concert with Hyder's troops. In the ensuing season, the troops of Nizam Ally under Ibrahim Beg (Dhonsa), and those of the Mahratta ministers under Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, took the field for the purpose of co-operating against Hyder ; but

* Colonel Wilks mentions that Hyder sent Rugonath Rao 16 lakhs of rupees at different periods. I can only find 24,000 pagodas, and, as before remarked, I scarcely think that such receipts could have escaped the notice of the Bombay government.

† Father of the present Chintamun Rao.

‡ He was a near connection of Rugonath Rao by his first wife, whose surname was Burway. Anundee Bye, his second wife, was of the family of Oak.

§ Mahratta MSS., Wilks.

the former was bribed, and the latter recrossed the Kistna without risking an action. Hurry Punt

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Phurkay after the rains of 1777, was detached into the Carnatic with the greater part of the disposable force; but met with no success. Mannajee Phakray, who had joined the army of the Poona ministry after the troops of his master Rugoba were disbanded at Surat, was induced by Bajee Punt Burway to unite with Hyder, and many of the Mahratta *mankurees* had engaged to accompany him;* but Hurry Punt defeated a part of the scheme for corrupting his army, by an able retreat,† and shortly after extinguished the treacherous intrigues of his officers by seizing Yeswunt Rao Manay, the *deshmookh* of Muswar, a powerful chief, and blowing him from a gun.* But besides the war with Hyder, other disturbances to the southward demanded the attention of the ministers.

Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, the last of the lineal descendants of the great Sivajee, died in December 1760 without issue. About two years afterwards, his widow Jeejee Bye adopted, as her husband's heir, a boy named Sivajee, the son of Shahjee Bhonslay, *patell* of the village of Kanwut, in the district of Indapoor; and, having placed him on the musnud, conducted the affairs of the principality in his name. Great irregularities took place during the minority of Sivajee, both by sea and land. Piracy prevailed to an extent before unknown on the coast, which induced the English to send an expedition in 1765, and reduce both Malwan and Bairee, the former belonging to

* Mahratta MSS.

† Wilks. Hyder himself, in a letter to the Bombay government, the known friends of Rugoba, gives Hurry Punt no credit for his retreat, but takes abundance to himself, by representing it as a victory he had gained.

Kolapoor, and the latter to Sawuntwaree. The reigning Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was exasperated against Kolapoor, both on account of plundering incursions into his territories, and the hereditary connection which the Kolapoor state maintained with the Nizam. In order to circumscribe its power and punish its aggressions, Mahdoo Rao dispossessed the raja of several districts, and added them to the jagheer of his own relations, the family of Putwurdhun; but during the late disturbances, the Kolapoor state, having embraced the cause of Rugonath Rao, recovered the districts, and one of the ministerial officers, named Ramchundur Hurry, in attempting to re-occupy them, was defeated by Yessajee Sindia, an officer of the raja's. Mahadajee Sindia was therefore sent to support Ramchundur Hurry, and succeeded in restoring order.

In the meantime Hyder reduced Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, and in the end of April formed the
A. D. 1778. siege of Dharwar. Hurry Punt proceeded to Merich, apparently with the design of forming a junction with Mahadajee Sindia at Kolapoor, and advancing in concert to attack Hyder. Nothing could be more distant from their real intentions; but the report was credited by every person, excepting Hurry Punt, Mahadajee Sindia, and Nana Furnuwees. Hyder fully believed it; and as Hurry Punt's army was now more to be depended upon, the former foresaw that he should be compelled to recross the Toongbuddra as soon as the Mahratta generals advanced. He therefore used every endeavour to bring about an armistice; but Hurry Punt pretended to be inflexible, until Hyder paid him a large sum of money,* and purchased the return of the Mahrattas to their capital—a

* Mahratta MSS. I could not discover the amount in the state accounts, nor is the sum specified in the Mahratta MSS.

measure which on their part had become absolutely necessary; and on this occasion Hyder was outwitted.

This artifice on the part of Hurry Punt is connected with a stroke of policy which ranks high in Bramin estimation, and which will appear in the course of our narrative; but in the meantime, that we may not lose sight of the other Mahratta authorities in following more interesting events, it may be mentioned that the pageant prince, Ram Raja, worn out with years and infirmities, died at Satara on the 12th December 1777. Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, also died about the same time, and was succeeded by his son, Pureshram Sree Newass, the present Pritee Needhee, born on the day of his father's death.

In regard to affairs in Berar, it has been already shown that Moodajee, after the fall of Sabajee in 1775, was acknowledged regent. But Ibrahim Beg (Dhonsa), the intimate friend of Sabajee, was sent by Nizam Ally, as was pretended, to avenge his fate, but in fact to take advantage of a strong party against Moodajee, who, conscious of inability to oppose the force sent against him, surrendered the forts of Gawelgurr, Nurnalla, Manikdroog, and Chunderpoor as the price of peace. Nizam Ally, however, restored those forts shortly afterwards, on the occasion of his coming to Elichpoor, when Moodajee, accompanied by his son, Rughoojee, Sena Sahib Soobeh, manifested the humblest submission, entered into an agreement of faithful co-operation, and bound himself to suppress the depredations of the Goands,* who were at that time troublesome in the districts of Nizam Ally. A like submissive demeanour towards the Poona durbar, and a bond for the payment of 10 lakhs of rupees, obtained a

* A savage race inhabiting the wilds of Gondwanah.

confirmation of the regency, through the favour of Nana Furnuwees. Sabajee had always kept a wukeel at Calcutta; and the same custom was observed by Moodajee, as it was convenient on account of his possessions in Kuttack. The governor-general, however, both misunderstood the relative situation of Moodajee in the Mahratta empire, and over-estimated his power.

Futih Sing Gaekwar, in February 1778, after having paid up arrears, $10\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees of tribute, one lakh as a present to Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees, besides an offering to the state of five lakhs of rupees,* was appointed Sena Khas Kheyl.

Ram Raja, a short time before his death, had adopted the son of Trimbuckjee Raja Bhonslay, a patell of the village of Wawee, and a descendant of Wittoojee, the brother of Mallojee and uncle of Shahjee, the father of the great Sivajee. Trimbuckjee Raja commanded a body of 200 horse, with which his son served as a sillidar, when selected as heir to a throne and tenant of a prison. He was styled Shao Maharaj. During the time of Ballajee Bajee Rao, it had been artfully contrived that there were only a few families, old, but of no power, with whom the raja of the Mahrattas could intermarry. To this day the raja of Satara would think himself degraded by a marriage with the daughter of Nimbalkur and of Jadow, although from them Sivajee was descended in the maternal line. This artifice, which may have been managed by bribing the Oopadheeas and Shastrees, explains the reason why it is scarcely known that Shao was married, in Aurungzebe's camp, to a daughter of Sindia of Kunneirkheir.

Records of facts, except receipts and accounts in their

* Poona State Accounts.

own favour, would often have proved inconvenient to faithless, shifting, time-serving Bramins; but it is not improbable that their prejudice against all other historical record may originate in causes of very remote date connected with the foundation of their religious institutions.

CHAP. IV.

FROM A. D. 1777 TO A. D. 1779.

Mr. Hornby's minute respecting Mahratta affairs.—French envoy, St. Lubin—account of his proceedings at Poona.—Orders from the Court of Directors in case the Poona ministry should not fulfil the terms of the treaty of Poonrundhur.—Dissensions of the ministry.—Application for the restoration of Rugoba from the party of Moraba Furnuwees.—Bengal government assent to that measure.—Six battalions of Bengal sepoy ordered to march overland to Bombay.—Terms on which the Bombay government agree to support Moraba's party.—Consummate artifice of Nana Furnuwees.—Moraba's party decline the restoration of Rugoba.—Return of Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt Phurkay—faction of Moraba crushed—unshaken constancy of Sukaram Hurry.—Observations respecting the march of the Bengal troops.—Further explanation of the motives which actuated the Bombay government—resolve to attempt the restoration of Rugoba.—Preparations of Nana Furnuwees.—The governor-general intimates his intention of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay.—The Bombay government adhere to their resolution.—Zeal of Mr. Carnac—judicious counsel of Mr. Draper.—Colonel

Charles Egerton, account of.—Field committee appointed—dilatory preparations—advanced detachment crosses over to the continent, and occupies the Bhore Ghaut without opposition.—Perverseness of Rugoba.—Embarkation—troops land at Panwell—extraordinary conduct and ignorance of Colonel Egerton—unparalleled dilatoriness of the advance.—Mahratta proceedings—manifest but slight opposition—appear in force at Tullygaom—burn the village—and retire before the British troops.—The English determine on retiring from Tullygaom—are attacked on their retreat to Wurgaom—gallant conduct of the rear guard under Captain Hartley—disgraceful convention of Wurgaom.—Misconduct of the committee.—Mr. Carnac and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn are dismissed from the service.—Distress of the Bombay government—observations on their late conduct—fortitude and ability of Governor Hornby—his review of their affairs—revert to the proceedings of the Bengal troops.—Colonel Leslie removed from the command—but dies before the order of supersession is received.—Colonel Goddard assumes the command and continues his march—treacherous conduct of the Mahrattas at Sagur—hospitality and kindness of the nabob of Bhopaul.—Negotiation with Moodajee Bhonslay—declines entering on the alliance.—General Goddard, on learning the disaster at Wurgaom, decides on marching straight for Surat—grateful acknowledgments of the Bombay government.—Mr. Hornby submits a plan of operations.—The negotiations with Poona confided to Colonel Goddard.—Conduct of the Bengal government—judicious observations of Mr. Hastings with regard to the members of the Bombay council.—Goddard appointed brigadier-general—remonstrances of the Bombay government.—Goddard instructed to negotiate a peace, or eventually to follow the plan pro-

posed by Mr. Hornby.—Policy of Mahadajee Sindia—he allows Rugoba to escape—sacrifices Sukaram Bappoo and Chintoo Wittul to the jealousy of Nana Furnuwees.

ON the 10th of October 1777, Mr. Hornby, in a minute
 of council, entered on a review of the
 A. D. 1777. Mahratta affairs, and remarks “that they were fast verging to a period which must compel the English nation either to take some active and decisive part in them, or relinquish, for ever, all hopes of bettering their own situation on the west of India.” He laments the control by which the Bombay presidency was fettered, remarks the secret divisions among the Mahratta ministers, the views of Sindia and Holkar to their own aggrandizement, the successes of Hyder, the defection of the Mahratta chiefs, and the demise of Gunga Bye, the young Peishwa’s mother, who had been the cause of her own death.*

The French ambassador was discovered to be an adventurer named St. Lubin, who, after imposing on the English government at Madras, went home to France, where he so far succeeded in deceiving the French ministry as to obtain an authority to proceed to Poona, and ascertain what advantages could be gained by an alliance with the Mahrattas. St. Lubin endeavoured to obtain the cession of the port of Choule, with the fort of Rewadunda; and in order to induce Nana Furnuwees to enter upon an offensive and defensive alliance, he offered to bring 2,500 Europeans to support the ministry, to raise and discipline 10,000 sepoy, and to furnish abundance of military and

* This event, on which the president expresses some doubt, was really true. Gunga Bye was the cause of her own death, by having taken medicine for the purpose of concealing the consequence of her illicit intercourse with Nana Furnuwees.

marine stores. He affected the utmost horror at the conduct of the English in supporting Rugoba; a painting had been executed under his direction in France, to represent the cruel and barbarous murder of Narain Rao; and this picture he exhibited himself, before the durbar, in a burst of grief, which drew tears from some of the spectators, whilst in others it excited ridicule or contempt. A cheat in the character of a European gentleman was new to the Mahrattas, but the discernment of Nana Furnuwees could not have been even temporarily obscured by such superficial artifice. It is probable that, in the great encouragement he affected to give St. Lubin, and in various petty indignities offered to the British envoy, he had no other object than to excite the jealousy of the English, without being aware of the dangerous nature of the experiment on which he ventured. Nana Furnuwees was inimical to all Europeans; but the despicable conduct of St. Lubin must have tended to lower the French nation, both in his estimation and that of the Mahrattas in general. Mr. Bolts, originally in the company's service in Bengal, who was in Poona at the same time as an avowed agent of the house of Austria, received no such civilities. Nana probably perceived that St. Lubin was a fitter tool; and Mr. Bolts, who was early dismissed, might have viewed that circumstance as complimentary to his character. The credulity which prevailed on the continent of Europe respecting India, and an uncommon plausibility of address, had enabled St. Lubin to impose on several young men, one of them an Englishman, and some of them of good family in France, whom he persuaded to embark in his enterprize. But unprincipled men, however superior they may fancy themselves, have generally foibles which speedily discover their true character; and those of St. Lubin seem

to have been egregious vanity and excessive irritability of temper.

Most of his companions were estranged from him; suspicion soon brought on altercation, and St. Lubin would have murdered them* to prevent exposure in India, and obstruction to his hopes from France; but they sought and obtained protection from Mr. Mostyn's assistant, Mr. Lewis, during the absence of the former at Bombay.†

* The attempt in one instance is clearly proved; he fired a brace of pistols, one after the other, at M. de Corcelle, within a few yards; one ball penetrated his clothes, but missed him.

† Mr. William Gamul Farmer, of the Bombay civil service, happened to be at Poona for the benefit of his health, and took that opportunity of ascertaining the views of the French, which he communicated to the governor, probably for his private information, but, as it contained useful intelligence, it was put upon record; the letter was dated Poona, 11th November 1777. "This St. Lubin is a most perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated even the ministry of France in this business. He introduced himself to the confidence of Monsieur de Sartine, as to Indian matters, by a memorial he presented relative to this country, which Monsieur de Corcelle assures me he has frequently seen. In this memorial he has not forgot himself. He has made himself the generalissimo at one time of Hyder's army, the very man who framed the treaty between him and the Mahrattas, for which he the next day received two lakhs of rupees; but what chiefly introduced him to this business was his particular intimacy with the raja of the Mahrattas. He was the constant companion of his children, used to learn them to ride—in short, he had not in the world a better friend than the raja. There certainly could not be so fit a man in France to send out to sound the ground here to form an alliance with the Mahratta state, if circumstances should prove favourable. You may perfectly judge from this, of what the character is capable of in the way of representation.

"Drunk and sober, jointly and separately, I have examined all the Frenchmen with whom we have yet had connection, that is—Madjett; Monsieur de Corcelle, who was to have been made engineer by St. Lubin; and Monsieur de Coronet, the captain of the ship, whom I found means to get to eat soup with us. They are all in such a situation with respect to Monsieur St. Lubin; that it is the first wish of their lives that he may prove totally a counterfeit, and not be supported by the ministry of France; for, in fact, their lives may perhaps depend on Lubin's reality, and the justifying his conduct. I have turned the matter every way to persuade them that he was a counterfeit, in order to fish out their arguments to the contrary; but they are all perfectly convinced of the facts mentioned in Madjett's letter. The captain of the ship confirmed to me repeatedly what Madjett had often mentioned, that his owner had given him his orders relative to St. Lubin, in consequence of recommendations from Monsieur de Sartine. They all agree perfectly

The encouragement given to St. Lubin by Nana Furnuwees might have had the effect of alarming the Bombay government, and inducing them, in the subordinate situation they had been taught to consider themselves, to accept the stipulations of the treaty of Poorundhur, under the disadvantages which the ministers would have imposed, had they not been uniformly supported by the Court of Directors. In a letter from that body, of the 16th April 1777, which was received exactly seven months afterwards, and was a counterpart of a despatch previously sent to the

with regard to the ideas entertained of him at Bordeaux: that it was first talked of sending out a body of men under Monsieur Dumas. The fact of the intelligence the captain and supercargo received at Cochin, of Lubin's destination, the captain confirmed to me. Picot and Briancourt acknowledged him, and Briancourt has gone so far as to request the consulship of Choul. The Count de Mendave, a man of good family in France, who has been seeking his fortunes in this country, and is now with Busalut Jung, heard of him, has offered to join him, and makes interest for a good employment under him; you will observe, Sir, that although it seems de Belcombe disavows him as an ambassador from the king, yet he takes no effectual measures to remove him; and it is a known fact that St. Lubin sent by a Frenchman a despatch to Belcombe in the month of July or August last. They all perfectly agree in the circumstance of the summons given to attend at the Nanah's to witness the treaty. Nanah was sworn by his Bramin, and St. Lubin by his Padre, and Nanah kept the book. The despatch of Monsieur Pascal due Santy to Surat, in order to carry from thence his despatches for France, is certain. We have learnt by a Frenchman, lately arrived here, that he has been seen at Briancourt's; his destination via Suez. This Frenchman says that he wanted to take his passage in an English Snow, I suppose Barrington, but that it was refused, and he is now to go in a vessel belonging to a black man.

"You see, Sir, how much Lubin has at stake by the total defeat of all his schemes, perhaps the loss of life, or imprisonment, if these fellows find that he is an impostor; everything, therefore, with him depends on his being able to persuade the minister to hurry out a body of men instantly on the receipt of his despatches, or order them from the islands, I leave you, Sir, further to judge what he is capable of, when he has wrote that they are in perfect possession of the port and harbour of Choul; and, to make the possession more valuable, he wanted the gentleman who took the draft of it for him, to put seven fathom water where there were only three and a half. The flourishing state of this country, the power of Nanah, the certain destruction of the English, the great advantage to France—all these he has dwelt on, as I am well assured, in a manner that cannot fail to make great impressions in France.

Bengal government, a repetition of the approval of their conduct, and of regret at the great and unnecessary sacrifice made by the treaty of Poorundhur, was still more clearly expressed than in the preceding year. The Court, to be sure, repeat their determination to adhere to that treaty ; but should its conditions not be fulfilled by the ministers, they authorize an alliance with Rugoba, on the terms of the treaty of Surat, which they considered more for the honor, as well as the advantage, of the company, than that which was concluded by Colonel Upton.

In the meantime, dissensions among the parties at Poona continued to increase. Nana Furnuwees
A.D. 1788. despised the abilities of his cousin, but with a Bramin's caution, he was at more pains to conceal his contempt than his enmity. Moraba was supported by all the partizans of Rugoba, particularly Buchaba Poorundhuree, Sukaram Hurry, Chintoo Wittul, and Wishnoo Nerher. This faction gained Tookajee Holkar, whose defection from the cause of the ministers became avowed by his excusing himself when ordered to support Hurry Punt Phurkay in the Carnatic. The English envoy attributed the confidence he could perceive in Nana to an assurance of support from France. Immediately after the death of Gunga Bye, Sukaram Bappoo began to be jealous of his hitherto humble colleague, and now united, but cautiously and with no decision, in a plan for the restoration of Rugoba. Moraba made the proposal to Bombay, and requested that the government would immediately bring Rugoba to Poona. Preparations were accordingly begun, and the president and council determined to afford their assistance without delay. Their resolve was approved by the supreme government ; and it was determined at Bengal, in consequence of the war in which they were

about to engage on the west of India, as well as the apprehended schemes of the French in the same quarter, to support the Bombay presidency with six battalions of sepoys, and a proportionate artillery, from the Bengal establishment, to which some cavalry were afterwards added. This force was directed to assemble on the Jumna opposite to Kalpee ; the command was given to Colonel Leslie, and he was directed to march across India towards Bombay, and place himself under the orders of that presidency.

But although the Bombay government agreed to aid the scheme of Moraba, it was with a proviso that Sukaram Bappoo, the principal authority in signing the treaty of Poorundhur, should state in writing that the invitation was made at his desire. This decided declaration, Sukaram, unfortunately for himself, refused, and the plan was in consequence suspended ; but it was the deliberate opinion of the Bombay government that their own safety depended on their effecting a change in the Poona administration. The complex political machine, which Nana Furnuwees managed on this emergency with consummate artifice, was at first a little deranged by a premature attempt to apprehend Moraba, who made his escape from Poona. This exposure would have disconcerted most men ; but Nana, through Sukaram Bappoo, persuaded his cousin to return, and it was agreed that a new ministry should be formed, including Moraba and Bujaba Poorundhuree ; but Bujaba was not so easily persuaded, and Sukaram Hurry nobly declared that nothing should ever induce him to abjure the cause of a generous master, who had been his protector from youth to manhood ; that Rugonath Rao was a soldier ; and Nana, a cunning, cowardly courtier.

Moraba's party, by the aid of Holkar's troops, obtained

the complete ascendancy ; and Nana, who was obliged to retire to Poorundhur, pretended to acquiesce in the plan for conducting Rugoba to Poona, on condition of obtaining security for himself and property. The Bombay government again received notice to prepare ; but the weak Moraba imagined that he had attained his object, and fancied himself at the head of the administration. Nana affected his usual deference for Sukaram's opinion, and was scrupulously respectful to his cousin. Consultations took place respecting the restoration of Rugonath Rao, and Moraba began to perceive the force of Nana's objections. He could not but recollect that when *he* was minister under Mahdoo Rao, the conduct of Rugonath Rao had invariably tended to dissension, loss, or dishonor. He therefore, though still pretending to be desirous of reinstating Rugoba, began to evade the question when pressed by his English friends.

A majority of the council in Bombay, seeing that their hopes from Moraba's party had vanished, soothing themselves with the hope of a continuance of peace with France, and with an idea of being able, through Moraba, to destroy the influence of the French at Poona, came to a resolution, on the 22nd April, of countermanding Colonel Leslie's detachment ; but on the 3rd of the ensuing month they reversed this resolution, for reasons which will be explained, and directed Colonel Leslie to advance.

Moraba had given Mr. Mostyn assurances that St. Lubin should be dismissed ; but his departure was delayed from day to day ; and it was soon discovered that St. Lubin, by Nana's contrivance, had been able to persuade Moraba to enter into his views. But, in effect, notwithstanding appearances, Nana Furnuwees, unless when under the immediate influence of fear, would have been the greatest

obstacle to the French views, had they ever attempted an establishment in the Mahratta country. His jealousy of Europeans would never have admitted a French force sufficiently strong even for the expulsion of the English from the small settlement of Bombay, unless he could have been certain of crushing them afterwards. Nana Furnuwees never entirely believed that St. Lubin could bring troops ; and one deception, which the impostor adopted to obtain credit, by writing to Goa and Damaun for permission to pass two French regiments through the Portuguese territories, seems only to have succeeded where he least wished it—with the English, by whom his letters were intercepted.

All the events that have just been detailed had occurred by the time Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt united at Merich. Both these officers were in Nana's interests ; and the well-concerted plan of threatening Hyder during Nana's danger deceived both Hyder* and Moraba ; nor did Moraba awake from his dream of security, until Hurry Punt and Mahadajee Sindia, arriving by different routes, united at Poorundhur on the 8th June. Nana re-assumed his former power, occupied the principal passes in the country with his troops, and, through Sindia's influence, seconded by a bribe of nine lakhs of rupees, detached Holkar from the confederacy. Moraba once more resorted to negotiation with the English (the detail of which will require more particular notice) ; but the opportunity was

lost. On the 11th July Moraba was seized
 July 11. by a party of horse belonging to Mahadajee
 Sindia, and shortly after made over to Nana, by whom he

* This circumstance, already noticed, is well known in the Mahratta country, but is not mentioned in any English record, and has escaped the notice of Colonel Wilks.

was thrown into confinement in the fortress of Ahmednugur. The whole of his party were arrested except Sukaram Bappo, whose confinement was only reserved, because his being ostensibly at liberty was essential in regard to the treaty with the English. Bujaba Poorundhuree was thrown into the fort of Wundun, and the others into different hill-forts in the Ghauts. The unshaken constancy of Sukaram Hurry to his master Rugoba deserved a better fate. He was chained in irons so heavy, that, although a very powerful man, he could scarcely lift them; his food and water were insufficient to allay his hunger or to quench his thirst; but he survived 14 months: and when so emaciated that he could not rise—"My strength is gone, and my life is going," said the dying enthusiast; "but when voice and breath fail, my fleshless bones shall still shout Rugonath Rao! Rugonath Rao!"*

The deep artifice of Nana Furnuwees had succeeded in baffling the designs of his own countrymen, but he had still to encounter the intellect and vigour of Englishmen. The national jealousy he had ventured to awake, rose with an aspect which terrified him. The application of the resident at Poona to the ministers, and to Sindia and Holkar, for passports to facilitate the march of a body of British troops from the east to the west of India, for the declared purpose of counteracting the designs of the French, seems at first to have been viewed by the Mahrattas as a threat. They probably considered that, if it had been intended to send troops to Bombay, they would have been embarked from the coast of Malabar or Coromandel, and replaced from Bengal—an opinion in which many com-

* Sukaram Hurry was a Purvoo, and is not a singular instance of the unshaken fidelity of that class in the history of Maharashtra. His daughter is alive in Satara.

petent judges, among our own countrymen, coincided ; but the unfavourable season of the year, the ill-treatment to which the Bengal sepoy had been invariably exposed on board-ship, and perhaps, though never avowed, the grandeur of the enterprize, together with some idea entertained by Mr. Hastings, from the first, of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, were the motives which influenced the governor-general in choosing the overland route.

Although the choice was more than questionable in regard to the mere military aid they could afford, yet the political effect was very considerable ; and had the Deccan become, as the Coromandel coast had been, the theatre of war with France, this enterprizing march would have proved of much importance in raising friends to the English, and in spreading opinions of their power, essential to their preservation. In England, however, in the language of the day, it was considered one of “the frantic military exploits” of Mr. Hastings ;* but had the English councils in India not been, at various periods, guided by men whose views and genius went far beyond the ordinary opinions of their contemporaries, the British empire in India might never have existed ; nor is it too much to suppose that we should, at this moment, have lamented our errors in the overgrown prosperity of our European rival, the exhaustion of our resources, or perhaps the annihilation of our power.

When the president and council at Bombay accepted the first invitation of Moraba’s party, the supreme government approved of their having done so, because the principal person who had signed the treaty of Poorundhur, the articles which still remained unfulfilled, was one of those who had joined in the application ; and the other

* Mr. Dundas’s speech 1782.

party, Nana Furnuwees, not only obstructed the fulfilment of the articles of the treaty, but was supposed to be negotiating, if he had not actually concluded, a secret agreement with the French, which threatened the existence of the company's possessions on the west of India. Under these circumstances, in a despatch dated the 23rd March, the governor-general and council authorized the Bombay government "to assist in tranquillizing the dissensions of the Mahratta state;" they directed that in whatever manner the ruling party should choose to conduct the administration, personal security should be demanded for Rugoba, and the expenses of any military expedition that might be required should be borne by the Mahratta government. Bassein, and some territory in its neighbourhood, were to be demanded in exchange for Baroach, whilst, in order to defeat the designs of the French, it was ordered that there should be an express stipulation, preventing all European settlements within the Mahratta territories, unless sanctioned by the supreme British government in India; and they announced that, lest the French should obstruct these objects, Colonel Leslie's detachment would take the field for the support of the presidency of Bombay.

The first plan, however, having been defeated, as we have seen, by the apparent reconciliation of the ministers, the Bombay government, for the reasons already enumerated, had dropped their intentions; but, upon receiving the orders of the 23rd March, they deemed themselves authorized to call upon the new administration, to know whether or not they held the Mahratta state bound by the treaty of Poorundhur, and to demand explicit answers on the point still in dispute. Instructions to their envoy were addressed to that effect, and they directed him to remon-

strate on St. Lubin's being still kept at Poona. Nana Furnuwees perceived that, in regard to the English, he had committed himself farther than he had intended or might be enabled to retract, and his enmity had been too actively exercised against Rugoba, ever to hope for reconciliation with him or his friends. St. Lubin was dismissed early in the month of July before Moraba was placed in confinement; but Nana, on St. Lubin's taking leave, although he entered on no absolute agreement, was at that moment sincere in his assurances, when he declared that, if the envoy could bring a French corps to his aid, he would grant his nation an establishment in the Mahratta territories.

Sindia and Holkar, as Mr. Hastings had foretold, granted passports for Colonel Leslie's detachment, because, as their territories were exposed during their absence, it was their object that the British troops, if they came by that route, should pass as friends. The ministers, however, observed to Mr. Mostyn that, as the detachment was sent on account of the French, by the dismissal of the envoy, both their advance and their passports were no longer necessary; Nana at the same time sent secret orders to the Mahratta officers, and to the rajas in Bundelcund, to oppose Leslie's progress.

It was at this conjuncture that Moraba's party made a specific application to Mr. Mostyn, which that gentleman intended to carry to Bombay himself, but postponed doing so in hopes of receiving answers to the demands which had been formally made on the Mahratta government, agreeably to the authority from Bengal. A part of Moraba's proposals contained satisfactory assurances on every point referred; but Nana, who was fully apprized of all that was going forward, in order to create delay kept back the

replies of the acknowledged and executive authority of the state, until Mr. Mostyn at last set out on the 6th July, when Nana sent them to his assistant, Mr. Lewis, who transmitted them to Bombay.

These replies positively denied having entered on any treaty with the French, but in general they were merely a brief summary of the arguments they had before used in their interpretation of the articles of the treaty of Poorundhur. In regard to the important question of whether or not the new ministry held themselves bound by that treaty, they observed—"The English should keep that treaty faithfully, when they should do the same."

About the time that these evasive answers were received in Bombay, intelligence arrived of the war with France, and the president and council, after deliberating upon the replies, and the proposals from Moraba's party, were of opinion that the former were a violation of the treaty of Poorundhur; and that they in consequence, under the authority granted by the supreme government in their despatch of the 23rd March, were at liberty to pursue such measures as might be expedient for the subversion of a party in the Mahratta state decidedly hostile to the English nation; and extremely dangerous to their interest, in the event of any attempt on the part of France against their possessions on the west of India.

They therefore resolved to make equitable stipulations for placing Rugoba in the regency, but with an express proviso that the government should be conducted in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narain, and that the entire powers should be surrendered to him on the expiration of his minority.* The whole was to be

* By Hindoo law the age is 16; with the Mahrattas the usage is from 16 to 20 years of age.

kept secret until the opening of the season, when it was intended to carry their plans into effect with the utmost vigour; and in the meantime they directed Colonel Leslie, who had been before instructed to proceed to Surat, to alter his route and march on Joonere.

But they had scarcely signed their resolution when they received accounts of the seizure of Moraba and his friends, and the defection of Holkar—circumstances which destroyed the party of Rugoba, but made no alteration in their plan, which they determined to prosecute at all hazards.

Nana Furnuwees perceived the gathering storm, and his preparations to meet it were in progress, whilst those of the Bombay government were only resolved. To prevent obstruction from Sukaram Bappoo, he was, on the plea of great age, removed from the administration, and guarded by a body of Sindia's troops, who were placed over his person and house, though Nana Furnuwees and Sindia still occasionally pretended to be guided by his advice. Sillidars were recruited all over the country, and directed to assemble at the Dussera. Vessels in the different ports were refitted, the forts were provisioned and repaired, fresh instructions were despatched to harass Leslie's march, but positive orders were also sent not to avow that the opposition was made by authority from Poona. An agent was sent to Bombay to amuse the government by making overtures to Rugoba, but the vigilance of Mr. Lewis had apprized them of the intention.

In the end of August, the Bombay government for the first time received some general information from the governor-general and council of their intention of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, and they were directed to enter on no engagement hostile to the government at Poona, excepting such as was absolutely defensive.

But on this the president, and the majority of the members of council, observed that Moodajee was so wholly unconnected with their design of establishing Rugoba in the regency, that this intimation ought not to be allowed to interrupt their proceedings. However, up to the 12th of October, no preparations had been begun at Bombay, and Mr. John Carnac, one of the members of council, and the declared successor of Governor Hornby, in consequence of the delay, submitted a minute, urging the necessity of vigorous preparation, and representing all the evils of procrastination. Mr. Carnac, though best known on the west of India in his civil capacity, was originally a military officer on the Bengal establishment, where he had risen to the rank of brigadier-general, and been distinguished by his services. Mr. Draper, with his usual deliberation, and in this instance with the clearest judgment, dissented from Mr. Carnac's proposal, because it was impossible for them to judge what might be the object of the governor-general and council in treating with Moodajee Bhonslay; he perfectly agreed in the propriety and expediency of removing Nana Furnuwees when it could be effected with certainty, but circumstances had materially altered at Poona since their first resolutions. Their own force, particularly in Europeans, was very weak, and Colonel Leslie's strong reinforcement was still at a great distance; he was therefore of opinion that a delay of about two months ought to be their object. All these suggestions were sound, and apparently too evident to be disputed; but the majority of the members of the Bombay government in regard to Rugoba were precisely as described by Mr. Hastings—"their passions were enlisted in his cause; it was in effect their own." Mr. Carnac, whose peculiar situation in having superseded Mr. Draper ought, on

every view, to have ensured delicacy and forbearance, scarcely concealed his contempt of Mr. Draper's caution, and strenuously supported the proposals of Governor Hornby. It was the opinion of the majority that no time should be lost; the French might probably arrive—an incident the truth of which Mr. Draper admitted, and that too, he observed, "with their garrison drained of troops and Bombay at their mercy;" but his voice was overruled, and Mr. Carnac's zeal was rewarded, in the first instance, by being appointed president of a committee to settle the preliminaries with Rugoba.

The Bombay government had lost a respectable counsellor in the death of General Robert Gordon, the commanding officer of their forces. He was succeeded by Colonel Charles Egerton, an officer who had been brought up in the army at home, and had served on the continent of Europe; but a man extremely weak, and totally unacquainted with India, its natives, or its warfare. His health was so infirm as to render him unfit for active service; but as he had been before set aside in favour of Colonel Keating, Mr. Hornby on the present occasion assented to his being appointed to the command. In a regular service, however, it sometimes happens that men whose rank is their only recommendation may be convenient commanders, but if their intended directors prove deficient in ability, or should they happen to fall under an influence contrary to what has been designed, the misfortune and disgrace that may result from such selections ought in justice to be attributed to those on whom the choice depends.

Many officers of rank, who at that time entered the company's service at an advanced period of life, came to India, less with an idea of attaining rank or honor, than

of making fortunes by any means. Their pay was inadequate, and as the manner of regulating the supplies, carriage, and equipment of an army was without system, the shameless corruption and embezzlement which frequently prevailed, excited the jealousy of the governments, without either suggesting efficient checks, or engaging by high confidence those better feelings, which, with the ideas common to their profession, they would perhaps in most instances have retained.

This jealousy was, on the present occasion, one cause of the appointment of two members of council, who, together with the commanding officer, formed a committee, in whom was not only vested the political authority, but every other arrangement for conducting Rugonath Rao to Poona; leaving the mere detail of duty and of march, as the sole occupation, separately entrusted to the senior military officer of their army.

On the first proposal of a committee, Colonel Egerton assented to the measure, conceiving, as he afterwards explained, that it was intended solely for the purpose of settling the preliminary arrangements with Rugoba; but he afterwards made repeated objections, and protested against the measure, as contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors, and derogatory to his situation as commanding officer.

The basis of the new agreement with Rugonath Rao differed little from the treaty of Surat, as far as the company were concerned; but, in regard to Rugoba, it was most expressly stated that the English were to place him at Poona as regent, and in other respects the articles were nearly in conformity with the instructions from Bengal. As the Bombay government had decided contrary to the advice of Mr. Draper, it might have been expected that they would have used despatch in sending off their troops;

but their preparations were extremely dilatory. At last an advanced party, consisting of six companies of native grenadiers from different corps, with a small detail of light artillery, embarked from Bombay on the evening of the 22nd November, landed at Aptee, and
Nov. 22. moved forward under Captain James Stewart, who took possession of the Bhore Ghaut without opposition, and encamped at the village of Kundalla. The advance had embarked before the treaty was signed; and at this moment an unexpected cause of delay arose from the perverse conduct of Rugoba, who, perceiving that the Bombay government had gone too far to retract, and that his concurrence was indispensable, started objections, and pertinaciously adhered to them until a part of his demands were granted. This disposition to take every possible advantage of those friends who had done so much to uphold his cause, occasioned considerable vexation; but for the present this disappointment was forgotten in the animating bustle of expected service, and the brilliant hopes entertained of the result.

The troops embarked at Bombay for Panwell on the 23rd, took possession of the small fort of Bellapoor, and disembarked at Panwell on the 25th of November. Including the advance under Captain Stewart, and a detachment of 60 rank and file left at Bellapoor, the army was composed of 591 Européans, 2,278 native infantry, and 500 gun-lascars; the whole, officers included, amounted to 3,900 men. Preparations sufficient to have enabled the commanding officer to move from Panwell were not completed for several days; but the delay which afterwards took place in making roads, and in the observance of various formalities, was equally unnecessary and inexcusable.

A proclamation declaring the objects of the expedition was issued in Rugoba's name, and probably intended to be disseminated through means of his people. When the troops first entered the village of Panwell, the carcoon in charge of it, on the part of the ministers, retired. Colonel Egerton immediately occupied his house : and as he had received two copies of the proclamation, he assembled the inhabitants, whom he describes as well satisfied with the change of government when he had read the proclamation ; and he was, therefore, not a little surprised on finding intelligence had reached Bombay that the inhabitants were retiring from the village, and that a complaint had been made against him for occupying, and of course defiling, a Bramin's house. This accusation Colonel Egerton repelled by declaring that he was actually living in the government-house, it never appearing to enter his mind that the government agent was a Bramin. It may seem frivolous to record such absurdities, or the petty disputes of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, which commenced regarding the military honors to be paid to the former. Unfortunately, Mr. Mostyn, the person best qualified to direct the expedition, was taken ill, and, without once attending the committee, returned to Bombay, where he died on the 1st of January. Mr. Carnac was fully sensible of his loss ; and at an early period expressed apprehensions of the great discouragement his illness might prove to the Mahratta party still inclined to the cause of Rugoba.

Colonel Egerton, on Mr. Mostyn's being taken ill, declared that the powers of the committee were suspended ; but his objections were overruled by an order from Bombay, although by this decision, there being only two members, Mr. Carnac, as president with a casting vote, became virtually commander of the army.

The whole force, accompanied by Rugoba, Amrut Rao (his adopted son), and a few straggling horse that had joined them, ascended the Ghauts by the

23rd of December; by that time some partial skirmishing had taken place

December 23.

between Captain Stewart and small parties of the enemy, in which the sepōys showed great zeal. Colonel Egerton, at the top of the Ghauts divided his force into two brigades; the one commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cay, the other under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, still reserving the advance as a separate corps under Captain Stewart. These three divisions advanced alternately at the rate of about three-quarters of a mile daily, the march rarely exceeding two miles, and the one division always occupying the ground which the other had quitted. In this manner, in eleven days they reached Karlee, a village eight miles from the ground which Captain Stewart had first occupied. This extraordinary mode of warfare, which the commanding officer afterwards declared was owing to want of provisions and carriage in the commissariat, and which Mr. Carnac describes as what Colonel Egerton might have seen in Germany, encouraged the enemy, who brought down infantry, rockets, and guns to harass them; but they were attacked and driven back on every occasion with the greatest spirit. During the march from Kundalla the army lost Lieutenant-Colonel Cay, an excellent officer,

who was mortally wounded by a rocket

December 31.
1779, Jan. 4.

on the 31st of December; but at the village of Karlee, on the 4th of January,

Captain Stewart, who, on the present and several other occasions, had distinguished himself, was killed by a cannon-ball, to the general regret of the army. "He was," says the Bombay government, "a most active,

gallant and judicious officer, and possessed of the true military spirit." It is a remarkable fact that his name is to this day familiar in the Mahratta country by the appellation of *Stewart Phakray*, which expresses something more than the gallant Stewart—a circumstance that marks the strong impression made by his conduct; and what soldier, wherever he may fall, could desire a nobler epitaph, than that such a tradition should be preserved by his enemies?

The dilatory preparations at Bombay afforded Nana Furnuwees and Mahadajee Sindia ample time to assemble the army. Sukaram Bappoo's restraint was, at this crisis, deemed impolitic, probably from the same cause as before—on account of the situation in which he stood with the British government as one of the two ministers who concluded the treaty of Poorundhur; a reconciliation had therefore been brought about, and he ostensibly resumed his office as minister. The principal part of the military operations were intrusted to Mahadajee Sindia, Hurry Punt Phurkay, and Tookajee Holkar. But they took care to place Holkar, of whom Nana was justly suspicious, in a situation from which he would have found it extremely hazardous to effect a junction with Rugoba. The whole Mahratta army, on the approach of the English, advanced to Tullygaom. Bhew Rao Yeswunt Phansay, with seven guns, 4,000 infantry, and 5,000 horse, had been sent on some time before, to oppose the Bombay troops; and it was with Phansay's party that the skirmishes had hitherto been maintained. On the 6th of January

January 6.

Colonel Egerton, in consequence of sickness, was obliged to resign the command of the army, which devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn; but Colonel Egerton continued a member of the committee, as

a party of the enemy's horse had cut off the communication with Bombay.

On the 9th of January the army reached Tullygaom, where the Mahrattas made a show of resistance ; but, when the line advanced in order of battle, they retired. The village had been destroyed by order of Nana Furnuwees, and the committee heard that similar orders had been given for burning Chinchore and Poona. On receiving this intelligence, instead of pushing forward 18 miles, the distance between Tullygaom and the capital, the apparent determination of the enemy alarmed them ; and Rugoba's assurance, that no person of consequence would declare for him until some advantage had been obtained, had quite a contrary effect from what he had intended, and, instead of being animated to exertion, the committee sank into despondency. With 18 days' provisions for their troops, they in the same breath came to a resolution, first, of negotiating with some of the chiefs, and then of retreating. Mr. Lewis, who had remained at Poona till the last moment, and had made good his way to Bombay, was with the army, and at this moment assured the committee that a party of horse in the interests of Moraba were in the Concan, and might soon be expected to join their army ; but this circumstance was disregarded. When Mr. Carnac proposed a retreat to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, Captain Hartley, and Mr. Holmes of the civil service, were present, and both these gentlemen ventured to suggest that it would be better to await the result of the negotiation where they then were. Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, on being called upon for his opinion, said he had no doubt that he could carry the army to Poona, but apprehended the impossibility of protecting the baggage, provisions, and cattle ; of which last, of bullocks alone, there were 19,000.

The committee, however, determined to adhere to their resolution of retreating. Rugonath Rao, whose advice at such a moment was of great importance, earnestly begged of them to defer their resolution ; but the man who had led 50,000 horse from the Nerbuddah to the Attock was equally odious to his countrymen and despicable among his allies ; not one day would the committee delay in deference to his opinion ; and at eleven o'clock on the night of the 11th of January, the heavy guns having been thrown into a large tank, and a quantity of stores burnt, an army of 2,600 British troops began its retreat, secretly, as was supposed, before 50,000 Mahrattas.*

It was vainly imagined that they could make one march before being discovered ; and when the advanced guard, under Captain Gordon, was fired upon by a party of horse at two o'clock in the morning, Colonel Cockburn conceived that the enemy must have obtained the intelligence from Rugonath Rao. The army, as already noticed, was divided into two brigades, besides six companies of grenadier sepoy, which were kept distinct as a reserve. On the present occasion the two brigades were united under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, having a strong advanced guard at some distance in front, with the six companies of grenadier sepoy and two guns, considerably in the rear.

On the death of Captain Stewart, Captain James Hartley was selected to command the reserve. Captain Hartley was a young man, who had been in the company's service 14 years ; he was well known to the sepoy, who have much discernment in the character of their officers, and are very different under different men ; but in the hour of

* Mr. Lewis seems to have estimated them at about 10,000 infantry and 25,000 horse. Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn declares there were above 120,000 men. The Mahrattas themselves say at least a lakh, and I believe there may have been above one-half of that number.

need, where they have experienced kindness, and seen their commanders worthy of confidence, there probably never was an instance of misconduct. An officer, even in a subordinate rank, has often a charge not only difficult in itself, but of higher national importance when leading the natives of India, than is likely to fall to the lot of a junior officer in any other branch of the British service. He has not merely to do his duty, not only to animate, or, what is often more difficult, to restrain, but to support the minds of his men, and infuse his own spirit, when he may perceive them despondent or discontented.

As soon as Colonel Cockburn heard the firing in front, he ordered Major Frederick with two companies of Europeans to support Captain Gordon ; but the Mahrattas had succeeded in plundering a part of the baggage, and in a very short time the rear was also attacked. The army, however, continued to move on till daylight, when they found themselves completely surrounded, and large bodies of horse coming on as if to charge the main body ; the troops were immediately halted, and the line formed ; but the strength of the attack, as had been the practice in Deccan warfare since the days of Shah Jehan, was made upon the rear. Hartley's sepoy received them with the greatest animation and steadiness, drove them back, and were with difficulty restrained from pursuing them. Shortly after sunrise the attack on the rear was renewed by the main body of the Mahratta army, consisting of both cavalry and infantry ; and their guns, having been brought up, opened on the line, but the heaviest fire, and the brunt of the onset, was still in the rear. The gallant band of sepoy, though now sore pressed, had excellent European officers, and not only stood their ground with spirit, but fought with perfect enthusiasm.

Captain Hartley sent an officer to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, requesting him to bring up the main body to his support ; to this Colonel Cockburn objected, as a large body of horse threatened to charge his left in case he quitted his position ; but he directed five companies of Europeans and two companies of sepoy's to support Captain Hartley. With this reinforcement, Hartley, holding possession of a rising ground, sustained the whole weight of a persevering attack with the steadiest intrepidity. About ten o'clock Colonel Cockburn had sent him peremptory orders to retreat ; but fortunately, Lieutenant Dawson, who was charged with this message, met, by the way, Lieutenant Rattray, an officer* in Captain Hartley's confidence, to whom he communicated his errand, when both concurring in the fatal consequence that must attend such an order, Rattray took the risk of stopping the messenger, of explaining to Colonel Cockburn, as if from Captain Hartley, the effects of retiring under such circumstances, and of begging that he would allow Captain Hartley to await a more favourable opportunity. To this proposal Colonel Cockburn consented ; before noon, however, he sent Major Frederick from the advance to the rear, desiring him to take the command, but not to depart from the disposition previously made by Captain Hartley.

During the whole of this time the main body was partially engaged : principally occupied in returning the fire of the Mahratta artillery, or cannonading such of their horse as ventured within range of the guns. The loss hitherto, except at the position occupied by Hartley, was very inconsiderable, and the fire from the enemy had slackened, when, about one o'clock in the afternoon, Major

* Lieutenant Rattray, of the Bengal establishment, served as a volunteer with one of Hartley's companies.

Frederick was ordered to retire to the main body, which he effected in a creditable manner; and the whole moved towards the advanced guard, which had halted at the village of Wurgaom.

The baggage, bazar, and camp-equipage, so useful to the comfort of an Indian army when successful, becomes quite the contrary in adversity; and, on the present occasion, the proportion was immoderately great. The followers had quitted the flank and crowded in between the divisions of the troops, so as greatly to impede the retreat; about three o'clock in the afternoon, when they got sufficiently near the village, the followers ran forward and pressed towards it, to seek shelter from the enemy's rockets, which were now showered upon them. This press created the greatest confusion; the enemy's horse took advantage of the circumstance, charged through the baggage and the ranks, and, when entering the village of Wurgaom, considerable loss was sustained. The troops, however, soon extricated themselves; the horse were driven off, the guns placed in commanding situations, and by four o'clock in the afternoon the army had some respite.

January 13.

Early on the ensuing morning the enemy's guns opened on the village, and a body of infantry advanced to attack it. They were repulsed, but the troops were supposed, by some of the officers, to be dispirited; doubts of their being able to retreat began to be expressed; the commanding officer, instead of crushing such dangerous despondency, if whispered in his presence, was himself infected by the spreading contagion. Some desertions had taken place, and alarming reports of many more were circulated. It is under such circumstances that a good officer of sepoys is proved. Captain Hartley addressed his men collectively and individually; there are

times to assume the officer, and moments where the officer must be the acquaintance and friend. Hartley was both respected and beloved ; he spoke to his men ; his officers seconded him ; and the desertions from his corps ceased. On the 13th, the total loss of fighting men in the preceding day was found to amount to 352, of which 56 were killed, 151 were wounded, and 155 were missing ; many of the last were supposed to have deserted. Among the killed and wounded, 15 were European officers, whose presence, even on occasions of success, is of great consequence, but at such a time it is invaluable to native troops.

A further retreat was deemed impracticable, and Mr. Farmer, the secretary of the committee, was sent to negotiate with the ministers. They at first demanded the surrender of Rugonath Rao, which the committee would have complied with, but they were saved from this disgrace by his having entered into a separate agreement with Mahadajee Sindia, to whom he afterwards gave himself up. Sindia was aiming at an ascendancy which Nana Furnuwees was studiously endeavouring to prevent ; yet each was so necessary to the other in the Mahratta empire, that, although their ultimate views were at variance, their present interests were in union.

The ruling party, of which Nana and Sindia were now the real authorities, insisted on the committee's entering on a treaty for the surrender of the whole of the territory, the Bombay government had acquired since the death of Mahdoo Rao Bullal, together with the revenue possessed by the company in Baroach and Surat, which the Mahrattas never had possessed. Mr. Farmer, who was compelled to write mysteriously, as his letters to the committee passed through the hands of Nana and Sindia, expressed himself by saying—" They seem to me to feel themselves in that

situation with respect to us which the Turkish vizier felt himself in regard to Peter the first, at the time the Empress Catherine sent her jewels to the vizier." Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn was then called upon for his opinion in writing, when he declared that a retreat was impracticable, and that he could not charge himself with such a responsibility. Captain Hartley, who was present when the declaration was made, not only differed from Colonel Cockburn's opinion, but showed him a plan by which it might be insured; Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, however, adhered to what he had stated. Mr. Carnac, as he afterwards proved, expressed an opinion at the time that he thought the retreat might be accomplished, and that it ought to be attempted rather than submit to the humiliating terms insisted upon; but he did not choose to press it. As such was Mr. Carnac's opinion, the plea of delicacy, or deference towards the military authorities, unfortunately for him, can little avail; for, as he ordered the retreat from Tullygaom, he ought to have adhered to that order, which, however injudicious or disastrous, could not have proved disgraceful. The committee replied to Mr. Farmer's communication by desiring him to inform the ministers that they had no power to enter on any treaty without the sanction of the supreme government. "Show us then," said Mahadajee Sindia, when this message was delivered, "the power by which you have taken upon you to break the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton."

But, immediately after the committee had despatched the reply alluded to, which was, at least, dictated in the language of fair dealing, they sent Mr. Holmes to Mahadajee Sindia, invested with full power to conclude a treaty. Mr. Carnac reconciled himself to this measure by the former message through Mr. Farmer, from which he

argued that, if the ministers submitted to be duped, it must be their own fault ; and so far from intending the good faith which he pledged, he afterwards declared that he granted the powers to Mr. Holmes under a *mental reservation* that they were of no validity.

The separate negotiation thus opened with Sindia flattered him exceedingly, and accorded most fully with his plans of policy ; but no ebullition of joy prevented his taking every advantage of the English, as far as was consistent with the control he now had, and was determined to preserve, over Nana Furnuwees. Mr. Holmes settled that everything was to be restored to the Mahrattas as held in 1773. The committee were obliged, on the spot, to send an order countermanding the advance of the Bengal troops, and Sindia's favour was purchased by a private promise to bestow on him the English share of Baroach, besides a sum of 41,000 rupees in presents to his servants. The committee were so completely humbled that they viewed with gratitude the kindness of Sindia in suffering the army to depart ; they were obliged to give two hostages, Mr. William Gamul Farmer and Lieutenant Charles Stewart, as a security for the performance of their engagement ; but their first act on descending the Ghauts was to suspend the countermand they had addressed to the officer commanding the Bengal detachment.

On the return of the troops to Bombay, the immediate object of attention was the measure of reward and punishment throughout the army. Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn were suspended from the service by the government ; no opinion as to the personal conduct of Mr. Carnac was then passed, but in anticipation of the order of events, as the characters are in future quite undistinguished, it is merely necessary to observe that,

when the whole of the proceedings came before the Court of Directors, after a deliberate investigation, they addressed a despatch to Bombay, in which they enumerated the particular demerits of the parties blamed, passed a just censure on the behaviour of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, and dismissed them from the company's service. They also dismissed Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, the justice of whose sentence was certainly not questionable, and the occasion called for example; but we may lament the errors of an officer whose reputation was deservedly considerable, until chance raised him to a station above his abilities. Four years before, Colonel Cockburn's character had been recorded by General Gordon in the following words:—"Cool, clear, steady, and determined as an officer; he has twice within these two years led our troops to assault,* which have been attended with glory and success to him and the troops, and much advantage to our employers. I do not know a better regimental officer."

But, although some were thus punished by the judgment of the Directors in England, others were dismissed at Bombay, and many were applauded and promoted for their conduct on the 12th January. The gallant and judicious behaviour of Hartley was represented in its true colours, and his merit was, at first, universally acknowledged; but the governor and council having raised him at once to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, although he might have merited the distinction, such promotion being unprecedented in the company's service, was deemed so improper and injurious, that every officer, before senior to Colonel Hartley, represented the injustice and degradation to which he was personally subjected. Some time after, when an answer arrived from the Court of Directors, it

* General Gordon alluded to Baroach and Tannah.

proved a source of mortification to Hartley, as, although he was not deprived of his rank, his further promotion and his pay as lieutenant-colonel in the company's service were suspended until the whole of those, formerly his seniors, should, in the usual routine, be promoted over him.

The Bombay government were reduced to a situation of great distress; their measures had been obviously imprudent and impolitic, ill-concerted and badly executed. Success, that grand apology for statesmen's blunders, had not attended the schemes which they had been labouring to be permitted to attempt. * From the time the supreme council exercised their first authority by a precipitate interference, the majority of the members of the Bombay government endeavoured, by argument and artifice, to bring about their own designs; and, instead of taking an enlarged and dignified view of the national interests and government in India, which would have been an honor to themselves, and a reproach to their opponents, they lost the commanding ground on which they stood, by following a course that brought about its own undoing. The character of their proceedings bears strong marks of personal interest and personal resentment.

In Bengal, whatever their practical errors, the views of men accustomed to think as great statesmen are always apparent in their consultations and transactions; but in Bombay the spirit of commercial adventurers still lurked at the council table. Their contracted policy was directed merely to carry their point in favour of Rugoba, and to aggrandize their own presidency. In sending off their expedition, it would seem as if they had been actuated by the puerile desire of showing the Bengal government what *Bombay* could do without their assistance. The excuse, subsequently made on this point, of expected

assistance from the Bengal detachment, cannot be admitted, as it would appear in their replies to Mr. Draper's dissent, and in the means taken to ascertain the progress of the Bengal detachment; but the importance of its co-operation seem scarcely to have been considered, until some time after their own army had taken the field. In short, the Bombay government neglected opportunity, they overlooked changes of circumstance, they desperately sent a handful of men against the strength of the Mahratta empire, and committed the conduct of an enterprize, practicable only by celerity, address, and resolution, to men totally unfit for such a charge. Their army had returned defeated, their treasury was exhausted, their credit insignificant, and their reputation sullied. But, under these discouraging circumstances, the merit of fortitude, ability, and vigour is justly due to Governor Hornby. There was no consolation in a retrospect; the present misfortunes were chiefly to be attributed to misconduct; and in anticipation there was censure for what was past, and danger in what was to come. Mr. Hornby, in the first place, judiciously recommended to the members of his government to abstain from all recrimination, to allow their motives and their measures as recorded, to await the judgment of their superiors, and that every one should bend his mind to the consideration of the future, for the purpose of preventing, and, if they did come, surmounting, the impending perils they had so much reason to apprehend. He took an unreserved and full view of their situation, and, although evidently humbled, he displayed the strong mind of an English chief, and convinced his council that, whilst they acted with the unanimity and firmness which became their country, they were not only above contempt, but might soon overcome

their difficulties, and retrieve their affairs. He disavowed the validity of the disgraceful articles of the Wurgaom convention; for, although Mr. Carnac had ostentatiously intimated to Nana Furnuwees, probably to enhance his own consequence, that he was intrusted with the company's seal, and with full powers, he had no authority to conclude a treaty, nor could the Bombay government have delegated such a commission. Mr. Hornby determined, at all hazards, to resist the cessions made by the committee; but as every point was indispensably referred to Bengal, there appeared no necessity for publishing a defiance to the Mahrattas. The intentions of the Bombay council were, however, sufficiently declared by their preparations, and every effort was made to recruit and improve their army.

On the 19th February, Mr. Hornby laid an elaborate minute before his council, in which he took a view of

February 19.

Mahratta politics, and the line of conduct which he thought the most expedient for the British authorities to pursue. The end he proposed to attain was that of securing a peace, so as to exclude the French from the Mahratta dominions, and to retain the territory then in possession of the English. He assumed, as matter of certainty, that Sindia had indicated, by several parts of his conduct, an aversion to the French, and a desire to form an alliance with the English against Nana Furnuwees. In the supposition thus adopted, Mr. Hornby was not wholly wrong; for, had Nana, by any means, foreign or domestic, become too powerful, Mahadajee Sindia might have sought assistance from the English; but whilst Nana Furnuwees held the reins principally by the support of Sindia's power, it was completely the interest of the latter to uphold Nana's administration. The president was of opinion that the sum of 41,000 rupees

promised to Sindia's servants ought to be paid ; and that Baroach, or an equivalent, should be given to him for the act of kindness, humiliating as it was, in permitting their army to return. All these suggestions were submitted to the supreme government ; but, in the meantime, the principal hope of retrieving their affairs was in the near approach of the Bengal army, to the progress of which a retrospect is now necessary.

Colonel Leslie crossed the Jumna in May 1778, and, notwithstanding professions of friendship made by the Mahratta officers, they manifested an
A.D. 1778. opposition which induced him to take possession of the fort of Kalpee. It was expected by the Bengal government that the army would have crossed the Nerbuddah before the rains ; but some of the Rajpoot chiefs in Bundelcund, instigated by the Mahrattas, attempted to cut off the supplies, murdered an officer, and frequently killed foragers and followers. Colonel Leslie, however, instead of steadily pursuing his route, entered on a war with those chiefs, took part in their feuds, and thus engaged in a task equally endless and unavailing. He attacked and carried with little difficulty their principal post at Mhow, three *kos* west of Chatterpoor ; he drove a large body of men from a strong position on the banks of the Kane ; and, notwithstanding repeated orders to proceed, he wasted the whole monsoon in this unaccountable manner. In five months he had not advanced more than 120 miles ; and in the fourth month the estimated expense of his army amounted to 12 lakhs of rupees.

Mr. Hastings did not hastily withdraw his confidence from Colonel Leslie, but he was at length compelled to admit that his conduct was indefensible. He was therefore recalled, and Lieutenant-Colonel Goddard was

appointed to succeed to the command of the army ; but, prior to the date of the order of recal, Colonel Leslie had died of a fever, on the 3rd October 1778.

Colonel Goddard immediately assumed command of the troops, and a few days afterwards commenced his march from Rajegurh, in Bundelcund, towards the Nerbuddah. His route lay by Mooltan, Khemlassa, Beilsah, Bhopaul, and Hoossingabad ; at the last-mentioned place he forded the Nerbuddah on the 2nd December. Before Colonel Goddard had quitted the Bundelcund territory, Ballajee Punt, the Mahratta officer stationed at Sagur, by whose machinations Leslie's progress was at first arrested, after many professions of friendship, made a perfidious attack on the baggage of the army, in which he was completely foiled. The conduct of the nabob of Bhopal was precisely the reverse of that of the Mahratta officer ; he treated the English with the greatest confidence and hospitality, furnished them with every supply and every possible assistance, at the risk of incurring future enmity from the Mahrattas, without the support of his new friends. This generous behaviour on the part of the nabob was never forgotten ; and it laid the foundation of a friendship, which, in modern times, has been laudably extended to his descendants by the British government.

After Colonel Goddard had crossed the Nerbuddah, he halted on the south bank of the river to await some communications from Moodajee Bhonslay, particularly connected with his future operations.

The views of the supreme government in contracting an alliance with the ruler of Berar were intimated to Bombay in the month of August, but merely in a general manner. The execution of the plan was intrusted to Mr. Elliot, a gentleman eminently qualified for any embassy ; but the

design was formed on defective information. It had for its object an alliance with Moodajee against the Poona ministers, for the purpose of attaining permanent peace and complete security to the company's possessions against the attempts of France, by establishing and upholding Moodajee Bhonslay as raja of all the Mahrattas. Mr. Hastings in this plan was precisely adopting the scheme originally suggested by Wittul Sondoore, the minister of Nizam Ally.* He was not aware that Moodajee had no claim to the Mahratta sovereignty; but even had such been the case, as the British government so long acknowledged the Peishwa's supremacy, as the Bombay presidency had concluded an authorized treaty with Rugonath Rao, declaring him regent during the minority of the young Peishwa, the measure was in the one view unjust, in the other inconsistent, and on the whole complicated and injudicious. Had Moodajee really been heir to the throne of Sivajee, it would have been very impolitic to have afforded the means of uniting an empire, hostile to all the world, which was of itself falling to pieces. The scheme was first interrupted by the death of Mr. Elliot, which happened on the 12th September, when on his route towards Nagpoor. The governor-general, in consequence of that event, directed the secret instructions addressed to Mr. Elliot to be made over to Colonel Goddard, whom Mr. Hastings empowered to treat according to their purport; and about the same time, as the new plan required that they should retain the means of carrying it into effect, the governor-general and council suspended the power of the Bombay government over Colonel

* It seems to have been first suggested to Mr. Hastings by Beneeram, the wukeel of Sabajee.—(See letter from the Bengal government to the Court of Directors, 19th December 1774; App. 5, Report from the Committee of Secrecy.)

Goddard's army, on the plea of a failure in the original plan for which the power had been granted. It was also resolved to strengthen Colonel Goddard by a reinforcement of two additional battalions of native infantry, which were directed to assemble on the western frontier of the province of Bengal under Major Jacob Camac.

Moodajee, in the first instance, would have acceded to the governor-general's views, but before any explanation had taken place, he had received intelligence of the designs at Bombay in favour of Rugoba, and of the vigorous preparations of his own countrymen at Poona; both of which, for obvious reasons, tended to deter him from entering on any immediate alliance. The favourite ambition of his family was, however, roused, and, in a conversation with Lieutenant Watherstone, the agent deputed by Colonel Goddard, Moodajee admitted the great desire he entertained of embracing the proposal at a fit time; but, whilst he wished to prolong the negotiation, he declined embarking in any enterprize at that period. Moodajee's plan, which was not disclosed till some time after, differed from that of Mr. Hastings; it was similar to what Rughojee seems to have intended on the death of Bajee Rao in 1740, and was more practicable than the one proposed.* Moodajee foresaw that opposition would be made to pretensions in his own person, but he knew there would be much less difficulty, and a powerful party against the Bramin administration, by his assuming the character of protector at Satara (his authority in Berar

* "Let," says Moodajee in his own proposals to Mr. Hastings, "a lineal descendant of Maharaja Chutter Puttee Sivajee Bhonslay continue on the *musnud* of the Satara Raja; but till the power and authority of the Raje (sovereignty) is established, nothing is done."—(See Appendix, No. 191, 5th Report, Committee of Secrecy.)

was nothing more), and declaring that his sole design was the restoration of the imprisoned raja's authority.

About the same time that Moodajee declined Colonel Goddard's overtures through Lieutenant Watherstone, urgent applications were received from Bombay, dated 6th and 19th December, requesting Goddard to advance with all expedition in order to support their army, which had taken the field in the cause of Rugoba.

Although Colonel Goddard, prior to the receipt of this requisition, was in possession of the order which withdrew him from the authority of the Bombay government, he considered the interest of his country so much at stake, that, without hesitation, he resolved to march straight to the west coast. This decision was extremely creditable, as Colonel Goddard had not merely to fight his way through the Mahratta army, but he incurred the serious responsibility of acting on his own judgment, where failure might be ruin in every sense of the word, and where he personally risked nothing by waiting for orders at Hoossingabad. He commenced his march about the 26th January, and arrived at Burhanpoor on the 30th of that month. The contradictory letters written by the field committee during and subsequent to the convention, though they afforded no information of the state of affairs, and might have perplexed most men, only induced Goddard to quicken his progress. After refreshing his men at Burhanpoor, he resumed his march on the 6th February, and in 20 days reached Surat, a distance of 300 miles, and by the expedition thus used, avoided a body of 20,000 horse, which were despatched from Poona to intercept him.

The Bombay government expressed the liveliest gratitude for the honorable and generous motives which had induced him to hasten to their relief; and they showed their sense

of it by immediately offering him a seat in their council, and recommending that he should be appointed their commander-in-chief. Colonel Goddard had gained on their esteem by his repairing to Bombay in person, and communicating with all the respect due to them, and to his own situation, joined with the becoming courtesy and frankness of a soldier.

On the 17th March the Bombay government first
March 17. received a copy of the instructions intended for Mr. Elliot; the first copy had been sent from Bengal in November, but had unfortunately miscarried. The state of the negotiation with Moodajee Bhonslay they now learnt from Colonel Goddard, who seemed still to be of opinion that an alliance would take place. The Bombay government were not sanguine on this subject; and as Mahadajee Sindia had shown none of those favourable intentions towards the English, imputed to him in Mr. Hornby's minute of the 19th of February, they now perceived that they were on the eve of being compelled to engage as principals in a war, to maintain which their absolute want of funds was the first and most alarming consideration.

In this exigency, making allowance for defects in the original information on which some of his calculations were made, Mr. Hornby submitted a very judicious plan of operations, in a minute laid before his council on the 30th

March 30. March; he there pointed out a method of at once obtaining resources and distressing their enemies, by entering into a treaty with the Gaekwar family on the terms solicited by Futih Sing in 1772; reconciling the brothers, releasing them from tribute and dependence on the Poona state, and conquering the Peishwa's share of Guzerat for the Company.

But in all their schemes they soon found themselves more dependent, and more than ever controlled by the governor-general and council.

The Bengal government, before they received intelligence of the disgraceful proceedings at Wurgaom, upon hearing that the Bombay presidency had sent an army into the field, had decided on sending Colonel Goddard to their support; but they would not again relinquish authority over his army. Even before they heard of the convention, they vested Colonel Goddard both with the separate charge of their army, and with distinct powers as their envoy plenipotentiary at the court of Poona. The governor-general, upon receipt of further intelligence, without waiting to learn the result of Goddard's bold and judicious march, sanctioned the proceeding, however it might turn out, by recording his approbation and applause. The whole conduct of the majority of the Bengal government was on this occasion admirable. Their first determination on hearing of the disastrous news was to place their military power, offensive and defensive, in the best possible state, without betraying either a weakness or alarm that might have encouraged other native states to rise against them. A brigade was ordered to the banks of the Jumna, and Sir Eyre Coote, the commander-in-chief, proceeded to inspect and prepare their military resources on the north-western frontier, the quarter most likely to be invaded. Mr. Hastings, whose after conduct made amends for his earlier errors, and whose difficulties had tended to improve and exalt his mind, showed at this trying period all the great qualities of which he was possessed, and prudence and ingenuity, vigour and moderation, are alike conspicuous in the measures which he suggested. Superior to the ineteracy of Mr. Francis, and entirely exempt from the

impatience of Sir Eyre Coote, which were displayed in a particular manner in regard to the measures of the Bombay government, Mr. Hastings applied his knowledge of mankind to the art of good government; and fortunately, by the support of Mr. Barwell, and his own casting vote as president, he commanded the majority in council. Become wiser by the past, though his present words were a severe censure on the hasty exercise of authority he had formerly supported, Mr. Hastings observes—"To mark our want of confidence in them (alluding of course to the Bombay council), by any public act, would weaken theirs in us; to load them with harsh and unoperating reproaches would indispose them to our authority, at the same time that it would absolve them from its effects; and to bind their deliberations by absolute and indiscretional orders, might eventually disable them from availing themselves of any fortuitous advantages, which the confusion of the Mahratta government is more likely to offer them than any plan which we could prescribe to them, or which they could form on the letter of our instructions. In a word, such a conduct, by inflaming the passions of men, whom we are not to regard as exempt from the ordinary infirmities of humanity, would prove the surest means of converting the powers which were still left in their hands into the instruments of opposition, and even of the defeat of the measures which require their agency, and cannot be accomplished without it. Let us rather excite them to exert themselves for the retrieval of their past misfortunes, and arm them with means adequate to that end; restricting their powers where the object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal extension of them in cases which are too variable and uncertain for positive injunctions."

Colonel Goddard was appointed a brigadier-general by the Bengal government during the service on which he was employed; and a recommendation to the Court of Directors, in support of an application for his being appointed commander-in-chief of the Bombay presidency, was forwarded to England. But the Bombay government, although they highly approved of the distinction conferred on General Goddard, remonstrated against bestowing the rank except through them, or on his being separately appointed to conduct the negotiation with the Poona state. They also objected to having any military force stationed within the limits of the Bombay presidency, independent of their authority, as they deemed such a circumstance an invasion of their rights, and highly unconstitutional; yet, soothed by the respectful consideration shown to them by Mr. Hastings, and the judicious behaviour of General Goddard, they determined that their disapproval in those particulars should not prevent the utmost exertions of their ability and means to forward the views of the supreme government.

On the 15th of April General Goddard was directed to endeavour to negotiate a peace with the Poona state, on the terms of the treaty of Poorundhur, but with an additional article expressly excluding the French from any establishment within the Mahratta dominions. In the end of May, when the supreme government had received and taken into consideration Mr. Hornby's minutes of February and March, they sent more detailed instructions for their envoy's guidance; and if peace on the terms proposed could not be obtained, he was then, if he thought proper, to adopt Mr. Hornby's plan of an alliance with the Gaekwar, in which case alone the authority of General

Goddard as the governor-general's agent was to be blended with, and guided by, the instructions of the Bombay government. The only alteration in the authorized from the proposed plan was a restriction preventing the British authority from being engaged as a party between the brothers Futih Sing and Govind Rao Gaekwar. The alliance was, therefore, to be formed with Futih Sing, the acknowledged head of the Baroda state, and no pledge given for reconciling their domestic differences.

This mode of operations would not have materially interfered with the projected alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, as the political connection between his father Rughoojee and Dummajee Gaekwar might have paved a way to a union of the sons; but after the convention of Wurgaoon, Mr. Hastings immediately perceived, and the result was a proof of his penetration, that Moodajee could no longer be accounted an ally, though, if judiciously managed, he might safely be reckoned neutral. It was desirable, however, that the British authority should be left unfettered in case Moodajee persisted in procrastinating; and therefore General Goddard was instructed to tender explicit conditions, by a rejection of which he would have it in his power to declare the negotiation at an end.

In regard to an alliance with Sindia, the governor-general was disposed to concur in opinion with Mr. Hornby in supposing that Sindia had some secret design of connecting himself with the English. Mr. Hastings also concurred in the propriety of giving up Baroach, as had been privately promised; but Sindia's conduct had been such as to preclude their deigning to bestow this mark of acknowledgment. General Goddard, however, was instructed to treat separately with Sindia, in case he should at any time find him disposed to espouse the

interests of the company ; but the dependence of Nana Furnuwees on Mahadajee Sindia was at this time best secured by war, and whilst his wukeel at Bombay was professing his master's regard, an attack, instigated by Sindia, was made on Bancote, with no other design than to blow the flame, and excite the English to hostilities.

As a further hold on Nana Furnuwees, whom Sindia governed by his fears, he caused the settlement of a jagheer in Bundelcund to be made on Rugonath Rao of 12 lakhs of rupees, of which he became the guarantee in behalf of Rugoba, and at the same time security to Nana for Rugoba's never molesting the government. He had thus got the latter into his power ; but the unpopularity of Rugoba made the custody of his person of little consequence as an instrument of aggrandizement : Nana Furnuwees was perhaps secretly pleased to observe Sindia connecting himself with a man more likely to be shunned than followed, and only dangerous as a political instrument in foreign hands. Soon after the arrangement was made, Rugoba was sent off towards his jagheer in Bundelcund for the purpose, as Nana believed, of being confined in the fort of Jhansee, until Sindia might find it convenient to release him ; but Rugoba's usual escort, and even his guns, were suffered to accompany him, whilst the troops which were sent as his guard scarcely exceeded the number of his own followers. Just before Rugoba reached the Nerbuddah, in the latter end of the month of May, he was secretly warned of Sindia's intention to confine him in Jhansee, on which, having watched an opportunity, which presented itself at the ford of Cholee Mheyswur, he attacked and dispersed his guard, mortally wounded the commander, and fled towards Baroach with all speed, to throw himself at the feet of his friends the

English, for he could scarcely expect that they would open their arms to receive him.

Although no explanation took place between Sindia and Rugoba, there is little doubt but the whole was Mahadajee's contrivance. It widened the breach between Nana and the English, but with either party it gave Sindia an advantage; it roused the fear and jealousy of the one, and made him more dependent; whilst broken, inexplicable hints* of friendship, which he occasionally dropped to the English, might be interpreted hereafter as alluding to some scheme of co-operation connected with this design of releasing their mutual friend.

When Nana Furnuwees required and obtained the sacrifice of his rival Sukaram Bappoo, and of Chintoo Wittul, once the minister of Rugoba, it was no test of Sindia's fidelity to him; on the contrary, his having given them up to satisfy Nana at that time is perhaps, from the artifice of his character, rather in evidence of his having been accessory to Rugoba's flight. Sukaram Bappoo was hurried to Singurh, and thence he was removed and thrown into the fort of Pertabgurh—a circumstance which leads to the remarkable reflection that this venerable old man, after sharing every vicissitude of privation and of grandeur, of toil and of triumph, which a leader in the camps and courts of a great empire must experience, now looked down on a scene far more awful to a mind in his situation, than the tremendous abyss of

* As one of several instances of these hints, just after the convention at Wurgaom, when Mr. Farmer, Mr. Holmes, and Mr. Sibbald were present, Sindia was loudly extolling the conduct of their rear-guard, which he compared to a red wall, "and no sooner beat down, than it was instantly built up again" ("each stepping where his comrade stood, the instant that he fell"). "I hope," said Mahadajee, whispering in Mr. Sibbald's ear, "to see these fine fellows co-operating with my own troops, by and bye."

4,000 feet of black rugged rock, which formed the western wall of his prison : for, from Pertabgurh, on the eastern side, he saw the spot where, 120 years before, his ancestor, Puntojee Gopinat Bhokeel, pledged to Sivajee the treacherous oath which betrayed his master Afzool Khan to the stab of the murderer. But Sukaram's death scene was not closed in Pertabgurh ; the cautious jealousy of Nana Furnuwees removed him secretly from one place to another, to prevent rescue or insurrection ; and the once great Sukaram Bappoo perished miserably in Raigurh. Chintoo Wittul's life was also shortened ; he died in some hill fort, from the effects of unwholesome food and harsh treatment.

CHAP. V.

FROM A. D. 1779 TO A. D. 1782.

Hyder makes himself master of the Mahratta territory south of the Kistna—his jealousy of the English—his connection with the French.—The English expect to be attacked by the French on the west coast of India.—Rugoba received by the English.—Report of a general confederacy against the English.—The British government acts as a principal in the negotiation with the Poona state, not as the auxiliary of Rugoba.—War declared.—Capture of Dubhoy.—Alliance with Futih Sing Gaekwar—terms.—Siege and storm of Ahmedabad.—Sindia and Holkar advance against Goddard.—Policy of Sindia.—Negotiation.—Goddard partially surprises Sindia's camp.—Operations prolonged in Guzerat—reasons.—Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley sent down to assist the troops in the Concan.—Operations in that quarter.—Capture and defence of Kallian—relieved by Colonel Hartley.—Operations of Captain Popham's detachment.—Capture of Lahar.—Surprise of Gwalior.—Unsuccessful attempt on Mullungurh.—Distress of the Bombay government.—War with Hyder Ally.—Admirable conduct of Governor Hornby.—Hartley opens the campaign with great spirit.—Siege of Bassein.—The covering army is attacked by the Mahrattas.—Battle of Doogaur.—Reduction of Bassein.—Memoir of Colonel Hartley.—Extensive confederacy against the British government.—Peace proposed to the Peishwa's government through Moodajee—who declines the mediation in consequence of the success of Hyder.—Proceedings at Bombay.—Goddard

injudiciously takes post at the Bhore Ghaut.—Preparations of the Mahrattas—they act vigorously on Goddard's supplies.—Goddard retreats to Panwell with heavy loss.—Proceedings of the Bengal government.—Operations of Lieutenant-Colonel Camac's detachment—Camac is surrounded by Sindia—retreats—surprises Sindia's camp—is joined by Colonel Muir.—Negotiation opened by Sindia through Colonel Muir.—Moodajee Bhonslay sends an army into Kuttack.—Warren Hastings purchases its retreat, and detaches Moodajee from the confederacy.—Instructions to General Goddard for negotiating at Poona.—Extensive plan proposed by Goddard for carrying on the war.—Peace with Sindia.—A general treaty of peace with the Mahrattas concluded at Salbye through Mahadajee Sindia.—Delay in its ratification.—Baroach conferred on Sindia.

HYDER ALLY, though mulcted and duped by Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Hunt Phurkay, was
 A. D. 1779. amply compensated by the opportunity afforded when they were called away, in the end of May 1778. Dharwar was taken, and the whole tract, as far north as the Gutpurba and Kistna, submitted to his arms. He also took Chittledroog, and extended his territories to the eastward by the reduction of Kurpa. During his stay in that neighbourhood, he was joined by Monsieur Lally, a military adventurer, who had been for some time in the service of Busalut Jung at Adonee, and afterwards with Nizam Ally, but he now came over to Hyder with his corps.

Prior to this event, Hyder had become thoroughly jealous of the English; and had he not been deterred by fears of a Mahratta invasion, he would, probably, at an early period have gone to war with them; and declared

himself an ally of the French. He had for some time encouraged a close intercourse with that nation, and was supplied with arms, warlike stores, and occasionally with men, from the island of Mauritius. The capture of

Pondicherry, on the 18th October 1778,
A. D. 1778. could not fail of occasioning regret to

Hyder ; and when the governor of Madras intimated the intended reduction of the French settlement of Mahé, the port through which Hyder drew his supplies, he formally protested against the attack of a settlement which, being situated in his territory, was, he pretended, under his protection. The expedition, however, went forward ; Hyder, during the siege, hoisted his colours on the works by the side of the French ; but the fort fell to a detachment

of Madras troops under Colonel Braithwaite in the month of March. The
A. D. 1779. governor-general and council, in consequence of having received intelligence that the French meditated an attack on the English settlements on the west coast, made an application to Madras for the assistance of some troops to reinforce Bombay, including Colonel Braithwaite's detachment ; and accordingly, after demolishing the works of Mahé, these troops were held at the disposal of the Bombay government, and intended, if necessary, to join General Goddard after the monsoon.

The fugitive Rugoba was received, though at first
June 12. scarcely welcomed, by the English ; and, on the 12th June, accompanied by his sons Amrut Rao and Bajee Rao, the latter a child of four years old, visited General Goddard in his camp, from whom he received an allowance of 50,000 rupees a month, which the governor-general and council totally disapproved, and condemned as a lavish and unnecessary expenditure.

General Goddard had been sufficiently prudent to avoid entering on any terms of alliance with Rugoba: it was considered very impolitic to attempt forcing a person into the Mahratta government, to whom the whole nation had manifested indifference or aversion; and therefore, acting upon the terms of the Poorundhur treaty, if all accommodation were rejected, the English, in support of their national honor, could do no less than engage in the war as principals. The negotiation between General Goddard and Nana Furnuwees continued for several months; but towards the end of the monsoon, Goddard communicated to the Bombay government some intelligence he had received of a general confederacy of the Mahrattas, Hyder, and Nizam Ally against the English, on whom, it was said, they meditated an attack at all the three presidencies. General Goddard, prior to the receipt of this information, had sent to demand explicit answers from Nana Furnuwees, which were obtained sooner than was expected, by his declaring that the surrender of Salsette and the person of

October. Rugoba were preliminaries to any treaty

which the English might wish to conclude with the Mahratta state. An immediate requisition was made for Colonel Braithwaite's detachment on the first intelligence of a confederacy; but, in consequence of an attack of the Nairs,* secretly instigated by Hyder, against both Mahé and Tellicherry, the services of the detachment could not be immediately spared; the Madras government, therefore, who then foresaw no impending danger to their own presidency, prepared another detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, of 100 artillery,

* There were two chiefs in Malabar known by the appellations of prince of Cherika and king of Cartinadee, who were leaders in the hostilities alluded to.

a regiment of 500 Europeans, and a battalion of sepoy; but, before they joined Goddard, the campaign of the ensuing season was nearly at an end.

When General Goddard obtained the answer from Nana Furnuwees, he evaded giving an immediate reply, embarked for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st November, and immediately consulted with the government respecting the plan of operations, particularly in regard to the proposed alliance with Futih Sing. His principal motive, however, for repairing thus promptly to Bombay was to urge despatch in preparing and sending off a reinforcement. Accordingly, although the Bombay government recommended delay, they acceded to his desire, and a detachment, under Colonel Hartley, of 100 European artillery, 200 European infantry, two battalions of native infantry, one of them a battalion of grenadier sepoy, volunteer drafts from different corps, principally those who had before served under Hartley on the rear-guard at Tullygaom, were speedily embarked for Guzerat.

On the side of Bengal a detachment of 2,000 sepoy were in readiness to follow General Goddard's route; but, on hearing that the war was inevitable, and might have broken out before they could have reached their destination, their march to Surat was countermanded. Mr. Hastings, desirous, it would seem, of embracing any proposal for effecting a diversion, and perhaps of giving the country a rallying-point of insurrection against the Mahrattas, entered into an alliance with their turbulent tributary, the rana of Gohud.

Meanwhile General Goddard, on his return to Surat, dismissed the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees, put his army in a state of readiness, and opened the negotiation with Futih Sing. A treacherous correspondence was about this period

intercepted by General Goddard between the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees and Mr. Vandegraaf, the Dutch chief and director at Surat, from which it appeared that the Dutch had engaged in a plot for assisting the Mahrattas to surprise Surat castle; but Mr. Boddam, the English chief, took effectual precautions to prevent the perfidious design.

Futih Sing, on the receipt of the proposals, attempted to procrastinate, and showed every disposition to evade a definite engagement with the English. General Goddard,

therefore, put his army in motion, crossed
 Jan. 1, 1780. the Taptee on the 1st January, but ad-

vanced very slowly to the northward, until his battering train and stores had joined him from Baroach, when he marched to attack the fort of Dubhoy, which was in possession of the Peishwa, and garrisoned by about 2,000 men. Whilst General Goddard moved forward, Mr. Boddam occupied the Peishwa's districts near Surat. Mr. Robert Gambier, and the gentlemen of the civil service at Baroach, having enlisted irregulars, also took advantage of General Goddard's being in their neighbourhood, drove out the Peishwa's thannas, and took possession of Oklaseer, Hansot, Desborah, and Ahmod. Jumbooseer had not been restored by the Bombay government.

The army arrived before Dubhoy on the 18th January.

The Bramin commandant, on being sum-
 January 18. moned to surrender, answered by a vaunt-

ing discharge of matchlocks, and kept up a continued fire during the ensuing day, which did no other mischief than that of wounding one subaltern of the Bombay army, Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, the same person who was afterwards surveyor-general.

By day-break of the 20th, a battery of three 18-pounders was ready to open within 200 yards ; but
January 20. the garrison had evacuated the place in the night, and Mr. James Forbes* of the civil service, with a company of sepoy and a few irregulars, were placed in charge of the new acquisition. Futih Sing now began to negotiate in earnest ; met General Goddard, seemingly with as much cordiality as alacrity, and
January 26. concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, which was signed on the 26th, on the terms proposed by Governor Hornby, and approved by the supreme government.

The Peishwa's share of territory north of the Myhie was to be given up to Futih Sing, in lieu of which he agreed to cede his share of revenue south of the Taptee, or those districts known by the appellation of Uthawees Mahal (or Attaweese), his share of the revenues of Baroach, the district of Sinnore on the Nerbuddah, and his villages in the Baroach district. The usual tribute to the Peishwa was to be remitted at all events during the war, but 3,000 horse were to join Goddard's army. The company were to be put in possession of the districts ceded, from the day that Futih Sing's troops were put in possession of Ahmedabad. For that place General Goddard marched with expedition, and arrived before it on the 10th February.

February 10. The walls of Ahmedabad are of immense extent, and, for so vast a city, were remarkably strong. Though this ancient capital was considered in a comparatively deserted condition, even at this period it was supposed to contain upwards of 100,000 inhabitants. The Bramin in charge on the part of the Poona government, being summoned to surrender, expressed his willingness

* The author of the Oriental Memoirs.

to give up the place, but desired a little time to persuade his garrison, composed of 6,000 Arab and Sindee infantry and 2,000 Mahratta horse to comply with the general's desire. This is the ordinary language of Mahrattas when they intend a firm resistance; but General Goddard had afterwards reason to believe there was truth in what the Bramin asserted.

Next day, some of the troops, having ventured too near the wall, suffered for their temerity, and,
 February 11. amongst the rest, an officer, the second-in-command, Lieutenant-Colonel Parker,
 February 12. was wounded. On the 12th, however, General Goddard opened a battery, by
 February 13. which a breach was effected, and reported practicable by the evening of the 13th. From motives of humanity, and the fear of excesses in the city, the assault was next day delayed, in hopes that the garrison might be induced to surrender; but the endeavour was unavailing, and the storming party was formed on the morning of the 15th February, under
 February 15. command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley. The advance was composed of volunteers from the Bombay division. Two unfortunate individuals,* of those who had been dismissed for misbehaviour in the preceding

* Their names were Fraser and Clancey. Fraser was dismissed for abandoning his post at the Bhore Ghaut on hearing of the defeat at Wurgaom. But the infamy was rendered particularly striking and ridiculous, as it was from him that the first intelligence was received in Bombay of the disaster; and, writing from recollection, his note is on the Bombay records in these words:—"Dear Sir,—Our army is cut to pieces; I can effect my retreat, but I scorn it, at the risk of my honour. This is the last you shall hear from, yours truly, W. Fraser." Fraser, however, lived not only to retrieve his honor, but to distinguish himself on several occasions, and to be much esteemed throughout the army. This last I mention on the authority of Major-General Baillie, who knew him intimately.

campaign, came forward to General Goddard, and earnestly solicited permission to accompany the forlorn hope, which was humanely granted, and both survived, after proving themselves worthy of being restored to the service. The command of the party, however, was intrusted to Sergeant Fridge of the Bombay European regiment, a corps always celebrated for gallant volunteers on such occasions. The grenadiers of the Bombay division followed the forlorn hope, with a strong reserve of chosen men from the army. On the preconcerted signal, the whole moved off at a brisk pace, rushed up the breach, where the garrison stood ready to receive them, and for a short time made a very determined stand, until 300 of them lay dead, when resistance ceased. The most honorable part of this gallant assault was the subsequent steadiness and good conduct of the troops. No excesses were committed, and two only of the inhabitants not composing the garrison lost their lives. Of the British troops, 106 were killed and wounded; among the latter were 10 European officers and four gentlemen volunteers, three of whom died of their wounds.*

The capital of Guzerat was scarcely reduced when General Goddard heard of the approach of Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar with a body of 15,000 horse, to which were to be united 7,000 horse, then engaged in plundering the villages about Baroach.

After the escape of Rugoba, there was some coolness between Sindia and the minister, but they were speedily reconciled; and although Mahadajee did not wish to quit the capital at that time, yet, as he had Nana under command by causing him to apprehend an alliance with the English, he at last consented to oppose Goddard in Guzerat;

* Major Spaith, Bombay Engineers; Captain Gough, Bengal Native Infantry; and Volunteer Wright.

and it is necessary to apprise the reader that Nana Furnuwees was without reserve informed of all the subsequent proceedings of Sindia: a report, however, was spread of Sindia's being on the eve of a rupture with Nana, which was speedily followed by another report of his intention to make a desperate effort to recover possession of Rugoba's person by assaulting Surat.

Rugonath Rao had been persuaded by General Goddard to remain in that city when the army took the field—a circumstance which Mahadajee, from not exactly comprehending that the English were at war as principals, did not expect, and which may have disconcerted the scheme he was hatching. The momentary alarm, however, occasioned by his threat, was dissipated on the arrival of the European part of the Madras detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, which had disembarked at Surat before the Mahratta army had passed Candeish.

Sindia and Holkar forded the Nerbuddah on the 29th February 29. February with upwards of 20,000 horse, and proceeded to the neighbourhood of

March 6.

Baroda, where they halted. Goddard crossed the Myhie on the 6th March at

Fazilpoor, to give them battle; but, on his advancing towards Baroda, they retired in the direction of Pawungurh. Sindia, so far from evincing hostile intentions, professed the greatest friendship for the English. The two hostages, Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart, who were still in his camp, and whom he had treated with much hospitality, were restored to liberty, and joined

March 9.

General Goddard on the evening of the 9th. This act of kindness was followed by the appearance of a wukeel, Abajee Shabajee, who gave assurances of his master's friendship for the English, and

enmity to Nana Furnuwees, declaring that his master had experienced from the latter the greatest ingratitude and treachery. But Goddard, without being drawn in to make proposals for an alliance, which, allowing Sindia to have been sincere, would have afforded him a grand advantage, made suitable answers by assurances of a reciprocal regard on the part of the English; but, with respect to the terms of a treaty, he left Sindia to be the judge of what would prove mutually advantageous, as the British governments in India had no other view than a permanent peace, which they were determined to obtain on terms honorable, defined and secure.

Sindia's object was to waste the time in negotiation, and keep Goddard inactive during the fair season; but Indian chicane is no match for European honesty. General Goddard was sincere in assuring Sindia of his desire for peace, but he limited the negotiation to a certain time, and allowed Sindia three days from the time his wukeel quitted the British camp to offer his proposals.

March 16.

Accordingly, on the 16th March, the wukeel returned, and submitted the following terms from his master:—"That formerly, when Rugoba was at Tullygaom, after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered into between him and Sindia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, when the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansee, where he should receive an allowance of 12 lakhs of rupees per annum; that the sicca should continue in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narain, and that Bajee Rao, the son of Rugoba, should be appointed the Peishwa's dewan, but as he was too young to transact the business of the office

himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it should be left entirely to Sindia. He now, therefore, proposed that Rugoba should retire to Jhansee, and that the young Bajee Rao should accompany him to Poona."

Such were his proposals, without declaring himself further respecting the English, whose part he still reserved for Goddard to propose; but General Goddard merely objected to what was wrong, declared that no force should be put on Rugoba's inclination, that he had sought the protection of the English, and that his quitting it should be voluntary; that even allowing the English did assist Sindia to acquire the entire powers of the state—for the sum of his proposals amounted to nothing less—Sindia, on his part, in the name of the Peishwa, should previously consent to certain conditions favourable to the British interests, as well in consideration of the benefits he was to derive, as in compensation for the wars of the Mahratta state in which they had been compelled to engage. The negotiation was thus brought to a point within seven days, which Sindia probably intended to have spun out into as many months, when it would have been his study to balance Bramin fears and jealousy against the policy of the English, and that sanguine temperament of Europeans which is usually accompanied by credulity.

Mahadajee Sindia continued to profess his friendly regard, but, perceiving that Goddard was not to be duped, he opened a negotiation with Govind Rao Gaekwar for putting him in possession of Guzerat; and Goddard had now no other desire than to bring on an action, which the Mahrattas as carefully avoided. Sindia, apprehending a surprise, sent his heavy baggage under the protection of the hill-fort of Pawungurh, which was in his own

possession, and threw out a number of small parties of horse to retire on the first alarm, and enable him to avoid any sudden attack that might be meditated.

In this manner, fancying himself secure, he allowed the
March 27. British army to encamp; on the 27th
March, within six miles of his main body,
in which situation they lay watching each other for a
week; but Goddard, on the night of the
April 2. 2nd April, prepared a detachment of 10

companies of grenadier sepoy, headed by the two European
grenadier companies of the Bombay regiment, two batta-
lions of Bengal and one of Bombay native infantry,
with the regiment of Bengal cavalry, and a small body of
horse belonging to the nabob of Oude, the whole being
supported by 12 pieces of artillery. This force he disposed
in two lines; the first line was commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel W. A. Baillie, the second by Major Hopkins; and

April 3. at two o'clock on the morning of the 3rd,
the time when the guards of irregulars
begin to be overpowered by drowsiness, they moved off
silently under General Goddard's personal command:
Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley remained in camp in command
of the rest of the army. The detachment passed the
Mahratta out-parties without being discovered,—came
upon their grand guard of several thousand men,—pushed
on for their camp, still a mile and a half in front, without
firing a shot; but the day dawned, the alarm had been
communicated, and the main body were ready mounted.
They stood for a short time, and even advanced, as if to
charge, but they were received with a heavy fire, on
which they turned their horses until they were beyond
reach of the guns; a spirited charge by the body of cavalry
belonging to the nabob of Oude, distinguished from the

regiment of Bengal cavalry by the name of the *Candahar horse*, on a body of the Mahrattas, completed the rout, and drove them beyond the reach of pursuit.

Of the regular troops not a man was touched, but 15 of the Candahar horse fell in the charge. The loss of the Mahrattas was supposed to be considerable; and General Goddard imagined he had gained a victory; but as soon as he had encamped, Sindia took up the same distance as before, observing a greater vigilance in guarding against surprise. On the

April 14. 14th, Colonel Browne, with the Madras troops, joined, and General Goddard on the

19th made another attempt on Sindia's camp; but the Mahrattas only waited until he came within sufficient distance, when they let off a flight of rockets, and retired as before.

The Bombay government expressed some impatience at General Goddard's allowing himself to be thus amused, as they imagined that his army might have been better employed in reducing the fort of Bassein, which they considered of value as a permanent acquisition; but General Goddard was constrained to this mode of operations; the time would not have admitted of his forming a regular siege, and to quit Guzerat at that period was to leave their Ally Futih Sing at the mercy of the enemy. It was evident that Sindia wished to draw him into a long pursuit; and, although no decisive advantage was gained, the mere circumstance of forcing Sindia and Holkar to decline a battle, and retire before his army, was of importance in the neighbourhood of the new acquisitions. At the request of the presidency, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley was ordered down to Bombay, and quitted the

May 8. army near Baroda on the 8th May. The presence of this reinforcement in the Concan was very necessary.

The greater part of the provisions for the consumption of the inhabitants of Bombay being drawn from the neighbouring continent, in order to prevent the Mahrattas from cutting off the supplies, in which they had partly succeeded, detachments were sent from Salsette and Bombay, which had seized and occupied several posts, and one party, consisting of two companies of sepoy, headed by four European subalterns, pushed on to the Ghauts, occupied one of the passes, where they established a post, got up three pieces of cannon, and were reinforced by a small detail of European artillery. But the principal acquisition was the town of Kallian, where a captain's post was established under Captain Richard Campbell. Nana Furnuwees, who set a high value upon that place, assembled a large force for the purpose of recovering it, and driving the English from the continent: the post at the Ghauts was attacked before it could be withdrawn; the party was cut off or dispersed, and the guns were taken. Three of the officers were killed, and one of them was made prisoner. The Mahrattas, elated with this success, advanced towards Kallian, threatened to exterminate the garrison if they dared to resist, and forced their prisoner, Ensign Fyfe, to write* to the commanding officer, Captain Richard Campbell, to demand the surrender of the town. To all which Campbell replied "that they were welcome

* The following is a copy of the letter :—

" DEAR SIR,—I am now a prisoner in the Mahratta camp, with seven European artillerymen, one subedar, two Jimmadars, and 15 sepoy. They are encamped within a very little distance of Callian, and are about 16,000 or 18,000 fighting men. They have eight guns and one howitzer. This is the best account I can give you. I write this at their desire, to demand that you will immediately deliver up Callian and Ballapore, otherwise they threaten to kill every one of us, to storm both those places, and put every man to the sword. You may act as you think proper, but I beg you will return the bearer, as I have pledged my head you will not hurt the messenger; so be sure to return an answer soon. Our situation

to it if they could take it," and made a most spirited defence. Colonel Hartley fortunately arrived from Guzerat just in time to prevent the assault, which was to have taken place on the morning of the 25th May; but, on the night of the 24th, Hartley surprised the Mahratta camp, followed them up for several miles, killed a great number, but could not succeed in taking the guns. They retired, however, from the Concan, and left the British troops unmolested during the remainder of the fair season.

General Goddard, in the meantime, being incommoded for want of forage, was obliged to send to a distance to procure it; a covering party was briskly attacked, but repulsed the enemy; and shortly after this event, Goddard moved to the Nerbuddah, in order to place his troops in convenient stations during the approaching rains.

He received a pressing application from the Bombay government to endeavour to seize Parneira, a hill 15 miles north of Damaun, fortified by Moro Punt Pingley in the time of Sivajee; but their wishes had been anticipated. Gunnesh Punt, a Mahratta officer, who had been stationed in the Concan, quitted that quarter, plundered such parts of the Attaveesy as did not acknowledge the ministerial party, and advanced close to Surat, where he had committed great devastations.

is none of the most agreeable. I should be obliged to M'Lean for a few clothes, as I have none.

"I am, Dear Sir,

"Your most obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) "THOMAS FYFE.

"Camp, near Callian, 12th May 1780.

"To CAPTAIN CAMPBELL.

"P.S.—This does not please Mr. Bappoojee, the Bura Surdar; he also demands he may be paid for all the batty (rice) that has been taken, and a tribute for the expense of his army. He also says that General Goddard, with the grand army, is at present surrounded in Guzerat, and if you will peaceably comply with the above terms, he will get the grand army released, and further threatens us on refusal."

Lieutenant Welsh, an officer of the Bengal cavalry, having been sent forward by Goddard, at the requisition of the civil authorities in Surat, with the regiment of cavalry, the Candahar horse, and a body of infantry, surprised the camp of Gunnesb Punt at four o'clock on the morning of the 23rd April, killed upwards of a hundred of the Mahrattas, mortally wounded Gunnesb Punt, the commander, took his guns, three in number, and the whole of his baggage.* Lieutenant Welsh went on to the southward, and greatly distinguished himself by reducing Parneira, Bugwara, and Indergurrh—three forts in the neighbourhood of Damaun, of which the Bombay government were very anxious to obtain possession. A detachment of the Bengal sepoy, under Major Forbes, also distinguished themselves by attacking and routing one of Sindia's detachment near Sinnore, on the banks of the Nerbuddah, which insured tranquillity to the newly-acquired districts in Guzerat during the approaching monsoon.

In the Concan, after the rain fell, the Mahrattas in small parties returned to molest the different posts; but Major Hopkins and Captain Abington, who were stationed

* Lieutenant Welsh's despatch to the chief of Surat, Mahratta letters. Lieutenant W. does not seem to have been aware that Gunnesb Punt was mortally wounded, which the Mahratta letters mention. The following is a copy of the despatch:—

"DEAR SIR,—I have the pleasure to acquaint you that I rode on at the head of the regiment and Candahars, and reached Gunnesb Punt's camp at four o'clock this morning, when I took his camp standing, bazar, and three guns, killed 90, and wounded 15. I have only lost one duffedar, and two troopers wounded, one Candahar killed. In short, there was nothing wanting to complete this matter, but sending you in Gunnesb Punt's head. I don't think he has much to brag of now. The inhabitants of the villages seem exceeding happy, and are coming in from all quarters.

"I am, dear Sir,

"Your very obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) "THOMAS WELSH,"

with the 8th* and 9th battalions at Kallian, prevented any attempt upon that place.

In regard to the affairs of Bengal, the treaty on the part of Mr. Hastings with the rana of Gohud was opposed by some of the members of the Bengal government with more reason than is always to be found in their objections; such an insignificant ally, without troops, resources, or extensive popularity, was more likely to embarrass than to aid a regular army, unless in regard to supplies whilst actually within the Gohud territory. A diversion, by attacking the Mahrattas on the north-east part of Malwa, by passing through Gohud, was strongly recommended by Goddard, and supported by Sir Eyre Coote. The latter, however, disapproved of sending a small force; and when, at the requisition of the rana, Captain Popham was ordered to cross the Jumna, Sir Eyre Coote deemed the measure extremely injudicious.

The detachment under Captain William Popham was

* The grenadier sepoy, who accompanied Hartley to Ahmedabad, were formed into a separate corps, but on their return lost their name of the grenadier battalion, and were called the 8th battalion—a circumstance which nearly created a mutiny in the corps. To restore the name to men who remonstrated in a manner so unsoldierlike was deemed improper; but they afterwards behaved with such extraordinary valour, that their name of grenadier battalion was restored in 1783. They distinguished themselves during the arduous campaign in the Concan, which will be presently detailed. For their conduct in the battle of Paniany by the side of the 42nd regiment, they received the highest compliment ever paid to a sepoy regiment. "The Royal Highlanders," says Colonel M'Leod, in his despatch of the 29th of November 1782, "evinced the ardour which always inspires their countrymen in battle. The 8th battalion of sepoy showed themselves equal to any troops in courage, coolness, and discipline." They then petitioned, through Colonel M'Leod, to have their name restored: but it was refused. In the following year, however, the 8th battalion formed part of the garrison which maintained the heroic defence of Mangalore, and their name was restored, as the only reward which the sickly, famished men, on their return to Bombay, solicited. They were long fortunate in a succession of excellent commanding officers; and on every occasion of service the spirit of Stewart and of Hartley has lived in their ranks.

composed of drafts intended to recruit the Bengal battalions serving with General Goddard ; but, in consequence of the renewal of the war, they were not allowed to march across India, as had been originally ordered, and were now selected for this service. The whole amounted to 2,400 men ; they were formed into three battalions of equal strength : a small body of cavalry, and a detail of European artillery, with a howitzer and a few field-pieces, accompanied them. Captain Popham crossed the Jumna, in the month of February ; he immediately attacked a body of Mahrattas, who were plundering in the neighbourhood of Gohud, drove them from the country, and, at the request of the rana, marched against Lahar, a fortified place 50 miles west of Kalpee, in possession of the Mahrattas. Having summoned the fort, which refused to surrender, he was obliged to commence an attack, although he found it much stronger than had been represented, and that battering guns were necessary to insure its capture. But the determined bravery of the troops overcame every difficulty ; long before the breach was, in the ordinary sense of the word, practicable, Captain Popham, foreseeing that field-pieces might never effect the purpose, determined to storm. Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner led on the advance ; both fell in the breach ; but Mr. O'Dell, a volunteer, rushed forward to supply their place, mounted the works, gallantly followed by the party, and, after a persevering assault, the place was carried, although with the heavy loss of 125 men of the storming party. This success was entirely unexpected by Sir Eyre Coote, who, on hearing of the attack without battering cannon, only anticipated disaster ; and, in consequence of his representations, another detachment of four regular battalions, with a battering train, was held in readiness to cross the Jumna,

under Major Jacob Camac. But if the successful assault of Lahar was unexpected, the capture of the strong hill fort of Gwalior without the loss of a man excited the utmost admiration. Captain Popham, after his return from Lahar, was encamped during the rains within five *kos* of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior; expecting to be relieved as soon as the season permitted. Gwalior was in possession of Mahadajee Sindia, and in Hindostan, where the stupendous fastnesses of the west of India were little known, it was accounted one of the strongest forts in Asia.

Captain Popham, with equal enterprize and prudence, was employed for about two months in laying his scheme; and at last, assisted by spies, furnished through the rana of Gohud, he determined to carry his plan into execution. Every preperation had been made with the utmost secrecy, and on the night of the 3rd August he formed his party. The command of the advance was conferred on Captain Bruce, who had before distinguished himself in the attack of the Mahratta horse, upon the first arrival of the detachment in the Gohud territory. The advance on this occasion consisted of two companies of sepoy, chosen grenadiers, and light infantry. They were led by four lieutenants—Wilson, Scott, Allen, and Paterson; and, as the surprise of natives was intended, 20 Europeans followed the sepoy—a judicious disposition, as they were near enough to gain the head of the column if necessary, and where they were placed, less likely to lead to discovery; two battalions of sepoy followed: scaling-ladders applied to the foot of the scarpd rock, which was 16 feet high, enabled them to mount with ease. Thence they had to climb a steep ascent of about 40 yards to the foot of the second wall, which was 30 feet high. The spies ascended, made fast ladders of ropes, by which

the sepoy's mounted with alacrity, and each man as he got inside squatted down. Twenty of the sepoy's, with Captain Bruce, had entered the fort, when three of them so far forgot themselves as to shoot some of the garrison who lay asleep near them. This indiscretion occasioned an immediate alarm; but the sepoy's stood their ground, their comrades mounted to their support, the garrison became intimidated, and the sun had scarcely risen on the 4th August when the assailants had obtained possession, almost without resistance, of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior.

On that very night a similar attempt was made with different success on the western side of India. Captain Abington, afterwards so well known from his gallant defence of Tellicherry, made an attempt to surprise the strong fortress of Mullungurh, or, as it is frequently termed, Bhow Mullun, one of the most conspicuous objects of the beautiful view to the eastward of the island of Bombay. Captain Abington succeeded in possessing himself of the lower hill; but the garrison, before his men could get sufficiently near to mingle with them, took the alarm, and made good their retreat to the upper fort—an enormous mass of perpendicular rock that defied all attempts at an assault.

During the rains the Bombay government had full leisure to contemplate the state of their affairs. Their greatest distress was their total want of funds. They looked to Bengal for a supply of treasure; but the hostility of Hyder, which the supreme government had doubted, and which the majority of the Madras rulers disbelieved, burst with appalling certainty on the province of Arcot, which was invaded in the month of July with the most formidable army that had ever opposed the British power in India. This new difficulty, superadded to their own distress,

induced the supreme government to declare that they could afford no assistance to the Bombay presidency. "We have no resource," says Governor Hornby in his admirable minute of the 1st August, "but such as we may find in our own efforts;" and in this strait his measures showed much judgment and vigour. To raise funds was the subject of immediate deliberation, and the difficulties are best expressed in the means taken to obviate them. A quantity of copper in the company's warehouses, valued at 10 or 12 lakhs of rupees, was disposed of to the highest bidder; loans in Bengal, on the credit of the Bombay government, were proposed to be negotiated, and a plan laid of seizing as much as possible of the enemy's resources, by anticipating them in the collection of their revenue.

General Goddard was to besiege Bassein as soon as the season permitted: the European part of his army was sent down to Salsette by sea, the battering train was prepared in Bombay, and the sepoy's were to march by land. Early in October the whole of the disposable force at Bombay and in the neighbourhood, consisting of five battalions, were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, who was instructed to drive out the enemy's posts, and cover as much of the Concan as possible, so as to enable the agents of the Bombay government to collect a part of the revenues, and secure the rice harvest, which is gathered at the close of the rains. There is perhaps no part of Mr. Hornby's minute more expressive of the distress under which that government laboured, than that where, alluding to the field force they were preparing, he observes—"Our troops will better bear running in arrears when employed on active service, and subsisting in the enemy's country;" for it is a principle with the British government and its officers, in India, than which

nothing has more tended to the national success, always to consider the peasantry under their strictest protection. As General Goddard advanced to invest Bassein, it was intended that Colonel Hartley should then take up a position a little to the east of that fortress, and prevent the Mahratta army from attempting to raise the siege.

Hartley, however, in the first place was required to march to the relief of Captain Abington, who still occupied the lower part of the fort of Mullungurh ; but a large body of upwards of 3,000 of the enemy, principally infantry, had cut off his communication with Kallian, so that he was attacked by the garrison from the works above him, and surrounded by the body in question. This service

Colonel Hartley effected on the 1st of
October 1.

October without loss ; and another corps under Captain Jameson joined the party at Mullungurh, which now consisted of the 2nd and 8th battalions under Major Hopkins. The enemy, however, were also reinforced, and pitched their camp next day on the south-east side of the hill, where they began to lay waste the country. Colonel Hartley immediately prepared to attack them, and for this purpose marched from Kallian with the Bombay European regiment and the 1st battalion of sepoys, directing Major Hopkins to send down the 8th battalion, under Captain Jameson, to assist in the attack. The Mahrattas were apprized of Colonel Hartley's advance, and met him at the foot of the hill. Thence they gradually retired towards their camp, which was left standing in the confidence of perfect security, and maintained a running fight, as if they had intended to draw the troops into an ambuscade ; but all at once, Captain Jameson's corps, advancing from the hill, came upon the whole body, and, without waiting for the rest of the troops, instantly attacked

them; to use the words of Colonel Hartley, "with the utmost eagerness and spirit pursued them to their camp (of which they took possession), and were shortly afterwards joined by the rest of the troops." This spirited success, which was effected with the loss of only a few men of the 8th battalion, put the troops into high spirits, of which Hartley took immediate advantage, followed up the enemy's parties with alacrity, drove them out of the Concan, occupied a position not far from the Bhore Ghaut, and thus for a short time enabled the Bombay government to carry their plan of collecting the revenue into effect.

General Goddard, having before sent down the Europeans by sea, commenced his march from Surat on the 16th of October. For the protection of Guzerat six companies from the Bengal and two of the Bombay detachment had been left with Futih Sing Gaekwar to strengthen his garrison at Ahmedabad; that party was accordingly directed to remain there for the present. In Baroda Futih Sing had a considerable force of his own, and Dubhoy was guarded against all but a regular siege. Two Bengal battalions were stationed on the Nerbuddah at Sinnore; two battalions of Bombay sepoys, one of which was held ready at Surat, and the other at Baroach, to act conjointly or separately, were placed under the orders of Major Forbes, a Bengal officer of approved merit, to whom the charge of the general defence of the Guzerat province was assigned, and Futih Sing Gaekwar's quota of 3,000 horse were to join Major Forbes as necessary.

General Goddard arrived before Bassein on the 13th of November, and, having carefully reconnoitred it, he found the north face the only site on which it could be attacked by regular approaches—a mode which, owing to

the great strength of the place, although it might require more time, he determined to adopt.

He accordingly opened trenches, and completed his first battery on the 28th of November at the distance of 900 yards ; other batteries were opened at the distance of 800 and 500 yards successively. He had a very powerful artillery, principally 24-pounders, and one battery of 20 mortars, at the distance of 500 yards, which did great execution.

In the meantime Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay were making every preparation to recover the Concan, and raised the siege of Bassein. The horse did not arrive until the Dussera, and the guns and equipments which had been before furnished, principally by Mahadajee Sindia, were not in sufficient readiness to enable them to take the field. Ramchundur Gunnessh, Pureshram Bhow, Anund Rao Rastia, and several other officers were sent forward, and as fast as the Maharatta troops were assembled, they were sent down to join them in the Concan.

The division under Colonel Hartley were for upwards of a month engaged in daily skirmishes ; a great deal of their ammunition was expended, and the sick, many of whom were wounded, amounted to 600, which, with his detachments, reduced his number to little more than 2,000 effective men. Having heard that the enemy intended to throw succour into Bassein, and cut off his communication with that place, it being no longer possible to cover the country, Colonel Hartley judiciously moved to Tit-

December 8. walla on the 8th of December ; from
thence he continued his march towards

Doogaur, nine miles east of Bassein. The Bombay government, over-anxious to recover the revenue, dis-

approved of his quitting the neighbourhood of the Bhore Ghaut; but they were not fully aware of the strength of the Mahratta army, or the experience and enterprize of the principal commander, Ramchunder Gunnesh. Finding that the precautions of Goddard had effectually prevented an attempt to succour Bassein, the Mahrattas had determined to make amends for its loss by the destruction of the covering army. On the 10th December their united force, amounting in horse and foot to upwards of 20,000 men, thrice attacked the Bombay division in front and rear, but were each time steadily repulsed; 5,000 of their horse made a spirited charge on the left of Hartley's line, but they were so well received that no impression was made, and the troops sustained but little loss, having only 18 killed and wounded; two, however, were officers—Lieutenants Drew and Cooper. On the ensuing day the attack was renewed, the horse did not charge, but the

December 11. Mahratta guns did considerable execution, and the division lost Lieutenants Cowan and Peirson, with upwards of 100 men; the troops, however, though weakened and harassed during a period of nearly six weeks' constant fighting, behaved most gallantly, and "their conduct," says Colonel Hartley, in his spirited but modest despatches, only confirms me in the high opinion I shall ever have of them."

On the right and left of Colonel Hartley's line there were two eminences, which, when well secured, completely covered his flanks. These heights were guarded by strong pickets, and Colonel Hartley, having observed that the enemy's skirmishers came very close to the right in the action of the 11th, with that judicious anticipation which always gave the Bombay sepoy so much confidence in Hartley, he strengthened those points by directing the

field engineer to throw up a small breastwork, and a gun was sent to each eminence during the night, both to the right and left. Ramchundur Gunnesh perceived the advantage of carrying one of these points, and next day intended to direct his principal attack on the right flank, as Hartley had foreseen. Orders were given to the Mahratta officers to advance in front and rear; Ramchunder in person, by a circuitous route for the purpose of storming the height, led on a body of Arab foot, and 1,000 regular infantry under Signior Noronha,* a Portuguese officer in the Peishwa's service. A body of the best horse supported the infantry, and Ramchunder was determined to carry this post or perish. Taking advantage of a thick fog, by nine o'clock in the morning they had

December 12. approached close to the picket, but the mist suddenly cleared away, the sun shone forth, and both parties, having now a near and full view of each other, paused for a moment, when a brisk fire opened at once, and the guns did surprising execution; the storming party advanced with great ardour; guns from the right of the line were brought to bear upon the assailants, and committed great havoc among the horse; but the Mahrattas still persevered, when suddenly their fire slackened, and a body was seen borne off towards the rear; it was Ramchundur Gunnesh, who fell with the well-earned reputation of a gallant and skilful officer. Signior Noronha was wounded, when the enemy, dispirited by the loss of their leaders, retired precipitately and with heavy

* I find this Portuguese officer mentioned in very high terms by Captain Bonnevaux, of the Madras establishment, in a letter dated Prison in Poona, 25th February 1781. Captain Bonnevaux, intrusted with an overland despatch from the Court of Directors, was taken near the coast of India, carried into Viziadroog, and thrown into the fort of Russalgurh. After enduring great hardship, he was conveyed to Poona, where his sufferings were humanely relieved by Signior Noronha.

loss. In the action of the 12th the Bombay troops suffered very little, and their whole conduct appears to have been much more justly appreciated by the Mahrattas than by their own government ;* the fact is, that military service in India seems always to have been commended rather in proportion to the result than to the duty performed, and this trying and well-fought campaign is scarcely known even to the gallant army by whom it was maintained.

Bassein surrendered on the 11th December, and General Goddard, hearing that the whole army had attacked the Bombay division, set off in person at the head of the cavalry, and the assembled grenadiers of the Bengal and Madras troops, with whom he reached Colonel Hartley's camp on the 13th. He expressed his admiration of the judicious position which had been chosen, and of the fortitude shown by the troops on that and on every occasion, where harassing service and great privation, from want of their pay, had been borne not only without a murmur, but with the greatest cheerfulness. The whole army was now united under General Goddard ; and it unfortunately happened that the orders from the Court of Directors, before alluded to, which made Hartley the junior lieutenant-colonel on the Bombay establishment until all those formerly his seniors should be promoted, was at this time promulgated. Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, of the Madras establishment, though just promoted to that rank, immediately claimed his right, and of course superseded him. Hartley represented the peculiar mortification to which he was subjected ; but the order was irrevocable. He quitted the army, repaired to Eng-

* Mahratta MSS. and letters. The Mahrattas never mention Colonel Hartley's name, and always attribute the defeat of their army and the capture of Bassein to the same person—Goddard.

land, and laid his case before the Court of Directors, who, sensible of his merit, although they could not alter the constitution of their service, recommended him to his majesty, by whom he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the 73rd regiment. Although no longer engaged in Mahratta warfare, he was afterwards distinguished on many occasions in India ;* and though hitherto best known as Major-General Hartley, his real merit is not less conspicuous in the military annals of our country when holding the rank of captain of sepoy.

The reduction of Bassein, and the defeat of the army in the Concan, were severely felt by Nana Furnuwees.† The judicious operations of Goddard had secured that important fortress, with an inconsiderable loss of 13 men, of whom was one officer, Lieutenant Sir John Gordon, who died of his wounds. On the same day that General Goddard joined Colonel Hartley, the Bombay government received a letter from Bengal, dated 9th October, informing them of their intention to make peace with the Mahrattas : ordering that, upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had commanded a cessation of hostilities, that they were immediately to desist in like manner ; but, until such an intimation was received, they were urged to prosecute the war with vigour.‡ Similar instructions were transmitted to General Goddard.

To account for these orders, it is necessary to explain that the supreme government had received information that all the Mahrattas, except Futih Sing Gaekwar (whose communication was in a manner cut off from his countrymen by the British troops, and whose interests strongly bound him to the company), were combined with Hyder

* Bombay Records.

† Mahratta MSS. and letters.

‡ Bombay Records, 6th Report.

and the Nizam against the English, and that Nizam Ally, although he had not commenced hostilities, was the contriver of the whole confederacy. The immediate cause of the enmity of Nizam Ally towards the English originated in a treaty concluded by the Madras government, in April 1779, with his brother Busalut Jung, jagheerdar of Adonee, by which they received him under their protection, on condition of their being allowed to rent the district of Guntoor, which was, at all events, to come into their possession after the death of Busalut Jung. The alliance alarmed Nizam Ally, whose jealousy of Busalut Jung was extreme ; and Hyder, some of whose late acquisitions would have been cut off from the rest of his territory, would not suffer the British troops to take possession of Guntoor, and opposed their march even before the war broke out. The treaty of the Madras government with Busalut Jung was illegal, because it never received the sanction or ratification of the governor-general and council, who, therefore, when it came to their knowledge, in February 1780, disavowed and annulled it—a measure which tended considerably to appease the resentment of Nizam Ally ; but, from the time of the Wurgaom convention, he had adopted a tone of overbearing insolence, which, towards the British authorities, he had not before ventured to assume. Hyder, in addition to those motives of jealousy already described, had a very strong inducement for engaging in the confederacy. The conquests he had made as far north as the Kistna had been ceded to him by Rugonath Rao, whom he affected to consider the legitimate Peishwa ; and the confirmation of this cession on the part of the Poona ministers was preliminary to his becoming a party in the alliance ; his right to the Mahratta territories south of the Kistna was admitted, and the future tribute for the whole

of his possessions was fixed at the inconsiderable sum of 11 lakhs of rupees.

Mr. Hastings, although Moodajee Bhonslay had acquiesced in the scheme of a general confederacy against the English, perceived that he might still ultimately indulge the hope of an alliance with them at some favourable period ; but, from the crisis to which events were hastening, he began to doubt whether the neutrality privately professed by Moodajee could be lasting. The governor-general was sensible of an influence, which Nizam Ally, although in reality an enemy, possessed over the ruler of Berar, through his (Moodajee's) dewan, Dewakur Punt, without whose counsel Moodajee decided on no political measure. The power of Hyder Ally was such that peace with the Mahrattas seemed necessary to the safety of the British in India ; but, in the adversity which threatened them, it seemed less difficult to engage Moodajee as a mediator than as an ally. Under these circumstances, Mr. Hastings offered peace to the Peishwa's government through Moodajee, early in the month of October, on the following terms :— Ahmedabad to be retained for Futih Sing ; Gwalior for the rana of Gohud ; and Bassein, if in possession of the company at the time, to be kept by them ; but the whole of the other acquisitions made since the 1st January 1779 to be restored ; a provision to be made for Rugonath Rao during his life, and a place of residence fixed wherever he might desire, except in the neighbourhood of Bombay ; at all events, no assistance to be afforded by the British government in reasserting his pretensions. Such were the conditions offered, provided the Peishwa's government agreed to enter on an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the company against Hyder Ally and the French nation ; but if the alliance thus tendered should not be

accepted, a peace was proposed by each party, retaining its respective conquests. Moodajee Bhonslay was to be the declared mediator and guarantee; the subordinate governments in India, and all officers commanding divisions of British troops, were to desist from hostilities upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had sent like orders to the commanders of his armies. But before these proposals reached Nagpoor, news had arrived of the disastrous affair where Colonel Baillie's detachment was destroyed by Hyder Ally, near Conjeveram, on the 10th September,* on which Moodajee, concluding that the company's affairs were desperate, hesitated in becoming mediator, unless on terms to which the governor-general and council would not accede.

Moodajee did not send answers to the proposals from Bengal for upwards of two months, but the offers made to him account for the orders already mentioned, which were received on the west of India in December. Although the wants of the Bombay presidency had been partially relieved by an unexpected supply of money from Bengal, the prospect of peace, notwithstanding the sacrifices they must make, was hailed by the members of that government with satisfaction; but as no intimation from the Peishwa arrived, they proposed to secure the Concan, reduce the forts, and then act only on the defensive.

A.D. 1781.	General Goddard was detained for some time by the fort of Arnaul, situated on a small island
January 18.	10 miles north of Bassein, the killidar of which refused to give it up until a force appeared before it; he then surrendered
	on the 18th January. It appeared to General Goddard

* See Wilks, vol. ii.

that an advanced movement, so as to threaten Poona, was more likely to facilitate the negotiations of the governor-general with the Peishwa, than wasting time in attempting to reduce hill-forts, the greater part of which seemed totally impregnable. Although General Goddard, by order from the Court of Directors, was now commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, he was still intrusted with his former powers from Bengal, and at liberty, in a great degree, to follow his own plans. The orders from Bengal, although they desired that the war should be vigorously prosecuted in the event of receiving no intimation from the Peishwa, were yet of a nature to unsettle any steady plan of the authorities acting in subordinate co-operation; and from Madras, where all their evils were attributed, with some justice, "*to Rugoba Dada and the Mahratta war*," every despatch to Bombay teemed with regrets on this subject, pressed the necessity of peace with the Mahrattas, and an attack on Hyder's possessions on the Malabar coast.

Under these circumstances Goddard adopted the half-measure of threatening, without being prepared to carry his threat into execution; and this excellent officer committed his first error by a departure from a rule which common observation inculcates even in ordinary life. He advanced towards the passes of the mountains; Hurry Punt, then in the Concan, retired to Poona, but left the Bhore Ghaut guarded. It was gallantly attacked by Colonel Parker, at the head of the advanced party of Bengal troops, on the night of the 8th of February. He forced the pass with ease, and the troops were encamped at Kundalla, on the same spot which Captain Stewart had occupied about three years before, where they were soon joined by the greater

part of the force ; although Goddard,* with the headquarters, remained at the village of Campoly, at the bottom of the Ghauts.

Their appearance gave Nana Furnuwees no alarm, for his political boldness was contrasted in an extraordinary, but amongst Bramins by no means a singular, manner with his personal timidity, and the only effects produced on him by the advance to the Ghauts were additional efforts to increase the army, and the most vigorous preparations for rendering the country a desert and Poona a ruin. He, however, tried to amuse General Goddard by sending an unauthorized agent to treat with him, which induced Goddard to make overtures on the terms proposed through Moodajee Bhonslay. Of these Nana affected ignorance ; Goddard sent him a copy of the terms, and thus subjected them to positive rejection ; for Nana Furnuwees observed that proposals had been tendered by the governor-general, but that Moodajee had refused to forward them ; that these now sent could not be listened to, nor at that time would any terms whatever be admitted in which Hyder,

* Nana Furnuwees, as appears by his letters, had very exact intelligence of everything ; but in stating Goddard's force at 10,000 fighting men, he greatly over-estimates it.

The following is the exact number, exclusive of European officers :—

<i>Present for duty.</i>		
Madras Artillery	67	} <i>Europeans.</i>
Bombay Artillery	57	
Bombay Regiment.....	170	
Madras Regiment	346	
Bengal Golundauz, or Native Artillery.....	97	} <i>Natives.</i>
Bengal Sepoys.....	2,542	
Bombay Sepoys	1,446	
Madras Sepoys	527	
Cavalry	700	
Lascars and Pioneers	200	
Total... 6,152		

the ally of the Mahratta state, was not included.* It is probable that General Goddard's own judgment disapproved of such unavailing concession, but he was urged to it by letters from Sir Eyre Coote at Madras, who, in the month of October 1780, had been solicited by the governor-general to repair to the coast and retrieve the fortunes and honor of his country—a call which was as gratifying to the feelings of the general as to the army of Fort St. George.

Nana Furnuwees had sent the Peishwa, now in his seventh year, to Poorundhur; Hurry Punt Phurkay and Tookajee Holkar commanded the main body of his army, with which Nana himself advanced towards the Ghauts, and Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun was sent down into the Concan with a force of 12,000 men to harass Goddard's detachments, and obstruct the communication with Bombay.† An opportunity soon presented itself; a detachment of two corps, the 1st Bombay and 5th Bengal battalions, under Captain Mackay, when returning from Panwell as

* The reply which I have expressed, as above, is couched in the following smooth terms. After explaining that Moodajee had refused to forward the terms, Nana observes—"The copy of the proposals which you have sent has been read from beginning to end by your friend; and it is certain that the contents therein written are not proper or fit for the approbation of this government. If you be sincere in your desire of friendship, it is incumbent on you to make proposals, which shall include those persons who at this time are allied to, and connected with, the councils of this state." (Extract of a letter from Nana Furnuwees to General Goddard, 5th March 1781.)

† Letter from Nana Furnuwees to the Peishwa at Poorundhur. The letters which I shall from this time have occasion to refer to, both from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay, are all translated from originals in their own handwriting. They were found amongst the records in the Peishwa's palace, recovered by Captain Henry Robertson, collector of Poona, and the late Lieutenant John M'Leod, resident at Bushire, when assistant to Mr. Chaplin, commissioner; and by those gentlemen they were made over to me by special authority from the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone.

an escort to a convoy of grain for the army, were very briskly attacked by Pureshram Bhow. On

March 15. the night of the 15th March, Captain Mackay had brought up his convoy a

March 16. distance of 12 miles, to the village of Chouke, when, early on the morning of

the 16th March, he was suddenly assailed by the whole force of Pureshram Bhow, which he repulsed, though not without difficulty ; but Pureshram Bhow's loss was comparatively very severe. Both battalions behaved well, and the Bengal sepoy, who had never before been so closely engaged, showed very great spirit. One company, however, in charging a body of horse with the bayonet, after having routed them, were drawn forward in the eagerness of pursuit, when the Mahrattas, than whom, if no troops sooner fly, none are so speedily rallied, wheeled about, charged, and overpowered them ; but the contiguity of the line saved them from total destruction. Captain Mackay had still 12 long miles to march before he could reach the bottom of the Ghaut : the face of the country in the Concan has already been described, and although the road was the best in the country, it was a mere pathway, through a tract exceedingly rugged, full of deep ravines and dells, strong jungles on his right and left, and frequently high rocks and precipices within musket-shot on both sides. Captain Mackay renewed his march as soon as it was dark, and advanced before morning to within a few miles of Campoly, whence General Goddard sent out a reinforcement, with carriage for his wounded, and enabled him to bring in his men and the whole convoy without further molestation.

The movement towards the Ghauts, from which Goddard calculated advantageous political results, had completely

failed, and the Bombay government, in the prospect of keeping Guzerat and the Concan, did not regret that an end was put to the negotiation; even Mr. Hastings in that view considered the rejection of his proposals as a circumstance by no means unfortunate. The opinion of the Bombay government in regard to a system of defence, and sending back the Madras troops to the assistance of their own presidency, was now adopted by Goddard; but, as the season for taking forts was nearly at an end, he proposed raising a work, and establishing a strong garrison at the Bhore Ghaut, of which Mr. Hornby disapproved, and judiciously observed that a large garrison left at the Bhore Ghaut—a pass which experience had shown they could at any time carry with ease—would be but a waste of money and of men. The capture, as Mr. Hornby observed, of Rajmachee, a fort a little to the north of the Bhore Ghaut, which might have been easily reduced, would, with a very small garrison, have served both to form a depôt and to distress the enemy.

After some deliberation, it was resolved in council that the army should return to canton for the rains at Bombay and Kallian; that the Madras troops should be sent back to their own presidency, and two of their own battalions sent down to assist in the defence of Tellicherry, which they had intended to abandon until they received some treasure from Bengal; but this ancient possession they now determined to defend. After all had been thus settled, General Goddard found it impracticable to march without

April 1. sacrificing a great part of his stores and equipments. About the 1st of April he had sent down to Panwell a strong escort of three battalions of sepoy, 10 guns, and the whole of the cavalry, for the purpose of bringing on another convoy of grain

and stores. On the road to Panwell, this escort, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, was attacked by Pureshram Bhow, and, although every exertion was made to save the cattle, the Mahrattas, whose dexterity in driving off unloaded bullocks is remarkable,* carried away a considerable number of them. The escort would have been sufficient to bring on the convoy through the whole force of Pureshram Bhow, but Holkar was sent down the Ghauts by Nana Furnuwees to strengthen him; when Colonel Browne, on hearing of the great army which lay in his route, deemed it impracticable to advance without a reinforcement, in which opinion General Goddard coincided. Unfortunately, the greater part of the cattle of the army had been sent down to assist in transporting the supplies, so that Goddard could not march with his whole force without sacrificing a great deal of public property, and with a part he was sure of being cut off by the enemy; he therefore represented his situation to Bombay, and entreated the government to send every disposable man of their garrison to reinforce Colonel Browne—a request with which they instantly complied, and the escort advanced without delay. The Mahratta force amounted to upwards of 25,000† horse, besides several bodies of rocket men, and infantry; they attacked the escort during their march for

* The usual way is, for two or three horsemen to steal forward quietly, get the bullocks' heads turned to a flank, when a few on each side gallop at them with their spears; two or three goad them from behind, and off they go at full speed, guided in any direction with great facility. The Madras followers, who are by far the most active of all camp people (though the practice is not confined to them), tie the bullock's load to his head, so that, when the animal throws his load in any way, he is, as it were, anchored; and whilst the rope holds, he cannot get away; but when unloaded, or let loose to graze, they are very apt to be carried off, even from within the camp guards.

† Letter from Nana Furnuwees. Colonel Browne reported them only 20,000.

three days, but were constantly baffled and repulsed by the skill of Colonel Browne, whose conduct was the theme of very great praise.

He brought in his convoy safe,* but with the loss of 106 men killed† and wounded during the three days on which he marched.

The junction of this detachment on the 15th April enabled General Goddard to prepare for his retreat. By the 19th he had sent down his guns and baggage to the bottom of the Ghauts, unobserved, as he supposed, by the enemy; but the Mahrattas had correct information of the least stir in his camp, and were silently but anxiously watching the result. Tookajee Holkar, with 15,000 men, without any baggage, was at the bottom of the Kusoor Ghaut, and Pureshram Bhow, with 12,000, was also below the Ghauts near Bheema Shunkur. Hurry Punt Phurkay was above the Ghauts between Kundalla and Karlee, with above 25,000 horse, 4,000 foot, and several light field-pieces. General Goddard's information represented Holkar and Pureshram Bhow as about to ascend the Ghauts, but on the 20th, the moment that Goddard marched, Hurry Punt's force poured down into the Concan,‡ took a considerable quantity of baggage, consisting of tents, boxes of musket ammunition, and 2,000 cannon shot.§ On the 20th Goddard halted at Kalapoor, and renewed his march on the 21st. His rear had scarcely cleared the

* Nana Furnuwees states that they took from 100 to 150 bullocks, chiefly laden with sugar.

† Of this number there were five officers, namely, Captain Bowles, Lieutenants Wheldon and Tindall, of the Bombay infantry; Ensigns Gibbings and Richardson, the former of the Madras, and the latter of the Bengal establishment.

‡ General Goddard's and Hurry Punt's despatches. § Hurry Punt.

ground of encampment, when the first shot from Hurry Punt's guns struck a tumbril full of ammunition, which instantly exploded, and, although it did very little mischief, the Mahrattas were greatly encouraged by the circumstance, and harassed the troops during the whole of their march to Chouke. The nature of the ground gave their irregular infantry every advantage, as they were enabled, from the cover of rocks, bushes, and ravines, to take deliberate aim, and Holkar and Pureshrām Bhow made their appearance in front about nine o'clock in the morning. At one o'clock in the afternoon, when Goddard pitched his camp, the enemy retired—Hurry Punt to Kalapoor, and the others to some distance in the rear of the right flank of the British army. The loss of the 21st, which was severe, fell principally upon the Bengal sepoy, who were stationed in the rear, and behaved with much gallantry. On the 22nd General Goddard halted, and again marched on the 23rd, when the attack was renewed; but the baggage having been sent forward at two o'clock in the morning, he was thus enabled to get on a considerable distance before the enemy came up. The attack on the rear was at one time very determined, and the 6th Bengal and 13th* Bombay battalions particularly distinguished themselves under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, of the Bengal establishment, an excellent officer, who fell whilst bravely exerting himself at the head of the rear-guard. General Goddard, observing that the enemy always retired when they saw him established in his camp, made a show of pitching his tents; the manœuvre succeeded, and, being the last march, was judicious. The

April 23. army arrived at Panwell on the evening
of the 23rd April without further molesta-

* The present 6th regiment, and lately the 2nd battalion 3rd regiment, was formerly the 13th battalion.

tion. On this retreat, which the Mahrattas consider one of their most signal victories, General Goddard's army sustained a heavy loss of 466 in killed and wounded, of whom 18 were European officers.*

Although the Mahratta troops, particularly the infantry, and that part of the horse under Pureshrām Bhow Putwurdhun, behaved well, it may be here remarked, as a symptom of the decline of military spirit, that the despatches of Hurry Punt are written in a style of the most vaunting gasconade, in which Bramin commanders before this period were less apt to indulge than either Mahratta or Mahomedan officers. The loss of the English was estimated by the Mahrattas at 1,500 men, one gun, several tumbrils, and a great part of their baggage; both Hurry Punt and Nana Furnuwees acknowledged that they too have sustained a heavy loss, both in men and horses.†

The reinforcement for Tellicherry and the Madras troops were embarked and sent off as predetermined; but the European privates were drafted into the Bombay regiment—a measure against which the Madras government bitterly inveighed. The remainder of the army, after they had remained encamped for some weeks at Panwell, marched to Kallian, where they were cantoned for the monsoon under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie.‡ Ten

** Killed.*

Lieutenant-Colonel John Neville Parker, Bengal Native Infantry.

Captain Sambers, Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Gibson, and Surgeon Penny, Madras Artillery.

Wounded.

Lieutenant William Rattray, Bengal Artillery.

Lieutenant F. W. Rutledge, Madras Artillery.

Lieutenant Duncan, Major of Brigade, Madras Native Infantry.

Lieutenants Hall, Taylor, More, and Smith, Bengal Native Infantry.

Captain Bannatyne; Lieutenants Taylor, Mills, and Reynolds; Ensigns Read and King, of the Bombay Native Infantry; and Mr. Fleming, Surgeon-General of the army.

† Original letters.

‡ Bombay Records.

thousand Mahrattas were sent towards Guzerat under Mahdoo Rao Ramchunder, the garrisons in the Concan were strengthened, and the main body of the Peishwa's army returned, as usual, to their homes.†

Whilst these events were passing on the west of India, the governor-general and council in Bengal having disapproved of the Bombay defensive system, were endeavouring to create a powerful diversion, by carrying hostilities into the heart of Sindia's territory; that he, the principal promoter, should become the greatest sufferer by the war; and Mr. Hastings was at the same time engaged in an intricate negotiation, for the purpose of detaching Moodajee Bhonslay from the confederacy.

It has been already mentioned that a division of troops under major (now by regular promotion Lieutenant-Colonel) Camac had been prepared to assist the rana of Gohud; and as the brilliant successes of Captain Popham, who was appointed a major for his gallant enterprize on Gwalior, had cleared the Gohud territory of the enemy, Colonel Camac invaded Malwa, reduced Sippree, and advanced to Seronje, where he arrived on the 16th of February. Mahadajee Sindia, who was marching from the westward to oppose him, came up with his division at the latter place, and Colonel Camac, having taken post, allowed himself to be surrounded. The want of provisions and forage soon reduced him to great distress. Perceiving the mistake he had made, and the great danger to be incurred by retiring, he sent off the most pressing letters to Colonel Morgan, commanding in the Oude territory, to send on a reinforcement to his relief. Lieutenant-Colonel Muir was detached accordingly with three battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a company of artillery. But in the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Camac

was attacked by Sindia, and cannonaded in his camp for seven days successively, when he determined to attempt a retreat at all hazards. At midnight on the 7th March,

March 7, 8, 9. with great skill, he commenced his march, and was not discovered till day-break ; but

on the 8th and 9th he was constantly harassed, until his arrival at the town of Mahautpoor, where he forced the inhabitants to supply him with provisions, and then turned and fronted his pursuers. Sindia encamped every night at the distance of five or six miles from the British troops, in a state of instant readiness, having his heavy baggage at an equal distance in his rear. This disposition to guard against surprise continued for several nights, until Colonel Camac, by his seeming want of enterprize, had thrown the wily Mahratta off his guard, when, on the night of the 24th of March, he entered Sindia's camp, attacked and routed his force, killed numbers of his men, took 13 of his guns, 3 elephants, his principal standard, 21 camels, and many horses. This achievement, which deservedly ranks very high, and marks a military genius, was suggested by Captain Bruce, the same officer who led the escalade at Gwalior. It was of the utmost importance, not only in raising the fame of the British arms, but in particularly affecting Sindia, whose reputation had suffered, whilst that of the Bramin party supported by Holkar was greatly increased, by the supposed victory over General Goddard. Colonel Muir's detachment did not join that of Colonel Camac until the 4th of April, when the former assumed the command ; but although their united forces kept the field, and encamped during the rains within the territory of Sindia, they obtained no further advantage, and were frequently straitened for supplies by numerous bodies of horse from Sindia's camp, which continued in the neigh-

bourhood of their own. Endeavours were ineffectually used by the English to excite active co-operation on the part of the Rajpoot princes in the neighbourhood against the Mahrattas; and Gwalior was restored to the rana of Gekud, in hopes, by this act of good faith, to wean him from a disposition he had evinced of making terms for himself with Mahadajee Sindia; but the rana was not inclined to bring forward the slender resources which he possessed; and matters remained in this situation until the commencement of a negotiation on the part of Sindia with Colonel Muir, in the month of August. But although the governor-general's scheme of stirring up those petty princes against their Mahratta superiors failed, his negotiations with the raja of Berar were productive of more beneficial consequences.

Moodajee, to support appearances with the confederates, had sent forward an army of 30,000 horse towards Kuttack in the month of October 1779, under his second son, Chimnajee; but in order to convince Mr. Hastings that his real design was not hostile to the English, they were seven months in reaching their destination; this favourable symptom, however, did not induce the Bengal government to relax in their vigilance, or to circumscribe their efforts. It had been determined at Calcutta, on the news of Hyder's invasion of Arcot, to send a division of six battalions of sepoy to assist in the war against him, as soon as the season permitted of their marching along the coast towards the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut. This force was to have been assembled in the month of October, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse; and it was hoped that Moodajee might be induced to aid them with a body of cavalry, but as Chimnajee's army lay in the route, it was deemed advisable to

suspend Colonel Pearse's march until Moodajee's answer was received.

When the replies did arrive, on the 9th January, it was determined to send on the detachment, and Colonel Pearse, on entering the territory of Moodajee, was instructed to observe an exact discipline, to protect the country, and to consider the raja of Berar as a friend, until any attempt was made to obstruct his march, when he was commanded to force his way against all opposition. To reconcile Moodajee, however, to this measure, the governor-general deputed an agent, Mr. David Anderson, to Kuttack, for the purpose of explaining the reasons, and obtaining, if possible, a body of 2,000 horse to co-operate with Colonel Pearse. Before Mr. Anderson reached Ballasore, Chinnajee had proceeded with his army to attack the fort of Dhikanall, the raja of which had neglected to remit the tribute, and refused to pay the arrears. Mr. Anderson, however, proceeded to Kuttack, and thence returned to Calcutta. Chinnajee, in the meantime, had quitted the hills, and come down with his army to the open country. Colonel Pearse had not only been allowed to pass without molestation, but assistance was afforded in procuring supplies through the province of Orissa; and the most friendly assurances were continued on the part of Chinnajee. The position of this Mahratta army was threatening: the government of Berar had behaved liberally to General Goddard, and civilly to Colonel Pearse: Moodajee had been so situated as to be compelled to join the confederacy, or at once declare his alliance with the English—the last a daring, a doubtful, and a generous policy, too great for any Mahratta to adventure. The governor-general had secretly promised to advance Moodajee the sum of 16 lakhs of rupees, in order to engage his aid either in the alliance

or mediation proposed ; for it is not very clear how this bribe was originally tendered. Twelve lakhs were now offered to Chimnajee if he would withdraw his troops and return to Nagpoor ; at the same time it was carefully expressed that the money was not given in a manner to enable them hereafter to demand it as a right, or to expect it in future, but merely to bespeak their friendship, and engage them against Hyder, who was represented to have at this period received sunnuds from the emperor for the whole Deccan, at the subjugation of which, including the complete peninsula of India, he was said to be aiming. The son of Moodajee observed that, on payment of 50 lakhs, he would be happy to afford the British government a proof of his friendship, by retiring to Nagpoor, and uniting against Hyder, especially if it should appear that he had procured sunnuds for the Deccan. This fictitious report obtained credence, especially with Nizam Ally, and it tended greatly, once more, to turn his versatile and treacherous mind against Hyder, whom, as a rival Mussulman and an upstart eclipsing him, he hated and feared.

After some discussion, conducted with much ability on the part of Mr. Anderson, Chimnajee at last observed that, of the 16 lakhs originally promised, three lakhs had been paid ; but if the balance of 13 lakhs were now tendered, he would withdraw ; that 2,000 horse, at 50,000 rupees a month, should be sent to join Colonel Pearse against Hyder, provided the governor-general and council would assist the Berar state in raising a loan of 10 lakhs of rupees, and aid Moodajee in reducing Gurrah Mundelah—districts which, the reader may recollect, had been taken by Ballajee Bajee Rao during his first campaign in 1742, before the return of Rughojee from

the Carnatic, and which, from their vicinity to their northern frontier, had ever since been an object of the greatest jealousy to the Bhonslays of Berar. The tenders were accepted, and thus, by an objectionable policy, justifiable only by the peculiarity of the circumstances, Mr. Hastings temporarily detached the eastern Mahrattas from the confederacy, and turned them against both Hyder and the Peishwa; at a moment when, with 30,000 horse, it is scarcely to be doubted that they might have pillaged Bengal, and burnt the towns from Burdwan to Point Palmyras. But in this negotiation, no credentials from Moodajee were given or demanded; and shortly afterwards copies of letters from Nana Furnuwees to Moodajee were transmitted to Bengal, representing the retreat of General Goddard as a great victory, and threatening Moodajee with the utmost vengeance of the Peishwa's government for seceding from the confederacy and his allegiance to his prince. In consequence of these letters, it was not altogether convenient for Moodajee to avow the agreement to its full extent; he wished, however, to mediate a peace, and to engage with the English in a general confederacy against Hyder. For this purpose he intended sending Dewakur Punt to Poona; but many circumstances rendered it desirable that this minister should first meet Mr. Hastings. An interview was to take place at Benares; but in the meantime orders by the supreme government were despatched to General Goddard to negotiate a peace nearly, on the terms formerly proposed; retaining the fort of Bassein if possible, but if not, to give it up, if he could thereby ensure an honorable pacification, which was now the sole end in view.

These instructions were not received by General Goddard until the month of August; various plans were

in the meantime proposed at Bombay : that by General Goddard—of making an increase of eight battalions of native infantry, drawing out the old, and leaving the new, levies in garrison ; calling on Futih Sing Gaekwar, the nabobs of Surat and Cambay, to assist with their utmost means ; permitting Rugonath Rao to assemble horse ; bringing down Colonel Muir's force from Malwa, forming a junction with his (Goddard's) army ; and carrying the war, first, into the heart of the Deccan, and then into Mysore—was very extensive, and with funds it would have been practicable ; but the lowest estimate of the required monthly disbursement was seven lakhs of rupees—an expense which, to the members of the Bombay government, was quite appalling at this season of unprecedented distress. Goddard, however, in hopes of aid from Bengal, proceeded to Guzerat, for the purpose of conferring with Futih Sing and Rugoba. Several schemes were proposed for the ensuing season ; but one, which was suggested to the Bombay government, is too remarkable to be omitted. Certain dispossessed Mahratta deshmoohs,* and men whose ancestors had held jagheer lands under the Mahomedan government, came forward, and offered, on certain conditions, to put the English in possession of the Concan, and of the whole of the forts in the Syhadree range, provided the British government would, on obtaining possession of the country, recognise their ancient rights ; grant them, on the delivery of each fort, 50,000 rupees for each of the larger fortresses, and 10,000 for the smaller ; allowing them to retain whatever plunder in money, jewels, gold and silver ornaments, and mares, they might acquire ; but everything else, of

* Arjonjee, and Jewajee Bamlay, and Suntajee Naik Surkunday, seem to have been three of the chiefs who came forward ; but their native villages are not recorded.

whatever description, he agreed to relinquish. Their proposals were fully considered,* but finally rejected.

On the opening of the season, Goddard returned from Guzerat, after some satisfactory explanations with Futih Sing, and obtaining a positive promise of being assisted by 5,000 good horse. If recovering the revenue had been the only object, General Goddard observed that the defence of Guzerat should have rather been secured than that of the Concan ; but until it could be ascertained whether the force in Malwa would be sent to join him, it was agreed to maintain defensive operations in the Concan, preserving as much as possible an appearance of action. Early in November accounts reached Bombay of a separate treaty between Mahadajee Sindia and Colonel Muir, concluded

October 13.

13th October 1781, by which Sindia agreed to return to Oojein, and Colonel Muir to recross the Jumna ; and that Sindia had further agreed to negotiate a treaty between the other belligerents and the British government, but he, at all events, bound himself to stand neutral. His territory, west of the Jumna, was restored ; but the rana of Gohud was not to be molested in the possession of Gwalior, as long as he conducted himself properly. The first overtures, as already mentioned, were made by Mahadajee Sindia, who, after his defeat by Colonel Camac, perceived that he had everything to lose by maintaining a contest in the heart of his own dominions, which would probably end in his being driven a fugitive across the Nerbuddah, without lands or friends, and probably to the secret satisfaction of his rivals at Poona.

Mr. Hastings was particularly pleased at the opening of this channel to a general pacification, as the plan of a

* Bombay Consultations, 29th June 1781.

mediation through Moodajee was obstructed by the death of Dewakur Punt, who did not live to meet the governor-general at Benares, as had been agreed upon; Moodajee, however, afterwards wrote to General Goddard, assuring him of his readiness to interpose his best endeavours for the attainment of peace, and even to repair in person to Poona for that purpose. About the same time, on the arrival of Mr. John M'Pherson at Madras, a letter was addressed to the Peishwa, dated 11th September 1781, in the joint names of Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. M'Pherson, forwarded to the wukeel of Mohummud Ally at Poona, stating their wish for peace, the moderation of the company's views, the desire of the British nation to conclude a firm and lasting treaty, which no servant of the company should have power to break; and assuring the Peishwa, upon their own honor, and that of the king, the company, and the nation, that just satisfaction should be given in a sincere and irrevocable treaty.

Amid all these authorized pacificators, General Goddard, who as yet considered himself the accredited agent on the part of the supreme government, also opened a negotiation, and assumed what was privately agreed, though not expressed in the treaty between Colonel Muir and Sindia, that the latter should use his endeavour to obtain a cessation of hostilities between the Peishwa and the English, until the terms of a general peace could be adjusted.

Captain Watherstone was deputed to Poona in January, but shortly after his arrival there, official
A.D. 1782. intelligence was received of the appointment of Mr. David Anderson as agent of the governor-general, with full powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the Mahrattas; for which purpose Mr. Anderson was

deputed to the camp of Mahadajee Sindia. Upon this news, Captain Watherstone was recalled—a circumstance which both Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt regretted ; for, although they were not fully prepared to treat, they could have wished to conclude the pacification without the mediation of Sindia. The terms to which Mr. Anderson was authorized to accede, differed little from the conditions before tendered, except that, as the rana of Gohud had, by his conduct, forfeited all claims to the benefits of the alliance, and had besides secretly endeavoured to conclude separate terms for himself with Sindia, it was deemed unnecessary to include him as a party in Mr. Anderson's negotiation. A principal obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty was the restoration of the Peishwa's share of Ahmedabad, which had been apportioned to Futih Sing. This point, however, was at last conceded, and a treaty was concluded at Salbye, on the 17th May, by Mr. David Anderson on the part of the East India Company, and by Mahadajee Sindia on that of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees, and the whole of the chiefs of the Mahratta nation ; Mahadajee Sindia being, at the same time, plenipotentiary of the Peishwa, and the mutual guarantee of both parties for the due performance of the conditions. The treaty consisted of 17 articles : the whole of the territory conquered since the treaty of Poorundhur was restored, together with the three lakhs promised near Baroach. The territory of the Gaekwar, and the whole of Guzerat, were to remain precisely on the same footing as they had been prior to the war of 1775 ; so that the Baroda state was thus secured from dismemberment, and no claim of tribute was to be preferred by the Peishwa against Futih Sing during the period of the late hostilities. Rugonath Rao was to be allowed 25,000 rupees a month, and to be permitted to choose a place of residence.

It was settled that Hyder should be obliged to relinquish the territories lately conquered from the English and the nabob of Arcot ; and the Peishwa on the one part, and the English on the other, agreed that their allies respectively should maintain peace towards each other. A free trade, the restoration of wrecks, and the exclusion of all European establishments, except those of the Portuguese, within the Mahratta dominions, also form part of the substance of the treaty of Salbye, which was ratified at Calcutta on the 6th June following ; but the adjustment on the part of the Peishwa was delayed by Nana Furnuwees, for reasons which will be hereafter explained, until the 20th December, nor was it finally exchanged until the 24th February 1783.

During the period when the ratification was in suspense, the governor-general in council agreed to fulfil the former intention in regard to the cession of Baroach ; and that valuable district was bestowed on Mahadajee Sindia in testimony of the sense entertained of the conduct manifested by him to the Bombay army at Wurgaom, and of his humane treatment and release of the English gentlemen who had been delivered as hostages on that occasion.

CHAP. VI.

FROM A. D. 1773 TO A. D. 1784.

Affairs at the imperial court.—Nujeef Khan.—Shujah-ud-Dowlah—dies—is succeeded by his son Asoph-ud-Dowlah.—Mujd-ud-Dowlah—his intrigues against Nujeef Khan frustrated.—Nujeef Khan establishes a paramount authority, which he upholds till his death.—His adopted son, Afrasiab Khan, obliged to relinquish the succession to Mirza Shuffee—disputed by Mohummud Beg Humadane.—Mirza Shuffee assassinated.—Afrasiab Khan resumes his situation, and contests the succession with Mohummud Beg.—Treaty of Salbye—Reasons for the delay in its ratification explained.—Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees—their respective views.—Hyder Ally.—Proposal for invading Bengal.—Sindia's reasons for desiring the friendship of the English.—Policy of Nana Furnuwees.—Death of Hyder Ally.—Ratification of the treaty.—Outrage committed by the Peishwa's admiral—capture of the English ship Ranger.—Tippoo professes to acquiesce in the terms of the treaty, but continues the war against the English—Mahadajee Sindia threatens him in consequence.—A separate treaty concluded between the English and Tippoo—disapproved but confirmed by the governor-general.—The court of Poona affect to consider the separate paci-

fication a violation of the treaty of Salbye.—Views of the Poona and Hyderabad courts.—A conference—claims discussed.—Offensive alliance against Tippoo proposed.—Seedee of Jinjeera.—Tippoo insults Nizam Ally.—Probability of a rupture.—Hostilities postponed.—Death of Rugonath Rao.—Intrigues in favour of his son Bajee Rao.—Mahadajee Sindia—his proceedings.

FOR some years, whilst the Mahrattas were engaged in domestic dissensions, or in war with the English, the imperial court was not subjected to their busy and rapacious intrusion; but, as the affairs of Delhi soon resume a considerable influence on their politics, we must not lose sight of the principal events that had occurred in that quarter.

On the retreat of the Mahrattas in 1773, Nujeef Khan regained his lost authority at the imperial court, and immediately directed his arms against their garrisons. Husham-ud-Dowlah, the rival of Nujeef Khan, who had been secretly subservient to the Mahrattas, was removed from the administration. Shujah-ud-Dowlah likewise took advantage of the retreat of the Mahratta army to expel their garrisons from his neighbourhood; and, after possessing himself of Etaweh, advanced towards Agra, for the purpose of assisting Nujeef Khan, who was besieging it; but the fortress having surrendered, Nujeef Khan placed Mohummud Beg Humadane, one of his own dependents, in command of the garrison. The nabob vizier, to conciliate Nujeef Khan, appointed him his deputy at the imperial court; and these two might have become formidable enemies to the Mahrattas north of the Nerbuddah, had not the vizier's attention been for a time fully engaged in prosecuting the Rohillah

war ; and, shortly after its termination, death put an end to all his schemes. His demise occurred
A. D. 1775. in January 1775, and his son, Asoph-ud-Dowlah, after some delay on the part of the emperor, was confirmed in his father's title and possessions.*

Nujeef Khan carried on various military expeditions with success. Although the emperor did not sanction the measure by remaining in the field himself, Nujeef Khan took part with the English and Shujah-ud-Dowlah in the war against the Rohillaes ; he was afterwards successful against the Jaths ; the imperial arms were again respected, and his own authority acknowledged throughout the province of Agra. But whilst thus employed at a distance, he found a domestic enemy in the person of one from whom he had a right to expect fidelity and friendship. As his own deputy in the imperial presence, he had chosen Abdool Ahud Khan,

A. D. 1776. to whom he confided the care of the court and capital, together with the general administration of civil affairs. The new dewan was shortly afterwards honored with the title of Mujd-ud-Dowlah ; but the first use he made of his power was to establish his own influence over the imbecile mind of the emperor, to the prejudice of his patron. Nujeef Khan did not remain ignorant of the progress of the intrigues against him, but he continued in the field, and vigorously prosecuted the measures he had undertaken.† Much of his success, it may be observed, was owing to some regular infantry, the better part of which were originally disciplined by the English, when the emperor resided under their protection ; but there were now two distinct bodies in the service of Nujeef Khan—

* Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

† Scott's History, and Bengal Records.

the one under Sumroo, a German,* and the other commanded by Madoc, a Frenchman.

Mujd-ud-Dowlah was unsuccessful in military expeditions. Foiled by Zabitah Khan, and harrassed by plundering irruptions of the Seiks, who laid waste the country, but still more alarmed at the rapid power which his rival's successes had gained him in the provinces, he sought to crush him, by involving the emperor in a war with the Rajpoots, which he hoped might prove fatal to his progress ; but the result was contrary to his anticipations, for, although the war was brought on, and Nujeef Khan actively employed, it terminated advantageously for the emperor, and creditably for his general.† In this situation Mujd-ud-Dowlah began a negotiation with Mahadajee Sindia, from which he hoped to free himself from all difficulties, and attain the entire control in the state, by the ruin of Nujeef Khan ; after which, in hopes of freeing himself from the Mahrattas, he intended to accede to a scheme, proposed by Sindia, for invading the English provinces in Bengal ; and promised, as soon as they could be spared, to lend both the authority and the army of the emperor in aid of Sindia's design.‡ But these schemes were at once overturned by his removal from the administration, which Nujeef Khan, with the emperor's concurrence, at last effected. No obstacle now interfered with that paramount

* The history and character of the infamous Walter Reignard, generally known by the name of Sumroo, the instrument of the barbarous massacre at Patna in 1763, is sufficiently public. He entered the imperial service after that event, having in the interval served principally with the Jaths.

† Scott's History, letters of Nujeef Khan, English Records.

‡ Original Mahratta letters from Sindia's camp, written by Ramajee Anunt, the Peishwa's dewan, with Mahadajee Sindia. His letters and papers were brought to me by his great-grandson, who now resides at Poona. Conjoined with other materials, those letters throw considerable light on the Mahratta views and transactions of the period.

authority which Nujeef Khan established. He became Umeer-ool-Oomrah, with the title of Zoolfikar Khan, and

A.D. 1782.

continued, till his death, which happened on the 22nd April 1782, to rule both the emperor and his territory with judgment and firmness.* His adopted son, Afrasiab Khan, was at first acknowledged his successor, but he was for a time obliged to relinquish his new dignity in favour of his relation, Mirza Shuffee, who was himself opposed by a powerful faction, headed by Mohummud Beg Humadane, the governor of the province of Agra.

An opportunity seemed thus afforded to the emperor for ridding himself of all parties, by a vigorous effort, which he at first seemed disposed to make; but he suffered the opportunity to pass, and his friends became the victims of his imbecility. A scene of contention and treachery soon took place amongst the competitors; Mirza Shuffee was assassinated by Ismael, the nephew of Mohummud Beg Humadane, so that Afrasiab Khan only remained to contest the supremacy.†

Such was the state of affairs at Delhi when the treaty of Salbye was pending; and now, to account for the long period which elapsed between its conclusion by Sindia, and its ratification by the Peishwa, it is necessary to unfold the motives which then actuated the leading parties in the Mahratta state.

Notwithstanding the increasing jealousy between Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees, though the former sought to establish a kingdom virtually independent, and though each was desirous of extending his control over the whole Mahratta nation, both continued sensible of the

* Scott, Francklin, and English Records.

† Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

necessity of preserving the strength of the empire undivided. By the progress of the war with the British government, Nana's influence and reputation had increased, whilst those of Sindia had diminished. Yet, by the treaty of Salbye, Sindia, whilst his fortunes seemed on the decline, had attained one main object of his policy—a sovereignty virtually independent, without any apparent break in the great link of interest which bound the Mahratta confederacy. Although both Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees were desirous of a general peace, yet each of them had secret intentions of soon breaking it, in such partial instances as suited their respective schemes of aggrandizement. Nana aspired to the recovery of all the territories south of the Nerbuddah that had ever belonged to the Mahrattas, whilst Sindia projected the re-establishment of their power in the provinces of Hindostan. Although the terms of the treaty of Salbye were so much more favourable to the Mahrattas than any that could have been anticipated before the war between the English and Hyder broke out, yet Nana, being jealous of the prominent part which Sindia acted in the negotiation, and hoping that he might, by temporizing, recover Salsette from the English, maintained, in all communications with the British authorities, an appearance of steadfast alliance with Hyder,* whilst to the envoys of the latter he affected to be satisfied with the treaty of Salbye, and declared that its immediate ratification by the Peishwa could only be prevented by Hyder's restoring the Mahratta possessions south of the Kistna, which would ensure their co-operation; but, if not restored, the Mahrattas would unite with the English against him.† Nana's ulterior views, in case the

*Original letters, records, oral information, and Mahratta MSS.

† Wilks.

pending treaty should be ratified, were hostile towards Hyder, as he, in that event, projected an offensive alliance with Nizam Ally against the usurper of Mysore, from which the English were to be carefully excluded.*

With regard to Sindia's particular views of aggrandizement, in order fully to understand the reasons which operated in inducing the British government passively to view the growth of such a power as he acquired in Hindostan, it may be requisite to explain that Mahadajee Sindia, even before his campaign against Goddard in Guzerat, had suggested a plan of attacking the English in Bengal, and, when his own territory was invaded, he renewed the proposal to the Peishwa, requesting that Tookajee Holkar might be sent to support the design.† To the whole of this scheme Nana Furnuwees at first objected, until he saw a probability of its recalling Goddard; but he was afraid to detach Holkar from the Peishwa, not only from being apprehensive that Goddard might not be withdrawn, but lest Sindia should allay the existing jealousy on the part of Holkar towards himself, which Nana, for his own security, was solicitous to foment. In giving, therefore, a tardy acquiescence to Sindia's plan, he proposed, instead of Holkar's quitting Poona, that Sindia should augment his army by a body of sillidars from the Mahratta country, whom he offered to assist in raising. Sindia gave various reasons for declining this suggestion; but the most important one was the removal, just at that period, of Muid-ud-Dowlah from the administration, and that Nujeef Khan would not lend his

* Mahratta MSS. and letters.

† Original letter from Mahadajee Sindia.

support.* Hyder Ally, who had been apprized that such a design was at one time in agitation, endeavoured, when he broke with the English, to engage Sindia to prosecute the enterprize;† but the negotiations which Sindia was carrying on with Mr. Hastings, the death of Nujeef Khan, and the subsequent contentions amongst the Mahomedan factions at Delhi, opened a prospect to Sindia of realising those schemes which he had long cherished, and made it of more consequence to him to court the favour of the English, than to excite their hostility. Mr. Hastings, if supported by his council, would probably, on the death of Nujeef Khan, have anticipated Sindia by interposing the British influence at the imperial court; but instead of that course, the policy of which might certainly have been questionable at such a crisis, Mr. Hastings turned the circumstance to advantage, by giving Sindia to understand that he would not interfere with his views at Delhi,‡ and thus not only engaged his interest in obtaining the ratification of the treaty, but secured him against the gold of Hyder, which was liberally proffered in support of the scheme for invading Bengal.§ After the treaty of Salbye was signed, an envoy from Hyder was permitted by the court of Poona to proceed to Sindia's camp; and Nana Furnuwees, in prosecution of his own views on Salsette, which he hoped the British government might be induced to cede, in order to propitiate his favour, gave out that the Peishwa had engaged in a new treaty with

* Copy of an original letter from the Peishwa's dewan with Sindia to Nana Furnuwees.

† Original letters from Sindia's camp.

‡ English Records.

§ Mahratta MSS. and letters. I am not certain if it be 20 lakhs of rupees, or pagodas, that are mentioned in an original Mahratta letter from Sindia's camp, which is my principal authority for this fact.

Hyder, to which the French were parties. But the death of Hyder, which happened on the 7th of December 1782, had a speedy effect in deciding the measures of the Mahratta minister, and the ratification of the treaty of Salbye was the immediate result. As already noticed, the treaty was ratified by the Peishwa on the 20th December

1782, formally exchanged on the 24th
A. D. 1783. February 1783, and the term for restoring

the districts on the Bombay side limited to the 24th April. Before that date an outrage was committed, which, had it happened at a time when peace was less essential to the British government, might have occasioned a renewal of the war. The *Ranger*, a small ship of the Bombay marine, on her voyage from Bombay to Calicut, with several

April 8. military officers of distinction as passengers on board, was unexpectedly attacked by the fleet of Anund Rao Dhoolup, the Peishwa's admiral, consisting of two ships, one ketch, and eight gallivats ; and after a very gallant defence, in which most of the crew and passengers were killed or wounded, she was at last overpowered and carried as a prize into Viziadroog. Colonel Humberston and Major Shaw were killed, and besides Lieutenant Pruett, the commander of the vessel, three of the passengers were desperately wounded. Of this number was Colonel Norman M'Leod, who, being disabled in one arm, continued to fight on, hand to hand, with the other, until shot through the body, when he fell, as was supposed, mortally wounded ; but though carried into confinement at Viziadroog, where the prisoners had neither medical attendance nor ordinary necessities, all the wounded officers recovered. This violation of the treaty produced a strong remonstrance from the British government, and the surrender of the Peishwa's districts was suspended ; but,

upon an apology for the outrage, and the restoration of the vessel, the terms of the pacification were carried into effect.

The war, however, was not at an end with the successor of Hyder Ally. Tippoo, although to the Mahrattas he professed his acquiescence in the terms of the treaty of Salbye, continued hostilities against the English. Mahadajee Sindia called upon him to desist, threatening him, in case of refusal, with an immediate attack from the united armies of the English and the Mahrattas. Tippoo, however, persisted; and, in consequence, Sindia, on the 28th October, concluded a new treaty with the English, for the purpose of enforcing compliance. It was as much the wish of Nana Furnuwees as of Sindia to oblige Tippoo to conform to the terms of the treaty of Salbye, in order that he might appear to the other powers of India a Mahratta dependent as well as a tributary; but Nana's jealousy of Sindia's assumption of authority, and his own projected alliance with Nizam Ally, impeded the scheme of this league, in which Sindia and the English would have borne parts so prominent. In the meantime a separate

A. D. 1784.

treaty was concluded by Tippoo, and the English presidency at Fort St. George.

Mr. Hastings had authorized the Madras government to negotiate a treaty, of which that of Salbye was to be the basis. But instead of following his instructions, from an over-anxiety to terminate the troubles and distresses in which they found themselves involved, they were led into a train of most injudicious proceedings, in the course of which they were systematically insulted by Tippoo, their representatives treated with indignity, the British nation

March 11.

held up as supplicants for peace, and finally, on the 11th March, the treaty of Mangalore

was signed, in which even allusion to the treaty of Salbye was omitted—a circumstance than which nothing could have been more gratifying to Tippoo or more offensive to the Mahrattas. The strongest disapprobation of this omission, and of many other points of that humiliating pacification, was expressed by the governor-general, and he was only prevented from disavowing and annulling it, by the confusion which must have resulted to the company's affairs, in consequence of the fulfilment of a part of the terms, before it could have been possible to obtain their ratification. The Poona Government affected to disbelieve that any treaty could be settled without their concurrence, and declared that such an agreement would be a violation of the treaty of Salbye. But Mr. Hastings had previously apprized Mahadajee Sindia, through Mr. Anderson, of the instructions sent to the Madras government, and he now explained the departure from his orders of which that government had been guilty, stating likewise some part of the motives which had operated to induce him to ratify their proceedings; in consequence of which, as the leading parties in the Mahratta state were anxious to prosecute their respective views, there was little difficulty in reconciling them to a measure which had become irrevocable.* The first proceeding of Nana Furnuwees in his designs on Tippoo was a formal demand on that prince for arrears of tribute; Tippoo admitted the justice of the demand, but offered various excuses for not immediately complying with it. At the same time that the demand was made on Tippoo, a like formal application was preferred to Nizam Ally for the outstanding Mahratta claims to chouth and surdeshmookhee within his territory. But a secret understanding existed between the courts of Poona and Hyderabad.

* English Records, Mahratta MSS. and letters.

They were on the best terms, in so much that, a short time previous to making this demand, Nana Furnuwees had assisted the latter state to suppress a formidable rebellion, which was headed by Ihtisham Jung, the Jagheerदार of Neermul. Nizam Ally, in reply to the application, proposed, as had been secretly agreed in order to cover their designs on Tippoo, to hold a conference with the Poona minister on the frontier. Accordingly each of the parties, attended by a large army,* set out from their capitals, and in the month of June had a meeting at Eedgeer, near the junction of the Beema and Kistna. Many points of importance regarding their mutual claims were discussed, some of which had existed for a long period, but it was agreed that such of the Mahratta thannas as had been displaced by Nizam Ally since 1774 should be re-established in the Moghul territory ; and that the claims for chouth and surdeshmookhee of the two past seasons should be put into an immediate train of payment, adopting, as a rule in all cases, the practice usual in the time of Mahdoo Rao Bullal. Where any considerable doubt existed, the demands were to lie over until a general settlement could be made upon the admitted claims in the time of Nizam-ool-Moolk, according to which Nizam Ally bound himself to pay up all arrears. Thus far the result of this conference was publicly known, but the principal object, as already alluded to, was an offensive alliance against Tippoo, for the recovery of the districts which both states had lost by the encroachments of Mysore. Nizam Ally, who over-estimated the value of his own alliance, demanded, as a preliminary article of the agreement, the restoration of Ahmednugur

* Nizam Ally had 16,000 horse, 20,000 infantry, and 75 guns. The Mahrattas, 8,000 infantry, 50,000 horse, and 40 guns. (Official reports from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt to the Peishwa.)

and Beejapoor. Nana Furnuwees promised to give up Beejapoor after they should recover the territory north of the Toongbuddra ; but after a prolonged discussion, neither party being very well satisfied, nor as yet by any means prepared to prosecute their scheme, the conference terminated in a general treaty of alliance, the particulars of which were to be specified as soon as they found themselves prepared to enter upon its execution.* After levying the tribute due by the Naik of Sorapoor,† both parties returned to their respective capitals in July, and Nana Furnuwees took this opportunity of endeavouring to possess himself of the ever-coveted island of Jinjeera, but the mediation of the British government prevented the attack, until events of greater moment diverted all immediate designs from the Seedee.‡

Nizam Ally had scarcely reached his capital, when Tippoo, probably apprized of what had taken place, with premeditated insult, set up some absurd pretensions to the sovereignty of Beejapoor, and called on Nizam Ally, in consequence, to adopt his standard of weights and measures.§ Nizam Ally took little pains to obtain an explanation, until, in the month of October, Tippoo was said to have taken the field for the purpose of invading that part of the Moghul territory which lay south of the Kistna. An envoy from Hyderabad was immediately

* Poona Records.

† Official letter from Nana Furnuwees. The Naik of Sorapoor is the descendent of the Berud Naik of Wakinkerah.

‡ Bombay Records.

§ Bombay Records, Tareekh-dil-Ufrooz, &c. It is scarcely worth enquiry how Tippoo arrogated to himself this right; but as Hyder, it was once reported, had obtained from the emperor the sovereignty of that portion of the Deccan comprized in the space allotted by Aurungzebe to his son Kaum Bukhsh, the insult may have been suggested by that circumstance.

despatched to Tippoo's camp, for the purpose of temporising, and another to Poona, in order to hasten the projected operations of the alliance. Nana Furnuwees, however, was not only unprepared, but various affairs of internal government prevented him at that moment from supporting his ally. Nizam Ally, therefore, was glad to prevent hostilities through his envoy at Seringapatam, which he effected, not so much by any forbearance of Tippoo, as by his want of preparation for war.

The principal reason which induced Nana Furnuwees to suspend the design he had so long contemplated, was the reported progress of a conspiracy, said to have for its object the deposition of Mahdoo Rao Narain and the elevation of Bajee Rao, the son of the late Rugonath Rao, to the Peishwa's musnud. Rugonath Rao, after the treaty of Salbye was ratified, seeing no other alternative, accepted the terms there specified, and fixed on Kopergaom, on the banks of the Godavery, as his place of residence. He only survived this last humiliation a few months. His widow, Anundee Bye, was pregnant at the time, and shortly after, in April 1784, gave birth to a son, Chimnajee Appa. Bajee Rao, at the period of his father's death, had scarcely completed his ninth year ; but the partizans of Rugonath Rao, and many who were dissatisfied with the existing government, began to stir up a faction in his favour. It is creditable to Nana Furnuwees that, in adopting measures for smothering these indications, which were soon accomplished, he placed no additional restraint on the family at Kopergaom, but they naturally became objects of his suspicion ; mutual distrust was the consequence, and hatred grew up between Nana Furnuwees and the sons of Rugonath Rao.* Mahadajee Sindia was

* Mahratta letters and MSS.

said to have been the secret fomentor of the intrigues to which we have alluded ; and, from his usual policy of keeping Nana in perpetual alarm, there is ground to suspect his connivance ; but he could have had no design of supporting such a faction, as he was at this time fully occupied in the accomplishment of those views on the imperial territory we have before seen him projecting ; and events took place which suddenly elevated him to the pinnacle of his ambition.

CHAP. VII.

A.D. 1784 AND A.D. 1785.

Factions at the imperial court.—Escape of Mirza Jewan Bukht.—Afrasiab Khan negotiates with the English.—The governor-general declines all interference.—Afrasiab Khan has recourse to Mahadajee Sindia.—Sindia's progress since the treaty of Salbye.—Benoit de Boigne.—Sindia accepts the invitation of Afrasiab Khan—marches to Agra.—Afrasiab Khan assassinated.—The whole power falls into the hands of Sindia—his policy in regard to the Peishwa.—The emperor confers on him the command of the army, &c.—Mahomedan chiefs submit.—The Dooab taken possession of.—Agra and Aligurh taken.—Effect of the news of these events at the Poona court.—Sindia, intoxicated by his success, prefers a demand on the British government for the chouth of Bengal—effect.—Determination of the acting governor-general to send an envoy to the Peishwa's court.—Sindia's objections.—Affairs in the Deccan.

At the imperial court we left Afrasiab Khan and
 A.D. 1784. Mohummud Beg Humadanee struggling
 for the superiority. The former at first
 obtained the advantage, owing principally to his having
 the control of the emperor's person ; but foreseeing no
 probability of reducing his rival with the means at his
 disposal, he contemplated an alliance with some of the
 neighbouring states, and cast his eyes successively towards
 the nabob vizier, the English, and the Mahrattas. Whilst

hesitating in his choice, the emperor's son, prince Mirza Jewan Bukht, made his escape from Delhi, fled to Lucknow, where the governor-general then was, and threw himself on his protection and that of the nabob vizier. He was promised an asylum; but although he entreated assistance in his father's name, Mr. Hastings declined affording it. The prince's flight, however, alarmed Afrasiab Khan, and he voluntarily offered to make any arrangement for the emperor, which the governor-general and the nabob vizier might suggest, provided they would support him with a sufficient force to suppress the rebellion of Mohummud Beg. But these overtures being also rejected, Afrasiab Khan had recourse to Mahadajee Sindia.*

Since the ratification of the treaty of Salbye, Sindia had obtained considerable advantages. Several of the minor Rajpoot chieftains, contiguous to Malwa, had returned to their former allegiance as Mahratta tributaries. The fortress of Gwalior, after a protracted siege, was restored by the rana of Gohud, who was constrained to surrender himself a prisoner on a verbal promise of maintenance and protection.* A body of troops was sent into Bundelcund for the purpose of endeavouring to reduce that province. These troops were under the command of Appa Khunde Rao, who was attended by a body of regulars, raised by a European gentleman named Benoit de Boigne.† But

* Scott.

† As M. de Boigne's progress in the Mahratta service will be found conspicuous, his previous history becomes interesting. M. de Boigne was born at Chamberri, in Savoy, in the territory of the king of Sardinia. He began his career as an ensign in the regiment of Clare, in the Irish brigade, in the service of France—a corps then famous for its discipline. Seeing little prospect of advancement, and hearing that Russia, then at war with Turkey, was much in want of officers in the Grecian Archipelago, he resigned his commission, and repaired to Turin, where, having obtained letters of recommendation from the Sardinian minister, he proceeded to Greece. Soon after his arrival, he was promoted to the

Sindia, whilst prosecuting those objects, was anxiously watching the confusion and contentions in the imperial

rank of captain in a Greek regiment in the Russian service. Being employed on an injudicious descent made upon the island of Tenedos, he was taken prisoner by a sally from the Turkish garrison, and conveyed to Scio, where he was kept until the peace, which was soon after concluded. On being released, he embarked for Smyrna, at which place, happening to meet some Englishmen from India, he was so struck, with their account of the country, that he resolved on trying his fortune there. He proceeded to Constantinople, and thence to Aleppo, where he joined a caravan for Bagdad; but in consequence of the successes of the Persians against the Turks, the caravan, after they had arrived near Bagdad, being under an apprehension of falling into the hands of the victors, retraced their steps to Aleppo. De Boigne, balked in his endeavours of getting to India by that route, repaired to Grand Cairo, where he became acquainted with Mr. Baldwin, the British consul-general, and through his influence and kindness, not only obtained a passage to India, but a letter from that gentleman to Major Sydenham, town-major of Fort St. George. M. de Boigne, soon after his arrival at Madras, was recommended to Mr. Rumbold, the governor, and appointed an ensign in the 6th native battalion under that presidency. M. de Boigne's corps was, with Baillie's detachment, destroyed by Tippoo; but De B. being at the time detached on escort duty, to convey grain from Madras, escaped. A short time after this event, in consequence of an act of injustice, which he conceived he had experienced from the governor, Lord Macartney, respecting the adjutancy of a detachment, he resigned his commission in the company's service, with an intention of proceeding to Calcutta, and thence overland to Russia. Lord Macartney, when he became sensible of the injustice, would have repaired it, but M. de Boigne appearing determined in his purpose, Lord M. gave him letters of recommendation to the governor-general, Mr. Hastings, by whom, on his arrival at Calcutta, he was kindly received, and by him furnished with letters, not only to the British authorities in the upper provinces, but to the native princes in alliance with the English government, which, owing to the presents an individual so recommended would have thus received, ensured civility, together with considerable pecuniary advantage. De Boigne experienced this advantage in a peculiar degree on his arrival at Lucknow, where the nabob made him rich presents, and furnished him with letters of credit on Cabul and Candahar for 12,000 rupees. He set forward on his journey, in company with Major Brown, at that time deputed on a mission to the emperor; but Major Brown's progress having been interrupted by the jealousy of the emperor's ministers, M. de Boigne, in consequence of being supposed one of his suite, was also detained, and took this opportunity of inaction to visit Sindia's camp, on the invitation of Mr. Anderson, the resident. Sindia being suspicious of De Boigne, and desirous of ascertaining his real character, which he expected to discover from the letters in his possession, caused all his baggage to be stolen by some dexterous thieves, whom he employed for the purpose; and although, on Mr. Anderson's application, the greater

territory. He had been invited to take a part both by Mohummud Beg and Afrasiab Khan, but as the invitation

part of the baggage was restored, the letters and credits were not given up—a circumstance, as M. de Boigne conceived, equally ruinous to his fortune and his journey. It was then he first thought of endeavouring to get employed in the service of some native prince; and Gwalior being at this period besieged by Sindia, De Boigne formed a scheme for its relief, which he communicated to the rana of Gohud, through an officer named Sangster, a Scotchman who commanded 1,000 well-disciplined sepoy, and a very respectable train of artillery, in the rana's service. De Boigne proposed, on receiving an advance of one lakh of rupees, to raise two battalions within the emperor's territory, east of the Jumna, in such a manner as to prevent suspicion, and, in conjunction with Sangster, from Gohud, to fall on Sindia's camp by surprise. There was little doubt but the plan would have succeeded, had not the rana been afraid to trust De Boigne with the requisite advance of money; but, in order to intimidate Sindia, he published the proposed scheme in all his ukhbars as about to take place. The knowledge of the circumstance excited the enmity of Sindia towards De Boigne, although he saw the merit of the suggestion.

De Boigne next made overtures to the raja of Jeypoor, and was commissioned by him to raise two battalions; but having inadvertently communicated this circumstance to the governor-general in an official form, Mr. Hastings, who had no objections to tolerate, although he could not sanction, his being so employed, ordered him to Calcutta—a summons with which M. de Boigne immediately complied. Mr. Hastings was so pleased by the prompt obediences shown to his commands, that he permitted him to return; but before he could reach the upper provinces, events had occurred which induced the raja of Jeypoor to alter his intentions. This change was a severe disappointment to De Boigne; but the raja made him a present of 10,000 rupees. At his juncture De Boigne heard of Sindia's intended expedition to Bundelcund, and proposed to raise two battalions, of 850 men each, for that service, to which, after some negotiation, Sindia agreed. No advance of money was granted, but De Boigne was allowed for himself 1,000 rupees, and for each man indiscriminately eight rupees a month. To the privates M. de Boigne gave five and a half rupees monthly, and paid the officers proportionally from the balance. The battalions were formed, as nearly as possible, on the plan of those in the English service, and armed, disciplined, and clothed after that manner; the labour which this imposed on an individual may be easily conceived by any person acquainted with military affairs. De Boigne gradually got European officers of all nations into his corps. Sangster, from the service of the rana of Gohud, joined him, and became superintendent of his cannon foundry.

The continuation of his memoirs will appear in the progress of the Mahratta history. What I have here stated is on the authority of General Count de Boigne himself, from notes taken in his presence.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my acknowledgments to General Count de Boigne for the obliging manner in which he communicated various points of information during my visit to his hospitable mansion at Chamberri.

sent by the latter was ostensibly from the emperor, Sindia preferred accepting it, and set out for Agra, towards which the imperial court was advancing. A meeting took place on the 22nd October ; but immediately afterwards Afrasiab Khan was assassinated by the brother of the late Mirza Shuffee, in whose murder Afrasiab Khan secretly participated.* As Sindia derived most advantage from the death of Afrasiab Khan, and as the assassin sought and found an asylum in his camp, he did not escape suspicion of being accessory to the murder ; but those who knew Mahadajee best never accused him of a deed so atrocious. The event, however, vested Sindia with complete authority, at Delhi, and placed him in a situation which he had only hoped to attain at some remote period. He refused the office of Umeer-ool-Oomrah, but, with his usual sagacity, obtained for the Peishwa that of wukeel-i-mootluq, or supreme deputy—a dignity first conferred on the great Nizam-ool-Moolk by Mohummud Shah ; and Sindia, reversing the domestic policy of the Bramins, who always endeavour to be first in power but second in name, secured for himself the appointment of deputy to the Peishwa, so that he thus held by authority the executive power in Hindostan, and a rank which, if he ever should be able and desirous of asserting it, would supersede that of all other ministers in the court of the Peishwa. The emperor also conferred on him the command of his army, and gave up the provinces of Delhi and Agra to his management. For all which Sindia engaged to pay 65,000 rupees monthly, in order to defray the expenses of the imperial household, and to that sum additions were, gradually to be made, according to the increasing prosperity of the provinces.†

* Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

† Bengal Records.

As Sindia appeared at the head of a powerful army,
A.D. 1785. many of the officers serving with Mohummud Beg Humadance withdrew from his party, and paid their respects to the emperor. Mohummud Beg likewise acknowledged Sindia's authority, accepted a command, and was sent to reduce Raghoogurh in the province of Kichwara, which he effected, and remained in that country for a considerable period. The imperial districts in the Dooab were speedily taken possession of, and Ryajee Patell was sent by Sindia to besiege Agra, the governor of which at first refused to give it up; but on the 27th March it surrendered, March 27. when the emperor's second son, Akber, was appointed nominal governor of the province, and Ryajee* Patell real governor of the fortress. The widow and brother of Afrasiab Khan resided in the fort of Aligurh, but refused to admit Sindia's garrison, and sustained a siege until the middle of November, when they also surrendered.

The news of Sindia's success was received by the people at Poona with surprise and joy; a small body of the Peishwa's troops was sent off to join him, as a measure of state policy to preserve the appearance of the Peishwa's co-operation and supremacy; but Holkar and Nana Furnuwees were jealous of his elevation, and Sindia at no period of his life was so little on his guard to prevent that jealousy from being turned against him. In the first intoxication of success, he so far lost sight of his usual prudence as to make a demand, under the emperor's

* Ryajee's surname was Sindia. He was a favourite commander of Mahadajee Sindia, and a Patell of Panoura, a village near Assee Oomra. Ryajee Patell must not be confounded with another eminent person, Ramjee Patell, whose surname was Jadow. Ramjee commenced his career in the humble capacity of Barjee in the service of Ryajee

authority, for the chouth of the British provinces in Bengal. To this arrogance he was probably encouraged by the departure of Mr. Hastings on the 8th February for England ; but Mr. Macpherson, who had succeeded to the temporary charge of the supreme government, not only denied the existence of such a claim, but insisted on its being disavowed ; and Sindia, perceiving that the acting governor-general would not submit even to temporize with encroachment, acknowledged its impropriety. Mr. Macpherson conceived that the ambitious nature of Sindia's policy was very dangerous and endeavoured to raise some counterpoise to his progress by exciting the jealousy and rivalry already entertained towards him among the other Mahratta chiefs. Moodajee Bhonslay being at Poona when the demand for the chouth of Bengal was made, the Bombay government, by Mr. Macpherson's desire, paid him extraordinary attention, which had the effect of gratifying Moodajee and alarming Sindia. Nana Furnuwees was encouraged in a desire he had frequently expressed of having a British resident at the Peishwa's court, and Mr. Charles Malet was chosen for that important mission. Although no part of the treaty of Salbye precluded the British government from sending an envoy to Poona, yet as considerable delicacy was due towards Sindia, it was desirable that he should give his assent to the appointment ; and it was supposed that this could be best obtained by Mr. Malet's proceeding in person to Sindia's camp ; but the latter was too sagacious not to perceive the loss of influence which Mr. Malet's mission would occasion him. He observed that, after having been entrusted for three years with the management of the English affairs at the court of Poona, the appointment of a political agent of their own would naturally impress the chiefs of the Deccan

with an idea that the British government was dissatisfied with his conduct, and had revoked the confidence it had previously reposed. But these objections, however plausible, were not of sufficient weight to dissuade Mr. Macpherson from the measure which he deemed it necessary to adopt. It was determined that Mr. Malet should proceed as envoy to the court of Poona; but, before the arrangement was finally settled, events had taken place to the southward which rendered the appointment still more essential to the interests of the British government.

CHAP. VIII.

FROM A.D. 1784 TO A.D. 1787.

Tippoo.—Nurgoond—Origin and progress of the dispute respecting it.—Tippoo's treachery—takes Nurgoond—seizes Kittoor—forcibly converts many Hindoos.—Nana Furnuwees proposes an alliance with the English—The latter less solicitous to co-operate than Nana expected.—Nana applies to the Portuguese.—French said to be in alliance with Tippoo.—Reported alliance between the Mahrattas and the French.—British resident instructed to proceed to Poona.—Mr. Macpherson's offer of assisting in the defence of the Mahratta territory—rejected by Nana Furnuwees.—Mahratta army advances to form a junction with Nizam Ally and Moodajee Bhonslay.—Moodajee in close alliance with the Poona court.—Mahratta and Moghul armies unite—Plan of operations.—Badamee taken.—Nana Furnuwees returns to Poona, and Moodajee Bhonslay to Nagpoor.—Holkar's proceedings. Tippoo attacks Adonee—Gallant defence till relieved by the confederates.—Adonee abandoned.—Gujendergurh given up to Hurry Punt.—Holkar makes a sudden march to Savanoor—his object—Burhan-ud-deen attacks him—is repulsed by Holkar, who is joined by the nabob of Savanoor. Hurry Punt's operations—Tippoo unexpectedly passes the Toongbuddra.—Operations of the armies.—Savanoor abandoned by the Mahrattas—Tippoo takes possession—proceeds to Benkapoor.—Hurry Punt

takes Seerhutti.—Feeble operations on both sides.—Tippoo suddenly tenders proposals of peace. Peace concluded.—Motives elucidated.—Sindia.

TIPPOO, in assuming a right to the province of Beejapoor, and in threatening to attack the territory
 A.D. 1784. of Nizam Ally, had probably no other intention than to show the members of the confederacy, which he suspected was formed against him, that he was as well prepared to resist, as they to prosecute, the hostility meditated. At the subsequent accommodation with Nizam Ally, both parties understood that the adjustment was merely temporary. Tippoo continued to discipline his army and to prepare his forts
 A.D. 1785. with increased exertion ; and as the crisis approached, the security of the frontier garrisons became a principal object of his attention.

The fort and district of Nurgoond, situated about 12 miles south of the Malpurba, belonged to a Bramin dessaye, and had fallen under Hyder, with the other Mahratta possessions south of the Kistna, in 1778. This district had only been subject to the payment of a moderate tribute, and Hyder, satisfied with the dessaye's submission, exacted nothing more than what had been usually paid to the Mahrattas. Tippoo, however, soon after his father's death, had increased the demand, with which the dessaye refused compliance ; but concluding it would eventually be enforced, he secretly claimed protection from the Peishwa, whose subject he declared himself ; and as secretly, through the agency of an Englishman in his service, named Yoon, applied to the Bombay government for the aid of some regular troops, representing that he was an independent raja, willing

to co-operate in the invasion of Tippoo's dominions. This application to Bombay was made before the treaty of Mangalore ; but as no notice was taken of his overtures, the dessaye continued to court the protection of the minister at Poona, and the friendship of the powerful Bramin family of Putwurdhun, with whom he is said to have been connected. When Tippoo, therefore, pressed his demand, Nana Furnuwees interposed, and declared that he had no right to exact more than the ordinary tribute,—“that jagheerdars, on the transfer of districts, were liable to no additional payments : and that the rights of suwusthanees,* who had been guilty of no treason against the state to which they owed allegiance, had been invariably respected.”† Tippoo replied that he had a right to levy what he chose from his own subjects ; and soon after detached two separate bodies of his troops to enforce demands beyond the dessaye's ability to pay, which was, in other words, an order to reduce his fort. The siege commenced in the month of March ; and a body of Mahrattas, under Gunesh Punt Behree and Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, advanced to its relief. Tippoo's wukeels still remained at Poona, and Nana Furnuwees had sent orders to the Mahratta commanders not to precipitate hostilities ; but by the time they arrived in the neighbourhood of Nurgoond, Tippoo's officers had been compelled, from want of water, to raise the siege and encamp at some distance. They, however, sent, in derision, a message to the Bramin commanders, intimating that they had withdrawn their troops from respect to their master the Peishwa. Fired at the insult, the Mahrattas rode on to their camp, drove in their outposts, and pressed

* Bramins who possess old hereditary jagheers are so styled.

† Mahratta MSS.

forward, until repulsed by two of Tippoo's regular battalions supported by the cavalry, when they retired with the loss of 20 men and an elephant. This premature attack was contrary to the orders of Nana Furnuwees; but as it had been made, he immediately directed Tookajee Holkar, with a considerable force, to support Gunesh Punt and Pureshram Bhow, though he at the same time intimated to Tippoo his concern for the quarrel, and his desire for an accommodation. Tippoo, whose motives will become apparent, expressed an equal readiness to meet his wishes, and even offered to pay two years' tribute, provided his right of sovereignty was recognised in regard to Nurgood. Nana Furnuwees, by the advice of Nizam Ally, and on assurance that submission only was required from the *dessaye*, acceded to what Tippoo proposed, and everything appeared to be settled except the mode of payment, for which a period of 27 days was allowed, and the Mahratta army recrossed the Kistna. But Tippoo had practised a gross deception; Nurgood, left to its fate, submitted, and the terms promised to the unfortunate *dessaye* were not observed. After evacuating the fort, he and his family were treacherously seized; his daughter was reserved for the Sultan's seraglio, and the rest were immured in Cabuldroog, where they perished. The fort of Kittoor, which also belonged to a tributary *dessaye*, had likewise been seized, and both that place and Nurgood, before the opening of the fair season, were occupied by strong garrisons of the Sultan's troops.

To crown these acts, as if he designed to render himself as odious as possible to the Mahrattas, Tippoo forcibly circumcised many of the Hindoo inhabitants of the territory south of the Kistna; and 2,000 Bramins, dis-

ciplines of Shunkeracharya,* destroyed themselves to avoid the detested violation.

Nana Furnuwees very soon found that he had been duped by Tippoo, and he even began to doubt how far he might rely upon the co-operation of Nizam Ally : the inefficient state of the Moghul army had not escaped his observation when they met at Eedgeer, and he was alarmed by accounts of the excellent state of discipline to which Tippoo's battalions had attained. These circumstances, combined with a report of Tippoo's having entered into a new and closer alliance with the French, had the effect of overcoming his reluctance to calling in the aid of British troops. But as Nana imagined the English would join in an offensive alliance against Tippoo on almost any terms, and being solicitous not to pledge himself so far as to prevent his eventually receding, the overtures to Mr. Boddam, governor of Bombay, were made with much caution. In the month of July he sent an agent to that presidency, offering, on the part of the Peishwa, to give up to the company any two of Tippoo's seaports on the Malabar coast, on condition of being assisted with a body of troops to co-operate in the reduction of his territory. Mr. Boddam received the proposal without expressing the least surprise at the inadequacy of the terms, and referred Nana Furnuwees to the supreme government, with an unfeigned indifference which did not escape the quick-sighted envoy, and from which Nana began to change his opinion of the English policy. Although Nana Furnuwees sent a private agent of his own to Calcutta, it was necessary to prosecute the negotiation through Mahadajee Sindia whilst there was no British resident at the Peishwa's court. Sindia immediately applied to the governor-general through Lieutenant James

* A famous Gooroo of the southern Mahratta country.

Anderson, then resident envoy in his camp, informed him of the probability of a rupture between the Peishwa and Tippoo, and artfully assumed, as a matter of course, that the English would afford every assistance, "as by the treaty of Salbye the friends and enemies of the Mahrattas and English were mutual." He added that the Peishwa was sure of the co-operation of Nizam Ally; that the terms of their alliance were that each state should recover its lost territory, and, of any new acquisitions, there should be an equal participation. Mr. Macpherson, in reply, observed that the treaty of Salbye did not stipulate that the friends and enemies of the two states should be mutual, but that neither party should afford assistance to the enemies of the other, and that by the treaty of Mangalore the English were bound not to assist the enemies of Tippoo. Mr. Macpherson, in declining the alliance, made strong general professions of friendship towards the Mahrattas, hinted at some reasons for dissatisfaction with Tippoo on the part of the British government, in consequence of his not having fulfilled all the stipulations of the treaty of Mangalore, and concluded by assuring Sindia that, in case of any reverse, the British government would not suffer the Mahrattas to be overpowered.

Nana Furnuwees, the less solicitous the governor-general appeared, became the more anxious to obtain the co-operation of the English, and he urged it the more in consequence of a new treaty supposed to have been concluded between Tippoo and the French. At last, either in despair of obtaining the aid of the English, or in order to quicken their decision, he made overtures to the Portuguese, by whom he was promised assistance. It is certain that Nana believed in the existence of this new treaty between Tippoo and the French, as the Mahratta

envoy at Pondicherry publicly remonstrated with the French governor, and accused him of having thereby violated the promises of the king of France to the Peishwa. The French governor denied the existence of such a treaty, and, as a proof of what he alleged, proposed a closer connection with the Peishwa—a circumstance which is said to have greatly offended Tippoo, who was already jealous of the high and independent tone assumed by his French friends. The French envoy at Poona was treated with much attention, and it was believed that the Peishwa's government had agreed to cede Rewadunda to that nation on condition of their not assisting Tippoo.

These negotiations showed more than ever the necessity of appointing a British resident at the Poona court, and Mr. Malet, then in Calcutta, was instructed to repair to Bombay, and there await an invitation from the Peishwa to proceed to his capital.

In the meantime the army was assembling at Poona for the purpose of invading Tippoo's territory, and Mr. Macpherson offered to send three battalions to assist in the defence of the Mahratta country, provided they were not employed within Tippoo's boundary; but as Nana's views extended to conquest, he did not contemplate defence, and therefore rejected the proposal.*

The periodical rains were this year of unusual duration, and the Mahratta army, under Hurry Punt Phurkay, did not quit Poona until about the 1st December. The troops advanced towards the eastern frontier for the purpose of forming a junction with Moodajee Bhonslay and Nizam Ally.

Moodajee, as we have had occasion to observe, had visited Poona during the preceding season; he showed a

* Bengal and Bombay Records.

sincere desire to connect himself with the head of the state, and, in the name of his son, Rughoojee, entered on a new agreement, promising to adhere strictly to that which had been framed by Mahdoo Rao and Janojee in 1769. He pledged himself particularly never to assist the English against the Peishwa's government, and promised to co-operate in the expected war with Tippoo, for which purpose he was now advancing.

A.D. 1786 Nana Furnuwees followed the army for the purpose of conferring with Nizam Ally, and overtook Hurry Punt at Punderpoor, whence they moved down the right bank of the Beema, and were joined by the Moghul troops near the spot where the interview took place during the preceding season. It was now resolved to reduce the whole of Tippoo's territories, and to divide the conquests into six equal parts, of which Nizam Ally should receive two shares, the Peishwa two, and Sindia and Holkar two shares between them, or one-sixth each. It was further agreed that their first efforts should be directed to the recovery of the Mahratta districts between the Kistna and Toongbuddra. Tookajee Holkar and Gunesh Punt Behree were detached with 25,000 troops, chiefly horse, to attack a body of Tippoo's, under Burhan-ud-deen, near Kittoor, and to expel his garrisons from that district, whilst the main army of the confederates advanced towards Badamee. As they approached that place, reports were received of Tippoo's having marched with his whole army; and it was agreed, in case this intelligence should prove correct, to postpone the siege, but to encamp in the neighbourhood of Badamee until the rains had fallen, when the swelling of the rivers would, in all probability, secure them from interruption.

The prospect of a monsoon campaign was so little relished

by Nizam Ally, that, in giving his assent to this plan of operations, he intimated his desire of returning to Hyderabad, and of leaving his general, Tuhuwur Jung, with 25,000 men, under the orders of Hurry Punt—a measure entirely conformable to the wishes of the Mahrattas, who felt themselves encumbered by the form and ceremony necessarily observed to the Soobeh of the Deccan.

Soon after the departure of Nizam Ally, it was ascertained that Tippoo had sent forward some troops from Bangalore, but had himself returned to Seringaptam, on which it was immediately resolved to commence the projected siege. Operations began on the 1st May.* The fortified town of Badamee is built on the plain, with a small gurhee or citadel in the body of the place ; but it is further protected by two hill-forts, one on each flank.† After battering the walls of the town for three weeks, they were very little injured ; but it was determined to try the effect of an escalade. On the morning of the 20th May, 20,000 infantry of the confederate armies were drawn up for that service. The garrison, consisting of upwards of 3,500 troops, manned the works to oppose them ; and when the assailants advanced, which they did with great resolution, they found the ditch and covert way full of small mines, constructed by digging pits, and placing in them large dubbers‡ filled with gunpowder ; these were fired, and proved exceedingly destructive ; but the Mahrattas and Moghuls, vying with each other, rushed

* Poona Records, Mahratta MSS.

† Sir C. Malet's despatches.

‡ Dubbers are large vessels, which, in appearance, resemble immense blown bladders ; they are extremely useful for many purposes, but principally for preserving oil and ghee. They are made of hides, which are first beaten into a pulp, and then spread in thin coats over shapes composed of clay, and as each coat dries, a new one is added, until the requisite thickness has been attained. When the whole of the coats become solid and dry, the clay is broken to dust and shaken out. Dubbers are sometimes made larger than a wine-pipe, and will last upwards of a century.

forward in a most impetuous, though tumultuous, manner, applied ladders, mounted the wall in various places, and, except a slight check sustained at the gurhee, carried all before them within the town. The garrison fled to the forts above, closely followed by the assailants; but the pursuers did not succeed in entering with the fugitives. They, however, continued to crowd up the face of the hills, though huge stones were rolled down, and a heavy fire of musketry opened upon them. Their casualties were numerous; but the garrison becoming intimidated at their furious and persevering attack, offered to surrender if their lives were spared—a condition which was immediately granted.*

After the fall of Badamee, Nana Furnuwees returned to Poona, and Hurry Punt was left to prosecute the war. Moodajee Bhonslay went back to Nagpoor, but left the greater part of his troops with Hurry Punt, under his second son Khundoojee, promising to return with a reinforcement after the Dussera.

While these operations were prosecuted by the grand army, the detachment which proceeded to the westward, under Holkar, had expelled Tippoo's troops from every part of the Kittoor district, except the fort of the same name, which they invested but could not hope to reduce.

Hurry Punt's first care was to send back all his wounded from Badamee; he then moved towards Gudjendergurb, but as the small fort of Seertee lay in his route,† he breached and stormed it; but scarcely had he accomplished that object, when he was informed that Tippoo was

* Poona Records and Malet's despatches.

† Hurry Punt's official report to the Peishwa. I do not know the exact situation of Seertee; the Hindoo names frequently differ from the Mahomedan. The propagators of the Koran have always been prone to bestowing new, and the Hindoos to retaining old, appellations.

marching to give him battle ; and such was the vigilance of a corps of Beruds* in Tippoo's service, consisting of both horse and foot, that the address and dexterity of Mahratta spies, famous only where their own language is spoken, could obtain no correct intelligence of his motions, and the first certain accounts which Hurry Punt received, assured him that Tippoo was in full march to attack Adonee. That fortress was then held by Mohubut Jung, son of the late Busalut Jung and nephew of Nizam Ally, who was totally unprepared for a siege. The families and seraglio of the late Busalut Jung, as well as those of his sons, were then in the fort, and Mohubut Jung's first application was to Nizam Ally, calling upon him to save the honor of his house. A pressing requisition was also sent to Hurry Punt, who immediately sent forward Tuhwur Jung, with the whole of the Moghul troops, and 20,000 Mahrattas under Krist Rao Bulwunt and Rugonath Rao Neelkunt. These troops were on their march towards Adonee, when they received intelligence of the advance towards Raichore of the whole of the disposable force from Hyderabad under Moghul Ally. A junction was formed at Bunnoor, when they moved towards Adonee, with an army of nearly 60,000 men. Tippoo endeavoured to carry the place before the arrival of the approaching succour ; his desperate but premature attempts were most gallantly repulsed by Mohubut Jung, and as the allies drew near, he was compelled to raise the siege, and retire some miles to the southward. The confederates had forded the Toongbuddra with difficulty ; and, as the country to the southward of that river was entirely at Tippoo's command, whilst they could place no dependence on the resources of the tract

* The class of people already described, resembling the Ramoosees of Maharashtra, and improperly called Beders.

between the Kistna and Toongbuddra, much of which still remained to be reduced, they prudently resolved to withdraw the garrison from Adonee, and recross the latter river. The retreat was judiciously executed; but the unpardonable oversight of leaving the fort, guns, ammunition, and stores, without an attempt to render them unserviceable to their enemy, cancelled any merit the commanders might otherwise have claimed.*

The troops from Hyderabad returned to that capital, and the main body rejoined Hurry Punt at Gudjendergurrh, of which place he had obtained possession by bribing the killidar.

Holkar still lay before Kittoor, apparently in careless inactivity, when, decamping suddenly, he made one march of upwards of 60 miles to Savanoor, with the nabob of which he had been some time in correspondence. The immediate object of Holkar's movement was an attempt to seize the person of Ragwundur Naik, one of Tippoo's principal bankers; but he had just time to escape across the Toongbuddra, and only two or three inferior soucars fell into Holkar's hands, from whom he exacted a ransom of two lakhs of rupees. Burhan-ud-deen, with a body of Tippoo's troops, attacked Holkar: but the Mahrattas, joined by the nabob of Savanoor, repulsed them; and on the ensuing night Burhan-ud-deen retired to Jerecanwutty, on the Wurdah, 30 miles above Savanoor.

About the year 1779, the nabob of Savanoor had married the sister of Tippoo, and on that occasion Hyder restored the whole of the 12 districts originally dependent on his principality, on condition that he should keep up 2,000 Patan horse for the service of the state. Tippoo entertained a personal enmity against the nabob, and, on his accession to

* Hurry Punt's despatches, Bombay Records, Wilks.

power, found a pretext for indulging it, owing to the nabob's having omitted to keep up the stipulated number of horse. Following a systematic plan, Tippoo mulcted and plundered both the nabob and his subjects, so that it was not surprising the nabob should seek the first opportunity of throwing off his allegiance, and declaring, as he now did, for the Mahrattas.

Hurry Punt's operations, after obtaining possession of Gudjendergurh, were directed against Buhadur Benda and Kopaul; the former had been delivered up, and he was in treaty for the latter, when he was astonished by information of Tippoo's having actually crossed the Toongbuddra at Gurhghaut,* with the greater part of his army, in basket boats. Hurry Punt advanced towards him: but finding the ground very unfavourable for the operations of his cavalry, he encamped at the distance of 10 miles, where Tippoo made two unsuccessful attempts to surprise him. Grain and forage being extremely scarce, in order to procure supplies as well as to draw Tippoo into the plain, Hurry Punt proceeded to Savanoor. Tippoo, marching along the bank of the Kistna, followed him, and encamped in a strong position within six miles of the confederates, keeping the town of Savanoor between the camps. In this situation both parties continued for 15 days, until, on the 1st of October, two hours before dawn, the Mahratta camp was alarmed by a sudden firing, which was speedily answered by the Mahratta artillery. Tippoo, who had headed the attack in person, on discovering where their guns were posted, directed his principal effort to that spot, which induced Hurry Punt to draw them off until daylight, when he again opened on the assailants. The position occupied by the

* Colonel Wilks calls this place Kurrucknaut. It is not marked in any map that I have seen, nor do I know its precise situation.

Mahrattas was still very unfavorable ; their horse were prevented from charging by the steep banks of a rivulet, which Tippoo cautiously refrained from crossing, and, after cannonading for several hours, he withdrew to his encampment.

There was a scarcity of forage in the Mahratta camp, and their own situation and that of their enemy precluded all hope of being able to gain any advantage by continuing at Savanoor. Hurry Punt, therefore, deemed it necessary to retire, although he thereby sacrificed the capital of his new ally. The nabob of Savanoor reluctantly fell back with him 10 miles, where the confederates took up a new position. Tippoo possessed himself of the town, but declined advancing upon them : he lay inactive at Savanoor until the Mohurram, when he retired to celebrate that festival at Benkapoor, leaving Hurry Punt to breach, storm, and take Seerhutti, a fortified town 20 miles N. E. of Savanoor, without interruption. Tippoo having deposited his heavy baggage in Benkapoor, moved from that place ; but aware of his enemy's superiority in cavalry, he did not quit the broken ground on the banks of the Wurdah and Toongbuddra. Proceeding down the left bank, he encamped between Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, and again obtained possession of the latter place. The confederates followed him, and endeavoured to cut off his supplies ; but their own forage being brought from a great distance, whilst Tippoo drew his with facility from the south bank of the Toongbuddra, they soon abandoned the attempt. Tippoo renewed his endeavours to surprise the camp of the confederates, and on one occasion took some baggage belonging to the Moghuls.*

* Just at this period the following letter appears in the official correspondence of Hurry Punt, and in his own handwriting :—" The loss sustained by the army in consequence of the cholera morbus is very great ; medicines are liberally supplied ; some do recover, but by far the greater part die."

In these feeble operations neither party could boast of much advantage, and the confederates were at a loss to account for Tippoo's motives in suddenly tendering proposals of peace. Even after the arrival of two envoys of high rank, Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and Ally Reza Khan, who negotiated through Tookajee Holkar and Gungadhur Rastia, Hurry Punt for a time imagined that Tippoo's professions were only a prelude to some stratagem. His suspicions contributed to prolong the negotiation ; for, although an armistice took place on the 10th February, the peace was not concluded till April. The Mahrattas obtained the cession of Badamee, Kittoor, and Nurgoond ; the other towns and districts reduced by them were restored to Tippoo. Tippoo also agreed to pay 45 lakhs of tribute, 30 of which were immediately produced, and the remainder promised at the expiration of a year. Adonee was restored to the nephew of Nizam Ally ; but Tippoo had destroyed the works and carried off the guns. The nabob of Savanoor obtained a promise of the restoration of that portion of his territory which he possessed prior to his marriage with Hyder's daughter ; but dreading Tippoo's treachery, he did not venture to return to Savanoor at this period, but continued with his Mahratta friends at Poona.*

Tippoo's motives for acceding to a pacification so disadvantageous have been imputed,† it would appear justly, to his apprehending that the English were about to take part against him. Mr. Malet had not only been invited to Poona as resident, but, at the request of Nana Furnuwees, he had joined him at Badamee—a circumstance which, Tippoo conceived, bespoke a very intimate connection ; but the acting governor-general was studious to allay any

Poona Records, Mr. Chaplin's report.

† Wilks.

alarm it might create, and had partly succeeded. Shortly afterwards, however, in September 1786, Lord Cornwallis, having assumed charge of the supreme government, addressed letters to the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, in which, although he expressly intimated his determination to take no part in the war between the confederates and Tippoo Sultan, yet the state of military efficiency in which it became the immediate care of the new governor-general to place all the presidencies, occasioned a bustle and apparent preparation, which seem to have convinced Tippoo that the designs of the English were decidedly hostile ; and may not merely account for his earnestness to terminate the war with the confederates, but afford some reason for that rancorous hostility which led him to persevere in schemes for annihilating the power of the British nation in India. The appointment of a resident at the Peishwa's court was not more a cause of alarm to Tippoo than of jealousy to Mahadajee Sindia. A tardy acquiescence was obtained from Sindia to the measure, and, in order to reconcile him to it as much as possible, Mr. Malet was instructed to send his despatches to the supreme government through the resident, for the purpose of being submitted for Sindia's information and obtaining his opinions. But Sindia was at this period, and for several years afterwards, too much occupied by his own vast projects in Hindostan to be able either to prevent the English from establishing their influence at Poona, or to direct much of his attention to the affairs of the Deccan. The history of his progress will be found in the ensuing chapter.

CHAP. IX.

FROM A.D. 1785 TO A.D. 1790.

Sindia's embarrasments—His impolitic conduct—Sequesters many of the jagheers—consequent enmity of the Mahomedan chiefs.—Mohummud Beg Humadane.—Sindia levies tribute from the Rajpoots—The Rajpoots revolt—attack and route Sindia's troops under Ryajee Patell.—Sindia takes the field—difficulties of the crisis—endeavours to negotiate with the Rajpoots without success.—Mohummud Beg and his nephew join the Rajpoots—Battle in which Mohummud Beg is killed, but victory declares for the Rajpoots.—The emperor's regular infantry, with 80 pieces of cannon, desert Sindia in a body, and join the Rajpoots—Sindia evinces great fortitude and conduct—retreats unmolested by the Rajpoots—followed by Ismael Beg—continues his retreat to Gwalior—applies to Poona for aid.—Views of Nana Furnuwees.—Sindia's exertions—Able defence of Agra by his general, Luckwa Dada.—Gholam Kawdir—takes Aligurh—joins Ismael Beg before Agra.—Jaths obstruct the operations of the siege—Sindia reinforces the Jaths.—Battle near Bhurtpoor, in which the Mahrattas and Jaths are worsted.—Successful diversion planned by Rannay Khan.—The battle of Agra, in which Ismael Beg is totally defeated.—Ismael Beg joins Gholam Kawdir—They repair to Delhi.—Barbarities perpetrated by Gholam Kawdir.—Mahrattas at last advance—Gholam Kawdir flies—is pursued—taken—suffers mutilation, under which he dies.—Shah Alum restored to his throne,

*and Sindia recovers his ascendancy—His situation—
Changes introduced in the constitution of his army—
Gosaeens.—Himmat Buhadur.—Regular infantry.—
Sindia's views.—Transition to Deccan affairs.*

THE resources of the provinces which Sindia had acquired in Hindostan were, from their exhausted state, totally inadequate to meet the great additional disbursements which his late success, more brilliant than lucrative, had entailed. Pressed by pecuniary embarrassments, he was driven to acts actually impolitic and unjust. Against foreign adversaries he might have prevailed, but domestic enemies soon became too strong for his newly-established power. The principal cause of discontent arose from his sequestrating the jagheers of many of the Mahomedan chiefs, and from being suspected of entertaining like designs towards all of them. The most considerable of these chiefs, whom he had not yet dispossessed, was Mohummud Beg Humadance, whom Sindia had recalled from Raghoogurh to Delhi, and endeavoured, without success, to prevail upon him to disband a portion of his troops. Mohummud Beg, suspecting that Sindia intended to enforce compliance, ever after harboured a secret enmity against him, which the course of events soon afforded an opportunity of declaring.

Under the sanction of the emperor's name, Sindia had not only preferred a claim for tribute on the Rajpoots, but at the head of his army at the gates of Jeypoor had fixed the first payment at 60 lakhs of rupees, of which a part was received, and the balance promised in a given time. When the period expired, Sindia sent Ryajee Patell to recover the remainder; but the Rajpoots having prepared for resistance, and

being secretly assured of support from Mohummud Beg and the disaffected Mahomedan nobles, refused to pay the amount, derided the authority of Ryajee Patell, attacked his troops, and routed them. The faction at Delhi opposed to Sindia was much strengthened by this revolt; even the imbecile monarch, whose stipend was irregularly paid, and who readily became the tool of any new party, joined in the increasing murmurs, complained of the invaded rights of imperial dignity, and of the arbitrary acts and uncourteous manner of the Mahratta chiefs. Sindia, though sensible of these discontents, though his funds were exhausted, his own and the imperial troops in arrears, and his fortunes depending on the issue of a very doubtful campaign, was obliged to take the field against the Rajpoot. He ordered the troops under Appa Khunde Rao, with the two battalions of De Boigne, lately returned from Bundelcund, to join him; but, to add to his difficulties, he was obliged to detach two separate bodies of troops to the northward of Delhi, under two of his own officers, Hybut Rao Phalkay and Ambajee Inglia, to repel an incursion of the Seiks.

On approaching Jeypoor, Sindia endeavoured to negotiate, but his overtures were disregarded. The raja of Joudpoor, with several Rajpoot chiefs of less note, united with Pertaub Sing, the raja of Jeypoor, who had succeeded his father Jey Sing, and their army was already very formidable. The greater part of Sindia's troops being very different from those of an army wholly Mahratta, the Rajpoots, by acting on the supplies and cutting off the foragers, soon rendered their situation critical. Both Mahrattas and Moghuls, irritated by privation, became dissatisfied; and Mohummud Beg Humadancee, together with his nephew, Ismael Beg, chose this moment for deserting Sindia, and joining the Rajpoots.

Lest the disaffection should spread to the whole of the emperor's troops, Sindia took the earliest opportunity of leading them into action. An obstinate battle took place; Mohummud Beg fell by a cannon-shot, and his troops were on the point of flying, when they were rallied by Ismael Beg, who retrieved the day, and forced the Mahrattas to retire. Sindia was preparing to renew the contest, when, on the third day after the battle, the whole of the emperor's regular infantry, with 80 pieces of cannon, went off in a body to join Ismael Beg.*

At no period of his life did Sindia evince greater fortitude and conduct than at this alarming crisis.† He immediately sent off his heavy baggage and many of his followers to Gwalior, by the route of Kooshalgurh; he then made a rapid retreat to Deeg, recalled his detachments, and restored Deeg, with several other places, to the Jaths, in order to preserve an interest with that people. He also deposited his heavy guns in their fort of Bhurtpoor, and strengthened his garrisons in Aligurh and Agra.‡

To effect these and other contingent arrangements required some time, and, had the Rajpoots pressed the war with vigour, they might probably have confined the Mahrattas to the southern bank of the Chumbul; but they only sought to suppress the ambitious pretensions of Sindia, not to annihilate the Mahratta ascendancy in Hindostan. They therefore returned to their respective capitals when Sindia retreated, and left Ismael Beg to recover the imperial districts.§ Ismael first proceeded towards Agra, in the neighbourhood of which Sindia was still hovering, but he was deter-

* Mahratta MSS. and letters, Bengal Records, &c.

† From the oral information of General De Boigne.

‡ Sindia's letters to the Peishwa, confirmed by General De Boigne.

§ Scott's History, Mahratta MSS., original letters, and English Records.

mined to avoid another general action. At that time, however, skirmishes took place for eight successive days, and one village was repeatedly taken and re-taken; but it being reported that Gholam Kawdir, the son of Zabita Khan Rohillah, was on his march to assist Ismael Beg, Sindia made a rapid retreat towards Gwalior, on which occasion many of his men perished, by losing themselves in the ravines contiguous to the Jumna.* Sindia had made repeated applications to the Peishwa for troops, and now wrote to Nana Furnuwees, representing that, although he by no means considered his own affairs desperate, yet as he had reason to believe the English were about to form an alliance with the emperor and the Rajpoots, he submitted to his consideration the danger that must ensue to the whole Mahratta empire, by allowing the English to establish their sway over the provinces of Hindostan, and to gain such an influence as they must acquire, if assisted by the weight of the imperial name. He strongly disavowed every feeling of jealousy, and called on Nana, if such did exist towards himself, to erase it from his mind; to ask Holkar, Hurry Punt, and Pureshram Bhow if he (Sindia) had ever interfered with their views, and if they had not seen that all his endeavours tended to the aggrandizement of the empire: "we serve," continued Sindia, "a common master; let our exertions be directed to the common cause: if you personally entertain jealousy of me, ask yourself who supported you against the faction of Moraba, and put your rival Sukaram Bappoo into your power; who suppressed the insurrections of the pretended Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, beat the English at Tullygaom, maintained a great share of the war against them, and concluded an

* General De Boigne.

advantageous peace? Think of these services, banish suspicion, and silence calumniators, who are our mutual enemies; let the cause of the Mahratta nation be upheld in Hindostan, and prevent our empire from being disunited and overthrown.”*

These observations, though incorrect with regard to any alliance then meditated by the English, carried much of truth in them; but the grand aim of Nana Furnuwees was to cement the Mahratta confederacy under the authority of the Peishwa, and the whole conduct of Sindia had so fully proved that his views were directed to independence, if not to supremacy, in the empire, that Nana, however unwilling to relinquish Mahratta claims in Hindostan, hesitated as to the extent and mode of reinforcing Sindia's army.

A body of troops had been held in readiness under Ali Bahadur† even prior to Sindia's retreat; but Nana wished to employ them in making a distinct settlement with the Rajpoot states, in the name of the Peishwa, for the purpose of extending the Mahratta influence, without confirming the power of a rival of such inordinate ambition. It is supposed by some of his countrymen that Nana had some communications with the raja of Jeypoor for the purpose of preserving the Hindoo power, but with a view also of controlling Sindia; the moderation shown by the Rajpoots in not molesting Sindia's retreat is adduced as a proof of this conjecture; but without an absolute rupture with Sindia, which was justly considered ruinous to the empire, Nana saw no means of attaining the ascendancy he desired. Besides the difficulties arising from these considerations, some fresh acts of hostility on the part of Tippoo rendered him averse to detach troops from the Deccan.

* Original letter from Mahadajee Sindia to Nana Furnuwees.

† The son of Shumsher Buhadur, and grandson of the great Bajee Rao.

Sindia, however, whilst he urged these applications at Poona, was using every exertion to retrieve his affairs by his own resources. His most active enemy was Ismael Beg, who, after the retreat of the Mahratta army, invested Agra, which was vigorously defended by Luckwa Dada—a Mahratta Bramin of the Shenwee tribe. At this time appeared Gholam Kawdir, who, on the death of his father, Zabita Khan, which happened in January 1785, succeeded to the jagheer. His disposition, equally cruel and turbulent, was kept in check, whilst the power of Sindia, his hereditary enemy, was predominant; but no sooner did he see a field open to his view, by the reverses which befel that chief, than he collected troops, and rushed on a scene which promised ample gratification to his inclinations. Instead of proceeding to join Ismael Beg, as was reported to be his intention, he, in the first instance, drove the Mahratta garrison from the city of Delhi, where he placed his own troops, but left the emperor unmolested in the citadel. He next besieged Aligurh, which he reduced, and

A.D. 1788. then proceeded to assist Ismael Beg, who was still engaged in the siege of Agra.

The Jaths, whom Ismael Beg might have conciliated by confirming the cessions made to them by Sindia, took every opportunity of obstructing his operations, and encouraging the besieged in the fort, till at last Sindia determined to support them. For this purpose he sent forward Rannay Khan* and Appa Khunde Rao with a

* Rannay Khan, says Sir John Malcolm, was originally a Bihishtee, or water-carrier, who saved Mahadajee Sindia's life, by carrying him off when wounded at Panniput, and, in gratitude for this service, Sindia raised him to high command. Whatever may have been Rannay Khan's origin, his conduct proved that he was worthy of his master's confidence. The escape of Mahadajee Sindia, however, is generally attributed, with more probability, to Trimbuckjee Ingolia, one of his sillidars, who is said to have carried him off behind him on his horse.

body of horse, supported by the two regular battalions of De Boigne and some other infantry. As the junction of Gholam Kawdir with Ismael Beg was known at Gwalior before the march of these troops, it was deemed an imprudent measure on the part of Sindia. Rannay Khan, however, united his forces with those of the Jaths at Bhurtpoor, when the whole marched towards Agra; but they had only proceeded 16 miles when they met Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir, who had raised the siege in order to give them battle.

The cavalry of the Jaths was commanded by Sew Sing Foujdar : their infantry, chiefly regulars, was under M. Listeneaux, a Frenchman, and two Mahomedan officers, each commanding separate bodies; but one of these Mahomedan officers, named Jehangeer Khan, with his three battalions, deserted to Ismael Beg without firing a shot. The action commenced by a cannonade from the
April 24. guns of Ismael Beg. The Jaths were on the right, the Mahrattas on the left.

Gholam Kawdir made a furious attack upon the infantry of the right wing, which soon put them all to the rout, excepting those under M. Listeneaux, who for some time maintained his ground. Ismael Beg, opposed to the infantry on the left, advanced with all the energy of his character, but found himself received with remarkable steadiness and intrepidity by the infantry of De Boigne. All parties admitted that, had De Boigne and Listeneaux been properly supported by the cavalry, the issue of the day might have been very different; but, after a heavy loss, the regular troops at last gave way, and the whole, favoured by the night, effected their retreat to Bhurtpoor. Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir called upon Runjeet Sing, the Jath chief, to renounce his connexion with the Mahrattas, otherwise

they would, after the reduction of Agra, besiege him in his capital. But their triumph was of short duration; Luckwa Dada, the killidar of the fort of Agra, persevered in his gallant and successful defence; the Mahomedan chiefs soon evinced a distrust of each other, and Rannay Khan, hearing of an incursion of the Seiks, sent a body of Mahrattas and Jaths to join and encourage them to fall on the jagheer of Gholam Kawdir. This diversion had the desired effect; Gholam Kawdir immediately set off to repel the invaders, and Sindia having reinforced the division of Rannay Khan, the Mahrattas and Jaths once

June 18.

more advanced towards Agra, at which place an obstinate battle was fought, in which De Boigne and his battalions greatly signalized themselves. The army of Ismael Beg was defeated and dispersed; that chief himself, after receiving two severe wounds, escaped from the field by the swiftness of his horse, plunged into the Jumna, gained the opposite bank, and with a few followers reached the camp of Gholam Kawdir, by whom he was courteously received. His dispersed army flocked to Delhi, whither, in hopes of again collecting them, he immediately repaired. Gholam Kawdir followed him to the capital. The emperor refused to admit either the one or the other into the citadel; but Gholam Kawdir, having corrupted one of the confidential servants, not only gained admittance, but seized the gates, occupied every part of the palace and citadel with his own troops, and commenced a systematic train of violence, rapine and barbarity, almost without example in the annals of the world. These enormities continued for two months; at the end of that time, when the unhappy monarch had been plundered, insulted, and dethroned, his eyes destroyed in their sockets by the point of a dagger in the hand of

the merciless Gholam Kawdir ; when his wives, daughters, sons, and relatives had been exposed, dishonored, degraded and some of them starved to death, the Mahratta army at last marched to his relief. Ismael Beg, who at first had so far concurred in the views of Gholam Kawdir as to agree to plunder the imperial palace, for the purpose of procuring the means of subsistence to their troops, turned with abhorrence from the commission of the cruelties exercised by his colleague, and, on the promise of a jagheer from Sindia, joined with the Mahrattas against him. Gholam Kawdir retired from Delhi upon their approach, carrying with him Bedar Bukht, the son of Ahmed Shah, whom, on the dethronement of Shah Alum, he had proclaimed emperor of the Moghuls.

Mahadajee Sindia was severely censured for not immediately proceeding to the capital, but he probably foresaw that Gholam Kawdir and Ismael Beg, if left for a time to themselves, could not remain united, and, as the result proved, that he should soon be able to secure one party in his interests. Besides these reasons, he was assured that reinforcements under Ali Bahadur, followed by Tookajee Holkar, were on their march from Poona to join him. These troops were granted by Nana Furnuwees on condition that all territory acquired north of the Chumbul should be equally shared by the Peishwa, Sindia, and Holkar.

The Mahratta army, which advanced from Agra, was under three principal officers—Rannay Khan, Ali Buhadur, and Appa Khunde Rao—accompanied by the two battalions of De Boigne. Rannay Khan, who was chief-in-command, on taking possession of Delhi, did everything which humanity dictated for the relief of the unfortunate emperor. The arrival of the Mahrattas in the Moghul capital was, on this occasion, hailed with the

greatest joy. A large body immediately pursued Gholam Kawdir, and forced him to take shelter in the fort of Meerut, where he defended himself vigorously ; but the place being destitute of provisions, and his capture, if he continued, inevitable, he mounted a swift horse, and fled alone. But after he had proceeded some distance, the horse fell, and his rider, being completely stunned, lay senseless on the ground. In this situation he was at daylight discovered and recognised by some of the peasantry, and by them carried to the Mahratta camp, where he was closely guarded, and shortly after, by Sindia's orders, he suffered a dreadful mutilation which he did not survive. The prince Bedar Bukht was retaken at Meerut : and at first, without any harshness, was remanded into confinement, but he was afterwards put to death by order of Shah Alum.*

Mahadjee Sindia arrived in Delhi a short time after the success of Rannay Khan. Shah Alum
 A.D. 1789. was re-seated on his throne with much pomp, and the honors of wukeel-i-mootluq, formerly conferred on the Peishwa, and those of his deputy on Sindia, were renewed with formal solemnity.

Meanwhile the jagheer of Gholam Kawdir was reduced, and the greater part of the Dooab, with the provinces of Delhi and Agra, were annexed to the Mahratta dominions. The situation of Sindia, however, was by no means secure ; he for some time dreaded an invasion of the Abdallee, who, under their king, Timoor Shah, were in the field in great force, and he well knew, although the Moghul faction was broken, and Ismael Beg had received his stipulated jagheer in the province of Maywat, that, in the event of the appearance of the Afghans, the Mahome-

* Bengal Records, Francklin, Scott, and Mahratta MSS.

dans would unite against him. He had also powerful enemies in the Rajpoots; and his coadjutors, Holkar and Ali Buhadur, were more solicitous to share his acquisitions and obstruct his measures, than to unite in upholding his cause. He at the same time experienced some inquietude from the escape of one of the sons of the emperor, who fled to the court of Nizam Ally at Hyderabad. Little notice being taken of him, he repaired to Poona, where he was received with attention, but more to excite Sindia's jealousy than with any intention of affording to the fugitive assistance or relief.

These obstacles did not deter Mahadajee Sindia from pursuing his plans of independence. In detailing his political schemes and the progress of his conquests, we must not omit to notice the changes which he introduced in the constitution of his army. Amongst the minor innovations of Sindia may be enumerated the great proportion of Rajpoots and Mahomedans whom he enlisted; the alteration of the dress of his horsemen, who, from the short breeches worn by the Mahrattas, adopted the long trowsers covering the heel,* and lastly, the large bodies of Gosaeens whom he entertained; and who, until introduced by Sindia, had rarely appeared as soldiers in the Mahratta armies.† The Gosaeens were kept distinct by Sindia from his other troops, and were attached to the division of Ambajee Inglia, principally under a leader named Himmud Buhadur, who was both their military commander and their spiritual director, and whose history merits some digression.

* This, to the mere European reader, may appear unimportant, but though not quite common among all Mahrattas, it tended, at that time, to make a difference between Sindia's horse and those of the Deccan; and, as the act of a Hindoo prince, was an important innovation.

† For some account of the Gosaeens, the reader may revert to the Preliminary Observations.

Himmut Buhadur accompanied Sindia on his first advance to Delhi in 1784 : he was left in charge of Muttra when Sindia retreated to Gwalior, and by means of a secret understanding, which he contrived to establish with Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir, he continued unmolested. Sindia, who knew that the sole object of Himmut Buhadur was to obtain a jagheer for himself from either of the contending parties, had, on a former occasion, in consequence of the Gosaeen's misconduct, resumed, and afterwards, on promised amendment, restored, the lands granted for the support of his followers ; and although he pretended on his return to be highly satisfied with the Gosaeen for retaining possession of the jagheer, he determined to deprive him of it on the first opportunity. Sindia's chief causes of displeasure arose from finding that he was engaged in secret intrigues with Holkar and Ali Buhadur, the partizans of Nana Furnuwees ; and that he persisted in an intercourse he had long kept up with the nabob vizier, in whose dominions he had at a former period sought refuge, when apprehensive of Sindia's enmity. At length, on pretence that the Gosaeen was employed in magical arts to take away his life, Sindia sent a party of troops, who seized Himmut Buhadur at Muttra, and were conveying him to their master ; but the camp of Ali Buhadur being contiguous to the road by which the prisoner was brought, he contrived to elude his guards, and gain the tent of Ali Buhadur before they could secure him. It was in vain that Sindia remonstrated ; Ali Buhadur declared he could not surrender the person of Himmut Buhadur without an order from the Peishwa ; and in the meantime, before any answer could be obtained from Poona, he connived at his escape to Lucknow.

The departure of the leader did not affect the great

body of Gosacens, as might have been the case at an earlier period ; they remained with Sindia, and, being attached to his service by habit, became intermingled with the rest of his irregular infantry.

But the most important of all the changes introduced by Sindia was the well-organized regular force, which he about this time raised, by augmenting the two battalions of De Boigne into a brigade, which was subsequently, at different periods, increased to three brigades. A brigade consisted of eight battalions of 700 men each. Attached to every brigade there were 500 horse ; and to each battalion five pieces of artillery, two six-pounders, two three-pounders, and a howitzer. To provide for the regular payment of these troops he made over assignments of land to the charge and management of De Boigne ; to whom he allowed two per cent. upon the net revenue, independent of his regular pay, which was 10,000 rupees a month. A select body of irregular infantry was attached to De Boigne's force, to whose efficiency that officer greatly contributed by adding a bayonet to their matchlocks. The augmentation of De Boigne's army was gradual, as was his train of artillery, which consisted at last of upwards of 200 pieces of cannon of different calibres. Sixty of his best guns were cast by Mr. Sangster, the officer already mentioned, who quitted the service of the rana of Gohud, and entered that of Sindia, under De Boigne. His officers were Europeans of all nations ; many of them British, and men very respectable by birth, education, and character.*

At the present conjuncture, in the commencement of
A.D. 1790. the year 1790, Sindia had only raised one
regular brigade. His immediate views

* Palmer's despatches, General De Boigne.

were directed to conciliate Holkar and Ali Buhadur, with the hope of obtaining their assistance in checking the incursions of the Seiks ; in humbling the Rajpoots, who continued in opposition to his authority; and in securing the dependence of Ismael Beg, who, it was apprehended, had serious intentions of joining the Rajpoots. His reasons for contemplating this fresh desertion are partly ascribable to the artifice of Holkar, who, in order to occasion a rupture between him and Sindia, plundered some of the villages in his new jagheer, which, though expressly contrary to Sindia's wishes and injunctions, was attributed by Ismael Beg to some inimical design on the part of that chief.* We shall, for the present, however, leave Mahratta affairs in Hindostan, and return to those of the Deccan.

* Sindia's letters.

CHAP. X.

FROM A.D. 1787 TO A.D. 1792.

Tippoo breaks the treaty with the Peishwa.—His great preparations—supposed by the English to be intended against them.—Nana Furnuvees proposes a defensive alliance, which is declined by Lord Cornwallis.—Transactions between the British authorities and Nizam Ally.—Guntoor given up.—Nizam Ally negotiates with the English and with Tippoo—results.—Lord Cornwallis's letter to Nizam Ally.—Tippoo considers that letter tantamount to an offensive alliance against him—His unsuccessful attack on the lines of Travancore.—Alliance of the English, the Peishwa, and Nizam Ally against Tippoo—its terms.—First campaign of the English in this war against Tippoo.—Dilatory proceedings of the allies.—A British detachment joins Pureshram Bhow.—The Mahrattas cross the Kistna.—The Moghuls advance to lay siege to Kopaul and Buhadur Benda.—The Mahrattas lay siege to Dharwar—operations—Dharwar capitulates after a protracted siege—Capitulation infringed.—Lord Cornwallis assumes command of the British army.—Capture of Bangalore.—Mahratta army marches from Poona under Hurry Punt Phurkay.—Sera surrendered.—The Mahratta armies advance to join the British and Moghuls before Seringapatam—Lord Cornwallis defeats Tippoo at Arikera, but is compelled to abandon his design of besieging Seringapatam—Distress of his army—relieved by the unexpected junction of the Mahrattas.—Various operations.—A party

of Mahrattas surprised and cut off by Kummur-ud-deen.—Lord Cornwallis reduces the forts between Bangalore and Gurumcondah.—The Moghuls, unable to reduce Gurumcondah, leave a party to mask it, which is surprised.—Pureshram Bhow's scheme of reducing Bednore.—Battle of Simoga.—Admirable conduct of Captain Little.—Simoga capitulates.—Pureshram Bhow advances towards Bednore, but retires with precipitation.—Operations at Seringapatam.—Peace concluded with Tippoo.—Cause of Pureshram Bhow's retreat explained.—The armies return to their respective territories.—Distress of Pureshram Bhow's army.

AT the period when Sindia retreated to Gwalior, we have observed that one reason which
 A.D. 1737. prevented Nana Furnuwees from supporting him with troops from the Deccan proceeded from fresh aggressions on the part of Tippoo ; in fact, the latter scarcely permitted Hurry Punt to recross the Kistna, when he retook Kittoor ; and an army, assembled at Bednore, threatened a descent on the Mahratta territories in the Concan. As often happens with respect to the capricious conduct of the native princes of India, it is difficult to reconcile this procedure with the reasons which had so recently induced Tippoo to tender hasty proposals of peace. Some of the English, from the various rumours in circulation, concluded that it was a deception, contrived with the consent of Nana Furnuwees, preparatory to a general confederacy against the British, in which the Mahrattas, Nizam Ally, Tippoo, and the French had become parties. In regard to the Mahrattas, there was no foundation for this supposition, but there was reason to believe that Tippoo had renewed his engagements with the French, and that his designs were more hostile to the

British than to the Mahrattas; but he wished to conceal his real object until he could prepare his army, and obtain effectual assistance from France. Nana Furnuwees believed that the invasion of the Mahratta territories was his chief object; and, in the end of the year 1787, proposed to the governor-general, Lord Cornwallis, through Mr. Malet, to form, on the part of the Peishwa, a defensive alliance with the English, in order to control the overbearing and ambitious spirit of Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis, though impressed with a belief of the great importance of this offer, as essential to the safety of British India, was prohibited, by act of parliament, from accepting it, until Tippoo should break through his engagements by some unequivocal act or declaration of hostility. In declining it, therefore, he instructed Mr. Malet to offer general assurances of the sincere desire of the governor-general to cultivate the friendship of the Peishwa's government.

The reports of Tippoo's hostile intentions became less prevalent during the early part of 1788; and this apparent tranquillity afforded a favourable opportunity of carrying into effect the intentions of the governor-general respecting the district of Guntoor, which, by the treaty concluded with Nizam Ally in 1768, ought to have been ceded to the English upon the death of Busalut Jung in 1782. Captain Kennaway was the agent deputed for the purpose of obtaining its surrender; but the motive of his mission was kept secret until he could reach Hyderabad, and preparations be completed at Madras for supporting the demand. Soon after Captain Kennaway's departure from Calcutta, it was again confidently reported that Tippoo was engaged in hostile machinations; that an attack made upon Tellicherry, by the raja of Cherika, was at his instigation; and that he

meditated the subjugation of the territories of the raja of Travancore, the ally of the English, which formed an important preliminary to the conquest of the British settlements in the south of India. Captain Kennaway, in consequence of these reports, was instructed to confine his immediate communications to general expressions of the great desire of the governor-general to maintain the most amicable understanding with the Soobeh of the Deccan in all affairs that might arise requiring adjustment. But soon after, as appearances bespoke no immediate hostility on the part of Tippoo, and Nizam Ally seemed disposed to settle everything with the British government in an equitable manner, the demand for Guntoor was made, and the district given over without impediment, and almost without hesitation, in September 1788. Notwithstanding his apparent readiness, Nizam Ally was greatly mortified at finding himself compelled to surrender Guntoor; but he was by this time sensible that, of the four great powers in India, his own was the weakest; and that, without a steadfast alliance with some one of the other three, his sovereignty must be swallowed up. The Mahrattas, from contiguity, and from their claims and peculiar policy, he most dreaded; personally, he was inclined to form an alliance with the Mahomedan ruler of Mysore; but some of his ministers, particularly Meer Abdool Kassim, in whom he had great confidence, strongly advised him to prefer a connection with the English, and endeavoured to show by what means the late concession might be made instrumental in effecting the desired object. He proposed that, as the English had obtained possession of Guntoor, they should be called upon to fulfil those articles of the treaty of 1768, by which they had agreed to furnish the Hyderabad state with two battalions and six pieces of cannon, to reduce the

territories of Tippoo, and to pay the Soobeh of the Deccan a certain annual tribute. Nizam Ally, acceding to these suggestions, despatched Meer Abdool Kassim to Calcutta, for the purpose of obtaining the concurrence of the governor-general. With his habitual duplicity, however, Nizam Ally at the same time sent another envoy* to Tippoo, proposing a strict and indissoluble union between the Mahomedan states, to which Tippoo declared his readiness to subscribe, on condition of an intermarriage in their families : but the Moghul haughtily rejected such a connection, and the negotiation terminated.

When the envoy deputed to Calcutta submitted his proposals, the governor-general found himself under considerable embarrassment.

A.D. 1789.

No specific revisal of the political relations between the English and Nizam Ally had taken place since the treaty of 1768 ; but the treaty of Madras, between the English and Hyder in 1769, and that of Mangalore with Tippoo in 1784, had each recognised both father and son as lawful sovereigns of that territory ; of which, by the treaty with Nizam Ally in 1768, Hyder was declared usurper, and of which the English had then arrogated to themselves the certainty of a speedy reduction. The governor-general was, as already mentioned, prohibited by act of parliament from entering on any new treaty without express authority from the Court of Directors ; but he was particularly desirous of securing the alliance both of Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, in consequence of his belief in Tippoo's hostile proceedings, already commencing by an attempt to subjugate Travancore, without appearing as a party in the aggression. The proposed alliance of the Mahrattas Lord Cornwallis had been constrained

* His name was Hafiz Fureed-ud-deen Khan.

to decline ; but the danger which now more distinctly threatened, and the covert nature of Tippoo's operations, which precluded proofs wholly sufficient for legal justification, induced Lord Cornwallis to adopt a line of conduct more objectionable than an avowed defensive alliance. In reply to Meer Abdool Kassim's application, Lord Cornwallis explained the reason of his inability to perform that part of the treaty of 1768 which related to the conquest of the Carnatic Bala Ghaut ; but by a letter which he now wrote to Nizam Ally, which letter he declared equally binding as a treaty, he promised that should the English, at any future period, obtain possession of the territory in question, they would then perform their engagements to him, and to the Mahrattas. This promise certainly implied, at least an eventual intention of subduing Tippoo, and that inference was strengthened by an explanation of a part of the treaty, relative to the two battalions, which was before equivocal. Instead of being furnished with these battalions, as before expressed, when they could be spared, they were now to be sent when required, and to be paid for, at the same rate as they cost the company, merely on condition that they were never to be employed against the allies of the British government. These allies were at the same time expressly named ; the Mahrattas were included, but Tippoo was omitted.

Tippoo considered this letter as a treaty of offensive alliance against him. He was now at less pains to conceal his intended invasion of Travancore, and his unsuccessful attack on the lines, which he headed in person, was of

December 29,

A.D. 1790.

course considered to be a declaration of war. Nana Furnuwees no sooner heard of it, than he made specific proposals to the Governor-General, through Mr. Malet,

in name both of his own master and of Nizam Ally, which, with slight modifications, were accepted. A preliminary agreement was settled on the 29th March, and a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded at

June 1.

Poona, on the 1st June, between Mr. Malet on the part both of the Company, and Nana Furnuwees on the part both of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, by which these native powers stipulated that an army of 25,000 horse should attack Tippoo's northern possessions before and during the rains, and reduce as much as possible of his territory. That, after the rains, they should act against Tippoo with their utmost means, and, in case the governor-general should require the aid of 10,000 horse to co-operate with the English army, that number was also to be furnished within one month from the time of their being demanded, but maintained at the expense of the company's government. Both states were to be allowed two battalions, and their expense was to be defrayed by the Peishwa and Nizam Ally respectively, at the same rate as they cost the company. All conquests were to be equally shared, unless the English, by being first in the field, had reduced any part of the enemy's territory before the allied forces entered on the campaign, in which case the allies were to have no claim to any part of such acquisition. The Polygars and zumeendars, formerly dependent on the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, or those who had been unjustly deprived of their lands by Hyder and Tippoo, were to be reinstated in their territory on paying a *muzur* at the time of their re-establishment, which should be equally divided among the confederates, but afterwards they were to be tributary to Nizam Ally and the Peishwa respectively. It was also stipulated that if, after the conclusion of peace, Tippoo should attack any of the

contracting parties, the others became bound to unite against him.

The treaty was not finally concluded by Nizam Ally until the 4th July, as he hoped, by procrastination, to obtain the guarantee of the British government, not simply, as he pretended, to ensure protection to his territories from the Mahrattas during the absence of his troops on service, but to procure the interposition of the English in the settlement of the Mahratta claims, which even, where just, he had neither disposition nor ability to pay ; and he foresaw that a day of reckoning was at no great distance. Lord Cornwallis, viewing the proposals simply as stated, could not accede to it without giving umbrage to the Mahrattas ; but he assured Nizam Ally of his disposition to strengthen the connection between the two governments, when it could be effected consistently with good faith, and a due regard to subsisting engagements with other allies.

The first campaign of the English against Tippoo in this war was conducted by General Medows. It commenced on the 26th May 1790, and terminated by the return of the army to Madras on the 27th January 1791. The advantages obtained were by no means inconsiderable, but not so great as had been anticipated. General Medows, with the Madras army, invaded Tippoo's territory from the south, and reduced Caroor, Dindigul, Coimbatore, and Palghaut ; whilst Colonel Hartley,* with a detachment of the Bombay army, assailed it from the west, gallantly attacked and routed a strong corps in the neighbourhood of Calicut, and, a reinforcement being brought from Bombay by General Sir Robert Aber-

* This is the same officer with whom the reader is already well acquainted.

cromby, who assumed the command, the province of Malabar was soon cleared of Tippoo's troops.*

The Mahratta and Moghul armies had been declared ready to take the field before the march of General Medows in May; but Nizam Ally, as we have seen, did not finally sign the treaty till July, and Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, the officer appointed to command the

May 5. Mahratta army, did not receive his com-

mission to raise and equip his troops until 5th May, on which day he had his audience of leave from the Peishwa, and immediately set out for his own jagheer at Tasgaom, to make the necessary arrangements. The two battalions with their artillery,† which by the treaty the English had engaged to furnish, sailed from

May 20—29. Bombay about the 20th May, disembarked

on the 29th at Sungumeshwur (the same place where Sumbhajee was made prisoner by the Moghuls upwards of a century before), and ascended the Ambah Ghaut by the 10th June, although the natural difficulties of that stupendous pass were much increased by the setting

June 10—18. in of the monsoon. On the 18th the detachment arrived at Koompta, a village

within a few miles of Tasgaom, when the commander, Captain Little, found that not above 2,000 horse had as yet assembled. Two carcoons had been sent to meet and accompany the British detachment on its march from the coast, and the many artificial delays and difficulties raised by these Bramin conductors, to prolong the march, and conceal their want of preparation, were now explained.

* Bombay and Bengal Records, Colonel Wilks, &c.

† The 8th and 11th battalions of native infantry, one company of European artillery, and two companies of gun-lascars, with six field-pieces.

The dilatoriness of the Mahrattas appeared ambiguous to the English, especially as it was found that Tippoo's wukeels were still at Poona, where they were allowed to remain, as subsequently avowed by that court, in the vain hope that Tippoo would endeavour to purchase their neutrality; for, although the Mahrattas had really no intention of breaking their engagements with the English, this mode of obtaining a supply of money from a tributary who owed so much was by them considered wholly justifiable. On the 5th of August, however, the

August 5—11. wukeels were finally dismissed, but Pureshram Bhow did not cross the Kistna until

the 11th; at which time, in addition to the British detachment, he had only 5,000 horse, and about one-third of that number of infantry. In the course of a few days he was joined by a body of horse belonging to the Pritee Needhee; and a separate body of 1,000 horse, whom it was at first proposed to attach exclusively to the British detachment, also joined, under a partizan officer named Dhondoo Punt Gokla, originally an agent superintending a part of the marine establishment at Viziadroog. His horse were not continued with the detachment as proposed; but the intention of thus employing them was the commencement of a connection between Gokla's family and the English, by whose influence Bappoo Gokla, the nephew of Dhondoo Punt, was raised to high rank at the Peishwa's court, where we shall ultimately see him, by no uncommon revolution, an active enemy of the British government.

Hostilities on the part of the Mahrattas against Tippoo commenced on the 25th August by an
August 25. attack upon a fortified village, from which the Mahrattas expelled the garrison with trifling loss. As

they advanced, the country was rapidly occupied. The inhabitants assisted to expel Tippoo's sebundees, but the latter were easily reconciled to a change of masters, enlisted with Pureshram Bhow, and aided him in collecting the outstanding revenue. The Mahratta force, daily joined by small parties, soon amounted to 10,000 horse and 3,000 infantry, exclusive of Captain Little's detachment. With

September 18. this army Pureshram Bhow arrived before

Dharwar on the 18th September, and after much unnecessary exposure, and considerable loss in reconnoitring, commenced the siege by firing cannon from a great distance during the day, and withdrawing them at night—an absurd practice not unusual with Mahrattas.

In the Carnatic, south of the Toongbuddra, Tippoo had stationed two officers, Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and Kootub-ud-deen, at the head of about 5,000 men, a few of whom were cavalry, but the greater part regular infantry. The Moghuls, as the Mahrattas were proceeding towards Dharwar, moved from Pangul to cross the Kistna in order to besiege Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, on which Kootub-ud-deen, with the whole of the horse and a part of the infantry, advanced to observe their motions, whilst Budr-ul-Zeman threw himself into Dharwar. The defences of this fortress are principally of mud, and though irregular, and now greatly decayed, were then very strong. It is situated in a plain having an outer and an inner ditch from 25 to 30 feet wide, and nearly as many feet deep. Adjoining to the fort, on the south side, and outflanking it to the eastward, is a town or pettah, defended by a low mud wall, and a ditch of no strength. The garrison, on being reinforced, consisted of 7,000 regular and 3,000 irregular infantry. The first operation of

October 30. any consequence was an attack on a party

of the enemy who had advanced outside of the town, but were driven back with the loss of three guns and a considerable proportion of killed and wounded, principally from the fire of the British troops. By their exertions also the pettah was stormed and taken; Captain Little, the commander, and Lieutenant Forster were the first who mounted the wall, and both were wounded, the former severely, the latter mortally. This acquisition, which cost the British detachment 62 men in killed and wounded, was made over to a body of Mahrattas under Appa Sahib, the son of Pureshrām Bhow; but no sooner had the British returned to their camp, than the garrison sallied, and a very severe conflict ensued in the pettah; 500 Mahrattas were killed, and a still greater number of the garrison. Although the advantage was rather on the side of the Mahrattas, Appa Sahib withdrew his troops to camp, and permitted the garrison to re-occupy the town. After a truce, in order to allow each party to burn and bury their dead, the Mahrattas, who were ashamed again to call in

December 18. the aid of the British detachment, attacked
and retook the pettah themselves. The

feeble and absurd operations, however, which generally distinguish Mahratta sieges, were never more conspicuous than on the present occasion. It must ever be a reflection upon those under whose orders the auxiliary force from Bombay was equipped, that there was no efficient battering train to assist the operations of the Mahrattas, whose aid, if so supplied, might have contributed much more to the success of the war. In the first instance it was excusable, because it might have been expected that the Mahrattas, if unprepared with battering cannon, would not employ themselves in sieges; but Captain Little had early represented how necessary it became to send some heavy

guns, ammunition, and stores, not merely to save the credit of the British arms, but to ensure some useful co-operation on the part of their Mahratta allies. No battering train was sent, but a battalion of Europeans and another native corps were despatched under Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick, who arrived in camp, before Dharwar, on the 28th December, and assumed command of the British force.

Every possible exertion was made by Colonel Frederick.

A.D. 1790. Pureshram Bhow's artillery was manned by Europeans, but the guns were old, clumsy, and nearly unserviceable; so scanty was the supply of ammunition, that they were frequently silent for days together, and the garrison, on these occasions, never failed to make a complete repair in the intended breach. A considerable quantity of powder was at length obtained, but a prospect of its being again wholly expended,

February 7. induced Colonel Frederick to attempt the assault before the breach was entirely practicable. He would probably have succeeded; but at the moment when the troops were to pass the ditch, the fascines, which they had thrown into it, were set on fire, and so rapidly consumed, that it became necessary to retire to the trenches. In this attempt the British detachment lost 85 men. The chagrin occasioned by failure, followed by a series of harassing delays, operating on an ardent mind and a debilitated constitution, proved fatal to

March 13. Colonel Frederick, who died on the 13th March, and was succeeded in the command of the detachment by Major Sartorius. Materials were furnished so sparingly that little impression was made by the batteries; but the Mahrattas carried on the approaches after their own manner, by running trenches and digging

mines under the glacis. Frequent sallies, with various success, were made by the garrison ; at length, after a protracted siege of 29 weeks, a lodgment having been effected by the Mahrattas and the English on the crest of the glacis, the brave veteran Budr-ul-Zeman Khan capitulated. The troops, with all the honors of war, were allowed to march out of the fortress, which was taken

possession of by the confederates on the April 4. 4th of April. But the late garrison had only moved a short distance, when they were attacked by the Mahrattas, the greater part of them dispersed, and their commandant wounded, overpowered, and, with several others, made prisoner. It appears that Budr-ul-Zeman Khan had stipulated to surrender the fort, ammunition, and stores in their actual condition ; but the Mahrattas, having discovered that he had destroyed them after the capitulation was made, upbraided him with his want of faith, and accused Hyder, Tippoo, and himself of habitual violation of their engagements, particularly in regard to Gcoty and Nurgoond. Their accusations were just ; but Budr-ul-Zeman Khan, enraged at the insult, drew his sword, and his troops followed his example ; the result of the fray proved as above related. Though the circumstances may induce us to believe that there was no premeditated treachery, the subsequent confinement of Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and several other prisoners reflects discredit on the conduct of Pureshram Bhow.*

Before the fall of Dharwar, the British army had been some time in the field. Its first campaign against Tippoo in this war terminated, as we have already briefly mentioned, on the 27th January. On the 29th of the same

* Narrative of Captain Little's detachment, Wilks, Moor, Bombay Records, Mahratta MSS. and letters.

month Lord Cornwallis assumed the command of the army, and marched, on the 5th February, towards Nellore, where he concentrated his forces, and advanced to Bangalore, which he invested on the 5th March, and carried it by assault on the night of the 21st of that month. This success tended to discourage the enemy, and stimulate the allies to exertion. The fall of Bangalore had some share in influencing the surrender of Dharwar, and also of Kopaul, besieged by the Moghuls, which was shortly afterwards given up, as was Buhadur Benda. The Moghuls, according to the treaty, were supported by two battalions of Madras native infantry, in the same manner as the Mahrattas were aided from Bombay. An army of

A.D. 1791. 30,000 Mahrattas, of which 25,000 were horse, marched from Poona, on the 1st

January, under the command of Hurry Punt Phurkay; advanced by Punderpoor and Sorapoor, forded the Kistna where it is joined by the Beema, and proceeded to Geddawal, whence Hurry Punt directed the main body of his army to continue its route to Kurnoul, whilst he proceeded to Paungul, with an escort of 2,000 cavalry, for the purpose of conferring personally with Nizam Ally, whose court was then held at that frontier position, whence he affected to direct the operations of his field army. At this conference it was agreed by Nizam Ally, and by Hurry Punt on the part of his master the Peishwa, that they should abide by the terms of the treaty with the English, but only so far as might humble Tippoo, without absolutely annihilating his power. After the interview, Hurry Punt joined his army at Kurnoul, where he remained some time, until, hearing of the capture of Bangalore, he sent forward 10,000 horse with orders to endeavour to join Lord Cornwallis, in which he had been anticipated by the Moghuls,

a body of that strength having effected a junction with the English army on the 13th of April, after routing the party of Kutub-ud-deen, which we had occasion to mention before the siege of Dharwar. But the Maharattas, on arriving some days afterwards at Anuntpoor, found that Lord Cornwallis had advanced towards Seringapatam. They therefore halted until joined by Hurry Punt with the main army, when the whole moved on to Sera. It having occurred to the Mahratta commander to try the effect of summoning the place, Sera was most unexpectedly surrendered, and found full of stores and in high order. This success induced Hurry Punt to detach a party under Bulwunt Soob Rao to besiege Mudgeery, situated 20 miles to the east of Sera ; after which, leaving a strong garrison in his new acquisition, he proceeded to join the army at Seringapatam.* The other Mahratta army, acting on the north-western quarter of Tippoo's territory, whose operations before Dharwar have been detailed, was now also advancing by orders from Hurry Punt towards Seringapatam. After the termination of the siege of Dharwar, a part of the British detachment was recalled to Bombay, and Captain Little, with three native battalions, the two with which he entered on the campaign having been much weakened by casualties, continued with Pureshram Bhow. The possession of Dharwar, and the forts taken by the Moghuls, gave the allies a strong hold on the country situated between the Kistna and Toongbuddra ; Kooshgul, and several other places of less note, surrendered to Pureshram Bhow at the first summons ; and the occupation of the country, with the consequent realization of revenue, became so inviting to the Mahratta general, that he soon evinced a greater care of his own interest than those

* Hurry Punt's despatches.

of the confederacy. It was recommended that he should join the Bombay army under General Abercromby, then on its march from Malabar towards the capital of Mysore, through the territory of a friendly chieftain, the raja of Koorg. The Mahratta army, under Pureshram Bhow, had been greatly increased during the siege of Dharwar; he crossed the Toongbuddra on the 22nd April, and arrived within 24 miles of Chittledroog on the 29th of that month. Several fortified towns surrendered without resistance, and Myconda was besieged by a detachment from his army; but when urged by Captain Little to advance in the direction by which General Abercromby was expected, or send on a part of his troops, he objected to it as unsafe, and continued his system of collecting from the surrounding country, until summoned by Hurry Punt to accompany him to Seringapatam.* Whilst Hurry Punt marched south-west, Pureshram Bhow moved south-east. Their armies were united at Nagmungulum on the 24th of May, and on the ensuing day they advanced to Mailcotta. But although thus near the capital, where they knew their allies were encamped, they had not been able to convey any intimation of their approach to Lord Cornwallis, as every letter was intercepted by the admirable activity of Tippoo's mounted Beruds. This circumstance is considered very discreditable to Hurry Punt and Pureshram Bhow by their own countrymen; and it was matter of most serious regret to Lord Cornwallis that he had remained ignorant of their approach.

After the Moghul cavalry joined him, as already noticed, Lord Cornwallis resolved to undertake the siege of Seringapatam, and directed General Abercromby to move forward from the westward, for the purpose of joining him

* Mahratta MSS. and letters, Captain Little's despatches, &c.

at that capital. As the grand army advanced from the northward, Tippoo burnt the villages, destroyed the forage, and drove off both the inhabitants and their cattle, so that the space on which the army moved was a desert, and the condition of its cattle and horses soon proved the efficacy of this mode of defence. On the

May.

15th Tippoo made a stand at Arikera, but was defeated; and on the 19th Lord Cornwallis encamped at Caniambaddy, to the west of Seringapatam. But the battle he had gained on the 15th, and his position at the gates of the capital, were advantages more than counterbalanced by the state of his cattle, and the alarming scarcity which prevailed in his camp. The want of forage and provisions, aggravated by the presence of the useless and wasteful Moghul horse, soon became so much felt, that, combined with the lateness of the season, Lord Cornwallis abandoned all hope of being able to reduce Seringapatam before the monsoon; he therefore sent orders to General Abercromby to return to Malabar, destroyed his own battering guns and heavy stores, raised the siege, and on the 26th May marched towards Mailcotta, from which place the Mahrattas had also moved that morning. Great was the surprise of the English army when large bodies of horse were seen advancing, of whose approach they had no intimation. Conceiving them to be enemies, preparations were at first made to treat them as such; but their real character was soon discovered, and, though not unclouded with regret and disappointment, their arrival was hailed with great joy, as the ample supplies of the Mahratta bazars afforded immediate relief to the famished camp. That we may not unjustly detract from the merit of the Mahratta commanders, as they have been accused of self-interested motives in the readiness

with which they permitted their bazar followers to sell to all comers, it is proper to mention that, though their followers took advantage of the period to raise the price of grain, their own troops suffered by the scarcity which for a few days ensued. Hurry Punt's despatches evince a very humane and laudable anxiety to alleviate the distress of his allies. The junction of the Mahrattas near the spot where Trimbuck Rao Mama had gained the victory over Hyder in 1771, was considered by them an omen particularly propitious.

The confederate armies remained for ten days in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, in order to allow time for the convoys of grain, expected by the Mahrattas, to join the camp, after which the whole moved to Nagmungulum. Hurry Punt proposed that they should proceed to Sera, and take possession of the whole country between that place and the Kistna. Lord Cornwallis, however, considered it of prior importance to reduce the Baramahal, and country in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, in order to facilitate the approach of the necessary supplies from Madras. Hurry Punt urged similar reasons in support of his own proposal, and was naturally seconded by the Moghuls; but as both depended on the English artillery and military stores, they yielded to the wishes of the governor-general. The army moved forward by very slow marches, necessary to the English from the exhausted state of their cattle, and the motions of the confederates were regulated accordingly. The fort of Osoor was evacuated on the approach of the grand army. Pureshram Bhow, accompanied by Captain Little's battalions, was detached towards Sera, for the purpose of keeping open the northern communication, and overawing the country which had already submitted. Nidjigul surrendered to

Pureshram Bhow, and the killidar of Davaraydroog promised to give it up, provided a part of the British detachment was sent to take possession; but, on approaching the fort, they were fired upon, and as Pureshram Bhow had not the means of reducing it, he burnt the pettah in revenge, and proceeded to Sera. Being desirous of returning to the north-west, he assigned want of forage as a reason for hastily withdrawing to Chittledroog, where he surprised and cut off 300 of its garrison, who happened to be outside, and neglected to seek timely protection in the fort. Pureshram Bhow long indulged hopes of obtaining possession of this stronghold by seducing the garrison; but all his attempts proved abortive; he, however, took several fortified places in its vicinity.

With regard to the operations of the other troops at a distance from the grand army, Bulwunt Soob Rao, the officer sent by Hurry Punt to besiege Mudgeery, did not succeed in gaining possession of it, but he left a detachment in the pettah, and went on to Makleedroog, Bhusmag, and Ruttengerry, of all which he took possession.* The army of Nizam Ally, with the two Madras battalions which continued to the northward, took Gandicottah on the Pennar, and laid siege to Gurrumcondah.

The operations of Lord Cornwallis, after his retreat from Seringapatam, until the season should admit of his renewing the siege, were chiefly in the Baramahal, the whole of which he reduced, except the strong hill-fort of Kistnagheery, which he intended to blockade, but previous to this arrangement, one of Tippoo's detachments, under Kummur-ud-deen, having surprised and cut off the party of Mahrattas left by Bulwunt Soob Rao at Mudgeery, the report of this circumstance was magnified into the total

* Hurry Punt's despatches.

defeat and dispersion of Pureshram Bhow's army, and induced Lord Cornwallis to proceed to Bangalore without forming the intended blockade. After hearing the true state of the case, he resolved on reducing the forts between Bangalore and Gurrumcondah, in the siege of which last the Moghul troops were still occupied. The whole tract soon fell, and, amongst other places of strength, the hill-fort of Nundidroog, when a part of the battering train used in its reduction was sent off to assist the Moghuls at Gurrumcondah, whither also most of their horse repaired.

By the beginning of December Lord Cornwallis's army had assembled at Bangalore, and might have advanced to Seringapatam, but the Bombay troops had a difficult march to perform before they could join; and Pureshram Bhow, though directed to be prepared to support their advance, remained on pretence of sickness near Chittle-droog. The Moghuls loitered with the camp at Gurrumcondah; and although Hurry Punt continued with Lord Cornwallis, the greater part of his troops were dispersed on various pretexts, but in reality to occupy the districts, and to collect as much money as they could. As circumstances thus detained Lord Cornwallis from the main object of reducing the capital, he in the meantime laid siege to the forts in his route. Savendroog and Outradroog were taken; Ramgheery, Shevingheery, and Hooliordroog surrendered.

The Moghul army, after months spent before Gurrumcondah in a series of operations still more feeble than those of the Mahrattas before Dharwar, were at length put in possession of the lower fort by the exertions of Captain Read, the officer who had succeeded to the command of the English detachment.* The Moghuls having resigned

* Bombay Records, Colonel Wilks.

all hope of reducing the upper fort, being anxious to join in the siege of Seringapatam, determined to mask it, and for that purpose a considerable body of troops was left under Hafiz Fureed-ud-deen Khan, a part of whom, under his personal command, he kept in the lower fort, and a small body was encamped at a little distance on the south side, under the orders of Azim Khan, the son of the nabob of Kurnoul, and a Frenchman who had assumed the name of Smith. These arrangements being completed, the main body moved on with the intention of joining Lord Cornwallis, but they were speedily recalled in consequence of an unexpected attack on the blockading party, many of whom were killed, and Hafiz Fureed-ud-deen having been made prisoner, was basely murdered from motives of revenge, he having been the envoy through whom the proffer of marriage on the part of Tippoo was sent, which was indignantly refused by Nizam Ally. The Frenchman Smith was also taken and put to death. On the return of the main body of the Moghuls, Tippoo's troops, who were headed by his eldest son Futih Hyder, retired and left the Moghuls to strengthen their party in the lower fort.* This arrangement being again completed, the Moghul army moved on, and joined Lord Cornwallis at Outradroog on the 25th January 1792.

We have noticed the delay of the Mahratta commanders in collecting their detachments, and in engaging actively with the English in the operations against the capital. The object of Hurry Punt was obviously plunder, but that of Pureshram Bhow extended to the long-meditated Mahratta scheme of obtaining possession of the district of Bednore. Pureshram Bhow conceived that the present

* Letter from Lieutenant Stewart, 1st assistant to the resident at Hyderabad.

opportunity, whilst aided by a body of British troops at his absolute disposal, was too favourable to be omitted. Though fully informed by Lord Cornwallis of the general plan of operations, in which he was requested to co-operate, he no sooner saw the English army engaged in besieging the fortresses already mentioned, on its route towards Seringapatam, than he directed his march straight towards Bednore. Hooly Onore having been assaulted and taken

December 21. by the British detachment, the Mahratta general continued his advance along the

left bank of the Toong, intending to reduce the fort of Simoga. But at that place, besides the regular garrison, there was a force consisting of 7,000 infantry, 800 horse, and 10 guns, under the command of Reza Sahib, one of Tippoo's relations, who, on the approach of the Mahrattas, either from not deeming his position advantageous, or with a view to attack Pureshram Bhow when engaged in the siege, quitted his entrenchments close to the walls of the fort, and took post in a thick jungle a few miles to the south-west of it. His position was uncommonly strong, having the river Toong on his right, a steep hill covered with impenetrable underwood on his left, and his front protected and concealed both by underwood and a deep ravine, full of tall and close bamboos, than which no trees form a stronger defence. One road only ran through this position, but it was more clear and open to the rear. Pureshram Bhow came in sight of the fort on the morn-

December 29. ing of the 29th December; but, instead of attacking, made a considerable circuit to avoid it, and continued his route towards the position occupied by Reza Sahib. Having arrived in its neighbourhood, the main army took up its ground of encampment; but Appa Sahib advanced towards the enemy with a body

of cavalry. Pureshram Bhow requested of Captain Little to leave eight companies for the protection of the camp, and move on with the rest of the battalions to support his son, which he immediately did. The closeness of the country rendered the attack of cavalry impracticable; and Captain Little's three battalions on this memorable occasion mustered about 800 bayonets! Notwithstanding the comparative insignificance of his numbers, he did not hesitate in moving down on the enemy's position, the irregular infantry of the Mahrattas following in his rear. Captain Little, for the purpose of ascertaining the manner in which the enemy was posted, and aware of the advantage of keeping his strength in reserve in such a situation, went forward with one battalion; and, as the fire opened, he directed two companies to advance on the enemy's right and two other companies to attack their left, whilst the rest were engaged with the centre. Every attempt to penetrate into the jungle was warmly opposed, but the enemy's right seemed the point most assailable, though defended with obstinacy. Two companies were sent to reinforce the two engaged on the right; but Lieutenants Doolan and Bethune, who led them, were wounded successively. The grenadier company, under Lieutenant Moor,* was sent to their support; that officer also fell disabled. Six companies of the 11th battalion were then brought forward, and Brigadier Major Ross, who directed them, was killed. The sepoy repeatedly penetrated a short distance into the jungle; but most of their European officers being wounded, they could not keep their ground. The Mahratta infantry, on every advance, rushed forward tumultuously, but were driven back

* Author of the interesting narrative of the operations of Captain Little's detachment.

in disorderly flight, which only added to the general slaughter, and contributed to the confusion of the regular infantry; but Captain Little, watching the opportunities when his men's minds required support, with that admirable judgment and gallantry which have, on so many occasions, distinguished the officers of British sepoys, rallied, cheered, and re-animated them; sent on parts of the reserve, and continued the apparently unequal struggle with steady resolution. At last the whole reserve was ordered up; the action continued with fresh spirit, and a small party got through the jungle into the enemy's camp. Captain Little, who immediately perceived the importance of this advantage, skillfully prepared a strong body to support them. This reinforcement he headed in person, and arrived in time to secure the retreat of the small advanced party which had given way on their officer being wounded, and were completely overpowered and flying; rallying, however, at Captain Little's word, and seeing themselves seconded, they turned on their pursuers with fresh energy. The enemy began to waver. The whole detachment was ordered to press forward. Captain Thompson, of the artillery, and the few European officers that remained, imitating the example of their gallant commander, led on with the greatest animation, drove the enemy from every point, and thus gained this well-fought battle. The Mahrattas rushed forward with their usual avidity to share the plunder, and were useful in the pursuit, which Captain Little continued in the most persevering manner, until he had taken every one of the guns, and rendered his victory as dispiriting and injurious to the enemy, as it was creditable and cheering to his own party.

The whole conduct of Captain Little on this occasion was most exemplary: it reminds us of the generalship of

Lawrence or of Clive, and of itself entitles him to a very respectable rank in the military annals of British India. Of the small number of British troops engaged, 60 were killed and wounded, and the loss would have been much greater, but for the judicious conduct of their commander, who exposed them as little as possible until he knew where their strength could be exerted with effect. The Mahrattas, though they contributed but little to the success of the day, lost about 500 men. The fort of

A.D. 1792.

Simoga did not long hold out after the defeat of the covering army; it surrendered to Captain Little on the 2nd January, and it was to him a very humiliating circumstance that he was compelled to place the principal officers at the disposal of Pureshram Bhow, who, contrary to the terms of capitulation, detained them in the same manner as he had kept Budr-ul Zeman Khan.

Some time was spent in making arrangements for the occupation of the country about Simoga; but, towards the middle of January, Pureshram Bhow, to complete his design, advanced through the woods in the direction of Bednore, which he reached on the 28th, and was preparing to invest it, when, for reasons which will be hereafter explained, he suddenly retreated, and, after returning to Simoga, took the straight route towards Seringapatam.* Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by Hurry Punt and the son of Nizam Ally, Sikundur Jah, arrived with the combined army before Tippoo's capital on the 5th February. On the following day, the well-concerted and brilliant attack made by the English on his camp within the bound hedge, put the allies in possession of the whole of the outworks, and immediate preparations were made for commencing

* Moor, Wilks, Mahratta MSS. and letters.

the siege. General Abercromby's division joined on the 16th, and materially contributed to forward the operations, particularly by the gallant repulse of Tippoo's attack on their advanced position on the 22nd of February.

Tippoo repeatedly endeavoured to open negotiations; but his first overtures were for various reasons considered inadmissible; at last, in consequence of the more becoming form and tone of his proposals, together with the intercession of the allies, particularly of Hurry Punt, two wukeels, Gholam Ali and Ali Reza, were admitted to an audience on the 14th February, whilst, in the meantime, the attack and defence were going forward as if no peace had been meditated. The wukeels were met by three agents appointed by the allies respectively—Sir John Kennaway on the part of Lord Cornwallis, Buchajee Rugonath on that of Hurry Punt, and Meer Abdool Kassim, now distinguished by his title of Meer Alum, in behalf of Sikundur Jah. After considerable discussion, and many references by the wukeels to their master, Tippoo on the 23rd February, the day after his unsuccessful attack on General Abercromby's division, consented to cede half the territory which he possessed before the war; to pay three crores and 30,000 rupees, one-half immediately, and the rest by three equal instalments within a year; to release all persons made prisoners from the time of Hyder Ally, and to deliver two of his sons as hostages for the due performance of the conditions. An armistice had taken place for two days, the hostages had already arrived in the English camp, upwards of one crore of rupees of the money had been paid, and the definitive treaty on the point of being concluded, when Tippoo, who appears to have at first overlooked the circumstance, finding that the principality of Koorg was included in the

list of cessions, loudly remonstrated against yielding what he termed equivalent to the surrender of one of the gates of Seringapatam. Appearances indicated his determination to break the truce, but the prompt measures adopted by Lord Cornwallis for renewing the siege, and his declared resolution to give up none of the advantages already secured, induced Tippoo to reflect on the consequences, and finally to sign the treaty.

Without reference to the condition of the former dependents of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, or to that clause which secured a greater advantage to the party first in the field, the allies received on equal share of the districts ceded by Tippoo, amounting annually to about 40 lakhs of rupees to each.

The share of the Mahrattas lay principally between the Wurdah and Kistna ; it also included the valley of Sondoor near Bellary, which was still in possession of the Ghorepuray family. The portion allotted to Nizam Ally included Gooty and Kurpa, with the districts between the Kista and Toongbuddra, of which Moodgul, Kannikgeeree, and Kopaul may be considered the western boundary, with the exception of a small district about Anagoondy, which Tippoo retained. Dindigul, Baramahal, Koorg, and Malabar were assigned to the English.

We now return to explain the cause of Pureshram Bhow's sudden retreat from Bednore, which was occasioned by his learning that Kummur-ud-deen had marched from Seringapatam with a strong force of infantry, for the purpose of entrapping him in the woods, and, although success would have more than excused his proceedings at the Poona court, his failure, should he be afterwards hemmed in, would have ruined both himself and his army ; for Nana Furnuwees, though he at first took little notice

of the Bhow's intention, no sooner found that it was generally understood, than he ordered him to desist, and proceed to Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis, after he laid siege to that fortress, had pressingly written to Pureshram Bhow, describing the manner in which he had invested it, and pointing out the essential service that might be rendered by his cavalry if posted on the south face of the fortress; but Pureshram Bhow disregarded the application, until he received the information already mentioned. By the time, however, that he reached Seringapatam, the armistice was signed; and although Lord Cornwallis scarcely noticed his faithless conduct, it has been a theme of just censure; nor can Nana Furnuwees be exempted from a share of blame, for when urged by Mr. Melet to expedite the Bhow's advance to the capital, he started difficulties as to the scarcity which his junction would occasion in the grand army, and would no doubt have been well pleased to effect a conquest which had been a favourite object with his great master, the first Mahdoo Rao.

By the end of march, after the usual interchange of civilities, the commanders of the allied armies had put their troops in motion towards their respective frontiers. Hurry Punt returned by the eastern route to Poona, where he arrived on the 25th May; but Pureshram Bhow remained with the heavy baggage and stores, which, together with his own artillery and 17 battering guns presented by Lord Cornwallis to the Peishwa, greatly retarded his progress. The devastation committed by his own troops on their advance rendered grain and forage extremely scarce, and the heat and drought of the season, together with the active annoyance which, notwithstanding the peace, he continued to experience from Tippoo's Beruds and

Pindharees, combined to render Pureshram Bhow's march from Seringapatam to the Toongbuddra one of the most distressing the Mahrattas ever experienced. Captain Little's detachment fortunately escaped the severe privations to which Pureshram Bhow's army was subjected, by having been directed to join General Abercromby's army, which marched to Malabar, and embarked at Cannanore for Bombay.*

* Mahratta and English Records, Wilks, Moor, &c., &c.

CHAP. XI.

FROM A.D. 1792 TO A.D. 1794.

An inquiry into the reasons which induced Lord Cornwallis to refrain from subjugating Tippoo's territory is foreign to the object of this work.—Opinion of the Mahratta ministers on this subject.—Mahadajee Sindia's proposals at the time of forming the confederacy against Tippoo, to which Sindia did not become a party.—Sindia's proceedings in Hindostan.—Battle of Patun.—Ismael Beg defeated.—Rajpoots continue the war—battle of Mairta—peace with the Rajpoots.—The regular infantry of De Boigne.—Holkar entertains the Chevalier Dudrenec, and raises some regular corps.—Ali Buhadur, assisted by Himmud Buhadur, establishes himself in Bundelcund.—Sindia moves towards Poona.—Surmises with regard to his intentions.—Declares that he is proceeding as bearer of the insignia of office for the wukeel-i-mootluq from the emperor to the Peishwa.—Grand state ceremony on presenting the insignia.—Sindia endeavours by various ways to gain the confidence of the young Peishwa to the prejudice of Nana Furnuwees.—Discussions respecting the affairs of Hindostan.—Ismael Beg again raises disturbances, but is taken prisoner and confined for life in the fort of Agra.—The troops of Sindia and Holkar commit hostilities against each other—obstinate battle of Lukhairee—Sindia's troops victorious.—Consequences at Poona.—Hostilities suspended in Hindostan by orders from the Peishwa and Sindia—the latter all-powerful in Hindostan.—His attempts to render himself

popular in the Deccan—perseveres in his endeavours to supersede Nana Furnuwees in the young Peishwa's favour.
—Remarkable explanation betwixt the Peishwa and Nana.
—Views of Mahadajee Sindia—his death.

AN enquiry into the reasons which induced Lord Cornwallis to refrain from the entire subjugation of Tippoo's territory is foreign to the object of this work; it is only necessary to observe that even Nana Furnuwees and Pureshram Bhow, the parties in the Mahratta state most inimical to Tippoo, were averse to the total overthrow of the Mysore state, and Mahadajee Sindia was decidedly hostile to that course of policy. The Mahrattas, who are not sensible of the effect which may operate on British authorities from the influence of public opinion in England, attribute the moderation shown by the governor-general to the representations of Hurry Punt Phurkay.*

At the period when Lord Cornwallis was negotiating the alliance against Tippoo, he instructed Major Palmer, the resident with Sindia, to request, both of Sindia and Holkar, to use their influence at Poona in effecting the desired connection between the Peishwa and the British government. Sindia offered to unite in the confederacy against Tippoo, provided two battalions similar to those granted to Nizam Ally were sent to join the army, with which he proposed to march to the southward; and that the British government should become bound to protect his territory in Hindostan during his absence. These proposals being considered inadmissible, he refused to become a party to the treaty of Poona.†

We left Mahadajee Sindia, in the early part of 1790,

* Mahrattas MSS., Hurry Punt's letters.

† Bongal Records.

endeavouring to conciliate his coadjutors, intent on humbling the Rajpoots, securing the dependency of Ismael Beg, and preventing the incursions of the Seiks. A temporary adjustment with Holkar and Ali Buhadur enabled him to prepare for opposing Ismael Beg, whose hostile intentions soon became unequivocal, and the Rajpoot rajas of Jeypoor and Joudpoor were pouring succours into his camp. Sindia, before risking a battle, endeavoured,

June 20. Ismael Beg, and at last ordered Gopaul

Rao Bhow, Luckwa Dada, and De Boigne to attack his camp near Patun, at a point which was left undefended by a body of troops whom Sindia had secured in his interest; but, notwithstanding this advantage, Sindia's officers being disappointed in the promised aid of Holkar, who stood aloof during the engagement, the utmost exertion was necessary to ensure success. Ismael Beg fought with his usual bravery, and a body of his Patans thrice charged through the regular infantry of the Mahrattas, cutting down the artillerymen at their guns. De Boigne displayed great personal energy on this occasion, and to his gallantry, and the discipline of his battalions, was justly attributed the great victory which ensued. Numbers fell on both sides,* but the army of Ismael Beg was completely routed, and that chieftain fled with a small retinue from the field of battle to the gates of Jeypoor. All his guns were taken, and 10 battalions of infantry grounded their arms and surrendered.

The Rajpoots, however, still maintained the war, and a second battle took place at Mairta, in the
A.D. 1791. Joudpoor territory, where they allowed

* One translation of a native newspaper in the Bengal records says 11,000 or 12,000 Mahrattas were killed.

themselves to be surprised by De Boigne at dawn of day
 on the 12th September ; and although 400
 September 12.

Rahtore cavalry made desperate efforts to re-animate their friends and allow them to recover themselves, the general confusion was irretrievable. It was supposed that Sindia would have completely subjugated the Rajpoots, but the opposition and dissensions to which he was exposed from his colleagues, Holkar and Ali Buhadur, induced him to grant them peace on their promising to pay a moderate tribute annually.*

A.D. 1792.

The force of De Boigne was now gradually augmented to 18,000 regular infantry, 6,000 irregulars, Nujeebs and Rohillaahs, 2,000 irregular horse, and 600 Persian cavalry. This last body was mounted, clothed, armed, and disciplined by De Boigne, to whom all the horses of it belonged. Districts in the Dooab yielding 22 lakhs of rupees of net revenue were assigned for the support of this force, and the fortress of Agra was given up as a depôt of small arms and cannon ; of the latter De Boigne had upwards of 200 serviceable pieces.† Sindia affected to consider this force as part of the emperor's establishment, and denominated them the imperial army : but such a flimsy veil was not calculated to deceive the watchful eye of his rivals, and Holkar, in particular, saw the growth of his power with rancorous jealousy. He retired across the Chumbul, and entertained in his service the Chevalier Dudrenec, a Frenchman, who raised and disciplined four battalions, the first troops of that description which the family of Holkar had ever used.

* Mahratta letters and MSS., Palmer's despatches, Indian newspaper, and General De Boigne.

† General De Boigne.

Ali Buhadur, at the suggestion of Himmud Buhadur, undertook the conquest of Bundelcund, in which province, after a long struggle, they succeeded in establishing themselves, but found infinite difficulty in reducing the country, and were perpetually involved in warfare and insurrection.

Whilst Sindia was engaged in contentions with his colleagues, he frequently declared his intention of repairing to Poona for the purpose of obtaining their recal.; but Nana's policy in supporting Holkar was well known, and Sindia's situation was deemed too insecure to admit of his venturing on an excursion so distant. When he therefore moved towards Oujein, and actually commenced his march for Poona, various were the conjectures which ensued. Some considered that, jealous of the increasing power of the British, and their influence at Poona and Hyderabad, his views were directed to the establishment of his own authority at Poona, for the purpose of preventing the ascendancy, which it seemed probable they would obtain, especially if Tippoo's dominions were conquered and partitioned. Others supposed that he had views on the territory of Nizam Ally, and some believed that his sole object was to prevent the interference of Holkar in his late acquisitions in Hindostan.

It is probable there was some foundation for all these surmises; certain it is that he had in view the control of the Bramins, and the establishment of his own authority at the Peishwa's capital. After the battle of Patan in June 1790, he obtained from the emperor, for the third time, patents constituting the Peishwa wukeel-i-mootluq, but which was now to descend to him as a hereditary office in unalienable *enam*, on condition, however, of appointing Sindia and his posterity his perpetual deputies. In order therefore, to exhibit to his countrymen his absolute power

over the imperial house of Timour, for which the Mahrattas in the Deccan had long a habitual respect, and to gratify the feelings of all Hindoos, the emperor invested Sindia with the right of selecting his heir from among his sons, and issued an edict forbidding the slaughter of bullocks and cows throughout the Moghul dominions.

Sindia's march to the southward was very slow ; and he often appeared as if deliberating whether he might venture so far from his own territory. He gave out that he was proceeding to Poona by the emperor's orders, as bearer of the sunnuds and insignia of the office of wukeel-i-mootluq for the Peishwa. On his arrival at Bheer, near the Godavery, charged with such commissions from the emperor, he made some demands on Nizam Ally, the nature of which is not ascertained ; but he endeavoured to induce him to make him a present of the fertile district of Bheer, and bestow Aurungabad on the Peishwa. On being refused, he pretended to be much hurt at his want of courtesy.

Nana Furnuwees long doubted whether Sindia would actually come into the Deccan ; but on being assured that he was on his route from Burhanpoor, he applied to Lord Cornwallis, through Hurry Punt Phurkay, for the permanent services of Captain Little's detachment, which in the name of the Peishwa he offered to subsidize ; but the governor-general, for various reasons, declined assenting to the proposal.

Sindia was very apprehensive of a connection of this kind ; and, to allay Nana's well-founded jealousy of his regular infantry, he only brought with him a small party, under an Englishman of respectable character, named Hessing, and one complete battalion, commanded by Michael Filoze, by birth a Neapolitan, a low illiterate man of worthless character, but of considerable address and

cunning. Sindia arrived at Poona on the 11th June, and pitched his camp near the *sungum*, or junction of the Moota and Moola rivers, the place assigned by the Peishwa for the residence of the British envoy and his suite; and hence the Sungum and the Residency, a spot for many reasons interesting, and well known to most of our countrymen who have visited that quarter, became synonymous. Nana Furnuwees did everything in his power to prevent the Peishwa's acceptance of the titles and insignia brought from the emperor: he represented the impropriety of adopting some of the titles, especially that of Maharaj Adeeraj (the greatest of great rajas), which was inconsistent with the constitution of the existing government of the Mahratta empire. But Sindia persisted; and permission for the Peishwa's acceptance of all the honors was formally obtained from the raja of Satara. Nine days after his arrival, Nana Furnuwees visited Sindia, who received him in the most cordial manner, refused to sit on his musnud in the minister's presence, and treated him with the greatest respect. On the ensuing day Sindia paid his respects to the Peishwa, carrying with him numberless rare productions and curiosities of Hindostan for the young prince. The following morning was appointed for the grand ceremony of investing the Peisha with the title and dignity of wukeel-i-mootluq, and Sindia spared no pains to render it as imposing as possible. A grand suite of tents was pitched at a distance from his own camp. The Peishwa proceeded towards them with the most pompous form. At the further end of these splendid apartments, a throne, meant to represent that of the emperor of the Moghuls, was erected, on which was displayed the imperial firman, the khilut, or dresses of

investiture, and all the principal insignia. The Peishwa, on approaching the throne, made his obeisance thrice, placed 101 gold-mohurs upon it as a *nuzur* or offering, and took his seat on its left. Sindia's Persian secretary then read the imperial firmans, and, amongst others, the edict which prevented the slaughter of bullocks and cows. The Peishwa then received the *khillut*, consisting of nine articles of dress, five superb ornaments of jewels and feathers, a sword and shield, a pencease, a seal and ink-stand, and two royal *morchuls*, or fans of peacock's tails, accompanied by a *nalkee*,* a *palkee*,† a horse, and an elephant; besides six elephants bearing the imperial standard, two crescents, two stars, and the orders of the fish and of the sun. The Peishwa retired to an adjoining tent, and returned clothed in the imperial *khillut*, when he resumed his seat; and Sindia, followed by Nana Furnuwees and such of the Peishwa's officers as were present, offered *nuzurs* of congratulation. When the Peishwa arose to return to his palace, he was followed by Sindia and Hurry Punt carrying the *morchuls* and fanning him. He entered Poona seated in the *Nalkee*; the concourse of people assembled to witness the procession was exceedingly great; the pomp and grandeur displayed was beyond anything that the inhabitants of Poona had ever seen, whilst the clang of thousands of musical instruments,

* A *nalkee* is a sort of sedan-chair without a top, having four poles, two behind and two before, never used but by the emperor, or persons of the very highest rank.

† A *palkee* is totally different from the more useful and convenient, though less splendid, conveyance commonly used by Europeans, and termed by them *palanquin*. The natives, who call them *meynas*, also use the same conveyance; but the *palkee* is a sort of short bedstead, over which a pole, very much curved in the middle, is fastened, and above all a scarlet cloth stretched on bamboos, as an awning, and sometimes very highly ornamented, is placed. When used by ladies, there are screens affixed to the upper cloth.

the shouts of the populace, volleys of musquetry, and salvos of cannon seemed to give all the effect that the projector of this state ceremony could possibly desire.

The investiture of Sindia by the Peishwa, as deputy to the wukeel-i-mootluq, immediately followed on their arrival at the Peishwa's palace; but on this occasion, and on several others, the pretended humility of Sindia gave disgust, when he insisted on being considered as the hereditary servant of the Peishwa, entitled only to carry slippers, and addressed by no higher title than that of *patell*. Though this affectation was meant to be in conformity with Mahratta taste, it failed in its effect. No Bramin of education was pleased or deceived by such coarse self-disparagement, and the old Mahrattas, though Mahadajee Sindia had purchased some hereditary privileges in the Deccan, would much more readily have acknowledged his new imperial titles* than have assigned to him the appellation of Patell, a distinction which they considered due only to the legitimate Sindia, Patell of Kunneirkheir. The mankurees, and those cavaliers who considered themselves the old officers of the rajas of Satara, though some among them could scarcely term the horse he rode his own, refused to enter the imperial tents with the Peishwa, nor would they present nuzurs to him as wukeel-i-mootluq. Nuzurs were presented to Sindia by his officers on returning to his own camp; but the feeling among his countrymen, which was too strong to escape his notice, proved to him the necessity of much caution in the prosecution of his designs.

A principal object was to gain the confidence of the young Peishwa, to which the rarities he had brought from

* These were Raja, Maharaj, Mahdoo Rao Sindia, Mudar-ool-Muham, Ali Jah Buhadur.

Hindostan, and the splendid spectacle with which he had been gratified, paved the way. The frank, unreserved manners of Sindia, who talked to the young prince of hunting and hawking, and carried him out on frequent excursions to see those field sports, were things so very different, and so much more agreeable than the sedate and grave observance of decorum habitual to Nana Furnuwees, that Sindia soon became his constant companion. Parties to the country in the neighbourhood of Poona constantly took place, to which the young prince was invited, and Nana thought it advisable to give his assent, although he clearly saw the design of Sindia, and watched his proceedings so vigilantly that it was difficult for him to find opportunities of conversing with Mahdoo Rao unobserved. When they did occur, Sindia never failed to comment on the manner in which he was treated, and to assure him that he had both the power and the inclination to render him independent of such tutelage. But although Mahdoo Rao readily entered into every scheme of pleasure suggested by Sindia, his natural good disposition and judgment rendered it by no means easy to shake his confidence in Nana Furnuwees; and at first he combated Sindia's arguments with warmth; but the customary restraints before unfelt began to be irksome, and Sindia's society proportionally more desirable.

Sindia's public affairs at the durbar seemed principally to refer to Hindostan; he represented the large sums he had spent in extending the empire, and procuring such honors and dignity for the Peishwa; he petitioned for the payment of his expenses, the entire management of affairs in Hindostan, and finally for the recal of Holkar and Ali Buhadur. In reply to these, the minister always demanded, in the first instance, an account of the revenue of those

districts which he had subdued so easily and had enjoyed so long. Many discussions on these subjects took place, and many circumstances occurred, tending to strengthen the mutual jealousy of Sindia and Nana ; but they for some time maintained every form of civility and respect, whilst their respective parties in Hindostan, though engaged in service together in the Rajpoot country, were almost in a state of open rupture.

The restless spirit of Ismael Beg, and his enmity to Sindia, rendered him a fit Instrument for disturbing the tranquillity of Hindostan, to which, after Sindia's departure, he was secretly prompted by the intrigues of Tookajee Holkar ; but, after assembling a considerable force, his career was stopped sooner than was anticipated.

The widow of Nujeef Khan refused to surrender the fort of Canoond to Sindia's officers. A force marched against her under M. Perron, the officer second-in-command to De Boigne. Ismael Beg advanced to her assistance, gave Perron battle outside the walls, and, being defeated, entered the fort. He there assisted in the defence, which was well maintained, until the widow having been killed by a stone shell, the garrison became dispirited by the accident, and began to think of betraying Ismael Beg to ensure themselves favourable terms. This treachery, however, the latter prevented by giving himself up to M. Perron, who promised, on the faith of his commanding officer, De Boigne, that he should not be put to death. The terms were observed, but he was ever after confined in the fort of Agra, where he died in 1799.

Subsequent to the surrender of Canoond, which happened before Sindia reached Poona, Holkar's and Sindia's armies were levying tribute together in the Rajpoot

territory ; they had also taken two forts, when, quarrelling about the spoils, their jealousy burst forth into open hostilities, which brought on the battle of Lukhairee, near Ajimere, on which occasion Gopaul Rao Bhow, Luckwa Dada, and De Boigne, with 20,000 horse and 9,000 regular infantry, defeated Holkar's army, consisting of 30,000 horse and the four battalions of Dudrenec. The attack was planned by De Boigne, and the conflict the most obstinate ever witnessed by that officer. By the explosion of 12 tumbrils of ammunition, his brigades were thrown into great confusion, but being posted in a wood, Holkar's cavalry could not take advantage of the disaster. Dudrenec's battalions fought until they were nearly annihilated. Their guns, 38 in number, were all taken ; the shattered remains of the corps retreated precipitately into Malwa, where Holkar, in impotent rage, sacked Oujein, the capital of his rival.

When accounts of these proceedings reached Poona, the ostensible cordiality of Sindia and the court was for a time obstructed, and precautions were adopted by both parties as if apprehensive of personal violence. Nana Furnuwees called in the aid of Pureshram Bhow, who arrived with 2,000 horse. This imprudent reinforcement furnished Sindia with a pretext for greatly increasing the parties of Hessing and Filoze who accompanied him, and for bringing down one of his infantry brigades, the command of which was confided by De Boigne to M. Perron. But as neither party was desirous of attaining their end by prosecuting the war, positive instructions were despatched to their respective officers to refrain from hostilities, and to await the pacific settlement of their disputes by orders from the Peishwa.

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The result rendered Sindia all-powerful in Hindostan, but he was conscious of his unpopularity in the Deccan, and strove to overcome it. With this view he had, on his arrival at Poona, espoused the cause of Govind Rao Gaekwar in a manner which will be hereafter explained, and upon one occasion, when Nana Furnuwees, during the minority of the Punt Suchew, assumed charge of his lands, Scindia, who knew that the proceeding met with general disapprobation, interposed, conveyed the Suchew to Poona, in opposition to the orders of the minister, re-established him in his possessions, and dismissed Bajee Rao Moreishwur, the agent whom Nana had placed in charge of the Suchew's territory. This daring interference gave rise to a quarrel, which was with difficulty appeased by the mediation of Hurry Punt Phurkay ; but fresh disputes arose in consequence of Sindia's more undisguised attempts to induce the Peishwa to seek his protection. On one occasion, in particular, a conversation took place in a boat at Lohgaom, which, being overheard and repeated, caused an immediate alarm in the mind of Nana, and he took the first opportunity of coming to an explanation with the Peishwa. He addressed himself both to his judgment and feelings, enumerated the services he had performed for him and for the state, described the views of aggrandizement entertained by Sindia, pointed out his foreign troops, his departure from ancient usage, and his want of connection with the Mahratta people, over whom and the Bramin sovereignty he was bent on establishing an absolute power. With these observations he contrasted his own situation, his inability to preserve order or to resist the encroachments of Sindia if unsupported by his prince ; and finally, lamenting in tears the probable effects of the evil counsels by which he had been misled, he

tendered his resignation, and declared his resolution to proceed to Benares. Mahdoo Rao was greatly affected. In a transport of grief he begged his forgiveness, entreated his stay, and promised to be for ever guarded in his conduct. But notwithstanding this re-establishment of influence, Sindia by his great power would probably have ultimately prevailed over his rival, although the unqualified support of Hurry Punt to all the measures of the minister, the friendship of the powerful Bramin families of Rastia and Putwurdhun, together with that of the old mankurees, some of them great jagheerdars, formed a strong opposition to the views of Mahadajee Sindia. But in the midst of his ambitious schemes he was suddenly seized with a violent fever, which in a few days terminated his existence. He breathed his last at Wunowlee, in the environs of Poona, on the 12th February 1704.

CHAPTER XII.

A.D. 1794.

Mahadajee Sindia's death an event of great political importance.—Review of his policy and summary of his character.—Is succeeded by his grand-nephew, Doulut Rao.—Sindia's regular infantry.—Opinions of many Mahrattas respecting that force.—Holkar long averse to its introduction.—Rughoojee Bhonslay had no infantry disciplined by European officers.—State of affairs at Nagpoor and at Baroda.—Govind Rao Gaekwar succeeded as regent.—Piracy on the coast of Maharashtra.—The Peishwa's fleet.—Angria of Kolabah.—Seedees of Jinjeera—Revolutions and events in that state.—Malwan and Sawuntwaree.—Various attempts of the English to suppress their piracies, and those of the raja of Kolapoor—never completely effected until the year 1812.

THE death of Mahadajee Sindia was an event of great political importance, both as it affected
 A.D. 1794. the Mahratta empire and the other states of India. His views and his character are perhaps sufficiently elucidated in the history of the 35 years antecedent to the period at which we have arrived ; but that we may hold in mind the state of the different Mahratta powers, and explain the proceedings of the petty princes on the coast of Maharashtra, formerly of so much importance when our establishments in India were in their infancy,

we shall devote this chapter to a brief recapitulation of Sindia's policy, a summary of his character, a review of the affairs of some of the other chieftains, and an explanation of minor transactions between the English and the petty princes to whom allusion is made. We shall then be free to enter on the causes which led to a war between the Mahrattas and the Moghuls in the Deccan.

The designs of Sindia, as we have already observed, were early directed to independence, but he was, at the same time, desirous of preserving a coalition, such as would unite the chieftains of the empire against all foreign enemies. He was inimical to the overgrown ascendancy of the Bramins. In his progress he first assisted the one Bramin against the other, and then attempted to overawe and control him whom he had raised. His absence from Poona, his campaign against Goddard in Guzerat, the necessity of his returning to his own jagheer in Malwa, his defeat by Camac, and the successful result of the campaign directed by the Bramins against Goddard, gave an apparent superiority to his rivals, which seemed to foretell the fall of his fortunes. But the treaty of Salbye, the recognition of his independence by the British government, and the commanding station in which he was placed as the mediator and guarantee of a peace, honorable to the Mahrattas, raised him at once from decline to aggrandizement. In his first attempts to extend his power in Hindostan, his contemporaries supposed him unequal to such a task, and that he must be ruined by the consequences of his own ambition. When he surmounted his difficulties, and not only rendered himself independent, but held in his hands a force which might control the Mahratta empire, he was very much alarmed lest Nana Furnuwees should call in the aid of a subsidiary, both as it interfered

with his own views, and sacrificed so much to the English. The power of that nation, at a time when they were supposed to be weak, and their resources exhausted, had appeared in the late war greater than at any former period, and had attained a height which, in Sindia's opinion, threatened the subjugation of all India. He was declaredly averse to the entire conquest of Tippoo's territory, as he conceived that measure dangerous to the Mahratta state; but whilst the war continued, he does not seem to have seriously meditated hostilities against the English; neither did he take any secondary steps to undermine the influence the latter had acquired with the Bramin ministers at the Poona court, because the revolution he contemplated would confine or enlarge the intercourse as he might desire.

But although nothing decidedly inimical appears on the part of Sindia towards the British Government, his power and ambition, his march to Poona, and, above all, the general opinion of the country, led the English to suspect him; and we accordingly find in their records various proofs of watchful jealousy. The Bombay government, in consequence of a slight alteration in the style of address from that which was used in the time of Governor Hornby, attributed the change to studied disrespect, and an attempt to mediate between that government and his relation, the *dessaye* of Sawuntwaree, was deemed a very improper interference; but in the one case the style of address was discovered to be the same as permitted by the governor-general, and in the other the proposed mediation was perfectly justified. There appeared, however, soon after Sindia's arrival in the Deccan, in an *ukhbar*, or native newspaper, from Delhi, a paragraph, which stated that the emperor had

written to the Peishwa and Mahadajee Sindia, expressing a hope that, by the exertions of the wukeel-i-mootluq and his deputy, he should obtain some tribute from Bengal. As such paragraphs are frequently written for the purpose of ascertaining the effects of the reports which they promulgate, it was properly noticed by Lord Cornwallis, whose spirited remonstrance prevented its repetition.

As to a summary of the character of Mahadajee Sindia, though much of his success is attributable to a combination of circumstances, he was a man of great political sagacity and of considerable genius, of deep artifice, of restless ambition, and of implacable revenge. With a high opinion of his personal address, he generally failed where he attempted to exercise it ; and, in ebullitions of anger, to which he was prone, he frequently exposed what he most wished to conceal. His countenance was expressive of good sense and good humour ; but his complexion was dark, his person inclining to corpulency, and he limped from the effects of his wound at Panniput. His habits were simple, his manners kind and frank, but sometimes blustering and coarse. He was beloved by his dependents, liberal to his troops in assignments of land or orders on villages, but quite the reverse in payments from his treasury or in personal donatives—a characteristic not only of Mahadajee Sindia, but of Mahrattas generally. His disposition was not cruel, although his punishments were severe. He could not only write, but, what is rare among the Mahrattas, he was a good accountant, and understood revenue affairs. His districts in Malwa were well managed—a circumstance, however, which must be ascribed to a judicious selection of agents ; for Sindia, like most Mahratta chieftains, was too much engaged in politics or war to bestow the time

and attention necessary to a good civil government.* He died without male issue.

Tookajee Sindia, Mahadajee Sindia's full brother, was slain in the fatal field of Panniput, but he left three sons—Kedarjee, Rowlajee, and Anund Rao—all of whom became officers in their uncle's service. Kedarjee died without issue; Rowlajee had two sons; but Mahadajee Sindia had resolved to adopt Doulut Rao, the son of his youngest nephew, Anund Rao. The ceremony of adoption had not actually taken place, but Mahadajee had repeatedly declared Doulut Rao his heir; and although Luxinee Bye, the widow of Mahadajee, opposed Doulut Rao's succession, her objections were overruled, as even Nana Furnuwees acceded to it. Tookajee Holkar was one of the first to acknowledge Doulut Rao. All the dependents of Sindia's family and the other Mahratta authorities sent their congratulations; so that this youth, who had scarcely attained his fifteenth year, became undisputed heir to the extensive realms of Mahadajee Sindia.

The great success of Sindia's regular infantry, rendered efficient by the talents and energy of De Boigne, led most of the Mahratta states to introduce regular battalions as a part of their armies. Many Mahrattas, however, were of opinion that this departure from usage would prove their ruin; infantry and guns, as they had once too bitterly experienced, compelled them to fight when flight was more judicious, and some of them predicted that, if they ever attempted to combat Europeans with their own weapons, they would one day experience a defeat still more fatal than that of Panni-

* Mahratta MSS. and letters, Bombay Records, the living testimony of many respectable natives, a good portrait in my possession, General Count De Boigne, Sir John Malcolm, &c.

put.* Tookajee Holkar long resisted the introduction of regular infantry, but he saw that Sindia could have made no progress in reducing the strong forts in Rajpootana without such aid; and although he might have been convinced that it would have been much better for his army to have wanted the four battalions of Dudrenec at Lukhairee, he was so well satisfied with their conduct that he immediately afterwards ordered Dudrenec to raise a like number.

Rughoojee Bhonslay, the raja of Nagpoor, did not, in this respect, follow the example of the generality of the Mahratta chieftains. His father Moodajee died in 1788, and besides Rughoojee, the eldest, he left two other sons—Khundoojee, and Venkajee or Munnya Bappoo. Khundoojee had charge of the northern, and Venkajee of the southern, districts; but Rughoojee, as heir of his uncle Janojee, was Sena Sahib Soobeh of the Mahratta empire, although, until his father's death, he was not considered as ruler of Berar. At the time when the confederacy was formed against Tippoo, Rughoojee, in consequence of a peremptory summons from the Peishwa, was constrained to repair to Poona, where he objected to being ordered upon an expedition where the Peishwa was not to command in person, and offered many other ineffectual excuses, until he at length privately explained to Nana Furnuwees his grounds for apprehending that his brother Khundoojee would usurp the sovereignty in his absence, upon which his presence was dispensed with, on promising to contribute 10 lakhs of rupees to assist in defraying the expenses of the war. Soon after his return to Nagpoor,

* Mahratta MSS. This was the opinion of Nana Furnuwees, and many Mahrattas of the present day attribute the overthrow of their power solely to the introduction of regular infantry and artillery.

his brother Khundoojee died, which relieved him from all apprehension of rivalry, and he soon after conferred on his brother Veenkajee the districts of Chandah and Chutteesgurh in jagheer. These were the only changes of importance amongst the eastern Mahrattas up to the period of Mahadajee Sindia's death. In the west, several events in regard to the Gaekwar, or Baroda state, require a summary notice.

Futih Sing Gaekwar, the regent at Baroda, died on the 21st December 1789, in consequence of a fall from an upper story in his house. His younger brother, Mannajee Rao, who was then at Baroda, immediately assumed charge of the person and government of his brother Syajee. Govind Rao, the elder brother next to Syajee, with whose history the reader is already acquainted, was then residing in obscurity at a village in the neighbourhood of Poona, and presented a petition to the minister, praying to be acknowledged by the Poishwa as regent of the Gaekwar possessions. His claim was just, but Mannajee Rao, by paying a nuzur of rupees 33,13,001, and agreeing to pay up arrears due by Futih Sing, amounting to upwards of 36 lakhs, was confirmed in his usurpation. Mahadajee Sindia, however, as already alluded to, espoused the cause of Govind Rao, and procured a repeal of Mannajee's appointment; upon which Mannajee applied to the Bombay government, claiming its protection on the terms of the treaty concluded with General Goddard by Futih Sing. As the treaty in question was superseded by that of Salbye, the English declined all interference on that ground; but by the talent of Mannajee's agent, Goolab Raec, and the supposed imbecility of Govind Rao, they were induced to recommend, through Mr. Malet, that some friendly compromise should be adopted, as being for

the benefit of the country and of all parties concerned. Nana Furnuwees concurred in this opinion, but Mahadajee Sindia and the partizans of Govind Rao objected to any compromise: The question, however, was at once set at rest by the death of Mannajee, about 1st August 1793. Still Govind Rao found it difficult to obtain permission to quit the Peishwa's capital. The ministers, without any regard to the exorbitant exactions already imposed on himself and his family, obliged Govind Rao to sign an agreement confirming the former stipulations, and ceding to the Peishwa the Gaekwar's share of the districts south of the Taptee, formerly included in the cessions to the company in 1780, together with his proportion of the customs of Surat; but, there being no service performed by the Peishwa towards the Gaekwar beyond the mere confirmation of his rights as regent, the British government objected to the cession as a dismemberment of the Baroda territory, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of Salbye. The validity of this objection was immediately admitted by Nana Furnuwees, the instrument of cession was restored, and Govind Rao at last set out to assume his office as undisputed regent at Baroda, on 19th December 1793.

Affairs on the coast of Maharashtra demand notice, chiefly from the system of piracy which continued to prevail between Goa and Bombay.

In 1756 piracy received a considerable check by the subjugation of Toolajee Angria, and, had the Peishwa then united his endeavours with those of the English, it might have been exterminated. But, like predatory incursions on shore, it was profitable; and so far from being suppressed, it was encouraged by the Poona Court. The Peishwa had two fleets—the one under his sur-

soobehdar at Bassein, the other commanded by Anund Rao Dhoolup, his admiral, who was stationed at Viziadoorg. The Peishwa's fleets did not molest vessels under English colours until the war of 1775. After that period, even in times of peace, we find that occasional depredations were committed, and, unless speedy detection followed, which was not always the case, the vessels were not restored: when the capture, however, was clearly ascertained, they were released, and the apology offered for their detention was that they had been mistaken for ships of some other nation.*

Mannajee Angria of Kolabah continued in obedience to the Peishwa's authority until his death, which happened in 1759. His son Rughoojee professed equal submission, but only obeyed when it suited his convenience. His piracies on the trading ships of the English were conducted in the same manner as the aggressions of the Peishwa. In November 1793 Rughoojee died, when, without reference to the Poona court, the sovereignty was assumed in the name of his infant son Mannajee, under the guardianship of Jey Sing Angria. By this usurpation, as it was termed in those who had not power to support their pretensions, Mannajee and Jey Sing incurred the enmity of the Poona minister, of which Sindia's successor, Doulut Rao, at a subsequent period took advantage, and raised a member of the family of Angria, who was nearly allied to himself, to the chiefship of that principality—a change which gave no umbrage to the English, because the reigning party, so far from courting their friendship, had most unjustifiably made prize of some of their ships.†

* Bombay Records and Mahratta letters.

† Mahratta MSS. and letters, Bombay Records.

The Seedees of Jinjeera plundered all nations except the English, nor did they always escape. Several revolutions had taken place in this small principality. In 1762, Seedee Yakoot, by the will of the regent, Seedee Ibrahim, succeeded to the government, in prejudice to Seedee Abdool Rahim, who was considered the nearest heir. Abdool Rahim endeavoured to obtain possession by force, and was secretly reinforced by the Mahrattas. The English took part with the reigning chief, and, having failed in an attempt to arbitrate the difference, they assisted to repel Abdool Rahim, who, being defeated, fled to Poona. Seedee Yakoot, apprehending that the Peishwa might openly espouse Abdool Rahim's cause, offered a compromise, promising him Dhunda Rajepoor, and the succession to Jinjeera at his death—a proposal which was accepted, and Abdool Rahim succeeded accordingly. But Seedee Yakoot had made a will bequeathing the principality to the second son of Abdool Rahim at his father's death, under the guardianship, in case of a minority, of his own friend Seedee Johur, who was commandant of Jinjeera. Abdool Rahim died shortly after, in 1784; but, without paying any regard to the will of Seedee Yakoot, he had bequeathed the principality to his eldest son, Abdool Khureem Khan, commonly called Balloo Meah.* Seedee Johur, however, defended his pretensions, founded on the will of Seedee Yakoot, and endeavoured to arrest Balloo Meah; but he, being apprized of the scheme, fled to Poona, carrying with him his younger brother, whom Seedee Johur wished to set up. Nana Furnuwees, in hopes that it was reserved for him to annex the unconquerable island to the Mahratta possessions, prepared to support the cause of Abdool Khureem Khan; Seedee

* Mahratta MSS. and letters.

Johur, however, called on the English for protection expressing his readiness to comply with any reasonable arbitration satisfactory to the inhabitants, but declaring his determination to resist the Mahrattas and the obnoxious Balloo Meah, "whilst the rock of Jinjeera remained and a man to stand by him." Nana Furnuwees, at the request of the Bombay Government, agreed to suspend operations until a reference could be made to Lord Cornwallis on the subject. It being at that time a great object of the governor-general's policy to gain the friendship of the Poona court, and it being generally believed that Seedee Johur was only striving to get the younger brother into his power, as a cloak to meditated usurpation, Lord Cornwallis directed the Bombay government not to support him. He also intimated to the Peishwa that, if he would make an adequate provision for the sons of the late Abdool Khureem Khan in some other part of the country, he might then take possession of the Seedee's territory. The Mahrattas, however, without making the provision stipulated, attempted, clandestinely, to possess themselves of Jinjeera, which no sooner came to the knowledge of the governor-general than he suspended the permission he had given. At length, when the treaty of alliance against Tippoo was concluded, the Peishwa having granted to Balloo Meah and his brother a tract of land near Surat, guaranteed by the English, and yielding annually 75,000 rupees, and having also given them 40,000 rupees in ready money, the heirs to the Jinjeera principality relinquished their right and title in favour of the Peishwa. The agreement was signed on the 6th June 1791; but the castle may fall whilst the cottage stands; the little island was never reduced, and the principality of Jinjeera has survived the empire of the Peishwas.

The most active, however, of all the corsairs on the coast, and the most destructive to the English trade, were the pirates of Malwan and Sawuntwaree. We have already cursorily alluded to the expedition sent against them in 1765. It was under the joint command of Major Gordon,* and Captain John Watson of the Bombay marine.† They speedily reduced the fort of Malwan, a much-valued possession of the raja of Kolapoor, and took Yeswuntgurh, or Rairee, from the dessaye of Waree. To the former the Bombay government gave the name of Fort Augustus, intending to have kept it; but the acquisition being unprofitable, they proposed to destroy the works; that alternative, however, was also abandoned on account of the expense, and they at last determined to restore it to the raja, on condition of his promising not to molest their ships or trade, to give security for his future good conduct, and to indemnify them for losses and expenses to the amount of rupees 3,82,896, the whole of which, except rupees 50,000, was received before Malwan was evacuated, in May 1766. This expedition took place during the minority of Sivajee, raja of Kolapoor. Kem Sawunt, dessaye of Waree, was then also a minor; and a confusion, greater even than usual, prevailed amongst his turbulent relations. To this confusion may be ascribed the difficulty which was experienced in effecting a settlement with the dessaye of Waree. The Bombay government do not appear to have been aware that there was a distinction between the pirates of Waree and Malwan, until 1765, when, on the 7th April of that year, they concluded a treaty of 19 articles with the dessaye, whom

* I am not sure if this name be correct; it is written Gowan and Goreham, as well as Gordon, in the records of the period.

† The same who, as Commodore Watson, was killed at the siege of Tannah.

they distinguished by his ancient family name of Bhonslay, or, as written in their records, the Bouncello. Of this treaty not one article was observed by the Mahrattas. Mr. Mostyn was therefore deputed in 1766 to conclude some settlement, and obtained an obligation for two lakhs of rupees, with a promise on the part of the dessaye to refrain from further aggressions, on condition that the Bombay government should restore Rairee. The money could only be raised by a mortgage on the revenues of the district of Vingorla for 13 years; and to induce the mortgagee, Wittoojee Koomptee, to advance the stipulated sum, Mr. Mostyn, in addition to two hostages procured from Waree, was obliged to promise that a small factory should be established, and the English flag hoisted, under the protection of a few sepoy to be left in the fort of Vingorla. This arrangement being concluded, Rairee was restored in the end of 1766. A very short time, however, had elapsed, when the hostages made their escape, and the agents of Wittoojee Koomptee were driven from the stations where they were collecting the revenue. Much remonstrance and negotiation followed, but nothing specific was effected. At last, when the 13 years expired, the Sawunts, although they had prevented the mortgagee from recovering the revenue, demanded restitution of the district, which being refused, they attacked and took Vingorla on the 4th June 1780, with a considerable quantity of private and some public property belonging to the English. The piracies of the Sawunts of Waree were henceforth renewed, and the marriage of Kem Sawunt to Luximee Bye,* the niece of Mahadajee Sindia, although a connection more splendid than honourable, increased their arrogance, especially whilst English were

* Luximee Bye was the daughter of Tookajee Sindia.

too much occupied to send a force against them. The raja of Kolapoor, seeing the depredations of the Sawunts escape with impunity, returned to his former habits ; and thus piracy became as prevalent as ever. Complaints on the subject were made by the English to Mahadajee Sindia, who promised to oblige his relations to restore their captures ; and the raja of Kolapoor was also induced to promise a liquidation of all balances, and to abstain from further aggressions on the English. The conditions were not enforced, and of course such temporizing measures only encouraged a repetition of robbery and insult. In the end of the year 1789 the English had resolved to adopt more active measures, and had determined to crush those depredators ; but in their extreme anxiety, at that time, to avoid giving offence to the Poona court, a doubt suddenly arose as to the propriety of attacking the raja of Kolapoor ; for so ignorant were they, at this late period, of the existing relations in the Mahratta state, that they supposed him a dependant of the Peishwa. When the question was referred to Nana Furnuwees, he foresaw, as he conceived, an opportunity of drawing in the Kolapoor state to seek the Peishwa's protection, and ultimately to yield obedience to the Poona government. Accordingly, by Nana's address, the raja was at first induced to accept the Peishwa's mediation ; but afterwards suspecting the design, and hearing of the hostilities in which the English were about to be engaged with Tippoo, he suddenly revoked his consent, and piracy was never more frequent on the coast of Malabar than during the war with Mysore. It was an attempt to mediate between the Bombay government and the Sawunts of Waree that led the former to accuse Sindia of the improper interference to which we have alluded. However, some compromise, through

Sindia, was agreed on with respect to the Sawunts, and an armament was prepared against the Kolapoor raja in 1792. But the expedition never took place, as, in consequence of his offering indemnification to individuals, promising to pay the balance due to the company on or before January 1795, granting permission to establish factories at Malwan and Kolapoor, and tendering the humblest apologies for his misconduct, the numerous aggressions he had committed were once more overlooked, and a treaty was concluded with him on the terms he thus proposed. But no benefit resulted from it; on the contrary, in the ensuing year there were complaints not only against the raja of Kolapoor, but against the Sawunts Angria and Dhoolup, for the capture or plunder of British ships; and it is no slight stigma on the British Indian administration that this system of piracy was not finally suppressed until the year 1812.

CHAPTER XIII.

A.D. 1794 AND A.D. 1795.

Reflections on the preceding details, and on the condition of the Mahrattas as a military nation at this period.—Their claims on Nizam Ally occasion a temporary union of the chiefs.—Course of policy adopted by the English in the negotiation which preceded the war between the Mahrattas and Nizam Ally.—Discussions between the courts of Poona and Hyderabad—war declared—assembly of the armies respectively—march to oppose each other—skirmish in which the Moghuls obtain some advantage—battle of Kurdla—extraordinary discomfiture of the Moghul army.—Submission of Nizam Ally, who surrenders the person of his minister, cedes large tracts of territory, and promises to pay three crores of rupees.—Anecdote of the young Peishwa.—Nizam Ally offended at the neutrality of the English, whose influence at Hyderabad is likely to be wholly superseded by a French party.—Unexpected rebellion of the prince Ali Jah occasions the recal of the English battalions.—The rebellion suppressed by the exertions of M. Raymond.—Movements of the Mahrattas during the insurrection.—No proof of their having been in any manner accessory to the rebellion.—Nana Furnuwees at the summit of power, when his anxiety to preserve it brings on an unforeseen catastrophe.

THE details in the last chapter, together with much of the preceding narrative, may tax the patience of the reader, but are, for the most part, absolutely necessary to elucidate our subject, and to

A.D. 1794.

afford a just view of the numerous authorities and interests which existed at this period among the Mahrattas. The empire founded by Sivajee now covered a vast space ; and had it been possible to combine its powers, to direct advantageously the peculiar genius of its people, and to render its various parts subservient to its general strength, the Mahrattas might still have extended their conquests, and a persevering predatory warfare would probably have arrested the rapid rise of the British nation in India. But the causes which drove the Mahrattas to predatory habits, and the circumstances which allured them to conquest, no longer existed, nor had they any chief whose authority was sufficient to unite them. They now lived under governments of their own, which were generally mild ; the executive authorities, even if administered by persons tyrannically disposed, were not so powerful as to become arbitrarily oppressive, but they were at the same time too feeble to call forth all the resources which smaller states, better organized, could have commanded. The Mahrattas were still a military people ; some member of every peasant's family, and sometimes the fourth or fifth of a whole village, had carried arms. Persons once employed were generally ready to return to the service when required, but pitched battles and regular warfare were unsuited to their genius ; the Mahratta cavalry, when accustomed to depend on regular infantry and cannon, lost their former surprising activity and confidence on distant enterprises ; even their courage, which as a national virtue was never very conspicuous, had fallen below its ordinary level ; and whilst some among them admired the wisdom of Mahadajee Sindia, and extolled the advantages to be attained by disciplined armies and artillery, others, as we have already mentioned, more justly predicted,

from the same cause, the certain overthrow of the Hindoo power.

The great object, however, of preserving the supremacy of the Peishwa, and of giving to the Mahratta nation that common excitement to action, founded on the immediate gratification of self-interest, became, for a short period, a point of much less difficulty than might have been anticipated. This tendency to union proceeded from the existing claims on Nizam Ally, in the settlement of which all the Mahratta chiefs were taught to expect a part; the death of Sindia left the entire management to Nana Furnuwees, and the English adopted a neutral policy on the occasion.

We have before noticed the nature of the claims on Nizam Ally. They were outstanding balances for a series of years on account of chouth and surdeshmookhee. Discussion on the subject had been occasionally agitated by the Mahrattas for upwards of 10 years; but the alliance in which they had been associated against Tippoo had enabled Nizam Ally to procrastinate, and prevented the Mahrattas from insisting on a settlement of their affairs. In 1791

A.D. 1791.

Govind Rao Kallay and Govind Rao Pingley, the Peishwa's envoys at the court of Hyderabad, formerly requested that Nizam Ally would appoint commissioners for investigating and adjusting the claims of their master. After considerable discussion, Nizam Ally delivered to these envoys a set of demands, under 34 separate heads, chiefly regarding contributions unjustly exacted, and the revenues of different places improperly taken, or withheld by the Mahrattas. He also demanded reparation on account of damage sustained by the inroads of Pindharees residing within the Peishwa's boundary. To all which, full and satisfactory replies,

drawn up with remarkable clearness and ability by Nana Furnuwees, were promptly returned, followed by a set of articles, 28 in number, demanding the adjustment of the Mahratta claims, some of which Nana proved to have existed since 1774. Nizam Ally was compelled to acknowledge some of these demands; others he evaded: but he promised in general terms to appoint some persons to settle the whole, as soon as the war with Tippoo had terminated, hoping by that time to obtain the interposition of the English.*

At the conclusion of the war, Lord Cornwallis did endeavour to effect a treaty of guarantee, founded
A.D. 1792. on that article of the alliance which regarded the assistance to be offered by the contracting parties, in case of an attack upon any one of them by Tippoo, believing that by such a treaty he should render a general benefit to all parties, and secure the peace of India. But it was hardly to be supposed that any Indian statesman could appreciate such a design; and accordingly each of the native courts interpreted the proposal as it appeared to affect their own interests. The Nizam saw in it a disposition to assist him, and hoped to realize his meditated scheme of raising a barrier between himself and the Mahrattas, so that he might not only resist their future encroachments, but evade their present demands; at all events he had no doubt of obtaining a settlement, such as Hyder had affected with the Mahrattas, by paying a fixed tribute, and from which Tippoo, by the late treaty, was entirely absolved. The Mahrattas, on the other hand, viewed the proposal as an arrogant assumption of authority on the part of the British government, and it excited their jealousy, both as affecting their

* Mahratta MSS. and original papers.

political consequence, and interrupting the settlement of their established dues. On the propriety of resisting this interposition both Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees concurred; but they differed in their opinions with regard to the supposed designs of the English. Sindia conjectured that they projected an alliance with Nizam Ally for the purpose of obtaining the command of the Nizam's resources, and turning them against the Mahrattas; in consequence of which, for a short time previous to his death, he carried on a friendly correspondence with Tippoo Sultan. Nana Furnuwees, although he did not perceive the benevolent purpose by which Lord Cornwallis was actuated, took a more correct view of the subject, in supposing that the English, though desirous of becoming umpires, would not risk a war unless to save the Hyderabad state from being subverted; such a conquest, however, even in subsequent success, Nana Furnuwees never ventured to contemplate. When the treaty of guarantee was submitted to the court of Poona, Mahadajee Sindia would have rejected it at once, but Nana, being anxious to keep well with the English as a check on Sindia, without giving a direct refusal, prolonged the discussion, although with no intention of assenting to what was proposed.

Sir John Shore succeeded to the charge of the government of British India on the departure of
A.D. 1793. the Marquis Cornwallis in August 1793.

Nizam Ally had supposed the latter so intent on effecting the treaty of general guarantee, that he concealed the deep interest he felt in the success of the negotiation of Poona, until he saw the prospect of its failure. He then used every argument, and held forth every inducement in his power, to obtain a separate treaty of guarantee for

himself. Sir John Shore, however, did not think it advisable to compel the Mahrattas to accept the mediation of the British nation, and adhered to a system of neutrality, for a variety of reasons which it is unnecessary to enter upon. We need only remark that, whatever might have been the apparent advantage of the governor-general's interference, if it had enabled Nizam Ally to effect his evasive purposes, it must have been recorded as an injustice to the Mahrattas.

From the period when the demands of the Mahrattas were formally renewed, whilst negotiations for the treaty of guarantee were in progress, Nizam Ally, probably without imagining that actual hostilities would take place, has been increasing his military force. A body of regular infantry which, during the war with Tippoo, had consisted of two battalions under a respectable French officer named Raymond, were increased to 23 battalions. His army was much augmented after Mahadajee Sindia's death, and he hoped, in consequence of that event, the Mahrattas might be easily satisfied, or successfully resisted, even if he should not be able to obtain the interposition of the English.* When the envoy, Govind Rao Kallay,† renewed his master's demands, he produced a detailed statement showing a balance in his favour of nearly two crores and sixty lakhs, or 26 millions of rupees. Warm discussions took place between the envoy and Musheer-ool-Moolk, when at last the former was told, in public durbar, that Nana Furnuwees must himself attend at the court of Hyderabad, in order to afford an explanation of the different items of their intricate claims. The envoy replied—"Nana Furnuwees is much engaged ;

* Mahratta MSS. and English Records.

† He was still alive when I left India in January 1823,

how can he come?" "How can he come?" re-echoed Musheer-ool-Moolk—"I will soon show how he shall be *brought* to the presence." This menace was considered a sufficient declaration, and although negotiations continued till the last, both parties prepared to decide their differences by the sword.

The war, whilst still at a distance, was extremely popular amongst the Moghuls; the grand army under Nizam Ally's personal command was assembled at Beder, and the camp exhibited much bustle and animation. The most vaunting threats were constantly heard from the ill-appointed disorderly soldiery. Poona was to be pillaged and burned; the dancing-girls already sung the triumphs of their army; and even the prime minister declared, in a public assembly, that "the Moghuls should now be freed from Mahratta encroachments; that they should recover Beejapoor and Candeish, or they would never grant peace, until they had despatched the Peishwa to Benares, with a cloth about his loins, and a pot of water in his hand, to mutter incantations on the banks of the Ganges."*

The minister at Poona was soon enabled to collect a very great army. No events had taken place since Sindia's death, except such as appeared favourable to Nana's power, and the prospect of sharing in the expected advantages brought to his standard all the chiefs whose attendance was important. Doulut Rao Sindia and Tookajee Holkar were already at Poona, and the raja of Berar had set out to join. Govind Rao Gaekwar sent a detachment of his troops; the great southern jagheerdars, composing the Bramin families of Putwurdhun and Rastia, the Bramin jagheerdars of Mallygaom and Vinchoor, the Pritee Needhee, the Punt Suchew, the Mahratta man-

* Persian and Mahratta MSS.

kurees—Nimbalkur, Ghatgay, Chowan, Duflay, Powar, Thorat, and Pahtunkur, with many others less conspicuous, attended the summons. But this was the last time the chiefs of the Mahratta nation assembled under the authority of their Peishwa.

Nizam Ally was first in the field, and slowly advanced

December. from Beder, along the banks of the Manjera,
towards the Mahratta frontier. The

A.D. 1795. Peishwá quitted Poona in January, and

his army marched at the same time, but by different routes, for the convenience of forage. There were upwards of 130,000 horse and foot in the Mahratta army, exclusive of 10,000 Pindharees. Of this force upwards of one-half were either paid from the Peishwa's treasury, or were troops of jagheerdars under his direct control. Doulut Rao Sindia's force was more numerous and more efficient than that of any other chieftain, although the greater part of his army remained in Hindostan and Malwa. Jooba Bukhshee commanded immediately under Doulut Rao, and had lately joined him with a reinforcement; the whole consisted of 25,000 men, of whom 10,000 were regular infantry under De Boigne's second-in-command, Monsieur Perron. Rughoojee Bhonslay mustered 15,000 horse and foot; Tookajee Holkar had only 10,000, but of these 2,000 were regulars under Dudrenec, and most of the Pindharees were followers of Holkar. Pureshram Bhow had 7,000 men.

Nana Furnuwees consulted the chief officers separately.* He appointed Pureshram Bhow to act as commander-in-chief. The Pindharees and some other horse were

* The memoranda in his own hand-writing of the different opinions were found in the Poona Records. He seems to have adopted the plans of Jooba Bukhshee and Tookajee Holkar.

ordered on to plunder in the neighbourhood of the Moghul camp, and destroy their forage ; the heavy baggage, properly protected, remained one march in the rear, and the best of the horse with the regular infantry, supported by upwards of 150 pieces of cannon, were sent forward to attack Nizam Ally, who, with an army amounting in all to 110,000 men, advanced towards Kurdla, and descended the Mohree Ghaut ; a body of the Peishwa's household troops under Baba Rao, son of the deceased Hurry Punt Phurkay, attacked the Moghuls when descending the Ghaut, and being driven off with some loss, Nizam

Ally, on the same evening, sat in durbar, and received nuzurs of congratulation on

March 11.

his victory. On the ensuing day, when the Moghuls were on their march from Kurdla to Purinda, the Mahrattas appeared on their right, and were soon perceived to be in great force. Nizam Ally halted his own elephant, sent off his baggage to the left, and directed Assud Alee Khan with the cavalry, supported by 17,000 regular infantry under Raymond, to attack the Mahratta army. Pureshram Bhow prepared to receive them ; he took his own station in the centre with the Peishwa's and Holkar's troops ; Rughoojee Bhonslay commanded the right wing, and Doulut Rao's army formed the left. Pureshram Bhow rode forward to reconnoitre, supported by Baba Rao Phurkay and Khassee Rao, the son of Tookajee Holkar. He had only advanced a short distance when he was suddenly charged by a body of Patans, under Lal Khan, a native of Baloochistan, who displayed great personal energy, cut down several men, and, with his own hand, unhorsed and wounded Pureshram Bhow. But Hurry Punt Putwurdhun, the Bhow's eldest son, seeing his father fall, instantly attacked the aggressor, and killed

him on the spot. The Patans, however, did not desist on the loss of their leader : being well supported by Alif Khan, the son of the nabob of Kurnoul, and Sulabut Khan, the son of Ismael Khan, nabob of Elichpoor, they persevered until the advanced party of the Mahrattas gave way, and were driven back in such confusion, that they communicated a panic to a great portion of their army, and thousands fled precipitately from the field, Baba Rao Phurkay, though in charge of the Juree Putka, seemed about to follow the fugitives, but was prevented by Jooba Bukhshee, who rode up, reproached him as a coward, and told him if he sought a place of safety he would find it behind Sindia's troops.

By this time the regular battalions on both sides had approached within musket-shot of each other, and the Moghul cavalry were advancing to the support of their infantry with apparent steadiness, when Rughoojee Bhonslay assailed them with a shower of rockets, at the same moment that they received a fire of 35 pieces of cannon, judiciously placed on an eminence by Perron. In the course of a very few minutes the whole of the cavalry were put to the rout ; but Raymond's infantry stood their ground, and had even obtained some advantage over Perron's battalions, when Raymond, by repeated and peremptory orders, was compelled to follow Nizam Ally, who had already retreated towards Kurdla. By the time the detached portions of the Moghul army had been made acquainted with their leader's intention, the sun had set, and darkness soon augmented the general confusion of the troops. Shots still continued to be exchanged in different directions after the night fell, and few men, except those of the half disciplined battalions of Raymond, could find their own particular division. At last, the

multitude, worn out by fatigue and vociferation, gradually sunk to rest, or lay down to await the return of day. But in the stillness of night, a small patrol of Mahrattas, in search of water for their horses, came by chance to a rivulet where lay a party of Moghuls, who, discovering what they were, instantly fired upon them. Raymond's sentries, being in the neighbourhood, also fired, when their whole line, who, lay on their arms, with their muskets loaded as they had retreated, started from their sleep, and instantly fired a sort of irregular volley. The alarm which such a discharge of musketry occasioned, in the state of the Moghul army at that moment, may be conceived. The uproar suddenly became greater than ever, and many of Raymond's sepoy, seized with the general panic, quitted their ranks and mingled in the confusion. At last the moon rose, and Nizam Ally, in perfect consternation, sought refuge within the walls of Kurdla, a very small fort surrounded by hills. Most of his troops fled, plundering the baggage of their own army as they went off: but they were not allowed to carry away this ill-gotten spoil unmolested; the Mahratta Pindharees over-took them next day, and, without experiencing the slightest opposition, stripped the panic-struck fugitives of everything.

The Mahrattas, advancing in the morning, found guns, stores, and baggage, and all the usual wreck of an army, strewing the ground; but their surprise was still greater on perceiving Nizam Ally shut up in Kurdla, and about one-tenth of the original number of his troops lying round the fort. No people are more active and vigilant than Mahrattas on such occasions; their most distant parties soon heard of this joyful intelligence, and came swarming "*to plunder the Moghuls,*" whom in a short time they had completely enclosed, and on the ensuing day opened

batteries, which commanded the fort as well as the position of the troops. Nizam Ally endured this hopeless exposure for two days, but on the morning of the 15th March, he solicited and obtained a cessation of arms. The preliminary demand made by the Mahrattas was the surrender of the minister Musheer-ool-Moolk, that amends might thus be made for the insult offered to the Peishwa, in threatening to seize Nana Furnuwees. They next exacted territorial cessions, extending along the frontier from the district of Purinda on the south, to the Taptee river on the north, comprehending the fort of Doulutabad, and such part of those districts, formerly conquered by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow in 1760, as had been restored to Nizam Ally. Three crores of rupees were promised on account of arrears of revenue and expenses of the war: besides which, by a separate agreement, Nizam Ally ceded territory yielding 3,18,000 rupees, in lieu of Rughoojee Bhonslay's claims for ghas-dana in Gungthuree, estimated at three and a half lakhs annually. Nizam Ally likewise promised to pay up the arrears due to Rughoojee Bhonslay, amounting to 29 lakhs, and to collect their respective shares of revenue in Berar, according to ancient usage, for all which the Peishwa afterwards became Rughoojee's guarantee.

It was with extreme reluctance that Nizam Ally agreed to surrender the person of his minister. Musheer-ool-Moolk urged him to the measure, especially as, under the circumstances in which they found themselves, they did not consider the other conditions so immoderate as might have been expected. The minister was delivered over to a party of 200 Mahrattas, by whom he was escorted to their camp. The Peishwa met him at the outskirts, and received him with distinction, but his person was care-

fully guarded. The Mahrattas were rejoiced to excess by this triumph, and a remark of the young Peishwa, when rallied by Nana Furnuwees on the melancholy which his countenance betrayed at the time of Musheer-ool-Moolk's arrival, was as just, as from him it was interesting. "I grieve," said he, "to observe such degeneracy as there must be, on both sides, when such a disgraceful submission has been made by the Moghuls, and our soldiers are vaunting of a victory obtained without an effort." There were scarcely 200 men lost by both those two great armies in the battle, though a considerable number of the Moghuls were killed in the subsequent confusion, and during the time they were surrounded; but to this day it is one of the great boasts of the old sillidars in the Mahratta villages that they were present in the glorious field of Kurdla.

During the action, the British envoys at the respective courts of Nizam Ally and the Peishwa were in the neighbourhood. Nizam Ally was much incensed against the English for their neutrality, which he considered an abandonment of promised friendship. On his return to Hyderabad he dismissed their two battalions, and ordered a great increase to the corps of Monsieur Raymond, assigning districts for their maintenance, in the same manner as Sindia had done. The influence of the English was further diminished by the captivity of Musheer-ool-Moolk, a great friend to their nation, and it was likely to be wholly superseded by the growing power of the French party, when an event occurred which induced Nizam Ally to recall their battalions, and the intercourse formerly subsisting was gradually renewed. The event alluded to was nothing less than the rebellion of Nizam Ally's eldest son, Ali Jah, who, from the time of the convention at

Kurdla, had been actively engaged in a conspiracy, the ring-leaders of which were all of the party most inimical to Musheer-ool-Moolk and the English interests.

On the night of the 28th June Ali Jah quitted Hyderabad, pretending to be forcibly carried off by a Mahratta, named Sewdasheo Riddey, for the purpose of obtaining the authority of his name in raising an insurrection. He was soon joined by many of his partizans, and took the route of Beder, of which fortress, and several other places of less consequence, he obtained possession. The season of the year was unfavourable to his success ; but the vast body of unemployed horsemen in the country (50,000 of the Kurdla fugitives having been discharged by Nizam Ally in one day) rendered the insurrection extremely alarming, especially as several officers of rank joined the prince, and Tippoo, as was given out, had promised to support him.

M. Raymond undertook to suppress this rebellion. He followed the prince to Beder, pursued him to Aurungabad, took him prisoner, and was bringing him to Hyderabad ; but Ali Jah, unable to face his father, put an end to his existence by poison, before they reached the capital.

On the return of the Peishwa to Poona, Nana Furnuwees was employed in distributing the late acquisitions,* and in settling various affairs with the different chiefs. Pureshram Bhow and Rughoojee Bhonslay remained in the neighbourhood of the capital, but Holkar and Sindia encamped at some distance—the former at Jejoory, and the latter at Jamgaom—until news arrived of Ali Jah's rebellion, when they repaired to Poona, with what view is

* The whole of the particulars of this distribution were found amongst the Poona records : but much confusion having subsequently arisen, the intended arrangements were never entirely completed.

not ascertained, nor is there any proof that the Mahrattas were instrumental to the rebellion, although it was suspected by Nizam Ally, and has been affirmed by Moghul historians.

By the middle of September Doulut Rao had obtained his audience of leave, and proceeded to Jamgaom, on his route to Hindostan; Pureshram Bhow had returned to the family jagheer at Tasgaom; Holkar continued at Poona, where Rughoojee Bhonslay also remained until the middle of October, when he was dismissed with great honor, receiving new sunnuds for a portion of territory lying on the south side of the Nerbuddah, which had been originally assigned to his grandfather by Ballajee Bajee Rao in 1750, but 12 of the districts* had not yet been conquered from the chiefs, who, in the confusion that followed the decline of the Moghul empire, had become independent.†

Nana Furnuwees was now at the summit of prosperity; without the intervention of a foreign power he had obtained every object of his ambition. Doulut Rao Sindia was favourably disposed towards him, and his ministers and officers were more intent on forwarding their own particular views in the government of their young master, than in schemes for controlling the Poona court. Tookajee Holkar had become imbecile, both in mind and body, and his officers were subservient to Nana. Rughoojee Bhonslay was completely secured in his interests, and the Bramin jagheerdars were of his party. The Peishwa's govern-

* These were—1st, Bachaee; 2nd, Beechea; 3rd, Burgee; 4th, Bhowangurh; 5th, Sypoor Chouréeagurh; 6th, Khooreybharee; 7th, Kuthoottea; 8th, Pullahoo; 9th, Dujwurdha; 10th, Mookundpoor; 11th, Surnalpoor; and 12th, Ramgurh.

† This chapter is on the authority of original Mahratta papers, Persian and Mahratta MSS., and English records.

ment had thus every prospect of regaining the tone and vigour it had possessed under the great Mahdoo Rao ; but Nana's fondness of power, and his anxiety to preserve it, brought on a catastrophe which speedily undermined his authority, overturned the labours of his life, and terminated his days in trouble and in misery.

CHAP. XIV.

A.D. 1795 AND A.D. 1796.

Nana Furnuwees—his conduct towards Mahdoo Rao—the raja of Satara, and the family of the deceased Rugonath Rao.—The sons of Rugonath Rao confined in the fort of Sewneree.—Bajee Rao the particular object of Nana's jealousy.—Bajee Rao's character at this period—his accomplishments.—The young Peishwa desirous of cultivating his friendship.—Nana advises him to beware.—Bajee Rao corrupts one of Nana's agents and opens a communication with the Peishwa—his insidious messages—discovery—its consequences.—Mahdoo Rao throws himself from the terrace of his palace, and dies.—Nana endeavours to exclude Bajee Rao from the succession.—Bajee Rao gains over Balloba Tattya and Sindia to his interests.—Nana Furnuwees determines on anticipating Sindia, and brings Bajee Rao to Poona.—Sindia, influenced by his minister, marches on the capital—Nana withdraws from Poona.—Balloba Tattya resolves to set aside Bajee Rao, and raise Chimnaje Appa to the musnud, with Pureshram Bhow as his minister.—Nana Furnuwees, being consulted by Pureshram Bhow, assents with seeming cordiality to the proposal.—Nana's proceedings.—Suspensions of Balloba Tattya.—Conspiracy matured, and Bajee Rao confined.—Chimnaje Appa declared Peishwa.—Sindia's pecuniary distress—plan for alleviating it—enlargement of Musheer-ool-Moolk.—The new administration pretend a wish that Nana Furnuwees should take a principal

share in the government.—Nana discovers their treachery.—Desperate situation of Nana—evinces great ability in extricating himself, and circumventing his enemies.—His interests in unison with those of Bajee Rao.—Rise of Ballajee Koonjur.—Nana discloses a part of his plans to Bajee Rao.—Rise of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.—Nana Furnuwees gains Sindia to his views.—The imprudent proceedings of Bajee Rao's party bring on a premature discovery of a part of the conspiracy.—Bajee Rao sent off towards Hindostan—enters into a compact with Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.—Proceedings at Poona.—Schemes of Nana Furnuwees matured—excites the raja of Kolapoor to fall upon the districts of Pureshram Bhow.—Treaty of Mhar.—Treaty with Rughoojee Bhonslay.—Sindia arrests Balloba Tattya.—Pureshram Bhow accidentally forewarned of his danger—flees from Poona—is overtaken and made prisoner.—Nana Furnuwees obtains the guarantee of Nizam Ally and of Sindia before trusting himself at Poona.—Bajee Rao proclaimed Peishwa.—The adoption of Chimnajee Appa declared illegal.—Chimnajee Appa appointed to the government of Guzerat, with Aba Sheelookur as his deputy.

ALTHOUGH the young Peishwa was now in his twenty-first year, Nana Furnuwees relaxed nothing of the rigid tutelage in which he had reared him ; and the old minister became more than ever watchful of all the state prisoners whose liberty might endanger his own power. He was apprehensive that Mahadajee Sindia had intended to use the raja of Satara as an instrument in overthrowing the Bramin government, and he now treated the object of his dread with more than ordinary severity, by diminishing his allowances, and prohibiting his relations from visiting him in the fort.

A.D. 1795.

The family of Rugonath Rao were kept at Kopergaom until the year 1793, when they were removed to Anundwelee, near Nassuck, as a place more agreeable to the widow Anundee Bye, whose health was on the decline. In the month of April of the succeeding year she died. The sons, Bajee Rao and Chinnajee Appa, with the adopted son of Rugoba, Amrut Rao, remained at Anundwelee ; until upon the prospect of hostilities with Nizam Ally, they were conveyed to the hill-fort of Sewnerree, where, once secured, Nana Furnuwees, at the termination of the war, retained them in close custody, under two officers in whom he confided, Rughoo Punt Ghorebulay and Bulwunt Rao Nagonath.

The condition of these young men excited strong feelings of commiseration, even in the minds of those who judged it necessary ; and others, swayed chiefly by their feelings, generally the larger portion of any community, execrated the conduct of the minister as cruel, vindictive, and unjustifiable. Distinct from either of these classes was the old faction of Rugoba, and other persons, wholly discontented, who endeavoured by every means to exalt the character of the prisoners, and lower the reputation of Nana Furnuwees. But these indications of the public mind only increased the wary circumspection of the minister, to whom the elder of the legitimate sons of Rugonath Rao early became an object of jealousy. Graceful in his person, with a handsome and youthful countenance which ensured favourable impressions, Bajee Rao had the mildest manner, and an address so insinuating that he gained the good-will of all who approached him. His bodily and mental accomplishments were equally extolled ; at the age of nineteen, he was an excellent horseman, and skilled in the use of the sword

and bow, and allowed to be the most expert spearman in Gungthuree. He was deeply read in the Shasters, particularly in such parts as regards the observance of caste; and, of his age, no pundit so learned had been known in Maharashtra.

The young Peishwa, so far from being jealous of the superior accomplishments of his cousin, was pleased at hearing him commended, and frequently expressed a strong desire to procure his enlargement, and cultivate his friendship. In vain did the cautious Nana Furnuwees advise him to beware of the sapling, however comely, which sprung from the weakness of Rugonath Rao and the wickedness of Anundec Bye; the greater the restraint, the stronger the inclination; but Mahdoo Rao was watched, and Bajee Rao was a close prisoner. The latter, however, having discovered the favourable disposition of the Peishwa towards him, and having at last gained Bulwunt Rao Nagonath, he conveyed a message with assurances of respect and attachment, adding that "he was in confinement at Sewnerce, and the Peishwa under the control of his minister; that their condition as prisoners was nearly similar, but that their minds and affections were free, and should be devoted to each other; that their ancestors had distinguished themselves, and that the time would arrive when his cousin and himself might hope to emulate their deeds, and raise for themselves a lasting and honorable name." This message was the commencement of a correspondence, which began shortly after the return of the army to Poona, and continued for some time, till at length it came to the knowledge of Nana, who betrayed a rage, altogether unusual, at the discovery. He immediately threw Bulwunt Rao Nagonath into a hill-fort loaded with irons, severely reproached Mahdoo Rao,

and rendered the strictness of Bajee Rao's confinement far more rigid than before. Mahdoo Rao, already galled by restraint, and irritated by the insidious messages of his cousin, was overwhelmed with anger, disappointment, and grief; he refused absolutely to quit his apartment, and his absence from his usual place at the durbar was imputed to fever. At the Dussera, which happened on the 22nd October, and was conducted with great splendour, he appeared amongst his troops, and in the evening received his chiefs and the ambassadors at his court in his accustomed manner; but his spirit was wounded to

October 25.

desperation, a fixed melancholy seized on his mind, and on the morning of the 25th October he deliberately threw himself from a terrace in his palace, fractured two of his limbs, and was much wounded by the tube of a fountain on which he fell. He survived for two days, and having particularly desired that Bajee Rao should be placed on the musnud, he expired in the arms of Baba Rao Phurkay, for whom he had entertained a strong affection.

The death of Mahdoo Rao was an event of such awful importance to the political existence of Nana Furnuwees, that the consideration of its consequences withdrew his mind from the deep affliction which the untimely end of that amiable young prince would have disposed him to indulge. He carefully suppressed the request of Mahdoo Rao in his cousin's favour, dreading that by such an arrangement he should not only be deprived of power, but perhaps of liberty and of life. His first care, on ascertaining the nature of the accident, was to send off notice

October 28.

to Pureshram Bhow, requiring his immediate attendance at Poona with every man he could collect; and the day after the Peishwa's death,

Rughoojee Bhonslay and Doulut Rao Sindia were recalled for the purpose of deliberating on the succession to the musnud. Tookajee Holkar, being in Poona, immediately visited the minister, who not only made use of all the popular prejudice existing against the name of Rugonath Rao, but described the enmity, which from the first dawning of reason had been instilled into Bajee Rao by his mother, against the whole of those officers who had now any experience in the affairs of the state ; he showed the danger to be apprehended from the connection between his family and the English, dwelt upon the happy state of prosperity and union which then prevailed in the Mahratta empire, and enlarged on the increasing benefits to be expected if the existing course of policy were carefully preserved.

In these sentiments Holkar concurred, and the disposition of the other chiefs being sounded, Nana ventured to disclose his plan by suggesting that Yessooda Bye, the widow of the deceased prince, who had not yet attained the age of womanhood, should adopt a son, in whose name he proposed to conduct the government as heretofore. Some objections were raised by Balloba Tattya, one of the principal ministers of Sindia, but they were overruled by his colleague in office, Jooba Bukhshee, who observed that their master was too young to be able to judge for himself, but he thought his safest course was to be guided by the experience of the elder chiefs, and to follow the example

A.D. 1796. of Tookajee Holkar. At length, after some discussion, the consent of the principal chiefs was obtained in writing, and in the month of January they again retired from Poona.

In the preceding November, Mr. Malet, the resident on the part of the British government, had made a formal

application to the minister for the purpose of ascertaining on what footing the Mahratta government was to be conducted. Nana Furnuwees replied that the widow of the late Peishwa was to be considered head of the empire, until the great officers of the nation had deliberated upon the succession, when the result should be communicated. He now therefore intimated their resolution that the widow should adopt a son, to which no objection on the part of Mr. Malet could be offered, and nothing was now apparently wanting except the selection of a child, and the performance of the ceremony. But Bajee Rao, who had obtained information of the whole proceeding, by which he was thus unjustly to be deprived of his right, gave a further specimen of his talent for intrigue, by immediately taking advantage of the favourable disposition evinced towards him by Balloba Tattya, opening a correspondence with him, and in a few months gaining him to his cause. This union was the more important to Bajee Rao, as the death of Jooba Bukhshee had taken place a short time before, and on his death-bed he sent for Doulut Rao, and expressed his regret for having advised him to accede to the plan of adoption whilst a lineal descendant of Ballajee Wishwanath remained. Having secured the prime minister, Bajee Rao next addressed himself to Sindia, offering him four lakhs of rupees of territory, and whatever might be the expenses of his troops during the time he should require their aid in asserting his lawful succession to the musnud.

This offer was accepted, a formal agreement was drawn up, but it was scarcely concluded when the whole was divulged to Nana Furnuwees. In the greatest alarm that minister instantly summoned Pureshram Bhow, who marched from Tasgaom to Poona with a body of horse in 48 hours, a distance of upwards of 120 English miles.

After some deliberation, it was resolved to anticipate Sindia's design to release Bajee Rao, and to declare him Peishwa. Pureshram Bhow accordingly proceeded to the fort of Sewneree, and made his proposals. Amrut Rao advised his brother not to accept them, observing that these offers were but certain indications of Sindia's sincerity. Bajee Rao did not rely on the good-will of either party beyond the dictates of their interests, and, if assured of attaining his object, he would not have hesitated; he, however, urged many objections, though only for the purpose of obtaining satisfactory assurances. With this view, amongst other solemn asseverations, he obliged Pureshram Bhow to hold the tail of a cow, and swear by the holy Godavery that no deception was intended; after which he descended from the fort, and, accompanied by his brother Chimnaje Appa, set out for his future capital. Amrut Rao, by Pureshram Bhow's orders, was detained in custody at Sewneree.

Immediately on Bajee Rao's arrival at Poona he had an interview with Nana Furnuwees, when they mutually promised to bury all traces of former enmity in oblivion; and Bajee Rao, on being assured of the succession, promised to retain Nana at the head of his administration. To this agreement both parties exchanged formal declarations* in writing.

* The following is a translation of that which was given by Bajee Rao to Nana Furnuwees:—

"In the presence of my God, and from the inmost recesses of my heart, have I rooted out every vestige of any former act; let all your future conduct be guided by the principles of good faith. I will never injure you or yours, by word or deed, by any inward thought or outward act, neither will I allow any other person to do so; on this point I will be inflexible, and will pay no attention to the suggestions of others. I will not allow your reputation to be sullied, and should any one attempt to instil anything of the kind into my breast, I will point him out to you. I will never release any one from confinement without your advice; all state affairs shall be managed by our conjunct counsel. From this day all your acts are mine: suspicion is wholly eradicated from my heart."

Balloba Tattya, on hearing of the step which Bajee Rao had taken, was incensed at his conduct, but determined to counteract the schemes of Nana Furnuwees. He therefore persuaded Sindia, then on the banks of the Godavery, to march on Poona with his whole force. Nana Furnuwees was dismayed; Pureshram Bhow advised him to stand firm, to collect the troops, and to give battle; but Nana, deficient in personal courage, was also sensible of the superiority of Sindia's army; he could not trust Bajee Rao, and he was terrified lest he should fall a prisoner into the hands of Balloba Tattya, by whom he believed he should be put to death. Having therefore left Pureshram Bhow with Bajee Rao at Poona, he told the latter that as Sindia was advancing with intentions hostile only towards himself, he thought the best means of averting ruinous civil dissensions was for him to retire from business, and withdraw from the capital. He accordingly repaired first to Poorundhur, and afterwards to Satara. Sindia arrived in the neighbourhood of Poona, and had a friendly interview with Bajee Rao; but Balloba Tattya, although he affected to meet him with cordiality, could not forget his behaviour, especially after he had seen Amrut Rao, whom he removed from Sewneree Jamgaom, but did not restore him to liberty.* After considering various plans, Balloba Tattya at last resolved to set aside Bajee Rao, and to raise both a minister and a Peishwa of his own; for which purpose he proposed to Pureshram Bhow, through Byhroo Punt Mendlee, that Mahdoo Rao's widow should adopt Chimnajee Appa as her son, that Bajee Rao should be placed in confinement, and that Pureshram Bhow should conduct the administration. Pureshram Bhow had begun to despise Nana Furnuwees for his pusillani-

* There is no reason assigned for his not having done so.

mous conduct, but he still so far respected his wisdom as to ask his opinion. Nana advised him to accept what was proposed, but to take care that Bajee Rao came into his own custody. To this last essential part of the advice no attention was paid by Pureshram Bhow. Balloba Tattya pretended to be partly influenced in the measure he now pursued, by the hope of rendering it, in some degree, acceptable to Nana Furnuwees, lest the latter, in the present state of Doulut Rao's inexperience, should form some confederacy, by means of the other chiefs, against the house of Sindia. Balloba accordingly, as soon as Nana's assent had been obtained, made overtures for a reconciliation, to which the latter made no objections.

Nana's own proceedings in the meantime deserve notice. When he quitted Poorundhur and repaired to Satara, he entertained some design of emancipating the raja, and restoring the old form of the government of Sivajee, as a plan calculated to avert the dissensions that had arisen, and which were likely to increase in the state; but a very few days convinced him of the futility of this scheme. The raja, in consequence of the treatment he had experienced, had no confidence in him. The raja's name was sufficiently popular to have brought many of the most warlike Mahratta families to his standard, and to have awakened a powerful interest amongst the descendants of the first followers of Sivajee, residing in the wilds of the Mawuls and Khoras. The raja, though incapable of conducting state affairs himself, was a man of courage, and several of his relations were fit leaders for any desperate enterprize. But Nana's object was to devise some means of establishing a controlling authority over the chiefs of the empire, not to stir up a power subversive of all order. After a few conferences he desisted, and retired to Wace,

a town in the neighbourhood ; but his having entertained such a scheme was so far fortunate for the raja, that he was indulged in a little more liberty, and was treated with greater kindness and consideration.

When Nana Furnuwees consented to the proposal of Balloba Tattya for adopting Chimnaje Appa, it became necessary to obtain the raja's khillut of investiture for the new Peishwa ; on which occasion Nana came from Wace to Satara, and, on receiving the khillut, promised that, if he ever had an opportunity, he would endeavour to fulfil the agreement made with Ram Raja in the time of Ballajee Bajee Rgo, by putting the present Raja Shao in possession of the territory promised by the treaty of Sangola.

Nana would have proceeded to Poona, but on finding, that Pureshram Bhow had allowed Sindia's minister to retain the person of Bajee Rao, he suspected, and with good reason, that the whole was a scheme to entice him into the power of Balloba Tattya ; and, therefore, although he forwarded the khillut, he himself remained at Wace.

Bajee Rao was still ignorant of the plot which had been formed against him, and the manner of disclosing it is too characteristic, not only of the period, but of the future ways of the Poona court, to be omitted. Some demands for money on account of Sindia's expenses were made on Bajee Rao, and, upon his expressing inability to comply with them, they were urged in a tone which produced altercation, and Sindia, pretending to take offence at the manner of Bajee Rao's refusal, begged permission to return to Hindostan. Bajee Rao, as had been foreseen, immediately repaired to Sindia's camp for the purpose of privately expostulating ; he was there detained in argument until late in the evening, when the conference was suddenly interrupted by intelligence of Pureshram Bhow's having

carried off Chimnajee Appa ; no one, it was pretended, knew whither, but it was supposed to Satara. Bajee Rao, alarmed and astonished, begged of Sindia to pursue him ; but the uncertainty of their route, the strength of their party, and the darkness of the night were urged against this proposal. A request, however, to be allowed to continue under Sindia's protection during the night was readily granted, and next day he discovered the snare, upon being advised to remain, as any place beyond the precincts of Sindia's camp was unsafe for his highness.

In the meantime Pureshram Bhow and Baba Rao Phurkay had merely conveyed Chimnajee Appa into the city of Poona ; but Chimnajee positively refused to become a party in the unjust usurpation of his brother's rights, and compulsion only induced him to bear his share in it. He was adopted by the name of Chimnajee Mahdoo Rao, and formally invested as Peishwa on the 26th May.

The pecuniary difficulties of Sindia, and the distress of his army, were not fictitious. Pureshram Bhow, on being appointed minister, had promised to raise money, and for this purpose offered to restore the minister of Nizam Ally, Musheer-ool-Moolk, to liberty, on condition of receiving a portion of the balance of three krores of rupees, due by the treaty of Kurdla. Musheer-ool-Moolk said he could only use his endeavours ; but upon this promise he was released from confinement, permitted to encamp in the environs of the city, and, in a short time, was surrounded by a considerable retinue.

The day after the installation of the new Peishwa, Pureshram Bhow proposed that Nana Furnuwees should come to Poona, meet and be reconciled to Balloba Tattya, and afterwards assume the civil administration in the new Peishwa's government, whilst the com-

mand of the troops and all military arrangements should remain with himself. In reply to this proposal, Nana Furnuwees requested that Pureshram Bhow's eldest son, Hurry Punt, might be sent to Wace for the purpose of clearly settling some preliminaries; but, instead of coming as an envoy, Hurry Punt crossed the Neera at the head of 4,000 or 5,000 chosen horses—a circumstance that in itself naturally excited suspicions, which were strengthened by a secret letter from Baba Rao Phurkay, advising him to seek his own safety without a moment's delay.

The fortunes of Nana Furnuwees were now, in the general opinion, and perhaps in his own, desperate; but on being forced to abandon half-measures, into which he was misled by a timid disposition, the vigour of his judgment, the fertility of his expedients, the extent of his influence, and the combination of instruments which he called into action surprised all India, and, from his European contemporaries, procured for him the name of “the Mahratta Machiaval.”

When we saw the danger imminent, he immediately fled from Wace towards the Concan, blocked up the passes in his rear, threw a strong garrison into Pertabgurrh, and, on arriving at the village of Mhar, his first care was to put the fort of Raigurrh in the best state of defence. Balloba Tattya proposed that he should be followed up without delay, and offered some of Sindia's regular infantry for the purpose; but Pureshrom Bhow, influenced by secret well-wishers of Nana's, objected to the employment of coercive measures, although his hostility to Nana Furnuwees was soon after avowed by his giving up Nana's jagheer lands to Sindia, and sequestrating his houses and property in Poona for his

own use. The ostensible property, however, of Nana Furnuwees bore but an insignificant proportion to the extent of his concealed wealth. It is a common report that he carried with him, when he quitted Poona, hoards of gold, the accumulated treasures of the Peishwas; but, as already stated on the authority of their accounts, the Peishwas, up to the time of the first Mahdoo Rao, were in debt, and were always embarrassed, so that the riches of Nana Furnuwees, which were without doubt considerable, must have been saved during his own administration. His funds were secretly deposited in different places, or lodged in the hands of agents in various parts of India, so that he could command them with promptitude in case of emergency; but the secret of their deposit, and of his management, remains a mystery, a subject of some curiosity, and the theme of many wonders and impositions amongst the Mahratta vulgar.

The revolution which had taken place naturally tended to unite Bajee Rao and Nana Furnuwees; and a secret intercourse was carried on between them, through the medium of an individual who afterwards became conspicuous. In the service of Nana Poorundhuree there was a Mahratta sillidar, the natural son of the patell of the village of Wangapoor near Poorundhur, who had contrived to attract the notice of Bajee Rao when he was taken from confinement at Sewneree, and who was afterwards permitted by Nana Poorundhurree to enter Bajee Rao's service. Ballajee Koonjur—for such was the name of this sillidar—perceiving the situation of affairs, although he had little opportunity of consulting his master, visited Nana Furnuwees at Mhar, and conveyed the most friendly declarations and assurances on the part of Bajee Rao, begging of Nana to exert himself in their mutual behalf.

No excitement to exertion was necessary : Nana Furnuwees had every engine at work. Baba Rao Phurkay, in command of the Peishwa's household troops, had engaged to bring them over to him. Tookajee Holkar's whole power and influence were ready at his signal, and he had opened a negotiation with Sindia through Ryajee Patell, whom he knew to be inimical to Balloba Tattya, offering to Sindia the jagheer of Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, the fort of Ahmednugur, with territory yielding 10 lakhs of rupees, on condition that he would place Balloba Tattya in confinement, establish Bajee Rao on the musnud, and return with his army to Hindostan. Thus far of his plans Nana Furnuwees communicated to Ballajee Koonjur for Bajee Rao's information.

This period of the revolution brought many persons into notice, although none so obscure as the individual just mentioned. Of these, one of the most conspicuous was the person employed by Nana Furnuwees to negotiate with Ryajee Patell in order to bring over Sindia : the name of this man was Sukaram Ghatgay, of the Kagul family, whose ancient title, as already mentioned, was Shirzee Rao. Sukaram, having had a quarrel with his relation Yeswunt Rao Ghatgay, the brother-in-law of the raja of Kolapoor, concerning the hereditary rights in their native village, they took up arms to assert them. Sukaram being defeated was obliged to fly from the Kolapoor territory, and seek shelter with Pureshram Bhow, into whose service he entered, and afterwards exchanged it for that of Nana Furnuwees, who gave him the command of 100 horse. When Nana quitted Poona, Sukaram Ghatgay entered Sindia's service, where he obtained a similar command. He was of an active, bold, intriguing disposition ; and by his address had

gained the good-will of Ryajee Patell. He was also at this time much courted by Sindia, by reason of the reputed beauty of his daughter, whom Sindia wished to espouse ; and Sukaram, who regarded his own aggrandizement more than the dignity of his house, which would be tarnished by his giving a genuine daughter of the Kagulkur Ghatgay to the spurious offspring of the patells of Kunneirkheir, was pleased with the prospect of the alliance, though, to enhance the favour of ultimate compliance, he raised numerous objections to the match.

By the aid of such an agent Nana Furnuwees was successful in gaining over Sindia to his cause ; and this secret having been communicated to Baba Rao Phurkay and others of the party, they became less circumspect in their preparations. Bajee Rao in the midst of Sindia's camp, assisted by his father's friend, the veteran Manajee Phakray,* used supplies of money furnished by Nana Furnuwees, in levying troops in that situation. These imprudent proceedings were discovered by Balloba Tattya. Baba Rao Phurkay was seized, and imprisoned in the fort of Chakun, but his carcoon, Naroo

* Mr. Tone, who was at Poona during the progress of these intrigues, published three letters from the 18th June to the 19th December, giving an account of the extraordinary affairs by which he was surrounded. I depend on better material, but I have examined attentively all which that intelligent gentleman wrote respecting the Mahrattas. What he saw may be relied upon ; as to what he heard, I am less surprised that he should have fallen into error, than that he should have obtained information so nearly correct. He describes Mannajee Phakray as "an officer of high military reputation, and so disfigured with wounds as to have scarcely the appearance of a human creature." "Mannajee," say the old sillidars of the present day, "was the last of the Mahrattas, and was worthy to wear a bangle on his horse's leg, for he never showed his back to a foe."

Mr. Tone's description of Bajee Rao at this period, except the Bajee Rao was not so old as he supposes, coincides with that of his own countrymen. "Bajee Rao," says Mr. Tone, "is about 25 years of age, light-complexioned, and rather above the middle size ; his person is graceful, and his manner strongly impressive ; his countenance is manly, sensible, and majestic."

Punt Chuckurdeo a very active officer, escaped by concealing himself in the camp of Musheer-ool-Moolk. Neelkunt Rao Purbhoo and Mallojee Ghorepuray, two chiefs of their party, had a few minutes to prepare for defence; they repulsed the troops sent to apprehend them, and, at the head of a few followers, made good their retreat from Poona to the strong range of hills south of the Neera.

Bajee Rao's place of encampment within Sindia's lines was surrounded and water was cut off. The troops he had assembled were permitted to disperse, but Mannajee Phakray enjoined them to meet him in the neighbourhood of Waee, where they assembled accordingly, and were promptly joined by Neelkunt Rao and Mallojee Ghorepuray. Nana Furnuwees supplied them with money, directed them to take up a position at the Salpee, Ghaut, where, being assisted by Nana's friend Bujaba Seroolkur in raising troops, they soon collected 10,000 men, upon which they declared for Bajee Rao.

Balloba Tattya, unconscious of the inextricable and extensive toils which Nana was weaving around him, attributed the whole plot to Bajee Rao, and therefore determined to send him off a prisoner to Hindostan. He was despatched, accordingly, under the care of Sukaram Ghatgay, to whom the command of his escort was entrusted. But Bajee Rao, aware of the most likely means of gaining Sindia, employed all his eloquence to induce Ghatgay to give his daughter to Sindia in marriage, on condition of Bajee Rao's being elevated to the musnud; and of preventing his being carried out of the Deccan, lest Nana Furnuwees, even if successful, should take advantage of his absence to exclude him from the succession. Ghatgay at first declared it to be impossible, but at last, pretending to be won over, he agreed to give his daughter on the

following conditions :—that Bajee Rao should authorize him to promise Sindia two kröres of rupees in ready money on his becoming Peishwa ; that, when Peishwa, he should get him (Ghatgay) appointed Sindia's prime minister ; and that he should also endeavour to obtain for him the village of Kagul in enam. Having assented to these conditions, Bajee Rao feigned sickness, and Ghatgay remained with him on the banks of the Paira.

At Poona great preparations were going forward. Musheer-ool-Moolk was permitted by Pureshram Bhow to raise troops, for the purpose, as the former pretended, of assisting to reduce Nana Furnuwees and the force which had declared for Bajee Rao. Holkar's and Sindia's troops were held in readiness apparently for the same purpose, and after the Dussera, which happened on the 11th October, the regular battalions in the Peishwa's service under Mr. Boyd marched to the Neera bridge, and a brigade of Sindia's regulars proceeded towards Raigurh. These movements were made by Pureshram Bhow himself, or artfully suggested by some conspirators, in order to veil the deception about to be practised on him and Balloba Tattya.

The schemes of Nana Furnuwees were now matured. In addition to what has been explained, he had incited the raja of Kolapoor to attack the districts of Pureshram Bhow ; he had obtained Nizam Ally's approbation of the draft of a treaty afterwards settled on the 8th October with Musheer-ool-Moolk, the basis of which was to be the establishment of Bajee Rao on the musnud, and his own re-establishment as minister ; for which the territory ceded to the Peishwa by the convention of Kurdla was to be restored, and the balance of the stipulated money-payment remitted. The entire remission of the chouth of Beder was also demanded by Nizam Ally, but Nana Furnuwees

replied that he could not yield that point without the previous sanction of Bajee Rao, to whose approval, indeed, the whole was declaredly subject.*

A negotiation with Rughoojee Bhonslay had been equally successful. To him Nana promised 15 lakhs of rupees for his immediate expenses, the district of Mundelah, and the fort of Chooreeagurh, with its dependencies. Three thousand horse, which, by treaty, he was bound to furnish when required, were now only to be called for on emergencies. Some other advantages were also held out, and Rughoojee had solemnly promised his support.†

The principal powers having been thus secured, the English having also expressed their appro-
 October 27. bation of Bajee Rao's being elevated to the musnud, Sindia, on the 27th October, arrested Balloba

* As this is the treaty of Mhar mentioned in the treaty of Bassein, the stipulations of which were perhaps not fully understood by the Marquis Wellesley, when, in subsequent negotiations with Bajee Rao, he insisted so particularly on their being recognised, I shall here detail them more particularly.

The preliminary of the treaty sets forth, that confusion have arisen in the affairs of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees has removed to Mhar, and, for the purpose of restoring order, he, as the chief director of the affairs of the Peishwa, calls for the interposition of Nizam Ally, through his prime minister Azim-ool-Oomrah (Musheer-ool-Moolk) with whom he concludes the following agreement:—Nizam Ally is to send an army of 15,000 men, with a train of artillery, to unite with those of Nana and Rughoojee Bhonslay, in restoring Bajee Rao. In this alliance Nana engages for the neutrality, and even for the probable co-operation of the English. The territory and the bills for the money-payment exacted from Nizam Ally at Kurda to be restored. Nizam Ally's right to certain districts near Delhi was confirmed. All contested points to be mutually relinquished, and the Mahratta claims settled annually. The chouth of the soobeh of Beder being considered as the *wutun* or private hereditary property of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees can only recommend its being ceded to Nizam Ally by Bajee Rao. Two lakhs of rupees to be advanced to Nizam Ally for expenses. The English, to be engaged by Nana Furnuwees, to interpose, in case Tippoo should attack the possessions of Nizam Ally, whilst the army of the latter is employed in the Mahratta territories. Fugitives from the dominions of Nizam Ally to be given up, and Bajee Rao's signature to these articles to be obtained.

† Copy of the original treaty.

Tattya, and sent a body of his troops, accompanied by some of those of Musheer-ool-Moolk, both parties under the direction of Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, for the purpose of seizing Pureshram Bhow. Naroo Punt, however, being desirous of apprizing one of his associates, named Pureshram Punt Wydh, wrote him a note, which was carried by mistake to Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun; the latter on reading it instantly got ready a body of horse, and having taken with him Chimnajee Appa, fled with precipitation to Sewneree; but he was quickly pursued, and compelled to surrender. Anund Rao Rastia having become security for his safe custody, he was delivered over to his charge.

Bajee Rao was now brought back, and encamped at Korygaom, on the Beema, 18 miles from Poona. Amrut Rao and Baba Rao Phurkay were released, and Nana Furnuwees having joined his army at the Salpee Ghaut, the infantry under Mr. Boyd having likewise placed themselves under his orders, he commenced his march for the capital. But on the route, having received a note from Bajee Rao which hinted at the tardiness of his proceedings, he immediately took the alarm, and before he would advance, insisted upon receiving a written declaration from Bajee Rao that he intended no treachery towards him; and that, in case of desiring to resign his situation as minister, he might be permitted to retire where his person and property would be secure. A treaty of guarantee was at the same time entered into by Nizam Ally and Sindia, agreeing to establish Bajee Rao on the musnud, and to reinstate Nana Furnuwees as prime minister; but they also, with a view of securing themselves, agreed to oblige the latter to fulfil the articles of the *respective* treaties which he had made with them—an

extraordinary oversight on the part of Sindia, who does not appear to have known the particulars of the agreement with Nizam Ally, or, at all events to have considered how much he should become a loser by the relinquishment of the territory and arrears of tribute obtained by

the treaty of Kurdla. These preliminaries being adjusted, Nana Furnuwees returned to Poona, and resumed the duties of prime minister on the 25th November. The insignia of investiture having been procured from Satara, Bajee Rao was at last seated on the musnud 4th December 1796. It was declared by a council of Shastrees that the relationship between the late Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narain, and the sons of Rugonath Rao, prevented the widow of the former from adopting the second cousin of his father; the adoption was therefore declared illegal, and annulled. The Shastrees who had performed the ceremony were expelled. Chimnaje Appa, though he had acted on compulsion, was obliged to undergo some penance to atone for the deed, but he was shortly after appointed by his brother to the government of Guzerat, which was however merely nominal, and the active duties of it were performed by his deputy Aba Shelookur.*

* When not particularly specified, the whole of the foregoing chapter is on the authority of original Mahratta letters and papers, Bombay Records, Mahratta MSS., and from many conversations with actors in the scenes.

CHAP. XV.

A.D. 1797 AND A.D. 1798.

New administration.—Army in a disorderly state.—Ahmed-nugur made order to Sindia, and the conditions of the treaty with Rughoojee Bhonslay fulfilled.—Bajee Rao refuses to ratify the treaty with Nizam Ally—Musheerool-Moolk suddenly quits Poona in consequence.—Nana Furnuwees endeavours to soothe him.—Bajee Rao's policy.—Death of Tookajee Holkar—dispute amongst his sons—Sindia espouses the cause of Khassee Rao—Mulhar Rao killed, and the house of Holkar rendered for a time subservient to that of Sindia.—Sindia's arbitrary conduct.—Bajee Rao still popular—his real character little known—proposes ridding himself of both Nana Furnuwees and Sindia—employs the latter to seize the former, and Nana, with most of the principal ministers, is thrown into confinement—the property of Nana and his adherents given up to plunder.—Outrages and alarms at Poona.—Amrut Rao becomes prime minister.—Sindia espouses the daughter of Ghatgay.—Ghatgay become Sindia's prime minister—is empowered to raise the money secretly promised by Bajee Rao by plundering the inhabitants of Poona—dreadful cruelties.—Amrut Rao proposes to seize and confine Sindia—Bajee Rao approves.—Differences with Hyderabad revived.—Bajee Rao summons Sindia to his presence.—Bajee Rao's weakness and treachery.—Affairs of Satara

—a force required in that quarter—Bajee Rao's troops mutiny.—Pureshram Bhow enlarged—raises troops—disperses those of the raja, but afterwards refuses to disband his army.—Bajee Rao grants him a pardon.

NANA FURNUWEES was assisted in the ministry by Trim-
buck Rao Pursooree. Naroo Punt Chue-
A.D. 1797. kurdeo had chief command of the army,
which from the late dissensions was in a very disorderly
state ; and one desperate affray took place in the streets
of Poona between a body of Arabs and a party of Mr.
Boyd's sepoy, in which upwards of 100 persons were
killed, and a great part of the shops and warehouses in the
bazar plundered during the tumult.

The fort of Ahmednugur, and the dependant districts,
were made over to Sindia as promised, and he was left
at liberty to reduce the jagheer of Pureshram Bhow as he
might find opportunity. The articles of agreement with

July 13. Rughoojee Bhonslay were also fulfilled,
and he departed for Nagpoor ; but Bajee

Rao refused to ratify the treaty of Mhar concluded with
Nizam Ally, unless greatly modified ; in consequence of
which Musheer-ool-Moolk quitted Poona, without taking
leave of the Peishwa, and returned, highly incensed, to
Hyderabad. There was at that time no envoy at the
Nizam's court, Govind Rao Pingley being at Poona ; but
his agent, named Sewdasheo Mankesir,* a person whom
we shall hereafter have frequent occasion to notice, and
whom Pingley kept at the court of Nizam Ally in the
humble capacity of a newswriter, was recommended by
Pingley to Nana Furnuwees as a fit agent to soothe

* Generally so written by the English ; properly, however, it is
Mankeshwur.

Musheer-ool-Moolk, and prevented the interruption of the amicable intercourse which it was so important for Nana to preserve.

The difference, however, which thus arose, Bajee Rao was at no pains to adjust ; it weakened the confederacy which Nana Furnuwees had formed, and the great power he so lately combined was still more shaken by the death of Tookajee Holkar.

August 15.

Holkar left two legitimate sons, Khassee Rao and Mulhar Rao ; and two by a concubine, Jeswunt Rao and Wittoojee. Khassee Rao was imbecile both in mind and body, but Mulhar Rao was in every respect qualified to support the fortunes of the house. Disputes soon arose between the brothers, in which the illegitimate sons took the part of Mulhar Rao, who, in a few days, removed from his late father's camp with a small body of troops, and took up his abode at Bambooree, a village in the suburbs of Poona, where he was secretly favoured by Nana Furnuwees. Sindia, who only watched for such an opportunity, on being solicited by Khassee Rao, readily afforded the aid of a body of troops for the purpose of apprehending Mulhar Rao, who, refusing to surrender, was attacked, and maintained a desperate defence until he was killed. His half-brothers made their escape—Jeswunt Rao to Nagpoor, and Wittoojee to Kolapoor ; but most of his handful of associates fell with him, and, amongst others, Sindia, Ruwee Rao of Lonee, a gallant soldier, whose fate was rendered more memorable from the fatal effects which the communication of the news had on his widow, who, on being told, dropped dead on the instant.

The assistance thus afforded by Doulut Rao to a person of such a character as Khassee Rao rendered the house of Holkar for a time subservient to that of Sindia, and was a

death-blow to the power of Nana Furnuwees. Sindia further secured his advantage by having Khundee Rao, the infant son of the deceased Mulhar Rao, kept in safe custody.

The interference of Sindia in the state affairs of Poona, which Bajee Rao, with a great want of foresight, secretly encouraged, soon extended to acts of sovereignty, some of which were of a nature more arbitrary than had ever been practised by the Peishwa's government. The circumstances particularly alluded to were the capture of the fort of Kolabah, the imprisonment of Manajee Angria, and the transfer of that principality to Baboo Rao Angria, Sindia's near relation.

The obloquy of such a violent and partial proceeding did not attach to Bajee Rao ; his appearance and misfortunes continued to attract sympathy, and the control by which the supposed goodness of his natural disposition was repressed, became a theme of general regret. Mr. Uhtoff, however, the acting resident at Poona, seems, at this early period, to have discovered much of his real character ; and it soon appeared that the opinion entertained of Bajee Rao's goodness and wisdom was in fact but a proof of his dissimulation and cunning: To trust none, and to deceive all, was the game he invariably played, and, like all who have ever done so, he never failed to lose. His attention was naturally directed to become independent of Sindia and of Nana Furnuwees ; he imagined he should soon be able to induce or compel the former to return to Hindostan, but he concluded that the thralldom of the minister would be perpetual. His first object, therefore, was to endeavour to effect the ruin of Nana Furnuwees. Amrut Rao, Govind Rao Kallay, and some others were privy to the design ; but Bajee Rao's chief instrument was Ghatgay, now distinguished by his

family title of Shirzee Rao, whose daughter, though promised, was not yet given in marriage, to Doulut Rao Sindia. No person had more influence with that chieftain, and Bajee Rao persuaded Shirzee Rao that his views of becoming minister to his future son-in-law would always

be obstructed whilst Nana Furnuwees had
 December 31. a vestige of power. It was therefore determined to place him in confinement. On the 31st December, Nana Furnuwees, after some precaution, was induced to return a formal visit of ceremony which Sindia had paid him a few days before, when he was seized by Michel Filoze, the Neapolitan who accompanied Mahadajee Sindia to the Deccan in 1792, and who now commanded eight battalions in the service of Doulut Rao. Filoze had, on his word of honor, guaranteed the safe return of the old minister to his home, and his perfidious conduct excited just indignation, particularly amongst the European officers in the service of the native states—a set of men who, though mere soldiers of fortune, had become as distinguished for good faith as daring enterprize, and their general character had induced Nana to accept Filoze's word in preference to any other pledge he might have obtained.* Aba Shelookur, Bujaba Seroolkur, Naroo

* The Mahratta excuse Filoze's treachery by saying that he was entirely ignorant of Sindia's intention to seize Nana; that there was no premeditated deception on his part, and that he was compelled to the act by a sudden order, accompanied by threats and promises from Shirzee Rao, through a person named Meer Assud Alee Wahid. The mere circumstance of their wishing to defend Filoze is honorable to the European character; had it regarded any of their own countrymen, the story would have been received without investigation, as a matter of course.

Mahrattas wishing to be polite, always disparage themselves, and, in addressing a European, nothing is more common than to speak of themselves as a treacherous, deceitful race of marauders, on whom no dependence should be placed. One unacquainted with their manners, or who has superficially observed them, would not readily suppose that they merely intend an indirect compliment, knowing how highly truth and plain dealing are estimated among us.

Punt Wydh, and several other persons of distinction who accompanied Nana Furnuwees, were seized at the same time ; the rest of his retinue, amounting to about 1,000 persons, were stripped, maimed, some of them killed, and the whole dispersed. Parties of soldiers were immediately sent by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay* to plunder, not only the house of Nana, but the houses of all his adherents, many of whom barricaded their doors, and defended themselves from the tops and windows. The city of Poona was like a town taken by storm ; the firing continued the whole of the night and the ensuing day. The roads in every direction were stopped ; all was uproar, plunder, and bloodshed ; the alarm was universal, and, in the words of a spectator, " friends marched together in groups, with their shields on their arms, and their swords in their hands."†

At the time Nana was seized in Sindia's camp, Bajee Rao, on pretence of business, sent for the other ministers of that party, and confined them. The principal persons among them were Baba Rao Phurkay, Appa Bulwunt, Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, Naroo Neelkunt Muzzimdar, and Govind Rao Pingley. Nana Furnuwees was sent into close confinement in the fort of Ahmednugur ; and Bajee Rao appointed his brother Amrut Rao prime minister, with Govind Rao Kallay and Sewram Narain Thuthay as his colleagues, whilst Ballajee Punt Putwurdhun, a man of no experience, was raised to the command of the army.

Having thus effected, as he supposed, the overthrow of Nana Furnuwees, Bajee Rao began to
 A.D. 1798. devise schemes for ridding himself of

* Ghatgay, Shirzee Rao, is the proper way of writing the name and title, but he is best known to Europeans as Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.

† Mahratta MSS., Mr. Uhtoff's despatches, oral information.

Sindia ; but in the first instance he found himself compelled to perform his engagements with Sindia and Ghatgay, though he hoped that, in the progress of their fulfilment, he might find the means of completing his schemes.

Sindia espoused the daughter of Ghatgay in March ; the marriage expenses were great ; and the monthly pay of Sindia's army at Poona was upwards of 20 lakhs of rupees. His pecuniary distress soon became urgent : he pressed Bajee Rao for the payment of the two crores of rupees which he had secretly promised, and was answered that he had not the means of raising it himself, but if Sindia would create Ghatgay his dewan, the latter might, assisted by information from Ballajee Koonjur, levy it upon the rich inhabitants of Poona. To this Sindia agreed ; and such was the recret means by which Shirzee Rao Ghatgay became minister to his son-in-law, and by which Bajee Rao Rugonath let loose upon his subjects the violence and extortion of a monster, whose name will be remembered whilst Poona exists, with horror and execration. To obtain the object of his mission, Ghatgay first proceeded to the palace of Bajee Rao, where the ex-ministers, late of the party of Nana Furnuwees, were confined. Those respectable persons were dragged forth, and scourged, until they gave up their property. Merchants, bankers, and all persons in the city supposed possess wealth, were next seized and tortured. Several of them died of the consequences, and Gungadhur Punt Bhanoo, one of the relations of Nana Furnuwees, expired whilst tied on a heated gun—one of the many modes of torture invented by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.

It was not supposed at the time, nor is it generally known, that Bajee Rao was the original cause of those excesses ; he certainly never contemplated the commission

of such barbarous enormities. He was shocked at the cruelties of Ghatgay, and remonstrated with Sindia on the subject ; but the latter lent a deaf ear to complaints, which he considered mere hypocrisy, or excuses to the world. Amrut Rao, who knew nothing of the existing compact, or that his brother had devised this mode of raising money, being irritated at the conduct of Ghatgay, and encouraged by the universal cry of abhorrence against Sindia, proposed to his brother the bold scheme of seizing Sindia when on a visit ; in which Bajee Rao immediately acquiesced, and was soon eager to carry it into effect. Previous to this suggestion, Bajee Rao had concerted with Amrut Rao a plan for raising a body of regular infantry, which in that respect might place him more on an equality with Sindia and Nizam Ally : in cavalry he could soon become superior to both. Amrut Rao, from his early intercourse with the British troops, during the campaigns of his father Rugoba, had a decided predilection for that nation over all other Europeans. He selected Mr. W. H. Tone to command the first brigade, of which the whole of the officers were to have been British subjects. To obtain a pretext with Sindia for this meditated augmentation, he referred to the state of their relations with the court of Hyderabad, and proposed that they should undertake a conjunct expedition against Nizam Ally, for the recovery of the balance of the arrears of tribute fixed, and of the districts ceded by the treaty of Kurdla, which had been restored by Nana Furnuwees without the Peishwa's authority or Sindia's knowledge. Sindia having readily acquiesced, the intention of the Poona court was formally announced to the British government on the 9th February ; but the brigade of infantry was never raised, and the rest of the Peishwa's army, owing to his secret jealousy of

Amrut Rao, his own ignorance of military affairs, and his unfit selection of a commander, became daily less efficient. Bajee Rao's total want of preparation did not, however, deter him from carrying on the scheme against Sindia; strong factions began to prevail in the camp of the latter, which encouraged Bajee Rao to hope that, by fomenting the rising disorders, the ministers and army of Sindia might be brought over to his views, or soon be reconciled to the disposal of their master.

In this state of affairs Sindia's unpopularity having become extreme, Amrut Rao, with Bajee Rao's cognizance, prepared Abba Kally, the commander of one of the Peishwa's regular battalions, to be ready to rush in, upon an appointed signal, and seize Sindia. Doulut Rao was invited, on business, to the Peishwa's palace; but the invitation being declined, a positive order was sent by Bajee Rao, desiring his attendance. He obeyed the summons; and soon after he sat down, Bajee Rao told him he had sent for him to desire an explanation of his conduct; and suddenly assuming a tone of authority and decision, for which the other was quite unprepared, he required of him to declare whether he was master or servant. Sindia having answered, with respect and humility, that he was the Peishwa's servant, and ready to show his dependance by his obedience, Bajee Rao reminded him of the insolence, violence, and cruelty which he and his servants had used, in numberless instances, towards the servants and subjects of his government, in the city and even in his own palace; he declared that "the contempt and disrespect thus shown towards his person and authority, he could bear no longer, and therefore ordered Sindia to remove to Jamgaom." Doulut Rao's reply was couched in the mildest terms; but whilst he expressed his willingness to obey, he declared

his inability to move from want of funds to pay his troops ; “ that he had large debts incurred by placing his highness on the musnud, which it was incumbent on his highness to discharge : when that was effected, he would immediately quit Poona.” At this moment Amrut Rao asked his brother if he should give the signal ; but Bajee Rao’s heart failed him ; he had not courage to proceed in the design, and thus gave his friends the first decided proof of that imbecility which swayed most of the actions of his life. Sindia withdrew from the presence in a manner the most respectful, but with a mind filled with suspicion and distrust ; and Bajee Rao had afterwards the baseness, as well as the weakness, to tell him what Amrut Rao had intended, and to advise him to be upon his guard.*

The Peishwa’s troops were as much in arrears as the army of Sindia. The state of affairs at Sattara, which we shall presently explain, demanded the presence of a military force ; but on their services being required, the men demanded their pay, and a tumult arose, which the commander, Ballajee Punt Putwurdhun, could not appease. Ballajee Koonjur, with the presumption of a favourite, made an attempt to restore order ; but the soldiery ridiculed his interference, and, on this preserving, they grossly insulted him by knocking off his turban, and kicking it in the streets. Govind Rao Pingley, who was still in confinement, sent a confidential message to the Peishwa, advising him to release Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo as the only person capable of preventing most serious disturbance—a suggestion to which, in the moment of alarm, Bajee Rao readily acceded. He also restored

* The despatches of Colonel Palmer detail what publicly took place at the interview ; the rest is from living authority.

Pingley to liberty the more readily as that person, though one of the late ministry, was no real friend to Nana Furnuwees.

Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, with that facility which any officer who has gained the confidence of the natives of India is sure to experience, calmed the tumult in a day; but Bajee Rao could neither spare troops from Poona, nor trust the new commander at a distance—circumstances which led to the enlargement of another state prisoner of consequence—Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun.

When Bajee Rao laid his plans for the overthrow of Nana Furnuwees, he engaged the raja of Satara in the plot, and advised him to confine Baboo Rao Kishen, Nana's agent, and to seize the fort, assuring him that it was his determination to re-establish the old form of government, and to serve the head of the state as faithfully as the first Bajee Rao had done. The raja promptly complied with this request, confined Baboo Rao, and seized the fort. But after Nana Furnuwees was imprisoned, when Sewram Narain Thuthay arrived on the part of the Peishwa to receive charge, the raja told him he would take care of the fort himself, and expressed a hope that his servant, the Peishwa, would soon fulfil his intentions. Bajee Rao, alarmed at the consequence of his own intrigues, ordered Mahdoo Rao Rastia to proceed to Satara, and endeavour to prevail on the raja to admit his troops into the fort. A respectable force accompanied Rastia; but the raja, having his relations about him, would neither yield to promises nor threats. These proceedings at last attracted the notice of Sindia, who, suspecting that Bajee Rao's intrigue with the raja was some scheme for enlarging his own power, secretly advised the raja to maintain the fort, and to raise troops, promising that he would assist him to

throw off the Bramin yoke, for which purpose he solemnly engaged to send him five battalions with their guns.*

The raja soon began to collect troops; and Mahdoo Rao Rastia, having interfered to prevent it, was attacked and obliged to retire from Satara to Malgaom. This event became the more alarming to the Peishwa, from the disposition and state of his army at Poona, already described.

It so happened that Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, hitherto confined by Anund Rao, the brother of Mahdoo Rao Rastia, at Mandoogaom, was at the moment removed to Wace, and, confident in his own influence, he offered his services in suppressing the disturbances and recovering the fort, on condition that he should be permitted to raise troops for the purpose. Accordingly, having obtained the Peishwa's sanction, and being assisted by Rastia, Pureshram Bhow soon assembled a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Wace.

The town of Satara lies immediately under the fort, in a deep hollow nearly surrounded on three sides by hills; cut off from the west by the Syhadree mountains, and from every other quarter by the Yena, Kistna, and Oor-mooree rivers. The raja's troops lay encamped in the town, and it being then the height of the rains, when the Yena was supposed unfordable, they considered themselves so perfectly secure, that they had not even the precaution to send out patrols. Pureshram Bhow discovered a ford,† and crossed with nearly 10,000 men before intelli-

* Bappoo Khanoo's history of his own times. This promise was actually made through Bappoo Khanoo, the secret agent of the raja of Satara. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur, the present jagheerdar of Nepanee, were present at the time.

† The ford was known to very few persons, and the Bramins, desirous of improving any circumstance in their own favour, gave out, what is still generally believed, that on this occasion the waters divided to allow Pureshram Bhow to pass.

gence was received of his approach. The force collected by the raja scarcely amounted to 2,500 men, and were quite unprepared. The raja had barely time to escape into the fort, and his troops were flying, until rallied by his relations Yellojee and Senajee Mohitey, Kooshaba raja, and Doorgajee Raja Mahareek: these persons were gallantly seconded by the raja's brother, Chittoor Sing, who was the mainspring of the party. As soon as they had collected a small band, they advanced to the environs of the town to oppose the approaching army; resistance was hopeless, but they pressed forward for a few minutes with impetuosity, until Yellojee Mohitey was killed, and both the Mahareeks wounded, when the party, by Chittoor Sing's advice, retreated. Senajee Mohitey, however, refused to turn his back, and though alone, having tried to single out Mahdoo Rao Rastia, he charged at him, in the midst of his followers, by whom he was soon cut in pieces.

The plunder of the town of Satara occupied the troops of the victors; and though a party pursued him, Chittoor Sing was enabled, with a small band of faithful followers, to join the raja of Kolapoor, who, ever since he had been excited by Nana Furnuwees to attack Pureshram Bhow, had spread fire and sword over the whole of the southern Mahratta country.

The fort of Satara being destitute of provisions, the raja surrendered, and the service being thus accomplished, Pureshram Bhow was desired to disband his troops; but he excused himself, declaring his inability to pay their arrears, and protesting his fidelity to the Peishwa's government. Bajee Rao was therefore recommended to grant him a pardon, on his agreeing to pay a fine of 10 lakhs of rupees.*

* My authority for the foregoing chapter is the same as the last.

CHAP. XVI.

FROM A.D. 1798 TO A.D. 1800.

Disorders increase at Poona.—The Byes.—Commencement of their insurrection against Sindia—they seek protection in the camp of Amrut Rao—negotiation.—Amrut Rao's troops treacherously attacked.—Rupture between the Peishwa and Sindia.—Peishwa negotiates with other powers.—Sindia releases Nana Furnuwees.—Reconciliation between Sindia and the Peishwa.—Shirzee Rao Ghatgay is seized and confined by Sindia's orders.—The union of Bajee Rao and Sindia strengthened by the course of policy adopted by the English.—The British government endeavours to negotiate a new treaty with Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas.—Nana Furnuwees is solicited to resume charge of the administration.—Nana, deceived by Bajee Rao, assumes charge without the guarantee he had at first demanded.—Treachery of Bajee Rao—Nana's behaviour.—The Peishwa's agents seized and confined.—New treaty between Nizam Ally and the English—regarded by the Mahrattas with much jealousy.—Nana's advice—Bajee Rao's dissimulation.—Plan of a confederacy against the English disconcerted by the subversion of Tipoo's government.—Orders sent by the Peishwa for the advance of his troops after the war had terminated.—Dispersion of the followers of Dhoondia Waug.—Dhoondia joins the raja of Kolapoor.—Remarks on the conquest of Tipoo's territory—partition—discussions with the Poona court.—New treaty between the English

and Nizam Ally.—Affairs of Sindia—the insurrection of the Byes becomes extremely formidable—by the re-appointment of Balloba Tattya it is nearly suppressed.—State of the war with Kolapoor—exploits of Chittoor Sing—proposed plan of operations—Pureshram Bhow defeated and killed—Kolapoor besieged—siege raised.

IN the meantime disorders increased at Poona, and Sindia's situation was rendered extremely critical. The danger proceeded from a quarter whence he least expected it.

Mahadajee Sindia at his death left three widows, one of whom, named Bhagirthee Bye, was young and beautiful. A.D. 1798. Doulut Rao, at the time of his being acknowledged the adopted son and heir of his uncle, promised to make an ample provision for these ladies. They accordingly continued to reside in his camp; but no steps were taken to ensure them a permanent establishment, and in a short time some of their ordinary comforts were circumscribed. No complaint appears to have escaped them; but of a sudden it was discovered, or at all events alleged, by the elder widows, that Sindia carried on a criminal intercourse with the youngest, at which they openly expressed their abhorrence, and declared they could no longer consider as a son the incestuous defiler of his father's bed. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay interposed; the ladies denied him admittance to their presence; but his miscreant, having forced the enclosure of their tents, seized, flogged, and barbarously degraded them. The Shenwee Bramins, who had held the principal offices under the government of Mahadajee Sindia, and many of whom were connected by relationship as well as by caste, being already much disgusted by the elevation of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and the confinement of Balloba

Tattya, whom they regarded as their chief, espoused the cause of the two Byes. Much dissension and discussion ensued; but it was at last settled that the ladies should proceed to Burhanpôor, where they were to take up their abode, provided with a suitable establishment and funds for its support.

They accordingly departed from Poona, but instead of carrying them to Burhanpoor, their escort
May 14. was directed to place them in confinement at Ahmednugur. This treachery being immediately discovered by their adherents in camp, they had scarcely reached Korygaom, on the Beema, when Muzuffir Khan, a Patan officer in the interest of the Shenwee Bramins, who commanded a choice body of Hindostan horse in Sindia's service, suddenly assailed the escort, rescued the ladies, and brought them back to the neighbourhood of Sindia's camp. This daring act would have been punished immediately, but Sindia had reason to believe that many chief persons in his army were concerned, and he also hesitated in attacking a party of desperate men, lest either of the females, standing in such relationship to himself, should be killed in the tumult—an accident which would have entailed upon him the greatest disgrace and odium throughout the Mahratta country. Ghatgay, however, strenuously urged him to crush the conspiracy in the outset, and was at last permitted to act against them; but Muzuffir Khan, who had correct intelligence of their proceedings, withdrew the ladies to the camp of the Peishwa's brother, Amrut Rao, who happened to be near the Beema, on his route to Joonere, and who instantly afforded them protection. Ghatgay had in person pursued Muzuffir Khan, and the latter no sooner deposited his charge, than he sallied forth, attacked his

pursuers, routed them, and returned in triumph to the camp of Amrut Rao.

It is alleged that Bajee Rao was the instigator of this revolt, and it is certain that he encouraged the partizans of the Byes to persevere. He said, with apparent sincerity, that he considered the protection with his brother had afforded as humane and proper ; but apprehensive lest it should provoke Sindia and Ghatgay to deeds of violence, he solicited the friendly interposition of Colonel Palmer, the British resident at his court, who tendered his mediation to Sindia, by whom it was declined.

On the night of the 7th June, five battalions of regular infantry were sent by Sindia, under a Frenchman named Du Prat, to endeavour to surprise the camp of Amrut Rao, and seize the Byes ; but he failed in the attempt, and, being briskly attacked, was compelled to retreat with some loss. Negotiations ensued ; a suitable provision, and a place of residence of their own selection, were again promised to the Byes, and Amrut Rao, not doubting Sindia's sincerity, approached his camp in the neighbourhood of Poona, and took up his ground at the Khirkee bridge. When Amrut Rao had been thrown entirely off his guard, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, taking advantage of the Mahomedan festival, which commemorate the death of the sons of Ali and Fatima,* came to the riverside on the 11th of Mohurram, when the bier is thrown into the water ; he was attended by M. Drugeon, a Frenchman, at the head of two brigades of infantry, on pretence of preserving order, and protecting this concluding ceremony ; but they suddenly opened a fire from 25 guns

* This festival, termed the Hoosein Hosyn, should only commemorate the death of Hosyn, whose fall is nowhere so well related as by Gibbon, volume 9th.

upon the unsuspecting troops of Amrut Rao, advanced, charged, and dispersed them with the powerful body of infantry, and afterwards totally pillaged their camp. The Byes were at the time residing in the hamlet of Wittulwaree, so that this outrage was a direct attack on the Peishwa's brother, and open war between the Peishwa and Sindia was supposed to be declared. Khassee Rao Holkar joined Amrut Rao, the Mankurees repaired to his standard, and the Peishwa negotiated an offensive and defensive alliance with Nizam Ally, through his resident envoys, then at Poona. The articles agreed to between Nizam Ally and Nana Furnuwees by the treaty of Mhar were to be confirmed by the Peishwa, the chouth of Beder was to be remitted, and an additional tract of territory, yielding eight lakhs of rupees, was to be ceded to Nizam Ally in perpetuity, as the price of his assistance against Sindia. Nizam Ally also agreed to support the Peishwa against any future encroachment of the ex-minister, Nana Furnuwees; but in case of his being liberated by Sindia, it was stipulated that Bajee Rao should allow him an annual pension of one lakh of rupees. Rughoojee Bhonslay, if he chose to accede to it, was to be considered a party to this treaty, and was to receive the whole of Gurrah Mundelah from Bajee Rao.

Sindia, now alarmed, became very desirous of obtaining that mediation which he had before refused from the British government. Colonel Palmer recommended the dismissal of his present ministers, the settlement of a jagheer upon the Byes, and reparation to the Peishwa by submitting to his authority. Sindia appeared much disposed to follow this advice; but the Byes became so extravagant in their demands, that it was impossible to accede to them; and although he was now really desirous

of returning to Hindostan, he had no means of discharging any part of the great arrears due to his army.

In order to intimidate Bajee Rao, and to establish an alliance as a counterpoise to that which was just formed between the Nizam and the Peishwa, Sindia sent envoys to Tippoo ; but Bajee Rao, by the advice of Govind Rao Kallay, did the same. A more efficacious mode of alarming Bajee Rao was the release of Nana Furnuwees, by which Sindia also hoped to obtain a sufficient sum to free him from the most urgent of his embarrassments.

Nana Furnuwees was accordingly brought from Ahmednugur, and two crores of rupees demanded as the price of his liberty. After some delay, during which Nana attempted to throw himself on the protection of the British government, he at last agreed to pay Sindia ten lakhs of rupees, provided he were previously set at liberty ; as otherwise, whilst under restraint, his agents would comply with no order, even if furnished with a private token from himself. He accordingly obtained his liberty, and the money was promptly paid.

The enlargement of Nana, though a source of great concern to Bajee Rao, was not unlooked for ; but when it was almost immediately followed by the revocation of the treaty with Nizam Ally, from causes not sufficiently explained, but chiefly owing to the unsteady and fluctuating policy of the minister Musheer-ool-Moolk, the Peishwa lost no time in commencing negotiations with Nana Furnuwees and with Sindia. The latter, not yet apprized of the revocation of the treaty, apprehensive of an attack from confederated Mahrattas and Moghuls, and alarmed by reports of disaffection among his troops in Hindostan, received these overtures with complacency, but insisted on the reinstatement of Nana Furnuwees as

preliminary to an accommodation. Ghatgay, in the meantime, assisted by an agent worthy of himself, a Mahratta named Fukeerjee Garway, continued to commit every species of extortion and excess : he even disregarded the remonstrances of Sindia, and his cruelty, increased by indulgence, was almost unparalleled. He seized four officers in Sindia's army, on mere suspicion of their being concerned in the Byes' insurrection ; he blew three of them from guns, and the fourth, Yeswunt Rao Sivajee, had a tent-peg driven into his brain by a mallet.

Sindia, aroused at length by the contempt shown to his authority, and the universal cry of execration excited by such conduct, listened to the representations of Ramjee Patell and Aba Chitnees, and directed two young men, the sons of Filoze and Hessing* by native mothers, to arrest Ghatgay and Garway, which they effected with great dexterity.

The confinement of these persons was a further step to a reconciliation between Sindia and Bajee Rao, and the new course of policy adopted about this period by the English tended to a species of union between them.

The system of neutrality, followed by the British government in India, during the administration of Sir John Shore, was entirely reversed soon after the arrival of Lord Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, in India, on the 26th April 1798. The revisal of the political relations of the English with the courts of Hyderabad and Poona was the first object to which the residents were instructed to direct their attention for the purpose of securing the alliance of those states, so as, at all events, to prevent their resources from being employed against

* Hessing, the father, was an Englishman, and held the rank of colonel in Sindia's service. He bore an excellent character.

the British government, in the same manner as appeared to be meditated by the Sultan of Mysore in his recent connections with the French.

The principal danger to the English in a war with Tippoo, supported by their European rival, was the fear of his being joined by the other native powers, whose governments were not only becoming gradually weaker, and therefore more likely to be guided by petty intrigue than by sound policy, but a great change had taken place in their military strength, especially that of Sindia and Nizam Ally, which now, in a great measure, lay in their numerous corps of regular infantry, and these chiefly commanded by French officers.

It was, therefore, of importance to the British government to secure the alliance of Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, and it became a primary object to induce Sindia to return to Hindostan, both from the central situation his brigades occupied in the Deccan, and from his known desire to obstruct the influence of the British with the Peishwa, over whom it was his policy to perpetuate his own ascendancy.

The reported designs of Zuman Shah, king of Cabul, and grand-son of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, a name terrible to Mahrattas, were strongly set forth by the British agents, in order to induce Sindia to return for the protection of his dominions in Hindostan ; whilst to the Peishwa was offered a body of the company's troops for the protection of his person and authority and the revival of the energies of his government. Bajee Rao had shortly before made an application to the British of a nature similar to this arrangement, but at that period, both their policy and the operation of the Act of Parliament prevented their complying with his request. The sudden desire now

evinced by the English to grant him a subsidiary force, their frequent recommendations to reinstate Nana Furnuwees in the ministry, and to remove Sindia from Poona, led Bajee Rao, whose views and information were bounded by very narrow limits, to suppose that the whole was a scheme of the detested Nana, the object most dreaded, and therefore uppermost in his mind.

Accordingly, although Sindia had declared his intention of endeavouring to return to Hindostan, a public visit of ceremony announced the reconciliation which had taken place between Sindia and Nana Furnuwees on the one part, and Bajee Rao on the other, the Peishwa shortly afterwards, in a secret conference with Sindia, urged his stay at Poona for the purpose of preventing the introduction of the English by Nana Furnuwees; but he was at the same moment doing all in his power to conciliate Nana, and was pressing him to quit Sindia's camp for the purpose of resuming the duties of administration. Nana accordingly returned once more to the city of Poona, but declined interfering with the Peishwa's affairs, until the safety of his person and property should be guaranteed by the British government and Nizam Ally, and until he could effect a reconciliation in Sindia's family to enable him to return to Hindostan. To forward the latter object, he laboured to bring about an accommodation, and in hopes of expediting Sindia's march, advanced him 15 lakhs of rupees from his private treasury, in addition to the 10 lakhs before paid at the time of his liberation.

Perceiving that Sindia was really serious in his proposal of returning to Hindostan, Bajee Rao intimated his intention of paying Nana Furnuwees a secret visit, and in disguise, so that it might not come to Sindia's

knowledge. In the middle of the night, attended by a single domestic, he repaired to Nana's house, and for the time succeeded in deceiving the old minister into a belief of his being wholly unconcerned in his seizure and disgrace, and that he confined the other ministers in the vain hope of affording them protection from the violence and rapacity of Sindia's agents. Colonel Palmer, the British resident, was of opinion that Nana Furnuwees was never deceived by him, but the fact is proved by the result; and, indeed, the eloquence and manner of Bajee Rao are so powerful and insinuating, that he had deceived most men even when on their guard against him. On this occasion, perceiving the effect his language produced, he laid his head at the feet of Nana Furnuwees, swore by those feet* to consider him as his father, to abide by his counsel in all his future measures, and finally, in a burst of tears, conjured and entreated that he would not abandon the Brahmin sovereignty, assailed, as it then was, by the factions of the Mahrattas and the ambition of the English.

In consequence of this appeal Nana Furnuwees resumed the duties of minister, without those securities for which he had at first so prudently stipulated; but scarcely had he begun the transaction of public business, when he was informed by Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray† that Bajee Rao was again endeavouring to persuade Sindia to confine him—intelligence which was confirmed by Sindia himself.

* To swear by the feet of a Bramin is one of the most sacred and solemn of Hindoo oaths.

† This person, who came into Sindia's confidence, whose name has already appeared, and whom we shall have occasion to notice repeatedly, was of the family of the great Suntajee Ghorepuray, so conspicuous in the days of Aurungzebe, and a descendant of Moorar Rao Ghorepuray of Gooty, so often mentioned by Orme.

Nana instantly repaired to the palace ; taxed the Peishwa with his unparalleled duplicity ; begged that he would no longer plot against the life and freedom of an old man, borne down by years, infirmity, and misfortune, but permit him to retire to some spot far from courts and camps, where his being suffered to exist could never interfere with any plans his highness might form. He abjured the desire of now possessing power on his own account, and declared that he had only accepted it in hopes of being still useful. Bajee Rao positively denied having been accessory to a proceeding so treacherous, and begged that those who had used his name might be apprehended. Sindia immediately seized the Peishwa's minister Govind Rao Kallay, and Sewram Narain Thuthay, the agents employed ; but as it is a point of honor amongst Mahrattas never to divulge the name of their principal on such occasions, they bore the loss of their liberty and property without impeaching the veracity of their master, and Sewram Narain Thuthay soon after died.

Satisfaction being thus afforded, Nana Furnuwees resumed the office of prime minister ; but his suspicions were not removed, and he avoided all interference in business not absolutely necessary.

The period, however, was extremely important ; Nizam Ally had concluded a new treaty with the English on the 1st September 1798, by which he agreed to receive no Frenchman into his service, to dismiss his French officers, and disband the whole of the infantry lately commanded by Raymond,* receiving in their stead six battalions of English sepoy, each battalion 1,000 strong, with a proportion of European artillery, for which he agreed to pay an annual subsidy of 24,17,100 rupees. The English govern-

* Raymond died March 25th, 1798.

ment also became bound, by an article cautiously expressed, to mediate between Nizam Ally and the Peishwa, and, in case of differences arising between them, to use every endeavour to induce the Peishwa to accede to a friendly arbitration.

The Mahrattas naturally viewed this treaty with much jealousy, and the Peishwa, on being urged by the British agent to conclude a similar one, evaded the subject by an assurance that he would faithfully execute the conditions of subsisting engagements, and, on the prospect of a war with Tippoo, promised to afford his aid. In these replies Babajee Rao had followed the opinion and advice of Nana Furnuwees, but had neither sincerity nor steadiness to fulfil the engagements alluded to, though assured by Nana that any departure from good faith must equally affect the honor and security of his government. Nana Furnuwees recommended that Appa Sahib, the son of Pureshram Bhow, should be appointed to command the contingent intended to co-operate with the English; and in the present exigency proposed to assemble it, by collecting the force under Dhondoo Punt Gokla, sur-soobehdar of the Carnatic, the troops of Rastia and Vinchorkur, and all the horse which the Bramin jagheerdars could raise. The necessities of the state, and the presence of Sindia, precluded the Peishwa from recruiting his own army or detaching any part of it from Poona.

Appa Sahib refused the command, but the offer having led to a reconciliation between Pureshram Bhow and Nana, the Bhow agreed to head the contingent himself, on condition of having his fine remitted, and receiving Dharwar, with several places in the Carnatic, in jagheer. An English detachment, similar to that formerly employed, and under the command of the same officer, was held in

readiness to join Pureshram Bhow; but these endeavours on the part of Nana Furnuwees were frustrated by Bajee Rao, who acted under the influence of Doulut Rao Sindia. After the English had commenced hostilities against Tippoo, his envoys were publicly received at Poona, although repeated remonstrances were made on the subject by the British resident. Even after their formal dismissal was intimated to Colonel Palmer, on the 19th March, they only retired to Kirwee, a village 25 miles south of Poona. Colonel Palmer at first supposed that the detention of the wukeels was a mere repetition of the former plan of obtaining a sum of money, on a false pretence of neutrality or aid. The British resident knew that Bajee Rao had received 13 lakhs of rupees from Tippoo, to which Sindia was privy, but it was not known at that time to Nana Furnuwees; and when the governor-general noticed the conduct of the court of Poona, by simply countermanding the detachment which had been prepared to accompany Pureshram Bhow, Nana Furnuwees could not comprehend the reason.

Bajee Rao imagined that, by the concessions made to Pureshram Bhow on the one hand, and the encouragement given to Tippoo on the other, he should deceive both parties, and postpone his ultimate decision, until circumstances enabled him to judge on which side it would be most advantageous to range himself. As far, however, as he was capable of following any plan, his resolution was taken in favour of Tippoo. In concert with Sindia, a scheme was laid to attack Nizam Ally, in which they hoped to engage Rughoojee Bhonslay, and as the English would, as a matter of course, defend the Moghul territory, in consequence of their late treaty, the Peishwa was then to declare the Mahrattas the allies of Tippoo Sultan. The

Marquis Wellesley, apprized of those views, was, on the other hand, endeavouring to engage Rughoojee Bhonslay as a party to the treaty concluded with Nizam Ally.

But before the Peishwa or Sindia had the slightest conception that Tippoo's downfall was so near, they were astonished by intelligence of the capture of Seringapatam, the death of Tippoo, and the subversion of his government.

Bajee Rao affected the utmost joy, and soon after endeavoured to persuade Colonel Palmer that the failure of his engagement was entirely attributable to Nana Furnuwees. Immediate orders were sent to Dhondoo Punt Gokla, sur-soobehdar of the Carnatic, to advance into Tippoo's country with what force he could collect. The consequence was that many villages were plundered after the country had submitted to the British government ; and the only merit which Dhondoo Punt's party could claim was that of intercepting Dhoondia Waug, a marauding fugitive from Seringapatam, whom Dhondoo Punt attacked by surprise, dispersed his followers ; after which Dhoondia entered the service of the raja of Kolapoor, who was actively engaged in hostilities against the Peishwa, and who readily received him into his army.

Sindia, on the news of Tippoo's overthrow, despatched emissaries to Seringapatam for the purpose of encouraging resistance among the partizans of the late Sultan who might yet remain ; but he also sent abundant congratulations to the English resident at Poona, expressive of his happiness at the glorious termination of the war.

The judgment and energy by which the power of Tippoo was so speedily reduced, may be considered one of the first examples of that energetic policy by which Great Britain, in her subsequent mighty struggles in Europe, has been distinguished.

The resources of Nizam Ally's government had been placed at the disposal of the Marquis Wellesley, and the services of his contingent had been directed with far greater efficiency than in the former war—an improvement justly ascribed to the ability and exertion of the governor-general's political agent, Captain Malcolm.*

The mode of dividing the conquered provinces was dictated by a wise and liberal spirit. Nizam Ally, with judicious confidence, had left the arrangements to the Marquis Wellesley, who effected them in the following manner.

As it was deemed incompatible with the future tranquility of the country, and the security of the company's possessions, to establish a son of Tippoo in sovereignty, the descendant of those rajas of Mysore, from whom Hyder Ally usurped the government, was released from captivity, and raised to the musnud of his ancestors. A partition treaty was then concluded by the British government, Nizam Ally, and the restored raja.

The whole of Tippoo's revenue being estimated at 30,40,000 pagodas,

To the raja was assigned, pagodas	13,60,000
To Nizam Ally	5,30,000
To the company	5,37,000
For the maintenance of the families of Hyder and Tippoo, in charge of the British government	2,40,000
For the maintenance of Kummur-ud-deen Khan and his family, in charge of Nizam Ally... ..	70,000
Pagodas,...	<u>27,37,000</u>

Notwithstanding the Peishwa's total failure in the engagements, the governor-general deemed it politic to allow him some share in the conquered territory, provided

* Now Sir John Malcolm.

he could be brought to accede to an alliance corresponding to that formed with Nizam Ally. With this view, the balance in the territory adjoining the Peishwa's southern boundary, yielding an annual revenue of pagodas 2,63,000, was reserved, and was offered on the above conditions to the Peishwa.

Much discussion took place in consequence: the court of Poona was unwilling, by a distinct refusal, to afford the allies a pretext for at once appropriating the territory reserved, in which case two-thirds of it were to be given to Nizam Ally, and the rest retained by the company.

In a great part of the negotiation which took place, it is easy to perceive the ability of Nana Furnuwees. In extenuation of the circumstances which had caused the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the allies, the Peishwa represented the unfortunate distractions of the empire which had prevented him from assembling an army, and the usage of native states in permitting wukeels to reside in their courts in time of war. To the preliminary conditions requiring the Mahrattas to abstain from all aggressions on the territory of the raja of Mysore, the Peishwa replied that, upon obtaining the proposed cession, it should be considered an equivalent for the chouth, to which the Mahrattas were entitled from the whole of the territories of the late Sultan. In case the French invaded India, the Peishwa engaged to unite with the English in repelling them; but he would not agree to exclude individuals of that nation from his service. He offered to subsidize two battalions, provided they might be employed to assist in reducing refractory tributaries, and the Seedee of Jinjeera; but he absolutely refused the company's mediation in the existing difference between the Mahrattas and Nizam Ally respecting the

chouth. To an application for exchanging the chouth of Surat for an equivalent revenue—a measure in itself calculated to obviate vexatious disputes and loss—a like peremptory refusal was given; and a proposal for including Rughoojee Bhonslay as a principal in the intended alliance, the Peishwa treated as absurd. Finally, after protracted discussion, the reserved territory was shared by Nizam Ally and the British government, as stipulated in the treaty, and, on the 12th of October 1800, a new treaty was concluded between them, by which the British government engaged to protect the territories of Nizam Ally from unprovoked aggression; two battalions of native infantry were added to the former six battalions, together with a regiment of native cavalry; and for the payment of the whole force, the territories acquired by Nizam Ally, on the partition of the provinces of Mysore, both in 1792 and 1799, were ceded in perpetuity to the British government.

The affairs of Sindia during this period continued in a very distracted state. After the treacherous attack made by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay on Amrut Rao's camp, the Byes fled to the raja of Kolapoor, who was still at war with the Peishwa. The Byes were soon joined by Narain Rao Bukhshee, and the principal Shenwee Bramins from Sindia's camp. Large bodies of horse flocked to their standard, and, when sufficiently strong, they returned to the northward, plundering every village from the Kistna to the Godavery which acknowledged the authority of

Doulut Rao Sindia,* and not only insulted
February. Sindia in his lines, but stopped the roads
in the vicinity of Poona. Sindia's horse at first attempted

* Numerous villages belonging to one chief are frequently found intermixed with those of another in the Mahratta country, the reason of which has been already explained and accounted for.

to oppose them, but their numbers were so inferior that, after a few skirmishes, in which they suffered severely, they would not advance unsupported by the regular battalions, before which the troops of the Byes retired, but as soon as the battalions returned towards their own camp, the insurgents also faced about and followed them. There is, perhaps, no parallel example of such an extraordinary state of affairs as that which the Peishwa's territory presented at this period, where a rebellion against one prince was maintained within the territory of another, whom both parties acknowledged as their sovereign. The anarchy which it engendered may be conceived; the whole country suddenly swarmed with horsemen, and, although plunder was not indiscriminate, great devastations were committed. The flame spread in Hindostan; Lukwa Dada, a Shenwee Bramin already mentioned, second in importance to the confined minister Balloba Tattya, by whom Lukwa Dada had been first raised, having been suspected of disaffection in consequence of his attachment to Balloba, was deprived of power, and dismissed from his employments. Being thus driven into the ranks of the insurgents, he soon raised a powerful army, repeatedly defeated the troops sent against him, and reduced the country from Oojein to Seronje.

To add to these troubles, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who, after his brother fell at Poona, had fled to Nagpoor, and was there confined through the influence of Sindia, having effected his escape, repaired to Malwa, collected followers, and plundered the country. M. Perron had succeeded to the command of Sindia's regular infantry on the departure of M. de Boigne, who was compelled from ill-health to return to Europe in 1796; but Perron, at the period we have arrived, was so fully occupied in the siege

of Agra, held by the adherents of Lukwa Dada, and in which he was assisted by Ambajee Inglia, that he found it impossible to stop the disorders in Malwa without additional troops, for which he sent repeated and earnest applications to his master in the Deccan.

Under these circumstances, Sindia had again recourse to negotiation; but the demands of the Byes extended to nothing less than complete sovereignty, which they required Sindia to hold under their authority; and before even these conditions could be admitted, they insisted on the release of Balloba Tattya.

Sindia's new ministers, Abba Chitnees and Ryajee Patell, with a judgment and a disinterestedness which do them honor, recommended their master to reinstate Balloba as prime minister, to which Sindia agreed, and no sooner was the arrangement accomplished, than it produced an immediate effect in detaching the principal leaders from the insurrection. The Byes agreed to an adjustment through Balloba's mediation; and the fort of Asseergurh with the city of Burhanpoor, and a jagheer of 11 lakhs of rupees, were to be assigned to them. Lukwa Dada, in consequence of the restoration of Balloba, had an interview with the brother of Ambajee Inglia, who had been opposed to him in Malwa, and agreed to a cessation of arms. Every difference was on the point of being settled; the Byes had received their clothes, jewels, and other private property from Sindia's camp, and had come as far as Rajawaree, near Jejoory, on their way to Poona, when one of their partizans having been attacked and cut off, they immediately returned towards Punderpoor, and recommenced their system of depredation.

The whole of the southern Mahratta country was in great disorder. The raja of Kolapoor still waged war with

the Peishwa, and the reinforcement brought by Chittoor Sing, after the defeat of the raja of Satara, gave a new spirit to his efforts. Chittoor Sing had been closely pursued into the territory of the raja of Kolapoor by a body of Rastia's troops, joined by some others on the part of the Pritee Needhee, the whole of whom encamped near the Warnah river. Five hundred horse of the troops who had been dispersed at Satara having got together, apprized Chittoor Sing of their situation, and by his direction concealed themselves for some days in the hills, until he had got a reinforcement from Kolapoor, when, by a well-concerted attack upon the troops who had pursued him, he cut them off almost to a man. A body of Pureshram Bhow's troops were shortly afterwards in a like manner surprised and routed; and Chittoor Sing, having learnt that, after Pureshram Bhow's departure from Satara, 2,000 or 3,000 of Rastia's troops with some guns were encamped in the neighbourhood of the fort, he vowed to avenge the disgrace sustained by the first defeat. Accordingly he led 600 infantry through the hills and valleys until opposite to the village of Pal, where he remained concealed until night, when, repairing to a celebrated temple in the village, he performed the usual worship, and the whole party, having solemnly invoked the deity, stained their clothes with yellow dye, rubbed their hands and faces with turmeric, and issued forth, thus fortified with the implied vow of conquest or death, to attack their enemy. They did not find Rastia's troops unprepared; but the latter had only time to fire a few rounds, when they were furiously charged sword in hand, their guns taken and destroyed, and the whole body dispersed in a few minutes. A rapid march to the banks of the Warnah, before his retreat could be intercepted, marked a prudence, as well as enterprize,

which gained Chitoor Sing considerable credit with the Mahratta soldiery, and his numbers were in a few months considerably increased. At the head of a very inferior force, and with no funds to support it, he kept 7,000 of Rastia's troops in perpetual motion between the Neera and Warnah. He was, however, frequently defeated; and on one occasion, when accompanied by only 500 men,* he was surrounded by 5,000 of Rastia's troops, but cut his way through them, although with the loss of more than half his party. His enterprize, his remarkable escapes, his conciliatory manners, the popularity of his cause amongst Mahrattas, and his confidence in the peasantry, rendered him everywhere a favourite, notwithstanding his having repeatedly laid the whole of the villages under contribution.

Chitoor Sing's insurrection was considered at Poona as a part of the Kolapoor war, and both the Peishwa and Nana Furnuwees had their share of blame in exciting it.

During the insurrection of Satara, and afterwards, whilst Chitoor Sing kept Rastia in check to the north of the Warnah, the raja of Kolapoor was actively employed against the Putwurdhuns and Dhondoo Punt Gokla. Tasgaom, the capital of Pureshram Bhow's jagheer, was pillaged, and his palace, which had been erected at great expense, was burnt to the ground. The Carnatic was laid under contribution, and Dhondoo Punt Gokla, though a brave and active officer, was repeatedly defeated. Such was the state of the Kolapoor warfare up to the period at which we have arrived.

In the month of August, after Balloba Tattya's release, a reconciliation having taken place between him and Nana Furnuwees, they deliberated, with the knowledge and approbation of their superiors, on the course of policy

* It is not mentioned whether horse or foot.

necessary to be pursued with regard to Nizam Ally and the English ; but both concurred in the necessity of suppressing the formidable disturbance to the southward, as a preliminary to any other arrangement.

It was accordingly resolved that the force, previously intended by Nana Furnuwees to have co-operated with the allies against Tippoo, should be sent, under Pureshram Bhow, considerably reinforced for the present service. The whole, to be furnished in proportions by the Peishwa and by Sindia and other jagheerdars, was to consist of 30,000 horse and 6,000 infantry ; but, as it was impracticable to prepare this force until the Dussera, Pureshram Bhow was directed to watch the raja of Kolapoor, and restrain him as much as possible. Pureshram Bhow, whose military spirit was on this occasion excited by personal injury and personal pique, although his health was in a declining state, kept the field all the rains, and recovered the garrisons between the rivers Gutpurba and Malpurba. In the month of September he advanced from Gokauk towards Kolapoor, not without hopes of finishing the war himself ; but near the village of Putunkoondée he encountered the raja of Kolapoor and Chitoor Sing, when he experienced a total defeat, and was himself mortally wounded and made prisoner.* Nana Furnuwees and

*Wiswas Rao, the brother of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, took up the dying man, and, laying him across his horse, threw him down before the raja of Kolapoor, who ordered him, it is said, when in this state, to be cut in pieces. Dajeeba Limmay, who was in the action, states this circumstance ; and Bajee Rao, in a particular conversation with Mr. Elphinstone at Punderpoor in 1812, mentioned it as a well-known fact, but it is not generally believed at Kolapoor, nor at Satara, where the raja of Kolapoor had many enemies.

Dajeeba Limmay, whose name I have mentioned above, was a confidential agent of Pureshram Bhow ; he was employed in several high situations during the administration of Nana Furnuwees, and was a sharer in many of the revolutions and events which I am now recording. At my request, he had the goodness to write the history of his own times, and I take this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgments.

Balloba sent the troops of the Vinchorkur, the Pritee Needhee, and five of Sindia's regular battalions under Major Brownrigg, to support Appa Sahib, Pureshram Bhow's son, and reduce the raja to submission.

This accession of force was too great for the raja of Kolapoor to withstand, and he therefore retired under protection of the fort of Panalla. But, in that situation, his troops were surprised by Appa Sahib, who drove some of them into the fort, whilst the greater part sought refuge in Kolapoor, which the Peishwa's troops invested, and after

A.D. 1800. a siege of considerable duration had nearly reduced it, when events and revolutions at

Poona interfered to save the Kolapoor state, which would otherwise, in all probability, have been subverted, or at least held in future as a dependancy on the Peishwa's government.

CHAP. XVII.

FROM A.D. 1800 TO A.D. 1802.

Death and character of Nana Furnuwees—fresh dispute between Sindia and the Peishwa.—Balloba Tattya's confinement and death—dreadful executions of Dhondeba and Narain Rao Bukhshee.—The Peishwa's plans for ruining the adherents of Nana Furnuwees and the family of Pureshram Bhow.—Sindia, on being promised the jagheer of the Putwurdhuns, sends a force into their districts.—Great disorders—insurrection of Dhoondia Waug—suppressed by a detachment of British troops.—State of affairs at Poona.—Bajee Rao's situation and views—critical state of Sindia's affairs in Malwa.—Rise and progress of Jeswunt Rao Holkar—Umcer Khan joins him—Jeswunt Rao recognized in Malwa as the representative of his nephew Khundee Rao—Imbecility of Sindia's proceedings—Sindia induces Holkar to attack the Byes.—Marches towards Hindustan.—Holkar cuts off two of Sindia's detachments—is repulsed by Major Brownrigg.—Events at Poona—execution of Wittoojee Holkar.—Sirzee Rao Ghatgay defeats a plot against him in a singular manner—he is ordered to join Sindia—defeats Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Indore, which he plunders.—Sindia injudiciously gives Holkar time to recover himself.—Jeswunt Rao carries the war into the Deccan—his successes there—Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur sent to oppose him.—The Peishwa's conduct.—Battle of Poona—Holkar is victorious.—The Peishwa

flees to Singurh—and sends to the British resident a preliminary engagement, binding himself to receive a subsidiary force.—The resident's interview with Holkar.—The Peishwa proceeds to Bassein.—Affairs in Guzerat.

THE first of the events alluded to in point of time and importance was the death of Nana Furnuwees. His health has long been in a declining state; but he continued to transact business, almost to the last, with his accustomed order and punctuality. He died on the 13th March, “and with him,” says Colonel Palmer, “has departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Mahratta government.” Nana Furnuwees was certainly a great statesman. His principal defects originated in the want of personal courage, and in an ambition not always restrained by principle. In the latter unhappy years of his life, on the testimony of English as well as Mahratta authority, he is entitled to the high praise of having acted with the feelings and sincerity of a patriot. He honorably advised Bajee Rao to such measures as he believed advantageous, unmindful of any consequences. He was decidedly averse to the admission of a body of foreign troops in the manner proposed by the Marquis Wellesley, if the energies of the government could possibly be restored without their aid. He respected the English, admired their sincerity and the vigour of their government; but as political enemies, no one regarded them with more jealousy and alarm. The life of Nana may be said to have been entirely public; and its events have been so fully recorded, as well as the motives for his conduct, that it is unnecessary to enlarge on his character. In private life he was a man of strict viracity, humane, frugal, and charitable. His whole time

was regulated with the strictest order, and the business personally transacted by him almost exceeds credibility.

In regard to civil government, whilst he continued in power he endeavoured to preserve the system of Mahdoo Rao Bullal ; but overwhelming business, and the frequent distractions that prevailed, produced great laxity in the superintendence.

No instance of greater neglect on the part of an administration, or of more extraordinary criminality in a subordinate officer, is recorded in the annals of any state than the case of Gassee Ram, kotwal, or police superintendent, of the city of Poona. This man, a Bramin native of Hindostan, employed the power with which he was vested in perpetrating the most dreadful murders. People disappeared, and no trace of them could be found. Gassee Ram was suspected, but Nana Furnuwees refused to listen to complaints, apparently absurd from their unexampled atrocity.

At last, it being suspected that Gassee Ram was starving a respectable Bramin to death, Mannajee Phakray headed a party of the people, broke open the prison, and rescued the unfortunate Bramin, which led to the detection of the monster's crimes ; and he fell a victim to the vengeance of the exasperated populace, by whom he was stoned to death.

In his person Nana was tall and thin, his complexion was rather dark and his demeanour grave ; but his look intelligent, quick, and penetrating ; he left a young widow and died without issue.

The death of Nana Furnuwees was the origin of a new dispute between the Peishwa and Sindia, each being desirous to obtain the treasures of which he was supposed to have died possessed. Sindia immediately seized Nana's

jagheer on pretext of his having owed him a crore of rupees ; he also supported his widow in her desire to adopt a son, both because it was in opposition to Bajee Rao's wish, and because it afforded the easiest means of getting the family and treasures into his own power. But these disputes did not prevent their plotting against others ; and Sindia, whose re-establishment of Balloba Tattya to power had disarmed the insurrection of Lukwa Dada, now determined on Balloba's destruction. To this measure he was advised by his father-in-law, who had been set at liberty in the month of January at the recommendation of Balloba, and had regained entire influence over Sindia's mind, of which the first use he made was to stir up a faction against the minister, and then to excite Sindia to his destruction, and that of his immediate adherents. He was accordingly seized and imprisoned at Ahmednugur, where a natural death interposed to save him from a cruel execution. But his brother Dhondeba and Narain Rao Bukhshee, confined at the same time, were both condemned to suffer ; the former, in a manner comparatively humane, was blown from a cannon ; but the latter was barbarously destroyed by being tied round with rockets, which, being fired, carried him along, mangling his body dreadfully—the invention and spot of the execrable Ghatgay.

One of the ruling passions of the Peishwa was implacable revenge ; and he having connived at the destruction of the Shenwee Bramins, Sindia, in return, agreed to assist him in the ruin of the friends and adherents of Nana, and the family of the late Pureshram Bhôw Putwurdhun. To accomplish the former object, the Peishwa, pretending to renounce the objection to the adoption of a son by the widow of Nana, indirectly encouraged the proceeding :

and at last, in order to ensnare Nana's friends, invited them to a meeting at his palace, for the express purpose of deliberating on the subject. When assembled, he suddenly accused them of treasonable practices, of plotting against him, and of intending to place the adopted son of Nana's widow on the musnud. He concluded by seizing and sending them off prisoners to hill-forts. In regard to the latter object, of crushing the Putwurdhun family, Sindia the more readily acquiesced in it, as he had long wished to possess himself of their extensive and fertile jagheer. It was this plot which prevented the capture of Kolapoor; as Appa Sahib, having received timely intelligence of their plan, quitted the siege, and with his own followers, accompanied by Dhondoo Punt Gokla, retired into the Carnatic. The raja of Kolapoor, through the influence of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, to whom he was reconciled, became the immediate ally of Sindia, whose battalions, under the orders of Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur, the dessaye of Nepanee, proceeded to attack the jagheer of the late Pureshram Bhow; Major Brownrigg, with the battalions, were soon recalled: but Seedojee Rao, at the head of a body of horse, plundered and devastated the country from Merich to Beejapoor.

Disorders were everywhere prevalent. Dhoondia Waug, whom we have already mentioned as having entered the service of the raja of Kolapoor, separated from him, returned into the Carnatic, and plundered in the company's lately acquired districts; taking advantage also of the absence of Gokla's troops, he laid the Peishwa's districts in the Carnatic under contribution, and committed great ravages. The British government made application to the Peishwa, and obtained permission to pursue and destroy the marauder; but in the meantime, on the

return of Dhondoo Punt Gokla to the Carnatic, Dhoondia Waug, who burned with revenge, vowed, with singular ferocity, to sacrifice his life, or dye his mustachios in the heart's blood of Dhondoo Punt. On hearing, therefore, of his approach, he laid an ambush in a wood, and watching an opportunity, when Dhondoo Punt was separated from the main body of his followers, attacked and killed him, when he literally fulfilled his vow. Several persons fell with Dhondoo Punt, among whom was his elder nephew; his younger nephew, Bappoo Gokla, whom we shall hereafter have frequently occasion to mention, lost an eye; Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun was also wounded, and the whole of their party were driven to seek refuge at Hullyhal, where they were kindly welcomed and protected by a British detachment then in that garrison.*

The British troops sent in pursuit of Dhoondia Waug were under the command of Major-General the Honorable Arthur Wellesley, who, on entering the Carnatic, was joined by Gunput Rao Phansay, Bappoo Gokla, and the Putwurdhuns. These Mahratta auxiliaries were of little service: but the British detachment, after a persevering pursuit, had at last the satisfaction of coming up with

Dhoondia at the village of Kondagul.

September 10.

His party, consisting of about 5,000 horse, was immediately attacked, routed, and dispersed. Dhoondia exerted himself with spirit at the head of such men as stood by him, until he was cut down in a charge by the 19th Dragoons.

Sindia was much dissatisfied at the permission granted to the British government of sending troops into the Mahratta territory. His control over the Peishwa was

* Mahratta MSS.

now complete, and fearing that Bajee Rao intended to fly, he for some time kept a guard over his palace. The Peishwa found that his condition was by no means improved by the death of Nana Furnuwees, and, from the situation in which he was so long placed we cannot be surprised that his natural disposition to intrigue should have become incurably habitual. He had much confidence, even at this period, in his own wisdom for extricating himself from the thralldom of Sindia. To that chieftain, even when experiencing indignity from him, Bajee Rao was profuse in his acknowledgments, and pretended to entertain for him the most unbounded gratitude and affection. When it appeared probable that Sindia would be compelled to retire to Hindostan for the protection of his dominions, the Peishwa entreated his stay, and even threw obstacles in the way of his departure ; but he saw, with secret joy, the increasing predatory power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as affording a prospect by which he hoped to be enabled to establish his own authority, without the interposition of a foreign power. He was, however, conscious of his own unpopularity as a son of Rugoba ; he was anxious to keep well with the British government, and really had a partiality for the English, though he rather chose to depend on Sindia, than to adopt, by calling in their aid, a course which he could not retrace. The establishment of an English subsidiary force was, it is true, in many respects consonant to his disposition : protection and support against his own subjects, could such have been obtained unfettered by control, being the end at which he aimed ; and if the proposal had been met in the first instance, or afterwards allowed to come from himself, he would have had recourse to that plan at an earlier period. But the haste with

which the Marquis Wellesley expected his agents to push on his system, evinced an anxiety which retarded his object at Poona, where the resident prognosticated that it would never be accomplished until Bajee Rao had found that all his own schemes were fallacious.

Sindia's affairs in Malwa at length became in the highest degree critical. Jeswunt Rao Holkar's energy and success threatened the entire subjugation of that province, a great part of which he had already pillaged and laid waste. The rise of this predatory chieftain was singularly rapid. After his escape from Nagpoor, he fled to Dhar, where he was kindly received by Annund Rao Powar; but as soon as Sindia heard of his retreat, Annund Rao being unable to shelter him from the power of that chief, he furnished him with a few horses and a little money, with which slender commencement, by enterprize and pillage, he soon collected a band of marauders, and united to his fortunes Umeer Khan, a Patan adventurer, at the head of a well-mounted body of his countrymen, and who, by his abilities and predatory habits, was a fit auxiliary for the schemes which Holkar meditated.

Khassee Rao Holkar, according to the first declaration of the party who opposed him, was set aside from incapacity. Jeswunt Rao being illegitimate, gave himself out as the subordinate agent of his nephew Khundee Rao, in custody at Poona, and invited all adherents of the house of Holkar to unite with him in upholding the name, and rescuing the territories and family from the power of Doulut Rao Sindia. Proceeding to the banks of the Nurbuddah, he levied contributions, and plundered Sindia's villages. A detachment of Khassee Rao's regular infantry, sent against him by the Chevalier Dudrence, was

defeated, which greatly raised Jeswunt Rao's reputation, and brought on a negotiation, which ended in Dudrenec's joining him with his battalions and guns, and in Jeswunt Rao's being recognized and obeyed as the representative of his nephew, which, shortly after, enabled him to commence regular payments to his troops. But the predatory system being the mode of warfare he followed, the work of pillage and destruction went forward, and Sindia's territory in Malwa was half ruined before he had taken any steps to stop the formidable progress of Jeswunt Rao.*

The cause of this military imbecility on the part of Sindia was the state of parties at his durbar. To impede Holkar's career, threats and conciliation were successively resorted to by Doulut Rao's ministers, and Jeswunt Rao, on promise of being supported by Sindia against Khassee Rao, agreed to seize the Byes, to whom he had before proffered friendship. He accordingly attacked their troops, forced the ladies into Burhanpoor, where he besieged them, but they were so fortunate as to escape towards Méywar, through the aid of Juggoo Bappoo, the colleague of Lukwa Dada. Sindia supposed that, in permitting them to get off, Holkar had acted with double treachery, so that, whether the supposition was well or ill-founded, this action was deservedly of no advantage to Jeswunt Rao. Sindia now became convinced that his presence was absolutely necessary to the northward, and in the end of November quitted the Peishwa's territory, where he left five battalions of regular infantry and 10,000 horse under Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, having, before he set out, exacted from the Peishwa bills to the amount of 47 lakhs of rupees.†

* Sir John Malcolm.

† Twenty-five by bills on Poona bankers, ten by a bill on the Gaekwar, and twelve by an assignment on Bundelcund. Mahratta MSS., Colonel Palmer's despatches.

Sindia's progress was tardy, and Jeswunt Rao continued to plunder and levy contributions throughout Malwa. Hearing of Sindia's great army, Holkar called in his detachments, and concentrated his force in the neighbourhood of Oojein, with an intention of plundering it. During this period there was a pause in their hostilities, and Sindia, in hopes of ensuring the protection of his capital, detached for that purpose four battalions from his own camp at Burhanpoor under Colonel John Hessian. Two battalions and six companies under Captain M'Intyre were ordered on to support Hessian; but Holkar, who saw that it was impossible to avoid extremities, and of the highest importance to strike a successful blow at the outset, first made a show of opposing Hessian, and drew him under the walls of Oojein, where, leaving some troops to amuse him, he pushed on to cut off the detachment under M'Intyre, in which he succeeded, having compelled them to lay down their arms at Newree. With his troops thus encouraged, he returned to the more arduous attack of Hessian, and a most obstinate contest was maintained by that officer until his men were completely over-powered. Of 11 European officers in Hessian's four battalions, most of whom were British, seven were killed, and three were made prisoners. Hessian alone escaped, and four-fifths of his corps are said to have been killed and wounded.*

Having exacted a very heavy contribution from Oojein, Holkar next proceeded to attack Sindia's grand park of artillery which had passed the Nerbuddah, and, under the

* Ferdinand Lewis Smith.

protection of the four battalions of Major Brownrigg and a body of horse, was awaiting the junction of the army from Burhanpoor. Brownrigg, on hearing of Holkar's approach, chose a very strong position, which he defended with such judgment and intrepidity that Holkar's utmost efforts were unavailing.*

This defence, as it checked Holkar's career, was of the greatest importance to Sindia, who had all this time remained inactive at Burhanpoor; but he now used every exertion to get his army sent across the Nerbuddah, in which he was much assisted by Rughoojee Bhonslay.†

Events were in the meantime occurring at Poona which require notice, as some of them were a good deal influenced by news from the northward. Bajee Rao, on Sindia's departure, instead of endeavouring to conciliate parties, evinced a malignant spirit of revenge towards all the great families whom he suspected of ever having been the political opponents of himself or his father. To distress and pillage all such of them as fell into his power, was, from first to last, a favourite object of his policy. The respectable family of Rastia was among the earliest who experienced his malevolence. Mahdoo Rao Rastia was invited on a friendly visit to the Peishwa's palace, seized, and hurried off as a prisoner to Raigurh. The unpopularity of this deed was proportionate to its treachery and injustice; many instances, though of a less conspicuous nature, occurred; the minds of his subjects were alienated, and distrust and disaffection towards Bajee Rao's power and government became almost universal. Anarchy was spreading in the country. Bodies of insurgent horse were

* In this action Dewajee Gokla, an officer of rank, Lieutenant Rowbotham, and 300 men were killed on the part of Sindia; Holkar's loss was three times that number.

† Ferdinand Lewis Smith, Bombay Records, and Sir John Malcolm.

plundering in various directions. One party under Bal Kishen Gungadhur was defeated by Gunput Rao Phansay ; and Wittojee Holkar, the brother of Jeswunt Rao,

who was concerned with him, and taken April 1. prisoner, was barbarously and ignominiously executed at Poona. That the Peishwa had a right to inflict the punishment of death on subjects so taken in arms cannot be doubted; but insurrection and plundering are not rigidly viewed among Mahrattas, and in public opinion a more lenient sentence than loss of life ought to have been passed upon the son of Tookajee Holkar; that circumstance, however, operated differently on the mind of the Peishwa, who could not forget that he was the son of the friend of Nana Furnuwees. Having seated himself with his favourite Ballajee Koonjur at a window which overlooked the exterior court of his palace, Wittojee Holkar was brought before the Peishwa, and there tied to the foot of an elephant; in vain did he offer up the humblest supplications for life and mercy; the execution went forward; Bajee Rao sat a composed spectator, and heard the yells of the unhappy malefactor as the animal dragged him forth from the palace yard, to a lingering death, as in his case it happened to be, in the public street.*

Bajee Rao, by this cruel proceeding, at once glutted his revenge and performed an acceptable piece of courtesy to Sindia; but Jeswunt Rao, who loved his brother, vowed vengeance on those whom he considered his murderers; and his threats, being soon followed by news of his success against Hessing, communicated an alarm to the conscious and cowardly mind of the Peishwa, which towards Holkar he could never afterwards conquer. He now, however, opened a negotiation with him, offering to recognize him

* Mahratta MSS., oral information, and Palmer's despatches.

as the heir of Tookajee Holkar, on condition of his giving up the territories of the family in the Deccan estimated at 25 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue. He was also encouraged, by the prospect of Sindia's being long occupied in the north, to devise means of ridding his country of the presence of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, who only increased the trouble and disorders, to prevent which was the pretext for his being left in the Deccan. After plundering to the southward he repaired to Poona with a small party, where he became importunate in his demands for money, sat in dhurna on the favourite Ballajee Koonjur, and insulted the whole of the Peishwa's court. At last Koonjur, on pretence of giving him some orders on bankers, invited him to his house, received him graciously, and shortly after got up as if to bring the bills agreed upon. His quitting the room was to be, in reality, the signal for seizing or murdering Ghatgay, but the latter, guessing his intention, instantly grasped his throat with one hand, drew his sword with the other, and in this manner dragged him to the street, where, springing on his horse, he galloped off to join his party, pursued his route to his army, brought the whole to Poona, and encamped within a mile of the city, which he threatened to plunder and burn. Messages full of conciliatory explanation were sent by Bajee Rao, but the mediation of the British resident became necessary to prevent extremities. The accounts, however, of Sindia's reverses in Malwa, and his express desire that Shirzee Rao should join him immediately to assume command of the army against Holkar, effectually rid the Peishwa of this turbulent and audacious man.

Having joined the army after it had crossed the Nerbuddah, Shirzee Rao was sent forward with 10,000 horse, and 14 battalions under Colonel Sutherland, to avenge the

plunder of Oojein by retaliating on Indore, the capital of Holkar: Jeswunt Rao advanced to its protection with some regular battalions, but without European officers, 5,000 irregular infantry, and about 25,000 horse. Skirmishes of some days' duration terminated in a well-

concerted but ill-executed attack on the part of Holkar, and a signal defeat was the consequence. He lost 98 pieces of cannon, and his capital was completely plundered. The remorseless Ghatgay had here a full opportunity of indulging his disposition to violence, which he fully gratified in dreadful acts of wanton and barbarous cruelty.

Had Sindia followed up the blow, the power of Jeswunt Rao was by this victory annihilated; but supposing him to be completely humbled, and being advised to recognize him as guardian to the head of the Holkar family, Sindia made proposals to that effect, and even sent Khassee Rao from his camp, who was thus compelled to seek an asylum in that of his half-brother. But Jeswunt Rao, whether suspicious of Sindia, encouraged by the Peishwa, or led on by an enterprising confidence in his own fortune, was immoderate in his demands; and although become, since his defeat, dependant entirely on plunder, his adventurous spirit was attractive to the soldiery, amongst whom he had a very high reputation, and many of Sindia's troops deserted to him, even at this stage of his career. But

A.D. 1802. Dudrenec, conceiving it prudent to withdraw from a falling cause, listened to overtures from Sindia, which his battalions, more faithful than their commander, having discovered, went off in a body, and joined Jeswunt Rao at Jowud. Holkar now adopted a new plan, and determined on carrying the war into the Deccan. With this view Futih Sing Manay was

detached with a body of horse to ravage the Peishwa's districts ; the regular infantry took up a position at Mohesir, whilst Jeswunt Rao in person, in order to veil his intentions, went off to the northward with the remainder of his followers, to plunder in Malwa and Rajpootana, in hopes of drawing Sindia's forces after him, and thus facilitating his future design. He acquired very considerable booty, but Sindia did not pursue him as he expected, a detachment only having been sent after him. Holkar might therefore have been induced to reap a larger harvest in pillage, but the Peishwa, having seized his districts in Candeish, he was hurried into the Deccan for their recovery. Previous, however, to his arrival, an advanced body of his troops attacked the Peishwa's general, Dhondoo Punt Ghorebulay, defeated him, and re-took the districts.

As soon as Jeswunt Rao was joined by his infantry from Mohesir, he assailed Sindia's possessions in Candeish, which he plundered and devastated without mercy, declaring at the same time that he was about to proceed to Poona to claim the interference of the Peishwa in protecting him, as the agent of the head of the Holkar family, against the tyrannical usurpation of Doulut Rao.

Notwithstanding this appeal to the Peishwa, Futih Sing Manay showed no respect to his territory, but swept the villages on the banks of the Godavery by contribution and plunder ; whilst Shah Ahmed Khan, another officer detached by Jeswunt Rao, carried his ravages still nearer the Peishwa's capital, and being opposed by Nursing Kunder Rao, the jagheerdar of Vinchoor, at the head of 1,500 horse, the latter were cut off almost to a man.

The consternation at Poona was great in consequence, and Bajee Rao renewed his negotiations with the British government, desiring the aid of a force, but objecting to

its being stationed within his own territory ; neither would he consent to the articles of the treaty of Mhar, nor the arbitration of the British government in the Mahratta claims on Nizam Ally.

Sindia, supported by Rughoojee Bhonslay, exerted his utmost influence to obstruct the conclusion of any arrangement with the British government, with which he was himself negotiating, not with any intention of becoming a party to the defensive alliance, against which both the raja of Berar and Sindia always maintained a strenuous opposition, but merely to gain a certain degree of consequence, which the presence of the British envoy in his camp was at that time likely to create, in the mind of the Peishwa.

It is difficult to account for the inactivity of Sindia in the prosecution of the war against Holkar. Doulut Rao became about this period suspicious of Perron, but the death of Lukwa Dada, and a final arrangement concluded with the Byes by Ambajee Inglia, one of Sindia's principal officers, left him nothing to apprehend in Hindostan which should have prevented his following up Holkar. After much delay, he at last ordered Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur to march against Jeswunt Rao with a large body of cavalry, and 10 battalions of infantry under Captain Dawes. This force forded the Nerbuddah without impediment ; but, on their arrival at Burhanpoor, the troops refused to advance without payment of all their arrears, and before these could be settled, the Taptee was so swollen that they could not cross. Jeswunt Rao at first moved as if to give them battle on the southern bank ; but if such was his intention, he soon abandoned it, and again moved towards Poona. The Peishwa tried by every means to prevent his advance, desired him to state his demands, and promised to arbitrate all differences if he would remain to

the northward of the Godavery. "My brother Wittoojee," replied Jeswunt Rao, "is dead; he cannot be restored to me; but let Khundee Rao, my nephew, be released, and let the family possessions be given up." To these conditions Bajee Rao appeared to assent, and assured Holkar he had sent an order for the release of Khundee Rao; but instead of which he begged of Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur to take advantage of the negotiation, and advance with all speed, while Khundee Rao was thrown into prison in the fort of Asseergurh.

Shortly afterwards a body of the Peishwa's troops under Pandoojee Koonjur attempted to oppose Futih Sing Manay at Gardoon, but were defeated with loss; Manay followed up his victory by attacking the Peishwa's camp at Baramuttee, where he routed Nana Poorundhuree and Gunput Rao Phansay, taking the whole of the artillery. The southern jagheerdars, particularly the Putwurdhuns, who had evinced considerable discontent towards the Peishwa since the treacherous seizure of Rastia, might have prevented or avenged this loss, but except Chintamun Rao, none of the Putwurdhuns joined the Peishwa's standard at this period, and that chief took the first opportunity of quitting it.

Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur at the head of Sindia's forces having passed Holkar's army, advanced by Jaulna and Bheer towards Poona, and having formed a junction with the Peishwa's troops, the united armies prepared to oppose Holkar, at the Ally Beylah pass, on which he was marching; but Holkar, aware of the strength of their position, made a circuit to the eastward, passed Ahmednugur, proceeded towards Jejoory, formed a junction with Futih

October 23.

Sing Manay, descended the Rajwaree pass and on the 23rd October encamped in the neighborhood of Poona, between Lonee and Harupseer.

The opposing army had returned from Ally Beylah about eight days before, and occupied a position nearer the city, and in the vicinity of the present cantonment of the British troops. Two days were spent in negotiation. The Peishwa demanded Holkar's reason for thus advancing in a hostile manner to his capital, and ordered him to retire. The latter professed his readiness to obey every order from the Peishwa when he was not under the control of Sindia, but that Sindia had disobeyed the Peishwa's orders, had rendered the confinement of Khundee Rao doubly severe, and had sent his army to prevent that mediation which the Peishwa had promised; that Sindia therefore was the real rebel, and he would soon oblige him to submit to the sovereign authority of the Peishwa.

The armies drew out for battle on the morning of the
 25th October. Holkar had 14 battalions
 October 25. —six under Colonel Vickers, four under

Major Harding, and four under Major Armstrong: 5,000 irregular infantry, and 25,000 horse. Although Sindia's infantry was in every respect much inferior to that of Holkar, Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur did not decline the contest, to which he was strongly urged by Captain Dawes. His cavalry and irregular infantry, including those belonging to the Peishwa, were, in point of numbers, at least equal to those of Holkar. The action began at half-past nine o'clock by a brisk cannonade, which continued with little interruption for two hours and a half. A body of Holkar's Patan cavalry made a successful charge on the horse of jagheerdar of Vinchoor, but Futih Sing Manay, in a like attempt on the Peishwa's Hoojrat Pagah (or horse on the personal establishment), was repulsed with very considerable loss. Sindia's cavalry followed up the advantage, and those of Holkar were on the

point of discomfiture, when Holkar himself, who had taken his station in the rear, sprang on his horse, and calling to those near him, "now or never to follow Jeswunt Rao," rallied the fugitives, and collected a compact body of his best horse, with which he met and repulsed those of Sindia.

In the meantime six of Sindia's battalions, which were without European officers, and opposed to those of Holkar under Vickers, had given way. The remaining four, however, being of the old battalions of De Boigne, though with only four European Officers to head them, behaved with great intrepidity. They stood their ground with remarkable firmness and discipline; but Holkar, having driven off the cavalry, charged the infantry, cut down the artillerymen at their guns, killed three of the European officers of the battalions, and took the fourth prisoner: still these battalions fought on, till they were completely overpowered by the persevering and desperate efforts of Holkar, who headed his cavalry in charge after charge, and at length bore all before him. A complete victory was the reward of the uncommon energy displayed by Jeswunt Rao on this memorable occasion. The whole of Sindia's guns, baggage, and stores fell into his hands, and the army of his rival was driven off the field. Holkar's troops were ordered to fall back, and not to enter the town, but many of them showing no inclination to obey, he compelled them to desist by turning his own guns upon them.

The Peishwa, not doubting of success, had quitted his palace with an idea of joining in the action: but the noise of the firing frightened him, and he turned off to the southward of the town to await the result. On ascertaining the fate of the battle, he fled with about 7,000

followers to the fort of Singurh, and despatched to Col. Close, the British resident, a preliminary engagement, binding himself to subsidize six battalions of sepoy, and to cede 25 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue for their support. In the course of the previous negotiation he had conceded that point which regarded their being stationed within his own dominions.

Towards the close of the action the cavalry of the contending armies were very near the British residency. Colonel Close had taken the precaution of hoisting the British flag in the most conspicuous parts about the Sungum, which had the effect of ensuring the respect of both parties.

Holkar sent an invitation to the resident to come and see him on the following day, which Colonel Close did not think it prudent to decline. He found the conqueror in a small tent, ankle deep in mud, wounded by a spear, and, with a sabre cut in the head, which last he received from an artilleryman in one of the charges. In his conversation he was polite and frank, spoke lightly of his wounds, and expressed himself in the most friendly manner towards the resident and the British government. He seemed extremely desirous of obtaining the mediation of the resident in settling with Sindia and the Peishwa, and solicited Colonel Close, whom he detained about a month at Poona, to arbitrate in the existing differences.

For a short time after his victory, Holkar assumed an appearance of great moderation ; he placed guards for the protection of the city, treated all the dependants of the Peishwa with kindness, and used many vain endeavours to induce him to return to his palace. Bajee Rao remained for three days at Singurh, and then hastily retired to Raigurh, where he released Mahdoo Rao Rastia, till then

confined in that fortress, restored his jagheer, and gave him a commission to raise men for his service.

Quitting Raigurh, the Peishwa proceeded to Mhar, whence he despatched letters to the Bombay government, requesting that ships might be sent to convey him and his followers to that island. Before a reply was sent to that communication, Khundee Rao Rastia, the sur-soobehdar of Bassein, had joined Bajee Rao at Mhar; but on hearing of the approach of Holkar's troops, who were sent in pursuit of him, the Peishwa repaired to Severndroog, where he resided for some time, under protection of that fort, until again alarmed by accounts of Umeer Khan's being in the neighbourhood, he crossed over to Rewadunda, and thence embarking in an English ship provided for his reception, he proceeded, accompanied by Khundee Rao Rasti, where he landed 6th December.

Previous to entering on the events at Poona, and the articles of provision of the treaty of Bassein, or its important consequences, it is necessary to explain the state of affairs in Guzerat, and the immediate causes which led to the connection, still subsisting, between the Gaekwar and the English; leaving their definitive treaty of 1805, and all subsequent settlements, to be explained in their natural order.

CHAP. XVIII.

FROM A.D. 1793 TO A.D. 1803.

Affairs of Baroda.—War between Govind Rao Gaekwar and Aba Shelookur.—The English depose the Nabob of Surat—they are promised to Gaekwar's share of the chouth and the district of Chourassy.—Gaekwar reduces Shelookur, and obtains the Peishwa's share of Guzerat in farm.—Death of Govind Rao Gaekwar—his eldest son, Anund Rao, succeeds him—two parties in the government, the one under Rowjee Appajee, the other under Kanhojee Rao Gaekwar—both apply to the British government for aid—the governor of Bombay supports the party of Rowjee Appajee by sending a small detachment into Guzerat under Major Walker.—Mulhar Rao Gaekwar attacks the British troops—reinforcement sent into Guzerat—Mulhar Rao is reduced.—A British subsidiary force established at Baroda—embarrassed state of the finances.—Sunkhera reduced.—The Arab mercenaries oppose the projected reforms.—Siege and surrender of Baroda.—Kanhojee Rao Gaekwar maintains an insurrection against the government.—Affair of Sawree—gallant conduct of Major Holmes.

THE reader may recollect that Govind Rao Gaekwar
 A.D. 1793. assumed charge of the Baroda government
 in December 1793, and also that Aba
 Shelookur, the deputy governor of the Peishwa's share
 of Guzerat, was one of the principal persons who accom-

panied Nana Furnuwees to Sindia's camp, the day on which that minister was treacherously seized by Michel Filoze. Aba Shelookur gave Doulut Rao Sindia a bond

A.D. 1798. for 10 lakhs of rupees as the price of his liberty, and for permission to return to

Guzerat, where, on his arrival, he immediately assumed charge of the government at Ahmedabad. Being one of the partizans of Nana, Govind Rao Gaekwar was secretly incited against him by Bajee Rao, and Shelookur, being pressed for the payment of his ransom, levied more than his own proportion of revenue, and exacted money from some of Gaekwar's villages. Hostilities soon followed, and for a time Aba Shelookur, was successful in the war of plunder and extortion which he pursued against the subjects of Govind Rao.

In 1799 the nabob of Surat died, and the year following,

A.D. 1799. during the prevalence of the disturbances to which we have now alluded, Mr. Jona-

than Duncan, Governor of Bombay, proceeded to Surat, commissioned by the governor-general to assume charge of the government of that city, granting to the nobab's brother, who was the heir apparent to the naib-ship, an annual pension, on condition of his resigning all pretensions to the exercise of authority. Mr. Duncan was at the same time directed to endeavour to obtain the Gaekwar's share of the chouth of Surat, without reference to the negotiations with the Peishwa for his portion of it. Two wukeels having been sent by Govind Rao to congratulate Mr. Duncan on his arrival, the latter conceived the opportunity favourable for making the application in question, to which he added a request that Chourassy, the district immediately surrounding in Surat, might be added to the grant. Govind Rao readily promised

to bestow both the one and the other on the East India Company, without requiring any condition on their part, merely observing that it was incumbent on the company to obtain the Peishwa's sanction to the measure, which, had the Peishwa been able to maintain his authority independent of the English, would have been tantamount to a refusal—both because the Poona Court was particularly anxious to perpetuate the Mahratta claims on Surat, owing to an extravagant idea of its consequence which they derived from the Moghuls, and because, in regard to the cession of Chourassy, the same objections urged by the British government, and admitted by Nana Furnuwees, at the time of Govind Rao's accession, were precisely applicable on this occasion.* The reason of Govind Rao's extreme complaisance was soon apparent by his making an application for aid against Shelookur, which was evaded; but shortly afterwards Ahmedabad was taken, Shelookur was made prisoner, and the Peishwa granted his share of the revenue of Guzerat in farm to the Baroda government, for a period of five years, at five lakhs of rupees annually. This agreement was concluded in October 1800; but the death of Govind Rao, which happened during the preceding month, occasioned fresh disturbances in the province.

* On this transaction of the governor of Bombay, the Court of Directors make the following observation:—"How desirable soever it might have been to obtain a territory contiguous to Surat, in consequence of the late arrangement with the nabob of that city, it ought not to have been accepted at the risk of incurring the imputation of a breach of faith, and the consequent resentment of the Peishwa, with whom we were reciprocally bound to preserve the integrity of the Brodera principality, and with whom our interference has, at a former period, been successful in preventing the execution of a similar design on his part. We have, however, the satisfaction to observe, by the 14th article of the treaty of Bassein, that the Peishwa has formerly recognized the treaty with the Raja Anund Rao Gaekwar, otherwise we should have thought it incumbent on us to desire that the before-mentioned cessions be restored to the Gaekwar government."

Govind Rao Gackwar left a large family ; four legitimate and seven illegitimate sons, besides daughters. His eldest son Anund Rao was acknowledged by the principal officers as successor ; but, being a prince of weak intellect, different parties attempted to take the lead in the administration. Kanhojee Rao, the eldest illegitimate son of Govind Rao, a bold ambitious young man, was, in consequence of his turbulent behaviour, placed in confinement previous to his father's death, but having afterwards contrived to effect his release, by professions of attachment to his brother and his influence with some of the soldiery, he soon usurped, not only the office of minister, but the entire powers of the

A.D. 1801. state, and continued to rule for some months. At the end of that time he was

deposed by a party headed by Rowjee Appajee, a Purvoe, who had been the principal minister of the late Govind Rao ; and both these persons—Rowjee the minister in power, and Kanhojee the deposed authority—made offers to the Bombay government, in order to engage its support. Rowjee promised to confirm the cessions of the late Govind Rao, and Kanhojee offered to add the district of Chickly to the grant.

Rowjee was supported by his brother Babajee, who commanded the cavalry of the state, and by the greater part of a large body of Arab mercenaries who composed the garrison of the town. The Arabs, whose numbers amounted to about 7,000, though in some respects bound by unity of interests, were, with their chiefs, divided among themselves into parties, under the influence of two soucars or bankers,* the one named Mungul Parikh, the

* The soldiery in the service of native states in India, owing to the irregular manner in which they are paid, have generally a shroff, or money-changer, the agent of some soucar, attached to each division, who advances them money at a high interest, and recovers it as he best can.

other Samul Becher—both men of great wealth acquired by exorbitant interest on loans, and who were the means by which the needy government of the Gaekwar was at once supplied and impoverished. Both these persons had acceded to the deposition of Kanhojee, so that Rowjee's party was the strongest at Baroda; but the cause of Kanhojee was espoused by Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, the first cousin of the late Govind Rao, and son and successor to Khundee Rao, the jagheerदार of Kurree, a man of considerable talent and enterprize. On promise of a remission of arrears and exemption from future tribute on the part of Kanhojee, Mulhar Rao, although he had at first acquiesced in the propriety of deposing and confining him, took the field, at the head of a considerable army, in aid of his cause, and began to reduce the garrisons held for Anund Rao under the administration of Rowjee. The minister immediately proposed to the Bombay government to subsidize five battalions, on condition of being supported against Mulhar Rao—an offer too tempting to be resisted; but the governor-general having sent no reply to Mr. Duncan's numerous applications for instructions, it was determined, with that injudicious caution which characterizes half-measures, to send a small auxiliary force of about 1,600 men to Rowjee's support. Major Alexander Walker, the officer in command of the detachment, was instructed to settle the disturbance by amicable mediation, if possible; otherwise he was to act with Babajee, the brother of Rowjee, in suppressing the rebellion of Mulhar Rao. Major Walker's detachment joined the Gaekwar's army in the end of February 1802, and advanced with it towards Kurree. Mulhar Rao, affecting regret for what he had done, offered to restore the places he had taken, and seemed sincerely desirous of making his peace: it was,

however, soon discovered that he was insincere in his professions : the army advanced, Mulhar Rao continued to negotiate, but suddenly, and in a most treacherous

March 17. manner, attacked the troops, and was repulsed by the British detachment, though they lost on the occasion about 50 men. It being, however, afterwards discovered that Mulhar Rao had seduced many of the Gaekwar's troops, Major Walker's situation became critical, and all the disposable troops at Bombay and Goa were immediately embarked under command of Colonel Sir William Clarke, who landed at Cambay on the 12th of April, marched on the 14th, and joined Major Walker at Kurree, who had acted chiefly on the defensive since the action of the 17th of March. Colonel Clarke found Mulhar Rao's army strongly entrenched under the walls of the town, and it was determined to storm their position

without delay. The attack was made at April 30. break of day on the morning of the 30th April, and the entrenchments carried in the most gallant style, with the loss on the part of the British of 163 men in killed and wounded.* Mulhar Rao shortly afterwards surrendered at discretion ; Kurree was evacuated, and made over to the Gaekwar's government, but two companies of sepoy remained under a British officer to garrison the citadel. A small part of the army returned with Sir William Clarke to Bombay ; the rest remained under the

* An extraordinary anecdote is related of Lieutenant M'Cole of the 75th regiment in this attack, which deserves to be recorded. Just as Lieutenant M., at the head of the grenadiers, had got into the entrenchment, he observed a Patan in the act of levelling his matchlock at him, when, snatching up a cannon-shot which happened to be at his foot, he threw it with such instantaneous effect, as to prevent his purpose by killing him on the spot. Lieutenant M.'s strength and agility, as may be conceived from this fact, were very remarkable ; but shortly afterwards, having caught the Guzerat fever, he died at Baroda after a few hours' illness.

command of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, subject to the requisitions of Major Walker, who was appointed political resident at the Gaekwar court.

A place of residence was assigned to Mulhar Rao in the town of Neriad, and 1,25,000 rupees of the revenue of that district were set aside for his support, with a promise, in the event of his conducting himself peaceably, to enlarge his income as the necessities of the state were diminished.

The finances of the Baroda government were in such a deplorable state of confusion and embarrassment, that without foreign aid it would have been quite impossible to extricate it from total ruin. The prudence and ability of the British resident were a powerful means of introducing reform; for although Rowjee Appajee was anxious for power, and jealous of authority, he gladly solicited support when insurrections were to be suppressed, the government to be strengthened, its expenses to be reduced, money to be raised, and debt to be redeemed.

The object requiring immediate attention was Gunput Rao, a relation of the Gaekwar family, and mamlitdar of Sunkhera near Baroda, who had declared for Mulhar Rao, and held the fort of Sunkhera in his name: he had also been joined by Moorar Rao, one of the illegitimate sons of the late Gaekwar. A detachment of the subsidiary force was sent to reduce Sunkhera, and soon succeeded in obtaining its surrender; but Gunput Rao and Moorar Rao made their escape, and found a refuge with the Powars of Dhar.

The next difficulty originated in the first essential reform

—the reduction of the military force.

A.D. 1802.

The Arab mercenaries, who had for some time ruled at Baroda, became alarmed at the prospect of a diminution in their body, and after some discussion, in the course of which they advanced extravagant demands for

arrears, taking advantage of their situation in the town, they confined the Gaekwar, and refused to release him until their claims were satisfied. They also permitted Kanhojee to escape. Mulhar Rao disappeared about the same time from Neriad, and from the number of men already discharged, the late dispersion of Mulhar Rao's army, and the unemployed soldiery at all times numerous in Guzerat, great apprehensions of serious disorders were naturally entertained. Major Walker anxiously endeavoured to bring them to terms, and to restore order without the necessity of resorting to force; but finding every reasonable inducement ineffectual, he called in the aid of a European regiment from Bombay, which, having joined the subsidiary force, Colonel Woodington invested the

town of Baroda, and after a siege of ten
December 18. days, during which the Arabs from the cover of the walls and houses killed a number of the assailants, and picked off a large proportion of officers, the breach being practicable, the garrison surrendered. The terms of capitulation were the payment of such arrears as might be found justly their due, and a promise on their part to quit the country. The arrears amounted to 17½ lakhs, and were duly discharged. Most of the Arab chiefs honorably adhered to the conditions, but some of them, especially Abood Jemadar, forfeited the pledge he had given, went off at the head of a large party in a contrary direction to that which had been prescribed, and with a view to join Kanhojee. Colonel Woodington, having been sent in pursuit of them, surprised their camp, and dispersed them, but the fugitives prosecuted their route, and ultimately most of them joined Kanhojee. That person, after his escape from Baroda, fled to Rajpeeplee, a hilly tract on the northern boundary of Maharashtra, where, having

collected a body of men, he returned to Guzerat during the siege of Baroda, attacked and routed a body of Babajee's troops, and prosecuted his march to the vicinity of the town.

Five days after its surrender, a detachment, consisting of his majesty's 75th regiment and a
Jan. 1, 1803. battalion of sepoys, was sent under Major

Holmes in pursuit of Kanhojee, who continued moving about, collecting troops, levying contributions, and endeavouring to stir up a party in his favour at Baroda. After a vain pursuit of one month, it was thought advisable to reinforce Major Holmes with 250 Europeans and 300 sepoys, and at length Kanhojee took post in a strong ravine within four or five miles of the village of Saurce,

February 6. where his troops, concealing themselves, allowed the advanced guard to enter before they gave their fire. It fell with such effect that the troops were thrown into some disorder. The Arabs immediately charged sword in hand, overpowered the advanced guard, and pressed forward in a most animated and daring manner. Major Holmes instantly dismounted, and placing himself at the head of the grenadiers of the 75th, followed by those of the second battalion 1st regiment, he rushed forward, supported by his whole line, and soon drove the enemy from the field. The loss of the British in this affair was considerable, upwards of 100 men having been killed and wounded, of whom five were officers. Major Holmes displayed great energy on the occasion, particularly in a personal rencontre with an Arab of great size, whom he laid dead at his feet, having by one cut nearly severed the body of his antagonist.*

* I give this anecdote on the authority of my friend and brother officer, the late Major Edward Tandy, who saw the combat between

Kanhojee continued in Guzerat for about a month after this defeat, till having near Kupperwunj made a last attempt to stand, his camp was stormed by Major Holmes, and his force dispersed. He himself fled to Oojein.*

them. The late Major-General Sir George Holmes, K.C.B., Major at the time the above affair took place, was a man of great stature and strength. He is said to have been frequently engaged hand to hand, and to have been always equally successful. He carried a stout stick in action, which, when he condescended to draw his sword, he used as a shield.

* Major Tandy's private journal, Bombay Records, oral information.

CHAP. XIX.

A.D. 1802 AND A.D. 1803.

Events at Poona.—Winaek Rao, the son of Amrut Rao, is placed on the musnud by Holkar.—Treaty of Bassein.—Sindia and Rughojee Bhonslay unite to obstruct the objects of the treaty.—Advance of the British troops—return of the Peishwa to Poona—Negotiation with the confederates—preparations for war—war declared—capture of Ahmednugur—battle of Assaye—Burhanpoor—Asseergurh—Baroach and Pawungurh taken.—Of the war in Hindostan.—Revert to General de Boigne—his opinions and those of his successor—advance of the Bengal army—affair of Coel—storm of Aligurh—successful attack on Shekoabad by M. Fleury—battle of Delhi—battle of Agra—battle of Laswaree—conquest of Kuttack, and of Bundelcund.—Supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein.—Prosecution of the war in the Deccan—Captain Baynes' defence—negotiations—battle of Argaon—siege and storm of Gawelgurh—negotiations—treaty of Deogaom—treaty of Surjee Anjengaom, and of Burhanpoor—partition treaties—treaties with the Rajpoots, Jaths, and Ambajee Ingliä.

THE natural order of events now carries us back to affairs at Poona before entering on the history of the important transactions which succeeded the Peishwa's arrival at Bassein.

A.D. 1802.

The moderation at first shown by Holkar after his victory was a mere cloak to allure Bajee Rao to return

to his capital. Being in distress for funds to pay his troops, Holkar, in order to satisfy the most urgent of their demands, was obliged to levy a contribution from the city of Poona, but for that purpose he employed two of Bajee Rao's ministers, Chintoo Punt Deshmookh and Wyjunath Punt Mama, who, without being apprized of their master's intention, had been sent by him to negotiate with Holkar a few hours previous to his retreat from Singurh to the Concan. Such was their influence with the inhabitants, that a very considerable cess was promptly raised, in the vain hope of buying exemption from future pillage by their readiness to comply with a measure, which, sanctioned by these men, had something of the character of regular authority.

When Holkar found that the Peishwa had no intention of returning, he sent a body of his troops to Amrut Rao at Joonere, inviting him to take charge of the government at Poona ; but Amrut Rao, on various pretences, declined the invitation for several days. At last he arrived on

November 12. the 12th November, and was prevailed upon to assume the government, in which he was assisted by Moraba Furnuwees, Baba Rao Phurkay, and several others of the adherents of Nana Furnuwees. He held his court in tents pitched at the village of Bambooree on the outskirts of the city. He refused to ascend the musnud himself, and for some time opposed a plan of elevating his son, Winaek Rao, to that dignity, as desired by Holkar ; but when Bajee Rao quitted Mhar, and threw himself entirely on the protection of the English, Amrut Rao pretended to consider it an abdication of the Peishwa-ship, and assented to the proposal of Holkar. The raja of Sattara at first obstinately refused to grant the usual form of investiture, till prevailed upon by his

brother Chitoor Sing, who had been for some time of Holkar's party, serving with the division of Futih Sing Manay.

Holkar now laid aside the mask of moderation, and began to extort and to plunder with all the violence of his habits and character. Chintoo Punt and Wyjunath Punt, who, by their exertions in levying the contribution, might have been at least entitled to his forbearance, were delivered over as prisoners to Huree Punt Bhawey and Hureenath, two Bramins, equally cruel, and more systematically wicked, than Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. They tortured both the persons thus made over to them in order to extort money; and every respectable householder of Poona, possessed of property, was seized and forced, by any means, to give up his wealth. Several men died under the tortures they underwent. Amrut Rao was not less blameable than Holkar in the enormities thus inflicted on the unhappy inhabitants of Poona, whose sufferings at this time were particularly severe; owing to Bajee Rao's having stationed guards to prevent their flight previous to the battle of the 25th October; and Holkar, though with a different motive, took care to observe a similar precaution as soon as the issue of the contest had established his control.

These excesses were begun even before Colonel Close quitted Poona. Both Amrut Rao and Holkar were very desirous of prolonging his stay, in hopes of his being prevailed upon to mediate in their differences with Sindia and the Peishwa, and of gaining by his presence the apparent sanction of the British government to their usurpation; but finding that no persuasion could alter his purpose, he was at last permitted to depart on the 20th November, and he arrived at Bombay on the 3rd

of the following month. Colonel Close met Bajee Rao on the evening of the day on which the latter landed at Bassein ; and the preliminary of the proposed treaty, already tendered by an agent on the day of his flight from his capital, was immediately alluded to, and acknowledged by the Peishwa himself. The 18th December was the day appointed for the discussion of the various articles of this treaty, and on the 31st it was finally completed. It was declaredly for the purpose of general defensive alliance, and the reciprocal protection of the territories of the Peishwa and the English East India Company, and their allies respectively. For this purpose a subsidiary force, of not less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of Field-Artillery and the European artillerymen, were to be permanently stationed in the Peishwa's dominions. In the event of war, two battalions of the infantry, not less than 1,000 each, were to remain near the Peishwa's person: the rest, joined by 6,000 infantry and 10,000 horse of the Peishwa's own troops, were to act as circumstances might require. No European of a nation hostile to the English was to be entertained by the Peishwa. Districts yielding 26 lakhs of rupees were assigned for the payment of the subsidiary force ; and all articles intended for the consumption of these troops were to be allowed to pass duty free. The Peishwa relinquished his claims on Surat, and submitted to the British arbitration in the adjustment of his differences and claims on the Nizam and the Gaekwar ; with respect to the former, he bound himself to conform to the treaty of Mhar ; and in regard to the latter, he recognized the engagement lately concluded between Anund Rao Gaekwar and the British. The Peishwa likewise bound himself to engage in no hostilities with other

states, neither to commence nor pursue, in future, any negotiations with any power whatever, without previous consultation with the British government.

Such was the substance of the important treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa sacrificed his independence as the price of protection ; but it was the only course he could pursue to save himself from becoming, more than ever, a pageant in the hands of one or other of the contending chiefs. He had scarcely ratified the treaty when he began to waver in his plans, and to regret the decided line of policy, so contrary to his disposition, into which he had been hurried by the exigency of his circumstances. Motives of policy probably dictated the expression of his regret that Sindia had not been consulted, but there was no insincerity in his strenuous objections to those articles which tended to control his political freedom and influence, nor to the arbitration of his claims on the Gaekwar and the Nizam—a sacrifice on his part greater than the English authorities seem ever to have fully understood, or at all events appreciated. He despatched Ballajee Koonjur

A.D. 1803. to Sindia, and Narain Rao Wydh to
Rughoojee Bhonslay, ostensibly with the

view of explaining the nature of the alliance into which he had entered, but in fact, as he knew they were both averse to it, rather to excuse his conduct in having been obliged, owing to their absence, to flee from Holkar and seek safety with Europeans. He sent no copy of the treaty, and in his letter invites Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay to march to Poona with all speed—not expressly to act against the English, of whom he takes no notice, but to punish the rebel Holkar.* He seems to have expected that Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay would unite to oppose the objects

* Copies of his secret letters found in his palace at Poona.

of the treaty ; to have been doubtful of the issue of the contest that might ensue between them and the English ; and to have been anxious, as usual, to deceive all parties, whilst he at the same time endeavoured to keep on terms with them.

The governor-general hoped that Sindia might be deterred from any hostile attempts to obstruct the operation of the treaty. After the battle of Poona, an effort was made to induce him to enter upon the defensive alliance, and, upon the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, he was again invited, in the manner hereafter detailed, to enter on similar engagements ; but Sindia, though he would have been pleased in the first moment of alarm, after the defeat of his army by Holkar, to have seen a British force co-operating with his own for the temporary purpose of re-establishing the Peishwa in his capital, and suppressing the power of his rival, was mortified and incensed on finding that his own and his uncle's plans for controlling the Peishwa's government were at once frustrated and overturned. Nor were these the only evils resulting from the Peishwa's engagements. He saw his own independence might be soon affected by the support which the Peishwa derived from a foreign nation, whose power, by a novel system of encroachment, threatened the subversion of the Mahrattas, as effectually as their establishment of chouth and surdeshmookhee had overwhelmed the empire of the Moghuls.

The aversion with which Rughoojee Bhonslay had always regarded the Peishwa's connecting himself with the English was well known, and his sentiments on the present occasion were in entire unison with those of Sindia. Yadow Rao Bhaskur, Sindia's prime minister, was deputed by his master to consult with Rughoojee on the best means of

cementing a general confederacy of the Mahrattas against the common enemy ; and Sindia, who had been preparing troops to oppose Holkar, crossed the Nerbuddah on the 4th February with a large army, with which he encamped at Burhanpoor on the 23rd of that month. It was a few days after this period when Colonel Collins, an envoy on the part of the governor-general, arrived for the purpose of again inviting him to enter upon the alliance, and engaging his co-operation in the arrangements required by the treaty with the Peishwa. To gain time Sindia at first evaded discussion ; but, when pressed by Colonel Collins, he declined becoming a party to the defensive alliance, declaring that he had no intention of obstructing the treaty ; he added that, as guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, he expected to have been consulted before these new engagements were made, but that his intentions were, in every respect, friendly to the British government. These professions were from the first deceitful ; both Rughoojee Bhonslay and himself were actively preparing for war, and Bajee Rao continued in constant correspondence with them, secretly encouraging their views.*

The governor-general, in the meantime, had taken his measures for the re-establishment of Bajee Rao on his musnud at Poona. For this purpose the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, consisting of six battalions of infantry, each upwards of 1,000 strong, with two regiments of native cavalry under Colonel Stevenson, took up a position at

March 25. Purinda near the Peishwa's eastern frontier, accompanied by 15,000 of the Nizam's troops. The Hon'ble Major-General Wellesley was detached from the main army of Madras, assembled on the

* Copies of secret letters found in the palace at Poona.

northern frontier of Mysore, with 8,000 infantry and 1,700 cavalry, being directed to march towards Poona for the purpose of co-operating with Colonel Stevenson in the Peishwa's restoration. General Wellesley was joined on the banks of the Kistna by the southern Mahratta jagheerdars—Appa Sahib and Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun, Bappoo Gunnesh Gokla, Appa Dessaye Nepankur, and the family of the Patunkurs. The jagheerdar of Vinchoor, grandson of Wittul Sewdeo, likewise attended the British army. The southern jagheerdars had orders from the Peishwa to co-operate with the English; and all of them on this occasion, especially the family of Putwurdhun, evinced a very friendly disposition to the British government. Straggling bodies of Holkar's horse, belonging to the division of Umeer Khan and Futih Sing Manay, were plundering the country between the Beema and Kistna; but on being called upon to desist, they retired. They had scarcely crossed the Beema when Umeer Khan, suspecting that Manay intended to join the Peishwa, contrived to seize him, and disperse his troops.

General Wellesley, on approaching Poona, made a march of 60 miles in 32 hours, and reached that city with his cavalry on the 20th April. Colonel Stevenson in the meantime arrived from Purinda at Gardoon on the Beema. General Wellesley's object in advancing so rapidly was to save the city of Poona, which it was supposed Amrut Rao intended to burn; but he had retired many hours before the arrival of the British troops. Holkar was already on his retreat towards Malwa; but intelligence having reached Colonel Stevenson that he had levied a contribution on Aurungabad, and plundered some of the Nizam's villages, that officer advanced towards the Godavery for the protection of the country.

Amrut Rao, accompanied by Huree Punt Bhawee, after leaving Poona, marched to Sungumnere, plundering the towns and villages on his route ; then turning on Nassuck, he attacked and defeated a body of troops in the interests of Bajee Rao, commanded by Raja Buhadur, and pillaged the town in the same barbarous manner as had been already done at Poona. Amrut Rao remained in the neighbourhood of Nassuck for some time ; and, as we shall have little occasion to introduce his name in the subsequent pages of this history, we may here briefly mention that all overtures of reconciliation between him and Bajee Rao having been obstinately rejected by the latter, he entered into an engagement with General Wellesley, and, during the progress of the war which followed, joined the British troops with a body of horse. His services were on no occasion conspicuous, but a most liberal pension of eight lakhs of rupees was assigned to him by the British government, on which he retired to Benares, where he still resides.

The Peishwa, escorted by a body of 2,300 infantry, of whom 1,200 were Europeans, arrived from Bassein, and resumed his seat on the musnud the 13th May. Sindia still occupied his position at Burhanpoor, and Rughoojee Bhonslay was preparing to join him. Every endeavour was used to induce Holkar to take a part in the confederacy. Rughoojee Bhonslay was employed as mediator between him and Sindia ; and Holkar, who was at the same time carrying on a negotiation with the Peishwa through Colonel Close, listened and appeared to favour the overtures of the confederates, from whom he obtained the release of his nephew, Khundee Rao, the restoration of his family territory in Malwa, and a promise that all his rights in Hindostan should be recognized.

It was the interest of the British government to conciliate Holkar ; and, in order to prevent his joining the confederacy, they wished to overlook any cause of complaint they had against him ; but the Peishwa could not be prevailed upon to listen to any mediation in his favour. The confederates wished Holkar to unite his army with theirs in the Deccan, but he excused himself by asking who was to take care of Hindostan ; and immediately retired to Malwa with the real design of being guided by the issue of events.

Although the plans of the confederates were conducted with considerable secrecy, rumours of their hostile designs were universally prevalent. The governor-general deemed it expedient to call upon Sindia for an explicit declaration of his intentions, and to make efficient preparations in every part of British India to repel the hostilities apparently meditated. In reply to the demands for explanation sent by the resident, Sindia declared that it was impossible to afford any satisfaction until he had met the raja of Berar, after which the resident should be informed whether it would be peace or war.

Their armies advanced to the frontier of the Nizam's boundary, and encamped in the neighbourhood of each other. The force under Colonel Stevenson crossed to the northward of the Godavery, and General Wellesley occupied a position in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur. A long train of evasion and delay followed the meeting between the chieftains. They declared they had no designs hostile to the British government, nor any intention of obstructing the articles of the treaty of Bassein ; but they alluded to their having received no official copy of it from the Peishwa, and mentioned that there were many points of it to be discussed, which the Peishwa was bound to have consulted them upon before he signed its stipula-

tions. Their professions of friendly intentions were only made with the view of gaining time, in the hope of Holkar's being induced to embrace their cause. Their whole conduct in other respects indicated their hostile determination; and the menacing position which they occupied, justified the warlike preparations of the British government. General Wellesley, having been vested with full powers as political agent of the governor-general, as well as military commander of the British troops in the Deccan, proposed, as the test of the friendly declarations of the chiefs, that they should withdraw their armies—Sindia to Hindostan and Rughoojee Bhonslay to Berar, whilst he should also direct the British troops to retire within their own territories. This plain and distinct proposal, so characteristic of its author, perplexed the Mahratta chiefs, as there was no evading compliance, except by a subterfuge too palpable to be overlooked or justified; after much discussion, it was finally rejected; the resident withdrew from their camp on the 3rd August, which was considered a declaration of war.

The governor-general, when he saw that war was inevitable, had resolved to strike a decisive blow, and, by a grand effort, to attack the territories of the confederates in every quarter at once. For this purpose the preparations of the British government were necessarily very extensive. Its resources were called forth on a scale of magnitude and efficiency before unknown, and the governor-general, by his liberality, his judicious selection of agents and commanders, and his confidence in the whole service, roused that ardour and spirit of enterprize which have been handed down in the Indian army, from the first struggles of the British nation in the east.

The British forces assembled in different quarters of India amounted to nearly 50,000 men.

The army in the Deccan and Guzerat amounted to 35,596 men, of whom 3,595 were left for the protection of Hyderabad and Poona, and 7,826 formed the covering army under General Stuart, between the Kistna and Toongbuddra.* The advanced force with General Wellesley consisted of 8,930 men under his personal command, and 7,920 under Colonel Stevenson. There were 7,352 men in Guzerat, of whom, after providing for the garrisons, 4,281 were available for field service, and placed under the orders of Colonel Murray, subject to the control of General Wellesley.

In Hindostan 10,500 men were collecting under General Lake, 3,500 men were assembled at Allahabad to act on the side of Bundelcund, and 5,216 men were destined for the invasion of Rughoojee Bhonslay's districts in Kuttaek.

The armies of Doulut Rao Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay were estimated at about 1,00,000 men, of whom about 50,000 were horse, and upwards of 30,000 were regular infantry and artillery, commanded by Europeans; of the rest, some were half-disciplined corps under the command of natives belonging to Rughoojee Bhonslay, some were matchlockmen and rocketmen; they had many hundred pieces of cannon, and Sindia's train of field artillery was excellent. Of the regular infantry, 10,000 or 12,000 were with Sindia in the Deccan, and 4,000 or 5,000 were on their march from the Deccan, conducted by the Chevalier Dudrenec, for the purpose of reinforcing the army in Hindostan. Sindia's army in the latter quarter was commanded by Monsieur Perron, the successor of De Boigne. His whole force, including those not yet joined, under

* In this part of the force there was subsequently some alteration made of no importance to the Mahratta history.

Dudrenec, amounted to 16,000 or 17,000 regular infantry, and from 15,000 to 20,000 horse, of which 4,000 or 5,000 were regular cavalry. This estimate does not include the forces of Shumsher Buhadur in Bundelcund, who was a party in the confederacy. Shumsher Buhadur was the son of Ali Buhadur, who, as the reader may remember, attempted, in conjunction with the Gosaeen Himmud Buhadur, to conquer Bundelcund. They so far succeeded as to possess themselves of several districts, all of which they held in the Peishwa's name—partly as belonging to him from a remote period, and the rest as their own jagheer. But being constantly engaged in warfare with the petty chiefs of the country, it furnished an excuse for remitting no part of the revenue to the Peishwa, although they acknowledged his authority. Ali Buhadur died in 1802, and his jagheer was formally resumed by the Peishwa; but, as the latter had no means of enforcing the resumption, Shumsher, the son of the deceased, retained charge of the territory, took part against the English on the present occasion, and mustered, of all descriptions, about 10,000 or 12,000 men.

General Wellesley received accounts of the unsuccessful termination of the resident's negotiation with the confederates on the 6th August, the same day on which Nizam Ally died at Hyderabad—an event long expected, and which was attended by no commotion or change, except the accession of his son, Mirza Secundur Jah, to the soobehship of the Deccan.

General Wellesley, who was encamped at the village of Walkee, eight miles south of Ahmednugur, was prevented by heavy rain from marching against that fortress until the 8th, when he commenced hostilities by detaching three divisions from his line of march to attack the pettah by escalade. The pettah is

surrounded by a mud wall, and was obstinately defended by a body of Arabs and one of Sindia's regular battalions, supported by a party of horse stationed between the pettah and the fort; but the perseverance and spirit of the assailants surmounted every obstacle; and this prompt manner of proceeding gave a character to the commander and troops, in the opinion of the enemy, which made amends for the loss sustained in the attack. Of the British detachments, 28 were killed and 22 wounded, of which number six were European officers. A battery was opened

upon the fortress on the 10th, and on the
August 12. 12th this important garrison, once the

capital of the Nizam Shahee kingdom, which, ever since the days of Chaund Beebee, had the reputation in the Deccan of being almost impregnable, was surrendered by its killidar, who marched out with private property and arms at the head of his garrison, 1,500 strong—a conduct for which he was much censured by the confederates.

The acquisition of Ahmednugur as a point of support to all future operations to the northward, was of great consequence to the British army. A respectable garrison was left in the fort, and the revenues of the district were temporarily collected by an agent of the British government, and appropriated to assist in the expenses of the war. General Wellesley moved forward, crossed the Godavery, and arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th August. The Mahrattas had ascended the Ajunta Ghaut on the 24th with a large body of horse, and, avoiding Colonel Stevenson, who was some miles to the eastward, they encamped at Jaulna. On hearing of General Wellesley's arrival at Aurungabad, they moved off in a south-easterly direction, intending, it was said, to proceed to Hyderabad. General Wellesley immediately moved down to the left bank of the

Godavery to check their probable design of plundering the country, and to protect his own convoys of grain, which were forwarded by General Stuart from the covering army south of the Kistna.

Neither Rughoojee Bhonslay nor Sindia were possessed of military enterprize or experience, and they were quite undecided as to their plan of operations; sometimes Sindia proposed to depend on his battalions and artillery, at other times Rughoojee persuaded him to act on the predatory plan; their operations were of course feeble in the extreme. When General Wellesley moved down the Godavery, they countermarched in a northerly direction; and whilst the general awaited the junction of his convoys, Colonel Stevenson made several unavailing attempts to bring them to action, but only succeeded in partially surprising their

September 9. camp on the night of the 9th September. He had also made himself master of the

September 21. fort of Jaulna. On the 21st September the whole of the Mahratta army, joined by

their infantry, of which there were 16 battalions of regulars, was encamped about the village of Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffeirabad. On the same day General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson met at Budnapoer, when it was agreed that the two divisions, then in the neighbourhood of each other, should move separately, and attack the enemy on the morning of the 24th. They accordingly marched on the 22nd—Colonel Stevenson by the western, and General Wellesley by the eastern, route. On the 23rd, on reaching the village of Naulney, where he was about to encamp, General Wellesley learnt from his spies that the confederate armies were encamped on the Kailna river, within six miles of him. With great prudence and decision, founded on a remarkable discernment of the

character of his enemy,* he instantly resolved on attacking them without waiting for Colonel Stevenson. Had General Wellesley hesitated, the enemy's infantry would have moved off, their horse would probably have been encouraged to attack his baggage and annoy his camp, the service must have been prolonged, and by one day's delay or hesitation a new character might have been given to the war.

Having directed his deputy adjutant-general, Captain Barclay, to place the baggage in the village of Naulney, under the protection of a battalion and some details from the native corps, and to bring on the rest of the line with all convenient despatch, General Wellesley moved out in person at the head of the pickets to reconnoitre, and in a short time, on ascending a rising ground, the host of the confederates was seen extending in a vast line along the opposite bank of the Kailna river, near its junction with the Juah. Their army amounted to upwards of 50,000 men, of whom more than 30,000 were horse, and 10,500 were regular infantry, supported by upwards of 100 guns. The handful of British troops which now moved straight down upon this formidable array did not exceed 4,500 men,† but the general sentiment was that of their commander—

* I have had occasion to observe how well the Duke of Wellington must have known the Mahrattas from having read his private letters to Sir Barry Close during the war of 1803. Without being acquainted with their language, and, one would have supposed, with little opportunity of knowing the people or their history, his correct views of the Mahratta character and policy are very remarkable. As the letters in question were shown to me confidentially in 1817, in the course of my official duties, I may be only authorized to mention that, in some instances, his opinion of individuals, particularly of Bajee Rao, was correctly prophetic.

† The corps which had the honor to serve on this occasion were the 19th light dragoons, the 4th, 5th, and 7th Madras native cavalry, a detachment of Madras, and a small detail of Bombay, artillery, the 74th and 78th highlanders, 1 battalion 2nd, 1 battalion 4th, 1 battalion 8th, 1 battalion 10th, and 2 battalions 12th regiment of Madras sepoys.

"they cannot escape us." As General Wellesley drew nearer the enemy's line, he found their right composed entirely of cavalry, and that their cannon and infantry, which it was his object to take and destroy, were on their left near the village of Assaye. He therefore moved round and passed the Kailna river at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, forming his infantry into two lines, and his cavalry as a reserve in a third, with his right towards the Juah, and his left on the Kailna. The horse belonging to the Peishwa and the raja of Mysore accompanying General Wellesley formed at a distance across the Kailna, but had little or no share in the conflict.* The position thus occupied by the British, between the two rivers and near their junction, not only brought them upon their object, but was of importance in diminishing the front of the enemy, who changed their position as the British turned the flank of their old ground, and were now drawn up in two lines, one of them fronting the British troops, the other running at a right angle to their first line, with the left of both resting on the fortified village of Assaye. In this situation, as the British lines were forming, the Mahrattas opened a heavy cannonade, the execution of which is described as terrible. The pickets of the infantry and the 74th regiment, which were on the right, suffered particularly: the pickets were for a time halted, and the officer in command of them, when urged to advance, sent word that that the guns were disabled, and the bullocks killed. General Wellesley received the message with the utmost composure, and coolly replied—

* Just before the battle of Assaye commenced, intelligence was brought to General Wellesley that the Peishwa's troops intended to join Sindia in attacking him. That they would have done so in the event of a reverse is not improbable, but I have not met with any confirmation of the circumstance.

“ Well, tell him to get on without them.” The whole line without artillery was exposed to a dreadful fire of round and grape; the ranks of the 74th were completely thinned, and a large body of the Mahratta horse charged them: the order was given for the advance of the British cavalry: the 19th light dragoons, who only drew 360 swords, received the intimation with one loud huzza! Accompanied by the 4th native cavalry, who emulated their conduct throughout this arduous day,* the 19th passed through the broken but invisible 74th, whose very wounded joined in cheering them as they went on, cut in and routed the horse, and dashed on at the infantry and guns. Never did cavalry perform better service, or contribute more to the success of a battle. The British infantry likewise pressed forward, the enemy’s first line gave way, fell back on their second, and the whole were forced into the Juah at the point of the bayonet; the

* Nothing could exceed the zeal of some of the cavalry, particularly the 19th dragoons; every officer and man fought as if on his arm depended the victory. As instances may be mentioned, Lieutenant Nathan Wilson, who, with his arm shattered by a grape shot, and dangling by his side, charged on at the head of his troop. Lieutenant Alex. Grant, of the Madras native infantry, major of brigade to Colonel Maxwell, observing a gun pointed ready to discharge on the flank of the 19th dragoons, the match suspended on the touch-hole, with a noble impulse, in hopes of preventing it, darted forward almost on its muzzle, and with such force that his horse stuck between the cannon and its wheel; in this situation the gun went off, as he was in the act of endeavouring to prevent it by cutting down the artilleryman. Captain George Sale was attacking a man who defended himself with a pike or short spear, a weapon with which all Sindia’s artillerymen were armed; the man’s comrade, standing on a gun, made a thrust from above at Captain Sale, but it was turned by the breast-bone, and glanced off diagonally across his chest: his covering serjeant, named Strange, laid the man dead who wounded his officer, but in the act was himself speared through the lungs by another man from below the gun. Captain Sale went on, but begged the serjeant to fall in the rear, this, however, he gallantly refused, and rode out the day. Captain Sale and others afterwards saw him, when in hospital, blow out a candle from his lungs. The reader will be pleased to learn that the gallant serjeant recovered,

fugitives, on gaining the opposite bank, were followed, charged, and broken by the cavalry; but some of their corps formed again and went off in good order. One large body of this description was pursued and routed by the British cavalry, on which occasion Colonel Maxwell, who commanded them, was killed. As the British line advanced, they passed many individuals of the enemy who either appeared to have submitted or lay apparently dead. These persons, rising up, turned their guns on the rear of the British line, and after the more important points of the victory were secured, it was some time before the firing thus occasioned could be silenced. The enemy's horse hovered round for some time, but when the last body of infantry was broken, the battle was completely decided, and 98 pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors. The loss was severe; upwards of one-third of the British troops lay dead or wounded, but they had, considering the circumstances, achieved a triumph more splendid than any recorded in Deccan history.

Of the enemy 1,200 were killed, and the whole neighbourhood was covered with their wounded. Yadow Rao Bhaskur, Sindia's minister, was amongst the slain. Rughoojee Bhonslay fled from the field in the commencement of the action, and Sindia soon followed his example. The whole of the horse behaved in the dastardly manner; Sindia's infantry, although defeated by such a disparity of troops, did not altogether sully their high reputation. The artillerymen stood to the last, and eight of the old battalions of De Boigne fought with ardour and firmness. Most of Sindia's battalions laboured under disadvantages by the secession of the British part of their European officers, who, in consequence of a proclamation by the British government, quitted the Mahrattas at the

breaking out of the war. This proclamation was addressed to all British subjects, native as well as European, offering them the same pay which they enjoyed with Sindia. It was judiciously extended to all Europeans and in regard to the British officers was equally humane and politic.

Colonel Stevenson, owing to various impediments, did not join General Wellesley until the evening of the 24th, when he was immediately detached in pursuit of the enemy, whose regular infantry retired before him and crossed the Nerbuddah, towards which Colonel Stevenson followed them. But the main army of the confederate, moved to the westward, with an intention, as was supposed, of marching by the Kassarbharee Ghaut towards Poona. Under this supposition General Wellesley remained on the south side of the Ajunta Ghaut, and directed Colonel Stevenson to take possession of the city of Burhanpoor, and to reduce the strong fort of Asseergurh, both of which

October 21. objects he had accomplished by the 21st
 of October with inconsiderable loss. The

dependent districts in Candeish, which fell in consequence to the British disposal, were placed under the temporary management of revenue officers of the Hyderabad state.

In regard to the operations of the Guzerat troops under the orders of General Wellesley, a detachment of the field force was sent by Colonel Murray, under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, for the purpose of reducing Sindia's possessions in that quarter. The fortified town of Baroach

August 29. was stormed and taken on the 29th August.

Colonel Woodington next marched against the strong hill fort of Pawungurh, took by assault the town of

September 17. Champaneer, which is attached to it, and
 the fort surrendered on the 17th September.*

* Public records, Mahratta MSS., Ferdinand Lewis Smith, and oral information.

Whilst those successes attended the British arms on the west, affairs of not less consequence were passing in the north and east of India. The important possessions which had been acquired by Mahadajee Sindia in Hindostan were a primary object of attention with the British government. These provinces, independent of their value and their situation, were the nursery of the regular infantry of Sindia, which, although in itself less formidable to the British power than other descriptions of the Mahratta force, was in one respect dangerous, from its introduction of French officers, whose patriotism might induce them to encourage and support their countrymen in a favourite scheme of conquest in the east.

General De Boigne, having been compelled, as already mentioned, to return to Europe in 1796 from bad health, was succeeded by M. Perron, who had particularly recommended himself to Sindia by his conduct at the battle of Kurdla, and who had been sent from the Deccan to Hindostan to assume the command of the army, the charge of the emperor's person, and the management of the jagheer from whence his brigades were paid. De Boigne, with much of military enterprize and enthusiasm, as was at the same time a man of sense and prudence; a decided enemy to French revolutionary principles, and, though friendly and kind to Frenchmen who sought his service, the ideas of conquest in India entertained by many of his nation he regarded, even at that period, as chimerical. He knew the power and the watchful jealousy of the English, and he foresaw that any object which might be attempted by the states of India, through a connection with France, would certainly be anticipated by their subjugation. His last counsel to Sindia, "never to excite the jealousy of the British government by increasing his battalions, and rather

to discharge them than risk a war," was a sound advice ; but his supposed partiality for a English, and the sentiments of his successor, Perron,* which were precisely the reverse, was one cause which drove Sindia, more confident and ignorant than Perron himself, to attempt projects which brought on ruin and disaster, before he and his coadjutors had fixed the mode of warfare they intended to pursue. Perron is said to have laid down a scheme of operations,† but jealousy and distrust on the part of Sindia, the neutrality of Holkar, and the intrigues of Sindia's officers for the purpose of superseding Perron in the government in Hindostan, seem to have combined in preventing its adoption.

The main body of the British force in Hindostan, already mentioned in the general preparations of the governor-general, was assembled at Cawnpore ; and General Lake, the commander-in-chief, was vested with the same powers, civil and military, which had been delegated by the supreme government to General Wellesley in the Deccan. As soon as General Lake understood that the confederates had refused to withdraw their armies on the terms proposed by General Wellesley, he considered them in a state of war with the British government, and immediately put his troops in motion.

On the 29th August General Lake's army first came in sight of Perron's cavalry, 15,000 of whom were encamped at Coel, near the fort of Aligurh. After a trifling skirmish they retired as the British troops advanced ; the town of Coel was taken possession of, and Aligurh was summoned ; but every endeavour on the part of General

* He appears to have imbibed some of his opinions after the departure of De Boigne, who represented him to me as a man of plain sense, of no talent, but a brave soldier.

† Ferdinand Lewis Smith.

Lake failed in inducing M. Peron, its governor, to surrender. Much dependence was placed on this fortress. It is very strong, situated on a plain, surrounded by swamps, having a good glacis, with a ditch 32 feet deep and 200 feet wide. It was well garrisoned, fully provided with cannon, ammunition, and provisions; and the Mahrattas expected, as they had a right to expect, that it would sustain a long siege. The only passage into the fort was by a narrow causeway across a ditch, for which the French commandant, by gross neglect, had omitted to substitute a draw-bridge. General Lake, apprized of this circumstance, determined to hazard an attack by the gateway; and Mr. Lucan, a British subject, one of the officers who had come over from Sindia's service, offered to conduct the storming party. Break of day on the morning of the 4th September was the time appointed for the enterprize. On the firing of the morning gun, the party, who had been lying for some time within 400 yards of the gate, waiting for this signal, immediately advanced; and Colonel Monson pushed forward at the head of the flank companies of the 76th, in hopes of being able to enter the fort with a party of the enemy, supposed to have been stationed outside a breast-work. The work in question, however, was found abandoned, and the gate closed. Scaling ladders were applied, but such a formidable row of pikemen presented themselves above, that it was impossible to mount. A six-pounder was brought up to blow open the gate, but it had no effect. Much time and many lives were lost before a twelve-pounder could be substituted; and when it did come, four or five discharges were necessary to force an entrance. Advancing round a bastion, the party came upon the second

gate, which was easily forced, and the third was taken by entering it with the fugitives ; but the fourth and last gate, which led to the body of the place, could not be blown open, even by the application of the twelve-pounder, though great delay was experienced before the gun could be brought in. Thus disappointed, in a most trying situation, Major M'Leod, of the 76th regiment, attempted the wicket, and most fortunately gained an entrance. He was followed by the grenadiers ; the rampart was mounted, opposition soon ceased, and the British troops, by extraordinary bravery and good fortune, found themselves masters of the fortress of Aligurh with the loss of 278 men in killed and wounded, of whom 17 were European officers. M. Pedron, the commandant, were taken prisoner, and 2,000 of his garrison are said to have perished, including those who were drowned in the ditch.

In the meantime 5,000 of the Mahratta cavalry, which retired from Cool, prosecuted a successful enterprize under the direction of a Frenchman named Fleury, by attacking the cantonment of Shekoabad, where there was a detachment of five companies of sepoy and one gun. The assailants were repulsed on the first attempt, but having renewed the attack after the intervention of a day, the

Sept. 2—4. detachment, when nearly destitute of ammunition, capitulated, and were permitted to retire with their arms, on a promise of not serving against Sindia during the war. This attack obliged General Lake to send off a strong detachment, which arrived too late to save the cantonment, but was of importance to the security of an expected convoy.

Perron, who had for some time been conscious of a decline in Sindia's favour, and had even made some overtures to General Lake before the commencement of the war, pro-

ceeded, after the affair at Coel, to Muttra, where he received certain accounts of his being superseded in the government of Sindia's districts, and that his successor and personal enemy, Ambajee Inglia, was intriguing with the French officers under him, to deprive him of his jagheer, and of course of his command. Under these circumstances, to secure his private fortune, and avoid a crisis in which he had nothing to gain, he addressed a letter to General Lake on the 5th September, requesting permission to pass with his effects, his family, and the officers of his suite, through the company's territories, to Lucknow ; with which General Lake, under instructions from the governor-general, yielded a ready compliance.

On the 7th September, General Lake's army marched from Aligurh towards Delhi, and on the Sept. 7—11. 11th encamped within six miles of that city ; but scarcely were the tents pitched, when the enemy unexpectedly appeared in front. The pickets immediately turned out, and General Lake with the cavalry proceeded to reconnoitre.

M. Louis Bourquin, the officer next in rank to Perron, hearing of the advance of the British force towards Delhi, and that a part of the army was detached in pursuit of Fleury, crossed the Jumna with 12 battalions of regular infantry, amounting to 8,000 or 9,000 men, besides 5,000 cavalry and 70 pieces of cannon, for the purpose of attacking General Lake, whose force, after providing for the safety of his baggage, amounted to about 4,500 men. Bourquin took up a strong position with his guns concealed by high grass, and General Lake, in advancing to reconnoitre, became exposed to a very heavy and destructive fire. The line of British infantry were ordered on, but it was a considerable time before they came up,

and General Lake in the interim practised a successful feint, by retiring with the cavalry, which the enemy, mistaking for a retreat, followed them, shouting as if secure of victory. The cavalry, however, opening from the centre, permitted the British infantry, advancing in perfect order to pass to the front. The fire of grape, round, and cannister from the Mahratta guns was for some minutes tremendous, but the British troops moved on steadily, without returning a shot, until they were within 100 yards. They were then ordered to fire a volley and charge bayonets. Sindia's infantry could not withstand the fury of their onset, but, abandoning their guns, fled with precipitation. The line of infantry then broke into open columns of companies ; and the cavalry, which formed the second line, charging through the intervals, committed great slaughter among the fugitives, many of whom escaped from the sabre but to perish in the Jumna. The total loss of the Mahrattas was estimated at 3,000 ; that of the British army was 585, of whom 15 were European officers. Louis Bourquin, the commander of the Mahratta infantry, and five other French officers surrendered themselves prisoners three days afterwards. The other results of the victory were the possession of the capital of the Moghul empire, and of the family and person of the descendant of Timour. Though the change was but change of masters, it was a happy event for the aged and unfortunate Shah Alum to find himself once more under the protection of the British nation, of whose honor and liberality he had experienced many proofs.

General Lake next marched against Agra, which he summoned, but no answer was returned. This garrison had been under the command of English officers, who, on

the breaking out of the war, were confined by their own troops ; the circumstance, combined with other causes, occasioned the greatest anarchy and confusion in the fort. Seven battalions of Sindia's regular infantry were encamped on the glacis ; but the garrison were afraid to admit them, lest they should plunder a rich treasury which they wished to reserve for themselves. General Lake resolved to beat up the quarters of the seven battalions outside, in the first instance, in which he

October 10. completely succeeded, taking 26 of their guns. Three days afterwards, 2,500 of

those who remained came over in a body, and were admitted into the British service. A few days after this event, the progress of the siege being considerable, the garrison applied to their European officers, whom they had kept prisoners, to make terms for them ; on the

October 18. 18th October they evacuated the fort with their private property ; but the treasury and arsenal, with 162 pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors.

General Lake's next object was the infantry which had been sent under Dudrenec, by Sindia, to reinforce his army in Hindostan. It consisted of seven battalions, and arrived from the Deccan about the beginning of October. This body had been joined by three of Bourquin's battalions, not engaged at the battle of Delhi, and by some of the fugitives from Delhi and Agra, who were formed into two battalions, the whole consisting of 12 strong battalions, and amounting to about 9,000 men. They had a very superior equipment of artillery, were accompanied by 1,200 or 1,500 good horse, and during the siege of Agra had occupied a position about 30 miles distant from the British army. The commander was a

Mahratta officer,* Dudrence having surrendered to the English on the 30th October. It was understood that they intended to march on Delhi for the recovery of the capital. General Lake with a strong force proceeded in quest of them on the 27th of October; but as he advanced they retired towards the hills of Mewat. On

the 31st of October General Lake, on
Oct. 27—31. arriving at the ground which they had occupied the preceding day, determined, in order to prevent their escape, to pursue them with his cavalry, now consisting of eight regiments, three of which were European dragoons. He accordingly moved off at eleven o'clock that night, directing the infantry to follow at three o'clock next morning. After a march of 25 miles he

came up with them at sunrise of the 1st
November 1. November. On descriing the Mahratta infantry they appeared in motion, and, supposing them to be on full retreat, Lake ordered on the cavalry to impede them by an immediate attack. The Mahrattas, however, had time to form, and, instead of being found on the retreat, they had taken up a strong position, their right on the village of Laswaree, partially protected by a deep ravine, and their left resting on the village of Mohaulpore. To their rear was a deep rivulet, and their front was lined with 75 pieces of cannon, chained together the more effectually to resist the charge of horse. The whole were concealed by very high grass. The different brigades of cavalry, particularly that under Colonel Macan, executed the orders they had received in the most spirited manner; but the opposition with which they had to contend was

* I have not ascertained who this officer was; he is called Abajee by Major Thorn, but I regret not having obtained more satisfactory information respecting him. It was perhaps one of Ambajee Ingli's carcoons.

formidable in the extreme, and their loss was very great; in so much that General Lake was compelled to desist from this hazardous attack, and await the arrival of the infantry.

The Mahratta troops, in the meantime, changed their position, and drew up in two lines—the one in front, the other in rear, of the village of Mohaulpore. Their commander, on seeing the approach of the British infantry, offered to surrender his guns on certain conditions which were accepted, and one hour was allowed to fulfil the terms; but at the end of that time General Lake prepared to renew the attack. The British infantry consisted of the 76th regiment and six battalions of Bengal sepoys. Of three brigades of cavalry one was directed to support the infantry; another was detached to the right to watch the enemy, and take advantage of any confusion that might appear among them; and a third brigade formed the reserve. The whole of the artillery was thrown into four batteries to support the attack of the infantry. General Lake's was to turn the right of the enemy's position, for which purpose he moved off with the infantry in open column of companies, along the bank of the rivulet, which was nearly at right angles to the enemy's new position. For a time the march of the British troops was concealed by the high grass, but the Mahrattas no sooner discerned them, than they perceived the general's intention, which they immediately frustrated by throwing back their left wing, covering the movement with a heavy cannonade, which did severe execution on the front of the British column.

The British artillery returned the fire with good effect; but the enemy's cannon were far superior in number and weight of metal, and equally well served. The ground

was much broken, the advance greatly impeded by that circumstance, and the ranks of the 76th were so much thinned, that General Lake, who now, as on every occasion, was foremost in the battle, deemed it advisable to hasten on the attack with that regiment, and one battalion and five companies of sepoy who had closed to the front. When they arrived within reach of the cannister shot, the fire and the execution became so extremely severe, that it prevented a regular advance, and the Mahratta horse were encouraged to charge. They came on, but were repulsed most heroically; again they rallied, and assumed so menacing a position, that General Lake ordered the British cavalry to charge in turn. This service was gallantly performed by the 29th dragoons,* who dashed through both lines of the enemy's infantry, wheeled round upon their cavalry, killed many of the latter, drove them from the field, and, turning round, fell upon the rear of their second line. That line was by this time hotly engaged with the British infantry, which, having taken advantage of the gallant charge of their cavalry, had rushed forward on the guns, taken possession of them, and driven the first line back on the second. The whole of the British troops had now come up and joined in the attack; but the hardy veterans of De Boigne determined to die where they could not conquer, fought on with brave though unavailing obstinacy, and, excepting about 2,000 who were broken, surrounded, and made prisoners, they fell with their arms in their hands! Few, if any, of those men were natives of Maharashtra; they were chiefly from Oude, Rohileund, and the Dooab, for, except Sivajee's Mawulees, and men trained in the ranks of the Bombay

* When forming for the charge on the flank of the infantry, the 76th, with the same spirit which distinguished the 74th at the battle of Assaye, gave them three cheers.

sepoys,* the native Mahrattas have never made good infantry.

The victory of Laswaree cost the English army 824 men in killed and wounded, but it completed the overthrow of the brigades of De Boigne and Perron, and placed Agra and Delhi, with all Sindia's districts north of the Chumbul, in the power of the British government.

While success thus attended the British arms in Maharashtra and in Hindostan, a force commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt invaded Kuttack. Manikpatam was taken possession of without resistance on the 14th September. The Bramins of the temple of Jaggernaut placed it under the protection of the British government, and the town of Kuttack was surrendered on the 10th October. A detachment under Captain Morgan occupied Ballasore on the 21st September, and took Soorrung on the 3rd October. The storm of the fort of Barabuttee on the 14th October, by the troops under Colonel Harcourt, completed the conquest of the province of Kuttack.

The conquest of Bundelcund was effected with equal celerity. In regard to this province, a new arrangement had been made with the Peishwa in the month of August, by which the greater part of his rights in it was ceded to the English company, in lieu of Savanoor and Benkapoor in the southern Mahratta country, and Oolpar in the neighbourhood of Surat—all of which were included in the cessions made by the treaty of Bassein, and yielded an annual revenue of 19,16,000 rupees. The nominal revenue of Bundelcund was 36,16,000 rupees, but the state of the country rendered the first-mentioned cessions of much

* The men of this description are remarkably quiet and sober, patient under privation, and good soldiers; they used to be more apt to desert than any other men, but that was probably owing to circumstances no longer in existence.

greater value to the Peishwa ; whilst to the British, Bundelcund, from its situation in the neighbourhood of their position on the Jumna, and their means of rendering its revenues available, was extremely important. The British government, in consideration of the advantages thus derived, agreed to maintain a body of 5,000 Mahratta horse during the continuance of the war, and to keep a regiment of cavalry, in addition to the 6,000 infantry, on the permanent establishment of the Poona subsidiary force ; whilst from the Peishwa, instead of 6,000 infantry and 10,000 horse, only half of that number was to be required. This arrangement was afterwards regularly recognized, and the treaty drawn up in consequence of it, under date 16th December 1803, was termed supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein.

The Gosaeen Himmud Buhadur had tendered his services to the British government to assist them in the conquest of Bundelcund ; and his offer being now accepted, he joined the British detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, on the 16th September, with a large body of troops. Colonel Powell had crossed the Jumna ten days before. The united forces, after reducing various forts, crossed the river Cane on the 10th October. On the 13th they found the army of Shumsher Buhadur drawn up to oppose them ; but after a feeble resistance they gave way, fled across the river Betwah, and evacuated the province.

We now return to the contending armies in the Deccan.

As soon as the confederates found that General Wellesley had not passed the Ghaut, but was moving south towards Aurungabad, and that Colonel Stephenson had marched against Burhanpoor, they made preparations for following and interrupting him in that object. General Wellesley,

learning their design, immediately returned north, and descended the Ajunta Ghaut. Sindia, on

October 19.

finding that General Wellesley had returned, halted, but Rughoojee Bhonslay, who had separated from his confederate, marched to the southward by the Unkye Tunkye pass. General Wellesley, therefore, in order to protect the territory of the Nizam, re-ascended the Ajunta, and continued his route beyond Aurungabad, until he arrived in the neighbourhood of the camp of Rughoojee, who was so apprehensive of a night attack that he moved camp five times in less than 48 hours. On the 31st

October 31.

Rughoojee detached 5,000 horse to cut off a convoy of 14,000 bullock-loads of grain, escorted by three companies of sepoy and a party of Mysore horse, under Captain Baynes, who made a judicious and spirited defence at the village of Amber, and brought in the whole of his convoy safe, with the exception of about 200 bullocks. After this event General Wellesley, finding that Rughoojee was moving towards his own territories, once more returned to the northward, and descended the Ghauts at Rajoora, for the purpose of supporting and covering Colonel Stevenson, whom he had ordered to form the siege of Gawelgurh.

Previously to this period, several propositions for peace had been made to General Wellesley in Sindia's name. Ballajee Koonjur, the Peishwa's most confidential agent, who, notwithstanding the war, continued in Sindia's camp, sent a letter 15 days after the battle of Assaye, requesting that one of the British and one of the Nizam's officers should be sent to Sindia's camp to settle terms of pacification; but as he was not an accredited agent, and as the appearance of a British officer in Sindia's camp would have enabled the Mahrattas to represent the British nation

as supplicants for peace, General Wellesley refused compliance, but expressed his readiness to receive any envoy the confederates might depute. Another communication was opened through Appa Dessaye Nepankur, who was serving with the Peishwa's contingent, and the result was that Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, accompanied by a Bramin named Naroo Punt, arrived in General Wellesley's camp on the part of Sindia for the purpose of negotiating ; but as they also were unprovided with credentials, General Wellesley refused to treat until they should obtain them from Sindia. That chief, in the meantime, sent a letter, disavowing Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray's mission ; but, notwithstanding this disavowal, General Wellesley was convinced, from a letter addressed by Sindia to Appa Dessaye, that Ghorepuray had been deputed, and therefore permitted him to remain in his camp until a reply to his first reference should be received. A few hours after the interview in question, powers arrived for constituting Ghorepuray and his companion the envoys of Sindia, but they were essentially defective, as they did not enable the envoys to cede any portion of territory as compensation to the British government and its allies, which was required as the basis of the pacification. Until this authority could be obtained, Ghorepuray solicited a cessation of arms for both the confederates. It was granted to Sindia on the 23rd November, on condition that he should occupy a position 20 *kos* east of Elichpoor, and forage still further to the eastward ; but it was refused to Rughoojee Bhonslay, because he had sent no envoy, nor expressed any desire for peace.

The conditions, however, on which General Wellesley agreed to a suspension of hostilities were not observed by Sindia ; Rughoojee Bhonslay's army was encamped at

Argaom, near Gawelgurrh, under his brother Venkajee Munya Bappoo, and Sindia's cavalry were at Sersowly, within about five miles of him. Venkajee, besides cavalry, had the whole of his brothers infantry, and a considerable number of guns. The wukeels of Sindia urgently dissuaded the British commander from attacking Venkajee. General Wellesley told them repeatedly that there was no armistice with Rughoojee Bhonslay, and none with Sindia, until he complied with the terms of the agreement. Colonel Stevenson was by this time within a short distance of the confederates, and on the 28th November halted to enable General Wellesley to co-operate in the expected battle. The confederates decamped from the position they had occupied, when the united British divisions moved towards them on the ensuing day. As General Wellesley approached his intended ground of encampment, a few of

the enemy's skirmishers appeared in front
November 29. and were opposed by the Mysore horse.

General Wellesley, not intending to pursue them, was, after a long march, about to pitch his tents, when the Mahratta cavalry appeared in greater force, and it became necessary to support the Mysore horse with the pickets. General Wellesley, moving out at the head of the latter, described the army of the confederates drawn up in line, on an extensive plain, in front of the village of Argaom. Though late in the day, he immediately advanced to the attack, and marched on in column until near the enemy, when he formed his army into two lines—the infantry in the first, and the cavalry in the second. Some confusion ensued in forming the lines, when the Mahratta guns first opened upon them, but, when formed, the whole moved on with steadiness and order. A body of about 500 infantry, supposed to have been Persians, in the service of the

confederates, rushed upon the 74th and 78th with desperation, and were destroyed to a man. Sindia's cavalry under Gopaul Rao Bhow charged the 1st battalion 6th regiment of Madras sepoy; but they were repulsed, and their commander was wounded; on which the whole army retired in confusion, pursued by the British cavalry and by the Mysore and Moghul horse. In this action the loss of the British was 346 men in killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Mahrattas is nowhere stated, but was very considerable.

The British army next invested Gawelgürh. The principal operations were carried on by
December 5. Colonel Stevenson's division on the north face, where the troops went through uncommon labour and fatigue in carrying the guns and stores to the point of attack. The outer fort having been
December 15. breached by the 14th, was stormed on the ensuing morning; the inner fort was escaladed by the light company of the 94th, headed by Captain Campbell, who immediately opened the gate and admitted the rest of the troops.

In the meanwhile negotiations had been going forward at intervals for upwards of a fortnight. Yeshwunt Rao Ramchundur, the wukeel of Rughoojee Bhonslay, endeavoured to prove that his master was not the aggressor in the war; that the Peishwa had concluded a treaty contrary to the usage of the Mahratta state, without consulting the chiefs of the empire; that his master had not quitted his own territory, nor moved towards Sindia's, with any hostile design against the British government, but had gone with his army to mediate between Sindia and Holkar; that Holkar was strong and Sindia was weak, and that the latter would have been overpowered without his

master's assistance. General Wellesley represented the fact of his having assembled an army on the frontier of an ally of Britain, and having, in conjunction with Sindia, refused to withdraw; he denied the right of the Mahratta chiefs to be consulted by the Peishwa before he could make a treaty; and, in regard to interfering between Sindia and Holkar on account of the weakness of the former, admitting the fact to have been so, it was, General Wellesley observed, an extraordinary mode of strengthening Sindia and weakening Holkar to transfer to the latter all the territories of the Holkar family. In short, after a long argument as to the merits of the war, and a still longer discussion respecting the terms of the pacification, it was finally agreed on

December 17.

the 17th December that Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh, should cede to the British government and its allies the province of Kuttack, including Ballasore, and the whole of his territory and shares of revenue to the westward of the river Wurdah, and south of the hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurh. The forts of Nurnalla and Gawelgurh remained in Rughoojee Bhonslay's possession, together with districts lying south of those forts, valued at four lakhs of rupees. All claims on the Nizam, including of course chouth, ghas-dana, &c., were renounced; all differences between the Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Sena Sahib Soobeh were to be arbitrated by the British government; and no European or American of a nation at war with the English, or any British subject, was to be entertained without the consent of the British government. Such was the substance of the principal articles of the treaty of Deogaom. Accredited ministers from each of the contracting parties were to reside at the court of the

other ; and the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone, at that time Persian interpreter on the staff of General Wellesley's army, was appointed to act as resident at Nagpoor.

The negotiations with Sindia were not so promptly terminated. Doulut Rao endeavoured by every means to avoid making the cessions which the British government demanded as the basis of a pacification : and it was not until assured that his compliance was the only means of averting the entire conquest of his territories, that he at length assented. The treaty was concluded at Surjee

Anjengaom on the 30th December, and
December 30.

Sindia ceded to the British government and its allies his territory between the Jumna and Ganges, and all situated to the northward of the Rajpoot principalities of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud ; but the territory lying between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former place, was reserved. The forts of Ahmednugur and Baroach, with their districts, his possessions between the Ajunta Ghaut and the Godavery, and all claims on the emperor of the Moghuls, the British government or its allies, the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the Gaekwar, were renounced by Sindia : he also gave up all claims upon such rajas or jagheerdars as might have become allies of the British government during the war, and declared them independent of his authority. Sindia entered into the same agreement in regard to Europeans and Americans, and to residents of the courts, as had been admitted by Rughoojee Bhonslay : Major Malcolm was appointed to act as resident in his camp. The city of Burhanpoor, the forts of Asseerghur, Pawungurh, and Dohud, with their dependant districts, conquered by the British government during the war, were restored to Sindia. The enams granted to Mahadajee Sindia by the

emperor, namely, the district of Dholpoor-Baree and Rajkerrah, situated to the northward of the prescribed limits, and certain jagheers belonging to the family, or to immediate dependents of Sindia, were restored ; and the British government likewise promised jagheers, or pensions in lieu of them, amounting to 15 lakhs of rupees annually, to some other persons in Sindia's service. All enam villages, lands, or wutun obtained by Sindia and his predecessors, within the territories ceded, were to be restored to him and to the respective owners ; but no troops were permitted to be kept in such places, either to the north or south of Sindia's own territory. Finally, the British government left it in the option of Sindia to become a party to the defensive alliance, offering him a subsidiary force, payable from the revenues of the territories already ceded, whether furnished or not. In conformity with this article in the treaty of Surjee Anjengaom, a new treaty was afterwards concluded with Sindia at Burhanpoor, on the 27th February 1804, by Major Malcolm, empowered for that purpose by General Wellesley. Sindia then agreed to become a party to the defensive alliance, and a subsidiary force of 6,000 infantry, with their artillery, was to be stationed near his boundary, but within the British territory.

Of the conquests thus gained from the confederates, by subsequent partition treaties between the British government and its allies, the Nizam and the Peishwa, the province of Kuttack including Ballasore, the pergunna and fort of Baroach, the districts conquered from Sindia north of the Rajpoot states, the territory along the bank of the Jumna, and between that river and the Ganges, were assigned to the British government. The whole tract west of the Wurdah, eastward of the Peishwa's frontier, and

southward of the range of hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurh, down as far as the Godavery, was made over to the Nizam. The Peishwa having failed to afford the aid which was in his power, and having in other respects profited largely by the war, the fort and district of Ahmednugur was the only portion reserved as his share of the conquests.

The princes and chiefs who, by treaties with General Lake, had become the allies of the British government, were the rajas of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Boondee, and Macherry, the Jath raja of Bhurtpoor, the rana of Gohud, and the Mahratta officer Ambajee Ingolia. The agreements with the Rajpoots and the raja of Bhurtpoor specify the guarantee of their territory against external enemies, an exemption from tribute, and the aid of their forces in the event of any invasion of the country lately conquered by the British; Europeans not to be received into their service without the consent of the British government. With respect to the rana of Gohud and Ambajee Ingolia, with whom treaties were also made, it will be recollected that Mahadajee Sindia conquered the Gohud territory in 1784, and since that period it had been held by that chieftain and his successor. Ambajee Ingolia, whom we have seen appointed successor to Perron, was mamlitdar of the province of Gohud, and after seeing the rapid conquest of Hindostan, revolted, or pretended to revolt, against his master, and joined the English, from whom he obtained by treaty a share of the province of Gohud, which was divided between him and the rana, with the exception of the fort of Gwalior, ceded by the rana to the English. The treaties with the rana of Gohud and Ambajee Ingolia were similar to those concluded with the Rajpoots, excepting that the rana of Gohud agreed to subsidize three batta-

lions of sepoy, paying for them at the rate of 75,000 rupees a month. But these two treaties last mentioned afterwards became null and void, for reasons which the progress of our narrative will explain.*

* The above chapter is on the authority of English Records, the Marquis Wellesley's narrative, oral information, Mahrattas letters and MSS., and Major Thorn's memoir.

CHAP. XX.

A.D. 1804.

Reflections on the late war.—Views of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. —Negotiations.—Lord Lake advances against Holkar, preceded by a detachment under Colonel Monson.—Holkar retires across the Chumbul.—Tonk-Rampoorah taken.—Ummer Khan cuts off part of a detachment in Bundelcund.—Lord Lake re-inforces Monson, and cantons the main army for the rains.—Monson advances—escalades Hinglaisgurh—Holkar crosses the Chumbul—Monson hesitates—Holkar attacks him—Monson retreats—bravery—privations—distresses—disasters—and discomfiture of his detachment.—Holkar invades Hindostan—Muttra evacuated—is repulsed at Delhi.—Defence of Colonel Burn at Shamlee—Holkar carries his depredations into the Dooab—is pursued by Lord Lake—battle of Deeg—surprise at Furruckabad—storm of Deeg.—Holkar's possessions in the Deccan reduced—Indore evacuated.—Lord Lake determines on besieging Bhurtpoor—The raja's resolve.

THE rapidity of the conquests, and the speedy termination of the war, surprised all India, and it was naturally supposed that the astonishing success of the British arms would have deterred any power, however inimically disposed, from evincing a spirit of hostility at such a moment; but the conduct of Asiatics is frequently so capricious that it cannot be foreseen by any reasonable estimate of their interests.

Family rivalry, next to disputes concerning hereditary rights, is always uppermost in the mind of a Mahratta. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, notwithstanding the great sacrifices made by Sindia to induce him to join the confederacy, could not believe that his rival would forget the defeat and disgrace he had so lately suffered; and he concluded that, in the event of success against the British power, Sindia's first object, after re-establishing his influence at Poona, would be a war of extermination against himself. On the other hand, if the tide should turn against the confederates, he imagined, after the power of Sindia had been reduced to the level of his own, he might not only interpose with safety, but attain a consequence, so much the greater, as it would be manifest, in the event of ultimate success, that it had mainly depended on his exertions. Like all the Holkar family, he was a great advocate for the predatory system of warfare, and conceived that it would have been better for the confederates if they had carefully reserved their infantry and guns under the protection of forts, avoided an action, devastated the company's provinces, and acted with vigour upon General Wellesley's supplies.

Holkar, during the progress of hostilities, remained in Malwa, levying enormous contributions* from friend and foe, and could scarcely credit the accounts he received of the rapid victories of the English. When too late, he began to carry his designs into execution, and moved up towards the Jeypoor territory, for the purpose of negotiating for aid from the Rajpoots, the raja of Bhurtpoor, the Rohillahs, and the Seiks. He likewise despatched an envoy to Sindia, recommending him to break the treaty, and renew the war; but that chieftain was, or pretended to be at the

* Sir John Malcolm mentions his having exacted a crore of rupees from the city of Mundissore alone.

moment, so exasperated against him, that he immediately communicated the fact to the British authority. Some of his ministers, especially his father-in-law, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, had more confidence in Holkar, and advised Sindia, notwithstanding the communication to the British resident, to despatch a wukeel to the camp of Jeswunt Rao, for the purpose, as they gave out, of ascertaining his designs but in reality to leave open the door of reconciliation, in case the project of Holkar, in whose wisdom and fortune all the Mahrattas began to have great confidence, should prove worthy of regard.

The principal part of the British armies in the Deccan, after the termination of hostilities, retired to the southward, and two considerable divisions were stationed, the one at Jaffeirabad, to ensure the tranquillity of the country and its occupation by the Nizam, and the other at Poona, with the Peishwa, whose territory was a good deal molested by plundering insurgents and freebooters, which is usually the case in India after the close of a war.

The army in Hindostan under General Lake was still in the field to watch the motions of Holkar, whose menacing position, as well as the tone of his language, the general report of his hostile intentions, and his having put to death three officers, British subjects, who wished, in consequence of these reports, to take advantage of the governor-general's proclamation and retire from his service, afforded strong indications of an approaching rupture. Superadded to these were the machinations already mentioned, which were ascertained from his intercepted correspondence; but it was scarcely credible that he could intend risking a war, and General Lake believed to the last that affairs with Holkar would be amicably adjusted. In Holkar's letters to General Lake, as is frequently the case when insolence

is designed on the part of a Mahratta, it is difficult to discover whether friendly profession, arrogance, or humility predominate. In his first letter, professing that he had no intention of saying anything improper, he requested General Lake to retire towards Agra, "as his near approach to his victorious army appeared likely to produce unpleasant circumstances." In his next he declares that from him the general shall never have any other language than that of friendship; "but if anything contrary to friendship shall appear from you, then I am helpless." At length it became absolutely necessary to ascertain the designs of Holkar, and the governor-general directed General Lake to intimate to him the necessity of withdrawing his troops from the frontier of the allies of the British government. Whatever claims might be urged by the Holkar family against the Rajpoots and others, such claims, he was told, could not be considered to rest in him; but the British Government was willing, with the consent of the Peishwa, to arbitrate the existing difference between him and his brother Khassee Rao, on principles of equity and justice: Jeswunt Rao was also invited to send wukeels to the British camp. To these proposals Holkar replied by promising to withdraw his troops; and in the middle of March sent wukeels to General Lake's camp at Ramgurh. These persons produced a letter from Holkar, in which, after many friendly professions, he recommends the general to consent to the propositions they would offer, otherwise "his country and his property were on the saddle of his horse; to whatever side the reins of his brave warriors should be turned, the whole of the country in that direction should come into his possession." The wukeels submitted the following propositions:—"1st,

March 18.

that Holkar should be permitted to collect chouth agreeably to the custom of his ancestors; 2nd, that the ancient possessions formerly held by the family, such as Etaweh, &c., 12 districts between the Ganges and Jumna, and a district in Bundelcund, should be ceded to him; 3rd, that the country of Hurriana, which was formerly in the possession of the family, should be given to him; 4th, that the country then in his possession should be guaranteed, and a treaty should be concluded with him on the same terms as that with Sindia." These demands were altogether extravagant, and were treated as such by General Lake. Most of these countries, mentioned in the second and third propositions, had been conquered from Sindia; Etaweh had not been in the possession of the Mahrattas since their garrisons were driven out by Shujah-ud-Doulah, after the recal of the Peishwa's general, Visajee Kishen, in 1773, and had been ceded in 1801 by the nabob of Oude to the East India Company. The wukeels proceeded, in a high strain of menace, to exaggerate the power of Holkar, and the value of the connections, hostile to the British government, which he had formed. General Lake replied "that it was not customary with the English to boast of their power, but that Holkar would find, in the event of a rupture, that he had much overvalued his own." General Lake also took occasion to mention to the wukeels that their propositions and their language were so much at variance with the tenor of Holkar's letters, that no judgment could be formed of his real wishes and intentions. On the ensuing day the wukeels attended to receive a reply to the letter they had brought from Holkar, when they solicited a grant of some country, or an annual sum in lieu of an increase of country, and asked whether or not Holkar was to be allowed to collect the customary tribute

from the states of Oudepoor and Kotah. To all which General Lake merely replied that Holkar must first evince his friendly intentions by returning into his own country before the British government could be enabled to enter upon a discussion of any claims.

Five or six weeks before the despatch of these wukeels to General Lake, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had addressed a letter to General Wellesley, in which he demanded from him certain districts claimed by his family in the Deccan as the condition of peace, and concluded in a strain of the most vaunting menace, in case by non-compliance it should be rendered necessary to resort to war.

In the beginning of April Holkar repaired on pretence of devotion to Ajimere, belonging to Sindia, where he levied contributions, and made an unsuccessful attempt to possess himself of the fort ; but he justified these acts to Sindia's wukeel as necessary to enable him to prosecute a war, involving the independence of the Mahrattas. A great portion of his army remained on the frontier of the Jeypoor territory, where they commenced plundering.

In the meanwhile the governor-general having been made acquainted with Holkar's demands, and apprehending many evils from continuing to temporize, issued orders to General Lake and General Wellesley to attack Holkar's troops and possessions in every direction, declaring at the same time that it was not his intention to retain Holkar's territories for the British government, but to divide them amongst its allies.

General Wellesley was at this period at Bombay, and, in consequence of a famine in the Deccan from a deficiency of rain, superadded to the devastations occasioned by the moving armies and plundering bands by which that country had been for years infested, it was apprehended that it

would be impracticable to act against Holkar's possessions in that quarter until the fall of the rains ; but General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray to assail them from Guzerat, and to advance upon his capital in Malwa. Sindia, who was informed of these particulars, professed his readiness to act in cordial co-operation for the reduction of Jeswunt Rao.

On the 18th April General Lake sent forward a detachment of three native battalions under
April 18—23. Colonel Monson to Jeypoor, on which Holkar began to retire rapidly to the southward. Parties of irregular horse under European officers followed his march, to watch his motions and harass his troops. Holkar having halted for two days, General Lake advanced upon him, preceded by Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's detachment, but Holkar renewed his flight, and continued his route until he had gained his own frontier, and crossed the Chumbul. During his retreat he made an attempt to renew the negotiation, which was declared inadmissible. He was followed by the irregular horse and Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, covered by General Lake's army, from
May 16. which a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Don gallantly stormed and took the fort of Tonk-Rampoorah by blowing open the gate.

The news of this first success in the war against Holkar was shortly afterwards followed by intelligence of a different description from the province of Bundelcund, where the refractory chiefs in that strong country occupied the troops for a considerable period after its transfer to the British government. Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, the officer in command, had detached seven companies of sepoy, with some artillery, for the purpose of reducing a small fort. Whilst operations against it were in progress,

the killidar sent out an offer to surrender on the ensuing morning, on condition that the firing should cease. The proposal being accepted, the killidar apprized Holkar's general, Umeer Khan, of the circumstances, and invited him to send a detachment, and fall by surprise on the British troops. In this scheme they were partially successful; the horse approached the battery before they were discovered, and two companies of sepoy's with 50 artillery-men, their officers and guns, were completely cut off. The remaining five companies under Captain Smith, supported by their only remaining gun, effected their retreat to the head-quarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett. Umeer Khan, encouraged by this success, made an attack on Kalpee, and attempted to pass the Jumna, for the purpose of plundering the Dooab, but he was checked by two companies of sepoy's stationed on the bank, and was shortly afterwards attacked and routed by a party of horse and a battalion of infantry, which had been received into the British pay from the service of Ambajee Inglia. Umeer Khan, however, continued to act for some time on the side of Bundelcund, where the numerous refractory zumeendars facilitated the means of predatory warfare.

In the meantime, as the rains approached, and the troops in Guzerat, in concert with those of Sindia, were supposed best capable of acting with advantage against Holkar's possessions during that season, General Lake, after the capture of Tonk-Rampoorah, returned with the main army into cantonment, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Monson to keep Holkar in check, with five battalions of sepoy's and about 3,000 irregular horse—the latter divided into two bodies, the one under Bappoojee Sindia, in the service of Doulut Rao, and the other under Lieutenant Lucan. After the return of General Lake, Monson, intending

to co-operate with Colonel Murray from Guzerat, entered Holkar's territory by the Mokundra pass, and a detachment from his division took the hill-fort of Hinglais-gurh by escalade. Without efficient means of supply, he continued his route towards the Chumbul until the 7th July, when he received information that Holkar was crossing that river to attack him with the whole of his army, including his infantry and guns. Monson, who, shortly after his appointment to his present command, was nominated to the temporary rank of brigadier-general by the British commander-in-chief, at first advanced with the intention of meeting the enemy, and of taking advantage of their probable confusion in crossing the river. But staggered by a report that Colonel Murray intended to fall back on Guzerat, he began to reflect that he had only two days' grain for the supply of his camp, and that several detachments might be expected to join him; he therefore determined to retire to the Mokundra pass. A prompt and spirited attack on Mahrattas has always succeeded: indecision on the part of their enemy encourages them to fight when they would otherwise only think of escape, and a prolonged retreat before them, except in the single instance of the British detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Camac, has invariably ended in disaster.

Having adopted the unfortunate alternative we have mentioned, Brigadier-General Monson, on
July 8. the 8th July, began his retreat by sending off his baggage and stores at four o'clock in the morning. No enemy having appeared, the line of infantry followed at nine, and the irregular horse were left on the ground, with orders to follow in half an hour, and to send the earliest intelligence of Holkar's motions. The division had retired about six *kos*, when intelligence was brought that

the irregular horse had been attacked and defeated, and that Lieutenant Lucan* was taken prisoner. This information, it may be here observed, was brought by Doulut Rao's officer, Bappoojee Sindia, who in a few days afterwards deserted to Holkar. On the ensuing morning,

July 9—11. however, Monson took post in front of the Mokundra pass. On the 10th the Mahratta

cavalry appeared, and next morning, their numbers having greatly increased, Holkar sent a letter requiring the surrender of the arms of the British detachment. The demand was of course rejected; when Holkar, dividing his cavalry into three bodies, attacked the division in front and flanks, but after various unsuccessful attempts, he withdrew his troops in the evening, and encamped at the distance of two kos, where, being joined by his infantry and guns, he intended, as was supposed, to renew the attack on the following morning. Monson not deeming his post tenable, and being apprehensive of having his retreat cut off, quitted his position, and in two marches, though harassed

July 12. by the enemy and exposed to very heavy rain, reached Kotah. The raj-rana of Kotah, when the British troops appeared as fugitives, would neither admit them into the town nor supply them with food;† Brigadier-General Monson was therefore

* Lieutenant Lucan's fate was never positively known. He was supposed to have been poisoned, but this I have heard contradicted on tolerably good native authority, which stated that he died of a bowel complaint. The authority alluded to was Mohummud Khan Bungush, one of Holkar's officers, taken in rebellion by Colonel Wallace in 1808.

† Monson's narrative as published by government. The raj-rana, Zalim Sing, afterwards denied his having refused them food, and said he had offered them an asylum outside the walls; but allowing this last to have been true, Colonel Monson, by accepting such an equivocal support, might have exposed his detachment to certain destruction between two fires. It is however certain that Zalim Sing was fined ten lakhs of rupees by Holkar, whilst the latter lay in the neighbourhood of Kotah.

obliged to continue his route towards the Gaumuch ford on the Chumbul. Although its distance from Kotah was only seven miles, the obstructions occasioned by the incessant rain, and the deep nature of the soil, prevented his

July 13, 14. reaching the expected ford until next morning, when it was found impassable

until the ensuing day. On the 14th Monson was obliged to halt to enable the troops to procure some grain; heavy rain continued throughout the night. On the 15th he resumed his march, but the guns sank so deep in the mud that they could not be extricated. The grain in the adjoining village was exhausted,—retreat was now necessary to procure subsistence; the ammunition was therefore destroyed, and the guns were spiked and abandoned; but they were recommended to the care of the raja of Boondee, who, although he could not save the guns, had the courage to maintain his engagements with the English in the face of the host of Holkar. On the 17th the

July 17. troops reached the Chumbelee rivulet,

which was not fordable, but Monson, on the ensuing day, sent his artillerymen across on elephants, with orders to proceed to the fort of Rampoorah. Nearly ten days elapsed before the whole of the troops—some on elephants, some on rafts, and some by being sent to a ford farther down—could cross this rivulet, so greatly was it swollen. During that time they sustained much privation; in different situations they repulsed several persevering attacks which were made upon them by Holkar's cavalry; and a detachment of flank companies, under Captain O'Donell, beat up the camp of a large body of the enemy

July 21. on the evening of the 21st July, with great spirit and success. Many of the men

were drowned in crossing the Chumbelee; but the most

trying to the poor sepoys of all that they endured, was the loss of many of their wives and children, who, being in some instances necessarily left on the opposite bank till the last, were, in this helpless and unprotected state, in view and within hearing of their husbands, barbarously massacred by Bheels from the neighbouring hills, who were in the interests of Holkar.

By the 29th July the whole of the corps of the division reached Rampoorah, and here Brigadier-General Monson was joined by two battalions of sepoys with four field-pieces, two howitzers, and a body of irregular horse, bringing with them a supply of grain. This reinforcement had been ordered forward by General Lake as soon as he was apprized of the situation of the detachment at the Mokundra pass; but Brigadier-General Monson, not judging his supplies sufficient, after a long and apparently unnecessary halt, determined to continue his retreat to Kooshalgurh, where he expected to find supplies, and to be joined by six of Sindia's battalions with 21 guns, under Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur, the officer defeated by Holkar at Poona in October 1802. After throwing a strong garrison with his field-pieces into Rampoorah, the division, consisting of five battalions and six companies of Bengal sepoys,* with two howitzers on the morning of the 22nd August, reached the Bunass, which was so much swollen as to be scarcely fordable for the largest elephants. Three boats were found, with which the treasure of the detachment, protected by the six companies of the 21st regiment under Captain

* 2 2d, 1 9th, 1 14th, both battalions of the 12th, and six companies of the 21st Bengal native infantry.

Nicholl, were sent across and forwarded to Kooshalgurh.

August 23, 24. On the 23rd August Holkar's cavalry again made their appearance in force, and on the 24th, the river being fordable, Brigadier-General Monson began to send over his baggage and one battalion. Holkar at the same time, took possession of a village on Monson's right, but was promptly dislodged from it. The river having decreased considerably, the Mahrattas were enabled to pass it to the right and left, and most of Monson's baggage having got across, his main body, consisting of three battalions with one of the howitzers, followed. Major James Sinclair was left with one battalion, the 2nd battalion 2nd regiment, and the pickets of the four corps which had crossed, to protect the passage of the remaining baggage and camp-followers. At 4 P. M., however, Holkar's infantry and guns camp up, and opened a heavy cannonade. Major Sinclair desperately charged the guns with the small party that remained, took several of them, and for a moment was victorious; but the enemy, rallied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar in person, charged in turn with overpowering numbers, and the gallant handful of sepoys was nearly annihilated. Of the brave European officers who led them on, 12 fell with their commander, and the wreck of the party escaped under cover of the fire of their comrades, who lined the opposite bank. The Mahrattas, as usual in success, were now active and energetic; they prosecuted the advantage which they had obtained, and compelled Monson to abandon his baggage, which, with their usual avidity, they seized as trophies of a decisive victory. But the British detachment could yet show they were far from being subdued; every attack was

repulsed, and Colonel Monson reached Kooshalgurh on the night of the 25th August. Here a most unexpected state of affairs presented itself; instead of finding an ally in Sewdashew Bhow, that officer had attacked Captain Nicholl, who had, with much judgment and spirit, maintained his post, and protected Kooshalgurh, a town belonging to the raja of Jeypoor. On the 26th August the Mahratta cavalry encamped in separate bodies, surrounding the British detachment; and two companies of sepoy, belonging to the 1st battalion 14th regiment, with a large proportion of the irregular horse, seduced by Holkar, deserted. Of the cause of this partial disaffection there is no account afforded, but for the treachery of the few, the general fidelity and steadiness of the detachment, most amply made amends.* Unfortunately, Brigadier-General Monson did not know the sepoy; they had no confidence in him, nor he in them. At seven o'clock on the evening of the 26th August, having previously spiked his remaining howitzer, the other having been taken by the enemy on the bank of the Bunass, Brigadier-General Monson moved out of Kooshalgurh, and prosecuted his retreat towards Agra in an oblong square. During that night and the ensuing day the Mahratta horse, supported by guns, repeatedly attempted to penetrate, but could make no impression. On the night of the 27th, under the protec-

tion of the ruined fort of Hindoun, Monson August 27. halted a few hours to refresh his weary men, but one hour after midnight his retreat was resumed. As soon as he had cleared the ravines near Hindoun, the

* During the most harassing days many of the old sepoy and native officers were often heard encouraging the younger European officers, when sinking under their fatigues telling them "to cheer up, for that they would carry them safely to Agra."

horse in three different bodies made a desperate charge ; but the sepoy, reserving their fire until they were almost within reach of their bayonets, then gave it with such signal effect that the enemy retired in every direction. The troops, almost exhausted with fatigue and hunger, reached the Biana pass about sunset ; here Brigadier-General Monson intended to halt during the night, but the ardent and persevering enemy once more brought up their guns, and opened so heavy and severe a fire on the exhausted troops as to oblige them to go on as they best could. But weary, and harassed beyond endurance, the baggage having become entangled with the line of march, and the night being excessively dark, no order could be restored, and the whole were thrown into inextricable confusion. In this state the troops fairly broke, and fled towards Agra. The enemy, though they attacked in straggling parties, fortunately were not in sufficient force to reap the full advantage they might have done, and by

August 31.

the 31st August, the greater part of the fugitives, who escaped the enemy, found an asylum at Agra.

Holkar, at the head of 60,000 horse,* 15,000 infantry and artillery, with 192 guns, advanced triumphantly to Muttra, which at his approach was abandoned by the British troops ; and parties of the Mahratta horse pushed across the Jumna. But General Lake, with his accustomed energy, had already taken measures for repairing the disasters. The Mahrattas who crossed the Jumna were driven back, troops were ordered on to Agra with all expedition, and the British army, in the cause of a

* So stated by Sir John Malcolm, who, in regard to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, is our best authority. To account for this vast body, it must be recollected that he was recruited by the wreck of the armies of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay, and a part, no doubt, were Pindharees.

month, again advanced on the Mahrattas. In a few days the Mahratta horse began, in their usual manner, the show themselves in small parties, gradually increasing in numbers, flying before the British cavalry when sent to pursue them, evading every attempt to bring them to action, turning as their pursuers turned, firing their matchlocks, and brandishing their spears ; whilst others stole in upon the flanks and rear, where they at first cut off stragglers and baggage with considerable success. The cruelties committed by Holkar on all who fell into his hands were barbarous in the extreme. It is probable that General Lake, instead of making fruitless attempts from a standing camp to bring Holkar's cavalry to action, would have pushed at his

October 4—12. infantry and guns, but he seems to have remained as Muttra for the purpose of collecting

supplies, which afforded Holkar an opportunity of attempting an important enterprize, being no less than that of endeavouring to possess himself of the emperor's person. The plan was well conceived, but it was completely frustrated by the precaution and gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony, the resident at Delhi, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, the commandant. The whole of the enemy's infantry and artillery attacked Delhi on the 8th, and continued the siege until the 14th, during which,

October 8—14. though deserted by a party of irregulars attached to the garrison, a small body of British sepoy, ably commanded,* made a successful sortie, repelled an assault,

* In regard to sepoy, it cannot be too well understood that much depends on their European officers; no officers in the British service can be placed in situations where more address, suavity, and firmness are necessary ; consequently none are more deserving of consideration from their country ; but officers must also remember that it is generally their own fault when confidence is not mutual. To encourage the sepoy on this occasion, Colonel Ochterlony served out sweetmeats, and promised them half a month's pay as soon as the enemy was repulsed. He knew them.

and under incessant fatigue defended a city ten miles in circumference.

General Lake, on hearing of this attack, marched to the relief of the capital, and arrived there

October 18.

on the 18th October ; but it was Holkar's

plan to keep his infantry out of reach, and they were already five days on their march towards the territory of his ally the raja of Bhurtpoor, who in favor of his old friends the Mahrattas, particularly the family of Holkar, had seceded from his engagements with the English, notwithstanding the great advantage which he derived from their alliance. Holkar's cavalry, except a few thousands who accompanied the march of his infantry, continued to hover round Delhi for some days ; but on the 29th of October suddenly crossed the Jumna below Panniput, for the purpose of cutting off a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, who, after being called in for the defence of Delhi, was on his return to his station at Sehraunpoor, with one battalion of sepoy and some matchlockmen, when he was overtaken by Holkar at Shamlee. He formed his camp into a square, which, towards evening, the enemy surrounded, but drew off in the night to the high road leading to Sehraunpoor, which enabled Colonel Burn to throw his party into a small gurhee near the town, where he resolved to defend himself if he could procure supplies, and, if not, to fight his way back to Delhi. In consequence of the hostility evinced towards him by the inhabitants of Shamlee, who joined Holkar in attacking him, he had determined to adopt the latter alternative, when he heard that General Lake, with three regiments of dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry, the horse artillery, and a brigade of infantry under Colonel Don, was marching to his relief. General Lake arrived

at Shamlee on the 3rd November ; Holkar retired on his approach, and now prepared to execute his long-meditated threat of wasting the company's provinces with fire and sword. To leave him no time for the purpose was now the object of the British general ; and on the 5th November the pursuit of Holkar commenced ; his route lay in a southerly direction, straight down the Dooab, in which he pillaged and burned the defenceless villages as he passed along.

The British infantry, excepting the brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Don, was sent with two regiments of cavalry by General Lake, when he crossed the Jumna, to follow Holkar's infantry and guns, which had taken post near Deeg, a fort belonging to the raja of Bhurtpoor. Major-General Frazer, who commanded, arrived in the neighbourhood of Deeg on the 12th November. Holkar's infantry was encamped behind an extensive morass

and a deep tank, with their left on a fortified village, and their right on the fort of Deeg, supported by ranges of batteries, which they deemed impregnable. On the morning of the 13th the British troops, in two lines, moved on to the attack ; the

gallant 76th first carried the fortified village with their bayonets, and finding a range of guns immediately under it, charged on through a tremendous fire of round, grape, and chain shot : the 1st Bengal European regiment rushed on to support the 76th, followed by the sepoys. Holkar's infantry abandoned the first range of guns, and retired to the next ; but this was as instantly charged by General Frazer, who fell mortally wounded in the operation, deeply regretted by his troops. The command devolved on Colonel Monson, under whom the victory was completed ; the enemy being compelled to abandon battery after battery, until

they were forced into the fort of Deeg; the garrison of which immediately fired upon the British troops. During the battle the Mahratta horse re-took the first range, and for a short time turned the guns on the rear of the British line, but they were again re-taken by 28 men of the 76th regiment, headed by Captain Norford, who lost his life in the performance of this remarkable exploit. The loss of the British was severe; no less than 643 were killed and wounded, and of these 22 were European officers. The loss of the enemy was estimated at about 2,000; 87 pieces of ordnance were taken, and among them Col. Monson had the satisfaction of finding 14 of those lost during his retreat.

Four days after the victory at Deeg, on the morning of the 17th November, General Lake, after November 17. a most persevering pursuit, came up with Holkar's cavalry at Furruckabad, and falling upon them by surprise, put 3,000 of them to the sword. General Lake from the 31st October estimated that he had marched at the rate of 23 miles daily, and that during the night and day preceding the attack, including the space gone over in the pursuit, his cavalry went upwards of 70 miles in less than 24 hours.

The explosion of a tumbril, as the British troops approached the Mahratta camp, gave the alarm to Holkar, and on the first discharge from the gallopers, Jeswunt Rao fled with such of his followers as were ready on the instant, taking the direction of Deeg, to join the remains of his army, of whose defeat he received intelligence the night before he was surprised. General Lake, continuing the pursuit, arrived at Deeg on the 1st December, when the siege of that fortress having been determined upon, the battering train was brought from Agra, and the trenches opened on the 13th. In ten days a breach was made

in an outwork, strongly fortified at one of the angles of the city, which was stormed and taken at midnight, with the loss of 227 men killed and wounded. On the
December 13.

ensuing day and night the town and citadel of Deeg were evacuated, the garrison, including the remains of Holkar's infantry, betaking themselves to Bhurtpoor.

The capture of Deeg, involving the loss of the greater part of the territory of the raja of Bhurtpoor, was a severe blow to Holkar. His territory in the Deccan was already reduced by the capture of all his forts, including Chandore and Galna, which, after a slight resistance, surrendered to a division under Colonel Wallace by the end of October. His principal forts in Malwa were also occupied by British troops, and in the month of August, Indore, his capital, had been taken possession of without resistance by the detachment of the Bombay army from Guzerat. That division had been ordered to advance into Hindostan for the purpose of endeavouring to intercept Holkar in his expected flight to Malwa, and it had reached Kotah by the end of December. The reduction of Bhurtpoor, however, was deemed necessary in order to cut off Holkar's only asylum, after which he might, it was supposed, be followed up as a fugitive, and either taken prisoner or rendered insignificant.

But the fortunes of Jeswunt Rao, though in a few weeks they had undergone a signal reverse, were not yet destined to close. The situation of his ally the raja of Bhurtpoor was still more desperate than his own, for as a Mahratta freebooter "he had still his country and his property on the saddle of his horse," but the Jath raja, as he himself declared from the first, "must stand or fall with his fort."*

* The above chapter, where the authority is not expressly mentioned, is from English Records, Major Thorne's memoir, and oral information.

CHAP. XXI.

A.D. 1805 AND A.D. 1806.

The siege of Bhurtpoor commences.—Holkar and Umeer Khan attempt to obstruct the operations.—Umeer Khan proceeds to Rohilcund—is pursued by General Smith—defeated and compelled to return to Bhurtpoor.—The Jaths repulse the British army in four assaults.—The raja sues for peace—terms granted—principal reason for admitting him to terms.—Disputes with Sindia.—The Marquis Cornwallis returns to India as governor-general—his views—death—is succeeded by Sir George Barlow.—Holkar takes the route of the Punjab—is pursued by Lord Lake.—Peace with Sindia—and with Holkar.—System of policy pursued by Sir George Barlow—remonstrances of Lord Lake—declaratory articles annexed to the treaties—policy of the British government towards the Rajpoots—particularly ungenerous towards the raja of Boondee.—Treaty with the Gaekwar.

THE Bengal army arrived before Bhurtpoor on the second day of the new year. General
 A.D. 1805. Lake being accustomed only to success without properly reconnoitring the place, and with a very inefficient battering train, commenced the siege by taking
 January 4. possession of a grove which afforded a partial cover to his operations. Bhurtpoor is a fortified town, six or eight miles in circumference, everywhere surrounded by a very high strong mud wall,

and bastions planted with a numerous artillery, having a wide and deep ditch, capable of being rendered unfordable. It was strongly garrisoned by the whole of the raja's troops and the remainder of Holkar's infantry. The raja pressed a great proportion of the neighbouring villagers, many of whom were of his own cast, to assist in repairing the works; and having a very large treasury, nothing to obstruct his supplies on three sides of the town, and Holkar's cavalry to act upon those of the besiegers, his means of defence were proportionate to his resolution to use them. In addition to Holkar's cavalry, Umeer Khan was summoned for Bundelcund, and during the progress of the siege, after making on one occasion a considerable but unsuccessful effort on an important convoy, where a number of his men were killed, he went off to effect a diversion,

February 7. crossed the Jumna and the Ganges, and invaded the Company's districts in Rohil-

cund. He was, however, so closely pursued by the British cavalry detached by General Lake under General Smith, that he had not time to effect extensive mischief. He was at last overtaken on the 1st March, and after a sharp skirmish routed with considerable loss. This defeat encouraged the people of the country to resist him, and his followers began to desert. Tired at length by a campaign less profitable and more hazardous than he expected,

March 20. Umeer Khan, about the 20th March, returned to Bhurtpoor, which still defied

every effort of the British general, who had by that time come to the resolution of suspending operations until the arrival of stores, and the junction of a more powerful artillery. The army had been repulsed in four assaults; the first, led by Colonel Maitland, who lost his life on the occasion, was made on the night of the 9th of January.

Several causes were assigned for its failure; owing to the irregularity of the ground, and the extreme darkness, a confusion took place at the outset, from which many of the men lost their way; the ditch was very deep, and the breach was not only imperfect, but defended with determined courage. A better breach induced General Lake to try the second assault on the 21st of the same month; it failed from the depth of water in the ditch. Means had been taken to ascertain the extent of this impediment by a stratagem of three of the Bengal native cavalry, who, pretending to go over to the enemy, and being fired upon with blank cartridges from the trenches, had thus an opportunity of making their observations, and returned with a favourable report. The enemy, however, dammed up the ditch in front of the breach, which, on the part of the besiegers, rendered valour unavailing, and perseverance destruction.

February 10. On the 10th February the Bombay division, under Major-General Jones, joined the Bengal army to assist in the siege, which was now going on by regular approaches. On the 20th of that month another assault

February 20. was made with no better success than the former. Two European regiments, one of them the hitherto brave 76th, refused to follow their officers, and thus gave the 12th regiment of Bengal sepoys an opportunity of immortalizing themselves. Following the gallant remains of the flank companies of the 22nd regiment of foot, the sepoys advanced with the greatest alacrity, planted their colours on the top of a bastion, and it was supposed that an equal degree of ardour on the part of the 75th and 76th regiments would have made them masters of the place. Next day the men of these regiments, when addressed by General Lake, were over-

powered by shame and remorse; they volunteered to a man; and a fourth and last attempt was made on the

21st February. The men marching over
February 21. the dead bodies of their companions, which

crowded the ditch and glacis, rushed on with a desperate resolution, which would have overcome any practicable obstacle. On this, as on every former occasion, none of the troops relaxed in their efforts; and for two hours, until ordered to desist, they persevered at the breach, or in climbing up a high bastion which adjoined it. But as fast as the leaders got up, they were knocked down with logs of wood, or speared by rows of pikemen who crowded the tops of the parapets. The besieged took every precaution, and used every effort of prudence and resolution; the damage done to the mud wall by the shot was generally repaired during the night, their guns, were drawn within the embrasures to prevent their being dismounted, and during the assaults, particularly in the last, pots filled with combustibles, burning cotton bales steeped in oil, with incessant discharges of grape from the cannon, and a destructive fire of small arms were poured upon the British troops, whose casualties were very great, and in the four assaults 3,203 men were killed and wounded, of whom 103 were European officers. The most afflicting circumstance attending these failures was the necessity of leaving many of the wounded behind, who were almost invariably put to death by a sally of the garrison.

The Mahratta horse made their appearance daily, endeavouring to obstruct the operations of the siege, and during the assaults afforded considerable assistance particularly when the British cavalry was in pursuit of Umeer Khan. They occasionally cut off cattle, foragers, and stragglers, and the foraging parties of the besiegers were

necessarily so strong, and obliged to march to such a distance, that very considerable impediment was the consequence. Besides the attempt made by Umeer Khan, already adverted to, there was another serious but unavailing attack upon a convoy, which was made by both Holkar and Umeer Khan, assisted by some of the Jath horse. On both occasions the convoys were saved by seasonable reinforcements from the British camp. Upon the return of the cavalry from the pursuit of Umeer Khan in Rohilcund, General Lake made two attempts to surprise Holkar, in the second of which he was particularly successful;* 1,000 of the Mahrattas were killed, and great numbers of the horsemen their spirit being now completely broken, quitted their leader after this chastisement. To such a pitch of alarm had they now arrived, and so completely disheartened were these active tormentors of Monson's detachment, that they had not courage to fight for their lives; not one of the British cavalry was killed on the occasion. A few days after this event, 3,000 of the remains of Holkar's regular infantry were intercepted by a detachment of British troops under Captain Royal, and defeated with severe loss.

To complete Holkar's misfortunes, his ally, the raja of Bhurtpoor, hoping to save himself, took advantage of the intermission of the siege to testify his desire of reconciliation; offering terms which, even after everything was prepared to renew the attack, many concurring reasons induced the British authorities to accept, although at the prodigious sacrifice of leaving a lasting impression of their failure. The raja of

* In the first attempt the clattering of the steel scabbards worn by the cavalry gave the Mahrattas intimation of his approach; in the second, by leaving them behind, he got nearer to their camp before being discovered.

Bhurtpoor paid 20 lakhs of rupees, renounced his alliance with the enemies of the British government, and his claims to advantages secured by the former treaty with General (now Lord) Lake. The fortress of Deeg was to be restored when the British government had reason to be assured of his fidelity.

The principal cause which actuated the British authorities in accommodating matters with the raja of Bhurtpoor was an apprehended rupture with Sindia. Doulut Rao, several days even before he signed the treaty of defensive alliance, had made strong objections to the restorations granted by the British government to the rana of Gohud, whom, as being long dispossessed of all territory, he affected to consider as a private individual possessing neither rights nor independence, and therefore incapable of engaging in any treaty ; consequently it was unjust, he argued, to set up his antiquated claims as one of the independent rajas or jagheerdars, and absurd to pretend that this elected rana could cede Gwalior to the company. These arguments, though easily combated, were sufficiently ingenious for the immediate purpose of Sindia's ministers, whose chief aim was to seek cause of present dispute, trusting to events for widening or repairing the breach as they saw occasion.

Ambajee Inglia, who was insincere from the first in his treaty with the English, and who claimed and obtained merit with his master for what he had done, by retaining possession of some of the districts in jagheer, is said to have been the deviser of this scheme in regard to Gohud,* and to have been the active abettor of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay in endeavouring to excite Doulut Rao to a union with Holkar. No Mahratta doubts, and the governor-

* Oral information from Ambajee's son-in-law and others.

general must have known, that Bapoojee Sindia and Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur joined Holkar with Doulut Rao's consent. Whilst disavowed, it was not expedient to charge him with such an act of treacherous hostility, and therefore, in the event of their being apprehended by General Lake, he had instructions to try them by a court-martial for their treason and desertion, and to carry into execution whatever sentence might be passed. Sindia, in a long letter of frivolous and unjust complaint, which he addressed to the governor-general on the 18th October 1804, had the assurance to adduce the desertion of those officers as one of his grievances, originating in his not having received pecuniary aid from the English, to enable him to co-operate against Holkar; and that they had only feigned to join the enemy for the purpose of obtaining subsistence for their troops.

At the period of the date of this letter, Sindia was on his march from Burhanpoor towards Malwa, professing an intention of proceeding to his own capital, Oojein, agreeably to frequent recommendations from the British government. But under the influence of Shirzee Rao, who from the first earnestly promoted the union with Holkar, Sindia was fully bent on joining that chief, and, in addition to various acts of a hostile nature against the allies of the British government, committed a gross outrage by attacking, plundering, and detaining Mr. Jenkins, the acting resident in his camp.

A division of the British army under Colonel Martindell in Bundeleund had been directed to reinforce the army at Bhurtpoor, and had advanced for that purpose as far as Gwalior; but on receiving intelligence of this outrage, Colonel Martindell fell back on Jhansee to frustrate any scheme which Sindia might have formed of invading the

company's provinces, which from Kalpee to Calcutta were completely exposed; but Sindia moved on gradually to the northward, until his approach to the Chumbul produced a strong remonstrance from the British resident, to whom Sindia declared that he was unable to proceed to settle his own country from the state of his finances, and that he was only marching towards Bhurtpoor to mediate a peace. He agreed, however, if assisted by the British government in the removal of his pecuniary embarrassments, to return to the southward, and act as they might desire; he also promised to make reparation for the plunder of the British resident. At the interview where these assurances were given, the demeanour of Sindia and his ministers was much more conciliatory than it had been for some time before, and it being of great importance to prevent Sindia from joining the confederacy at Bhurtpoor, the governor-general accepted this promise as an atonement for the outrage on his representative, and agreed to advance some pecuniary aid, provided Sindia would return and employ himself in taking possession of Holkar's unoccupied districts in Malwa. Sindia pretended to acquiesce, and retired eight miles towards Subbulgurh; but still, on pretence of mediating, sent on a part of his cavalry and all his Pindharees towards Bhurtpoor. The treaty, however, was concluded previous to their arrival; the raja declined an interview with Sindia's wukeel, and the troops, joined by Holkar with the remains of his cavalry, returned to Sindia's camp, where Holkar met with a cordial reception, as did Bappoojee Sindia and Umeer Khan. Sindia in regard to Holkar endeavoured to justify himself to the British government, by telling the resident that Holkar, who had intended to plunder the British territories, had at his request abandoned that design,

and consented to his mediation for the attainment of peace.*

Lord Lake, in consequence of this junction, moved from Bhurtpoor with his whole army towards the camp of Sindia and Holkar, desiring the resident to quit Sindia's camp. The resident, however, was still detained on various pretexts, whilst the two chieftains, on Lord Lake's approach, retreated in a south-westerly direction towards Kotah, with great precipitation. Their whole force consisted of 5,000 infantry with 140 guns, 12,000 sildar horse, and 12,000 Pindharees. From the advanced state of the season, Lord Lake did not deem it advisable to pursue them, and therefore directed the army to take up positions during the monsoon. The Bombay troops, under General Jones, occupied a central situation at Tonk-Rampoorah, Colonel Martindell's division returned to Bundelcund, a detachment was placed at Gohud, and the main body of the Bengal army was stationed at Agra and Muttra.

Sindia and Holkar repaired to Kotah, and afterwards moved towards Ajimere. Holkar was a decided advocate for continuing the war; Shirzee Rao was strenuous in support of this proposal, and whilst he continued to sway the councils of his son-in-law, Holkar had entire influence in Sindia's administration. But the violence of Shirzee Rao defeated his own purposes, and Halkar was instrumental in removing him from power, and placing Ambajee Inglia at the head of Sindia's administration. Holkar, with Sindia's connivance, had at first confined Ambajee, and after exacting from him a large sum of money, on which the troops subsisted for some time, he was released, and appointed as has been just mentioned. Holkar expected

* Mill's History of British India,

to find in him a willing coadjutor, and, from the reputation of his wisdom, much more was hoped than from the rash violence of Shirzee Rao ; but the temporizing policy of Ambajee, the re-kindling rivalry of the two chieftains, the separation of their camps, and above all, Sindia's conviction of their impotency to contend with the British government, paved the way to a pacification which had by that time, owing to a change in the government, become the primary object of the British cabinet.

Peace was no doubt of the greatest importance to British India at this period, but the power of the Mahratta chiefs was completely broken : the Peishwa, however inimically disposed, had as yet acquired no authority, and the Marquis Wellesley, without renouncing any advantages, would have soon been enabled to effect every arrangement for securing a long, if not a permanent, tranquillity ; but the protected warfare, and the popular clamour in England against his administration, arising chiefly from temporary embarrassments and a sudden accumulation of debt, began to influence the opinions, not only of the proprietors and directors of the East India Company, but of the British ministry. The return of the venerable Marquis Cornwallis to India was solicited by the highest authorities, as if the salvation of that country depended on his presence. He arrived in Calcutta on the 30th July, and on the same day assumed charge of the government. He showed, almost from the first act of his administration, that he disapproved of the system of defensive alliance conjoined with a subsidiary force, and evinced so great an eagerness to put an end to the war with Holkar, and to accommodate the differences with Sindia, that, had the power of these chiefs and of Rughojee not been completely broken, it would probably

have ensured a prolongation of hostilities, conducted with all the energy and activity of Mahrattas in success. Lord Cornwallis was willing to overlook the outrage committed by Sindia on the British resident, to give up Gwalior and its dependencies and to make some provision for the rana of Gohud from the disposable territories on the Jumna. To Holkar he proposed to restore the whole of the territories conquered from him during the war. He greatly disapproved of the treaties of defence and guarantee entered into with the petty rajas of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, Bhurtpoor, Macherry, and Boondce. As to the first, the raja of Joudpoor having refused to ratify the treaty which his wukeel had made with General Lake, of course no agreement with that state existed. With regard to the second, the raja of Jeypoor had not fulfilled the conditions of his agreement, and the Marquis Cornwallis, at an early period, had directed him to be informed that it was considered as dissolved; but the raja's subsequent conduct had in a great degree retrieved his previous neglect. With respect to the other three, the governor-general proposed, as an inducement to their renouncing the alliance, to make over portions of the territory conquered from Sindia south of Delhi, and on the west of the Jumna, which river he intended should form the south-western boundary of the company's possessions in that quarter, and by these means exempt the British government from all obligation to guarantee or defend the territory so assigned from the attack of Sindia or any other potentate. In conformity with these sentiments, instructions were forwarded to Lord Lake on the 19th September; but before their official transmission, Lord Lake, apprized of the pacific course of policy which the new governor-general had determined to pursue, seized an opportunity, conso-

quent to Ambajee's appointment to the administration, and to the dismissal of Shirzee Rao, to draw proposals from Sindia—an important advantage in most negotiations, but particularly so in the present case. To the overtures made Lord Lake replied that he could listen to no proposition until the resident was released, a preliminary to which Sindia now readily consented; and Lord Lake, in anticipation of the wishes of the governor-general, had submitted, previously to the receipt of his instructions, a plan for the adjustment of differences with Sindia. In consequence of this favourable state of affairs, and the evils he conceived likely to result from abandoning the connection with the petty states, and permitting the Mahrattas to regain a footing in the northern provinces, he delayed acting upon the instructions, and represented the reasons by which he was guided.

Before this representation was received, the mortal illness of the Marquis Cornwallis had rendered him incapable of attending to public business; and at his death, which happened on the 5th October, the charge of the British government in India devolved on the senior member of the Bengal council, Sir George Barlow.

In the meantime Holkar, perceiving the change of politics on the part of Sindia, and that he had nothing to hope from him whilst his own fortunes were so low, quitted Ajimere early in the month of September, and with about 12,000 horse, 2,000 or 3,000 infantry, and 30 guns, took the route of the Punjab, giving out that he expected to be joined by the Seiks and the Afghans. Two divisions of the British army—the one under General Jones from Rampoorah, and the other under Colonel Ball, in the Rewaree hills—made ineffectual attempts to intercept him;

on which Lord Kake, having posted divisions to prevent his getting back, set out in pursuit of him with five regiments of cavalry and four battalions of infantry.

These operations did not obstruct the arrangements with Sindia, which, under the immediate direction of Lord Lake, were concluded by a new treaty on the 22nd November; Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm being the agent on the part of the Company, and Moonshee Kavil Nyne on that of Sindia. The treaty of Surjee Anjengaom was to remain in full force, excepting in such parts as might be altered by the present arrangement.

The subsisting engagement between the British government and the rana of Gohud being inconvenient, or, as was declared, the rana being found totally unfit for the exercise of sovereign authority, the agreement was dissolved, and the fortress of Gwalior with the Gohud territory were restored to Sindia. It was, however, stipulated that an establishment should be provided for the rana by the British government; and, in order to remunerate them for the expense of supporting it, Sindia, on his part, agreed to relinquish the pensions of 15 lakhs of rupees, granted to certain officers in his service, and to resign his enam districts of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-Kerrah, which were reserved to him by the treaty of Surjee Anjengaom. The river Chumbul, from Kotah on the west, to the extremity of the Gohud territory on the east, was declared the boundary of the two states; and, in consideration of the benefits derived by the company from this line of demarcation, it was agreed to allow Sindia, personally, an annual pension of four lakhs of rupees, and to assign jagheers to his wife and daughter—the former to have two lakhs, and the latter one lakh of rupees annually, within the territory of the company.

The two small districts of Bhadek and Sooseporarah, on the right bank of the Jumna, and south of the Chumbul, being necessary to the greater security of the company's frontier, were made over to them. Sindia renounced all claim to tribute from the raja of Boondee, or from any other state north of the Chumbul, and to the eastward of Kotah. The British government engaged to enter into no treaties with the rana of Oudepoor, the rajahs of Joudhpoor, Kotah, and other chiefs, the tributaries of Sindia in Malwa, Marwar, and Mewar; nor to interfere with the arrangements Sindia might make with them. In the event of peace with Holkar, the British government engaged that they should not desire the restoration of such of the districts of Holkar between the Taptee and Chumbul as Sindia had taken, or interfere in any manner with their arrangements, wars, or disputes. The losses, public and private, sustained by the British residency, were to be made good; and as it was notorious that Shirzee Rao Ghatgay was the instigator of this outrage, and that he had always acted with the most virulent hostility to the British government, Sindia agreed never to admit him into his councils. The negotiation of this treaty did not obstruct the active pursuit of Holkar; Lord Lake, joined by reinforcements as he advanced, followed him into the Punjab with unremitting perseverance. Jeswunt Rao, if he entered the territory of the Seiks in any expectation of assistance from them, was totally disappointed; but, whilst they preserved a strict neutrality, they were also anxious to become mediators for Holkar, whose hopes of resisting the British power were now completely crushed. Driven at length to extreme distress, he sent agents to Lord Lake's camp, on the bank of the Beah, to sue for peace; and as the

instructions of the late governor-general remained in force, under the authority of Sir George Barlow, it may be imagined that the negotiation of a treaty which restored conquered territories, to which Holkar had forfeited his right, even had he been the legitimate representative of his family, was very soon concluded. Holkar renounced all right to Tonk-Rampoorah, Boondee, and all other places north of the Boondee hills, all claims on the province of Bundelcund, and on the British government and its allies; he engaged never to entertain Europeans in his service, and never to admit Shirzee Rao Ghatgay into his councils or employment; he also became bound to return to Malwa by a prescribed route. The British government engaged to have no interference with the possessions of Holkar south of the Chumbul; to restore the forts and districts of the family in the Deccan, excepting Chandore and its dependencies, and the districts of Amber and Sewgaom; but, in case of Holkar's evincing amicable and peaceful intentions towards the British government, Chandore, Amber, and Sewgaom were to be restored, and the district of Koonch, in Bundelcund, was to be given in jagheer to his daughter—the former in 18 months, and the latter in two years, from the 24th December 1805, the day on which the treaty was dated.

December 24.

Sir George Barlow, in whom the power of confirming treaties on the part of the British government now rested, made an alteration in

A.D. 1806.

this treaty, as well as in that concluded with Sindia. Sir George Barlow conceived that the reasons adduced by Lord Lake for continuing the connections with the petty states north of the Chumbul, were outweighed by the political advantage of their dissolution. Lord Lake maintained that the alliance of these petty states interposed a

strong barrier against the future encroachments of the Mahrattas; and that, at all events, the honor of the British government was pledged to respect its engagements, until the treaties were infringed or renounced by the states in question. Sir George Barlow contended that the security of the British government depended either on its controlling all the states of India, or on leaving them to the wars and disputes which were sure to arise if left to themselves; and if the British government renounced its claim to the territory in which any such petty states was situated, all obligation to protect it was dissolved. It is not clear, in the circumstances then existing, in what manner Sir George Barlow meant to apply this latter argument, excepting to the raja of Boondee; but with respect to the former observation, as far as regarded the contentions of those states, Lord Lake had before expressed his opinion that, if left to themselves, they would quarrel with each other, call in the aid of the native powers in their vicinity, and large armies of irregulars would be contending upon the frontier of the most fertile provinces of the British government, against whose eventual excesses there would be no well-grounded security, but a military force in a constant state of preparation. Had His Lordship's life been extended to the term which might have been reasonably hoped, he would not only have seen his prediction verified, but that a military force, acting on the defensive, afforded no certain security against the incursions of swarms of brigands which were thus nourished.

Agreeably to the system of policy he had determined upon, Sir George Barlow annexed declaratory articles to the treaties concluded with Sindia and Holkar, explaining away any obligation which, by the treaty with the former, might be inferred, of protecting the petty states north of the Chumbul, from Kotah to the Jumna, and restoring to

the latter Tonk-Rampoorah and all the territory north of the Boondée hills ; thus abandoning to his fate the raja of Boondée, who, on his part, had maintained the alliance with honor and generosity.

Lord Cornwallis, disapproving of the system of alliances, had, as already mentioned, taken advantage of a failure in his engagement on the part of the raja of Jeypoor, to direct that alliance to be considered as dissolved ; but Lord Lake had prevailed upon Lord Cornwallis to suspend this dissolution, because, at the period, the raja had it greatly in his power to assist or incommode the British army ; and from that time he had performed such essential service as to render himself obnoxious both to Sindia and Holkar, to whose vengeance he became exposed, should the British government withdraw its protection. Notwithstanding these claims, and the earnest recommendation of Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow obstinately adhered to his determination, and declared the alliance at an end. This declaration, it may be observed, did not take place until subsequent to the treaties with Holkar and Sindia ; so that, without infringing its engagements with them, the British government was still at liberty to extend its protection to Jeypoor if it should see fit. The engagements with the rajas of Bhurtpoor and Macherry, though their dissolution was much desired by the governor-general, remained in force.

The treaty of Deogaom concluded with Rughojee Bhonslay, 17th December 1803, also continued in force ; but by an engagement, dated 24th August 1806, Patwa and Sumbulpore were restored to him. By the definitive treaty with Sindia it became necessary to provide for the Rana of Gohud, and the districts of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-Kerrah were assigned for that purpose.

A definitive treaty of general defensive alliance had been concluded with the Gaekwar, 21st April 1805, for the

purpose of consolidating the stipulations contained in three preceding agreements, drawn up in March, June, and July 1802, and making some additions and alterations which were deemed expedient. The Gaekwar had previously received a subsidiary force of 2,000 men, and he now engaged to maintain 3,000 infantry and a company of artillery, which were to be stationed within his territory, but only employed on occasions of some importance. Districts yielding rupees 11,70,000* were assigned for their support. The districts of Chowrassy, Chickly, and Kaira, together with the Gaekwar's share of the chouth of Surat, were ceded to the company. The British government having advanced, or become security on account of the Gaekwar's government to the amount of nearly 41½ lakhs of rupees, the revenue of districts yielding nearly 14 lakhs annually was appropriated for liquidating this debt. The Gaekwar agreed to submit the examination and adjustment of the outstanding accounts and debts between him and the Peishwa to the British government, to receive no European into his service, and to commit no act of aggression against any other power without the acquiescence of the British government.

Such was the substance of the principal articles of the treaty of Baroda, concluded by Major Walker on the part of the company, and intended to render the engagements with the Gaekwar state consonant to those of the treaty of Bassein.†

* <i>Viz.</i> —Dholka.....	Rs. 4,50,000
Neriad	1,75,000
Beejapoor	1,30,000
Mahtur	1,30,000
Moondah	1,10,000
Tuppa of Kurree.....	25,000
Kheemkatodra.....	50,000
Wurat on Kattywar	1,00,000
	<hr/>
	Rs. 11,70,000

† Authorites as in the preceding.

CHAP. XXII.

FROM A.D. 1806 TO A.D. 1814.

Review of the condition of the Mahratta states—and of the British policy in regard to them.—Holkar's proceedings—insanity—confinement—death and character.—Regency under the control of Umeer Khan—factions—embarrassments and anarchy.—State of Sindia's territory.—Death of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.—Affairs of Rughoojee Bhonslay.—Rise of the Pindharees—their mode of assembling and conducting an expedition—their progress—general anarchy in Central India—alarming increase of predatory power.

IN the preceding chapter we have brought to a close the detail of those important events in
 A.D. 1806. Mahratta history which immediately followed the treaty of Bassein. It now becomes requisite to survey the condition of the Mahratta states before and at the conclusion of those arrangements with the British government, to review briefly the policy which actuated that government, and to explain the effects resulting from it on the various Mahratta states. It will then only remain to detail the principal causes which led to the last great revolution, and entirely subverted the dominion of the Peishwa.

The treaty of Salbye, by which Mahadajee Sindia was acknowledged by the British government as head of an independent state, and the policy of Warren Hastings,

which permitted him to extend his power on the side of Hindostan, had a great effect in weakening the power of the Peishwa, and in hastening the decline of the Mahrattas, by dissolving that community of interests which was the mainspring of their union. Previously, however, to the treaty of Bassein, if we except the engagements entered into by the Gaekwar with the English, the visible changes in the Mahratta government were wrought by domestic feuds, originating in the intrigues of some of its principal members—first, of Nana Furnuwees and Sindia to supplant each other; next, of Bajee Rao to overturn the power of both; and finally, of the Mahratta chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, to obtain by force a control over the Bramin court, similar to that which the Peishwa had established by policy over the head of the empire.

By the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent treaties on the part of Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sindia, and Holkar with the British government, a still greater and far more obvious change had taken place in the condition of the Mahrattas than that which resulted from the treaty of Salbye. The Peishwa had ceded a large tract of country; he was controlled in his foreign relations, and upheld in his musnud by a British force. The territories of the other Mahratta chiefs had been dismembered; the Moghul emperor had fallen into the hands of their great rival; and they sat down exhausted and dismayed, sensible of some of their errors when too late, but with no plan, or even sentiment of union, except hatred to that nation by which they had been subdued.

The inconsistencies observable in the British policy were produced by the different views entertained by successive governors-general, each influenced in a greater or less degree by opinions in England. Lord Cornwallis,

before the close of his first administration, perceived the necessity of some measures of precaution to secure the territories of the company, and to preserve the peace of India. He hoped that the native powers would become sensible of the integrity and advantage of the plan he suggested for ensuring a common alliance, and that they would embrace it with the same candour with which it was proposed; but he failed in completing the treaties of general guarantee, which he had contemplated as a remedy for the evils with which the country was threatened.

The Marquis Wellesley, looking equally to the security of British India from foreign invasion, and from wars with the native powers, believed that such security was only attainable by establishing an ascendancy in the councils of the native states, so as to be able to direct their resources to their own advantage, and to that of the British nation; hence his policy tended to the control of all the native powers from Cape Comorin to the gulf of Kutch and from Kutch to the Sewalick mountains. How far, and with what success, he carried his measures into effect, has been detailed. His extensive plans, the effect which their prosecution had upon the commercial interests of the East India Company, and the obstacles he encountered, alarm the authorities at home, some of whom, doubting the justice of the measures pursued, and dreading a rapid extension of dominion, were desirous of at least impeding the conquest of all India; and others, whose views extended little further than the obvious increase of debt, and the irregularity of furnishing the company's investments, sought a change of policy as essential to prevent or repair these apparent evils. The Marquis Cornwallis was accordingly, as we have seen, again sent out, and an instant stop was put to the system of defensive alliances. His

successor, Sir George Barlow, inflexibly pursued the same line of policy without regard to various circumstances, which he considered unimportant in attaining a general end ; but his measures were as short-sighted and contracted as they were selfish and indiscriminating.

The Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Gaekwar were already bound by the defensive and subsidiary alliances of the Marquis Wellesley ; but British protection was withdrawn from the petty states in Hindostan, excepting the rajas of Bhurtpoor and Macherry. Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sindia, and Holkar were each left in possession of considerable tracts of territory ; but under their management the net revenues of each state, after deducting enams and jagheers, did not exceed 60 lakhs of rupees ; that of Rughoojee Bhonslay was considerably less, but his military followers were fewer, and of an inferior description. The treaties with these three states were mere instruments of general amity ; their intercourse was completely unrestrained, and no control, except in relation to the allies of the British government, was to be exercised over them. Plausible reasons were not wanting for supposing that the whole pacification was wise and politic. The progress of conquest was at least impeded ; a considerable territory, pretty equally balanced, remained to each of the chiefs ; and it was expected that their domestic wars, the plunder of their neighbours, and the fear of losing what they possessed, would deter them from hostile proceedings against the British government. In the armies which they maintained a portion of the unemployed soldiery, numbers of whom were entertained in the British service during the war, and discharged from it immediately afterwards, would still obtain a livelihood ; and it was even hoped that these chiefs would find it to their interest

to establish order in their revenue collections, gradually to reduce their military establishments, and turn their attention to cultivate the arts of peace. Until these desirable reforms could be effected, the vigilance of the British government and the power of its allies would, it was supposed, be quite sufficient to quell disorders or inroads occasioned by the plundering hordes, which, after every war in India, disturb the general tranquillity.

It is not the object of this work to enlarge on this subject ; it is sufficient to state the policy embraced, and the ends expected by the British government ; but the consequences, as they tended to hasten the decline of the Mahrattas, and the leading events antecedent to their fall, it is our province to explain.

When Jeswunt Rao Holkar returned from Hindostan, he intimated to his army his intention of discharging about 20,000 of his horse, chiefly Deccanees ;* but large arrears being due to them, which Holkar could not immediately pay, they placed him in *dhurna*, when he gave them his nephew Khundee Rao as a pledge that their demands should be satisfied. The advantage of having the admitted head of the Holkar family in their custody was not overlooked by a turbulent soldiery, already disaffected and mutinous ; they immediately hoisted the standard of Khundee Rao, declared him the only legal representative,

* Sir John Malcolm. Bappoo Kanhoo, one of my authorities, who was with Holkar at the time, says, "there were no words with the Mahrattas," and that the subsequent mutiny was occasioned entirely by the Patans. Bappoo Kanhoo, to whose authority I have here referred for the second time, is a respectable old Bramin soldier, who was the staunch adherent and devoted friend of Chitoor Sing. He was employed in all his negotiations, and shared in most of the vicissitudes of his remarkable life. Bappoo Kanhoo was found imprisoned in one of the hill-forts taken by the British troops in 1818, and, on being rescued, joined the raja of Satara, at whose court he now resides. The history of his own times, written at my request, is lodged with the Literary Society of Bombay.

and refused obedience to Jeswunt Rao. But the overaweing power of the infantry, and the payment of their arrears, to defray which Holkar exacted a large sum from the raja of Jeypore,* had an immediate effect in quashing the sedition. But the innocent instrument of the mutineers fell a sacrifice to his enraged uncle, who secretly put him to death; and the ferocious jealousy of Jeswunt Rao, once roused, could not be allayed until he had also decreed the death of his brother, Khassee Rao, who was in like manner privately murdered.

Those atrocious deeds were the forerunner of a state of
A.D. 1807. insanity, which was further evinced by extraordinary military preparations, carried on with an ardour and violence proportionate to the derangement of his intellects; until at last in 1808, his extravagant conduct led to his being put under restraint, in which state he continued in his camp for the space of three years, until the 20th October 1811, when his miserable existence terminated.

The chief feature of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's character was that hardy spirit of energy and enterprize which, though like that of his countrymen, boundless in success, was also not to be discouraged by trying reverses. He was likewise better educated than Mahrattas in general, and could write both the Persian language and his own: his manner was frank, and could be courteous, and he was distinguished by a species of coarseness with very attractive to the Indian soldiery. He had few other commendable qualities; for although sometimes capriciously lavish, he was rapacious, unfeeling, and cruel, and his disposition was overbearing, jealous, and violent. In person his stature was low, but he was of a very active strong make;

* Bappoo Kanhoo.

though his complexion was dark, and he had lost an eye by the accidental bursting of a matchlock, the expression of his countenance was not disagreeable, and bespoke something of droll humour, as well as of manly boldness.

When Holkar returned from the Punjab, after signing the treaty with Lord Lake, the rajas of Jeypoor and Joudpoor were at war on account of a princess of Oudepoor, for whose hand both were pretenders. Each party solicited

aid from Sindia and Holkar; Sindia sent
A.D. 1808.

them Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and Bappoo Sindia with 15,000 horse; and Holkar allowed Umeer Khan to join the raja of Jeypoor with his Patans. This raja was for a time successful, until Umeer Khan left him, commenced plundering the Jeypoor and Joudpoor districts indiscriminately, then, changing sides, reversed the probable issue of the contest by joining the raja of Joudpoor. At last, interposing between them, he put an end to the contest by horrible deeds of treacherous assassination.*

When Holkar's state of mind rendered it necessary to place him under restraint, Umeer Khan was just disengaged from his Rajpoot warfare, and proceeded with all speed to Rampoorah. It was there settled that the government should be administered by a regency controlled by Umeer Khan, but under the nominal authority of Toolsee Bye, the favourite mistress of Jeswunt Rao; a woman of profligate habits, and of most vindictive disposition, totally unfit for high station, or the exercise of the power with which she was vested. On the death of Jeswunt Rao, she daopted Mulhar Rao Holkar, a boy of four years old, the son of Jeswunt Rao by another concubine, and in his name continued to govern. Umeér Khan was soon recalled to Rajpootana in the prosecution of his own views, which

* See Malcolm's Central India.

were solely bent upon the extension of predatory power for the interest of himself and his ferocious bend of Patans, over whom he maintained an authority by superior art, but in whose hands he was sometimes a mere instrument. When it suited his views of plunder, Umeer Khan sometimes advanced claims in Holkar's name, but those claims were not pressed where the consequences might involve the state of Holkar with the British government. At this departure from Rampoorah, he caused a jagheer to be conferred on his relation Ghuffoor Khan, whom he left as his agent and director with Toolsee Bye.

The conduct of the administration was worthy of such a regency; there was no regular collection of revenue, the government had not the power of reducing its army, and the finances of the state, even under the most skilful management, were inadequate to the support of the establishments. Bodies of troops, under various commanders, were therefore sent to collect or extort subsistence from the provinces, without much regard to the rights of neighbouring states; many of them became disobedient; one body of Holkar's troops, under Mohummud Ally Khan Bungush, went into rebellion at a very early period, plundered the districts in Candeish, and would have forced their way through the Nizam's territory into Holkar's district of Amber, but the subsidiary forces of Poona and Hyderabad were called out to oppose them, when the rebels were dispersed, and Bungush was sent as a state prisoner to the fort of Bombay.

The government, if such it may be designated, of Holkar was alternately swayed by two factions, the Mahrattas and the Patans, who were constantly intriguing against each other, and nothing could exceed the state of anarchy which prevailed throughout the country—at the court,

bribery, execution, and murders ; in the provinces, violence, rapine, and bloodshed.

Sindia's territory was merely as much disturbed as that of Holkar. His military establishment
A.D. 1809. far exceeded his financial means, and, to rid himself of the clamours of his troops, he was obliged to send them out to subsist upon the districts in the manner which was adopted by Holkar ; but some found employment in reducing several refractory zumeendars and rajas, who were Sindia's tributaries. Armies accustomed to rapine and violence in extensive regions were now confined to tracts comparatively small ; the burden of their exactions became, in many places, intolerable, and districts, before cultivated and populous, were fast running to waste and wretchedness. For the supply of personal exigencies Sindia was obliged to have recourse to a banker, who at large rates of interest furnished him with occasional advances of money ; and of all his pecuniary resources, the pensions which he and his family derived from the British government were the security most acceptable. On the death of Ambajee Inglia, Sindia proceeded to reduce the territory in Gohud held by Ambajee's family, and, having established his camp at

A.D. 1810. Gwalior in 1810, though he frequently went on pilgrimages and expeditions, he had never moved his head-quarters from that spot ; hence Sindia's camp, as it is called, has become a great city. His authority was considerably strengthened by the reduction of Inglia's jagheer ; and the death of his father-in-law, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, having happened during the preceding season, was important both in tranquillizing the domestic feuds and public dissensions, which that turbulent man was perpetually exciting. The articles of

the treaties with Sindia and Holkar respecting Shirzee Rao were subsequently annulled by the British government. He afterwards exercised considerable power, and frequently dictated to his son-in-law in the most audacious manner: the circumstances which led to his death originated in a violent altercation respecting a jagheer, which Shirzee Rao, in opposition to Sindia, wished to confer on some rich sillidars,* the Nimbalkurs of Watar. Sindia, unable longer to endure his violent and contumacious behaviour, ordered him to be arrested, when Shirzee Rao having refused to obey the mandate, Anund Rao Sindia, the son of Manajee Phakray, transfixed him with his spear, and thus rid the world of a being than whom few worse have ever disgraced humanity. Doulut Rao, if he did not order, approved of the deed; and it is said that he has all his life been a prey to remorse for the atrocious actions to which he was induced to lend his sanction when under the influence of the monster Ghatgay.†

The state of affairs at Nagpoor under the government of Rughoojee Bhonslay partook of the weakness and confusion prevalent in the territory of Sindia and Holkar, with this difference, that the troops of Rughoojee were inferior, and the country became in consequence more exposed to the attack of freebooters from without. Invited by these circumstances, Umeer Khan, in 1809, after establishing himself in Rajpootana, made a pretext of some alleged claim of the Holkar family to carry his ravages

* Poor soldiers are at least as common in Mahrashtra as in other parts of the world. The Nimbalkurs of Watar are the only rich sillidars with whom I am acquainted. Watar is a village between Phultun and the Mahdeo hills, where the different members of this inferior branch of the Nimbalkur family have expended vast sums of money in the erection of palaces, which are more remarkable for their solidity than their elegance. They have at least the merit of being the most substantial dwellings in the west of India.

† Malcolm, Prinsep, Mahratta MSS., and oral information.

into Berar, and to let loose the Pindharees, as well as his own followers, to plunder the territory of Rughoojee; but the British government, glad at the moment of an opportunity to employ its troops, gratuitously interposed, and forced these predatory bands, which no state acknowledged, to recross the Nerbuddah.

The Pindharees, a class of the lowest freebooters, whom we have already had frequent occasion to mention, were early known in the Deccan. Great numbers of them followed the army of the first Bajee Rao; and it probably was an object of that great man's policy to draw them out of the Mahratta country. It is certain that he left his Pindharees in Malwa with his officers Sindia and Holkar, that they always attended their armies when they invaded the Moghul provinces, and that the Pindharees of each of these leaders distinguished themselves as Sindia Shahee and Holkar Shahee, or the respective followers of Sindia and Holkar.

In 1794 Sindia assigned some lands to the Pindharees near the banks of the Nerbuddah, which they soon extended by conquests from the Grassias, or original independent landholders in their neighbourhood. Their principal leaders at that time were two brothers, named Heeroo and Burrun, who are said to have been put to death for their aggressions on the territory of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay. The sons of Heeroo and Burrun became Pindharee chiefs; but Khureem Khan, a Pindhara, who had acquired great booty in the plunder of the Nizam's troops after the battle of Hurdla, and was distinguished by superior cunning and enterprize, became the principal leader of this refuse of the Mahratta armies.

Khureem got the district of Shujahalpoor from Umeer Khan, which, with some additions, was afterwards con-

firmed to him by Sindia, through the interest of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. During the war of 1803, and the subsequent disturbed state of the country, Khureem contrived to obtain possession of several districts in Malwa, belonging to Sindia's jagheerdars; and his land revenue at one time is said to have amounted to 15 lakhs of rupees a year. He also wrested some territory from the nabob of Bhopaul on which he built a fort, as a place of security for his family, and of deposit for his plunder. Khureem was originally a Sindia Shahee,* but, like most of the Pindharees, except about 5,000 of the Holkar Shahees, who remained faithful, he changed sides, or plundered his master whenever it suited his convenience, which was as often as he found an opportunity. Sindia, jealous of his encroachments, on pretence of lending him some guns, inveigled him to an interview, made him prisoner, plundered his camp, recovered the usurped districts, and lodged Khureem in the fort of Gwalior.†

A number of leaders started up after the confinement of Khureem, of whom Cheetoo, Dost Mohummud, Namdar Khan, and Shaikh Dulloo became the most conspicuous. They associated themselves with Umeer Khan in 1809, during his expedition to Berar; and in 1810, when Khureem Khan purchased his release from Gwalior, they assembled under that leader a body of 25,000 horse and some battalions of newly raised infantry, with which they again proposed to invade Berar; but Cheetoo, always jealous of Khureem's ascendancy, was detached by Rughoojee Bhonslay from the alliance, and afterwards co-operated with Sindia in attacking him; Khureem was in consequence driven to seek an asylum with his old patron

* Sir John Malcolm.

† Prinsep.

Umeer Khan, but, by the influence of Sindia, Umeer Khan kept him in a state of confinement until the year 1816.*

When the Mahrattas ceased to spread themselves, the Pindharees, who had attended their armies, were obliged to plunder the territories of their former protectors for subsistence, and on being suffered to exist at all, their numbers were very soon augmented. To the unemployed soldiery of India, particularly to the Mahomedans, the life of a Pindhara had many allurements; but the Mahratta horsemen who possessed hereditary rights, or had any pretensions to respectability, did not readily join them.

In every 1,000 Pindharees, about 400 were tolerably well mounted and armed; of that number, about every fifteenth man carried a matchlock, but their favourite weapon was the ordinary Mahratta spear, which is from 12 to 18 feet long. The remaining 600 were common plunderers and followers, armed, like the bazar retainers of every army in India, with all sorts of weapons.

Before the Pindharees set out on an expedition, a leader sent notice to the inferior chiefs, and hoisted his standard on a particular day after the cessation of the rains, generally about the Dussera. As soon as the rivers were fordable, and a sufficient number had assembled, they moved off by the most unfrequented routes towards their destination. Commencing with short marches of about 10 miles, they gradually extended them to 30 or 40 miles a day, until they reached some peaceful region against which their expedition was intended. Terror and dismay burst at once on the helpless population; villages were seen in flames, wounded and houseless peasants flying in all directions, fortified places shutting their gates, and keeping up a perpetual firing from their walls. The plunderers dispersed in small

* Public Records, Prinsep, Sir John Malcolm.

parties, and spread themselves over the whole face of the country; all acting on a concerted plan, they swept round in a half circle, committing every sort of violence and excess,—torturing to extort money, ravishing, murdering, and burning in the defenceless villages; but seldom venturing on danger, unless the prospect of booty was very certain. When they approached a point on the frontier, very distant from where they had entered, they united and went off in a body to their homes. Whilst they continued their excesses, marauders of all descriptions sallied out to join them, or to profit by their presence, and whole districts became a scene of rapine and conflagration.

The ordinary modes of torture inflicted by these miscreants were heavy stones placed on the head or chest; red hot irons applied to the soles of the feet; tying the head of a person into a tobra, or bag for feeding horses, filled with hot ashes; throwing oil on the clothes and setting fire to them; besides many others equally horrible. The awful consequences of a visitation from the Pindharees can scarcely be imagined by those who have not witnessed them. For some time, until the districts in Malwa, Marwar, Mewar, and the whole of Rajpootana were exhausted, and the Pindharees were encouraged and excited to venture on more fertile fields, their ravages were chiefly confined to those countries and Berar; a few of them, however, ventured almost every year into the dominions of the Nizam and the Peishwa, though little notice was taken of them by the British government whilst they refrained from molesting its own subjects* and territory.

* For a long time they respected the persons of the British subjects, to which the author can himself bear testimony, having accidentally passed through a body of Pindharees in the middle of a night when they had committed great excesses; and to him, though unarmed and unattended, they offered neither molestation nor insult.

But even had no other causes arisen to excite the Pindharees to extend their depredations, it was impossible, in the state in which India was left, by the half-measures and selfish policy adopted by the British government, that any part of it could long remain exempt from predatory inroad. The Rajpoot states were overrun by Umeer Khan, Sindia, Holkar, and the Pindharees; and the territories of Sindia and Holkar, intermixed as they were in Malwa, and in the hands of a powerful and lawless soldiery, soon became, like Rajpootana, common prey. The aggressions of Sindia and Holkar on each other gave rise to disputes, and even to battles; but to no political warfare. Had Sindia been able to pay up the arrears due to his troops, and to command the services of those who owed him allegiance, he might, at Jeswunt Rao's death, have made himself complete master of Holkar's dominions; but intrigues were substituted for military force, and these were counteracted. Although the chiefs were not at war, the troops of the Rajpoots and of Umeer Khan, and those of Sindia, Holkar, the Powars of Dhar, and the Pindharees, fought frequent battles amongst each other, when plunder was in dispute, all which had no other effect than that of rendering yet more miserable the already unhappy country, and stirring up materials for predatory power, on which Umeer Khan and Sindia began to found higher hopes when they foresaw a prospect of support from the head of the empire.

To him, therefore, we now return, in order to detail the events preceding that revolution in Maharashtra with which this history closes.

CHAP. XXIII.

FROM A.D. 1803 TO A.D. 1817.

The Peishwa's proceedings after being re-established on his musnud.—Appoints Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir to conduct affairs with the British residency.—Ingratitude to Khundee Rao Rastia—and total disregard of the claims of the former servants of the state.—Appoints Ballajee Luximon sur-soobehdar of Candeish and Buglana.—Treacherous seizure and murder of the Bheels at Kopergaom.—Rebellion of the Pritee Needhee—suppressed by Bappoo Gokla, who is enriched in consequence.—Appa Dessaye Nepankur—called to interfere in the wars of Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree.—Affairs of these petty states.—Revert to affairs at Poona.—Collusion of Sewdasheo Mankesir and Khoosroojee Moodhee.—Mr. Elphinstone is appointed resident.—Settlement with the southern jagheerdars, who are compelled to submit to the Peishwa.—Suppression of piracy in the Concan.—Treaties with Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree.—Exultation of the Peishwa—he raises a brigade of regular troops.—Accusations against Khoosroojee Moodhee by Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir.—Rise of Trimbukjee Dainglia.—Bajee Rao extends his views of policy—recruits his army.—Conduct of Bappoojee Sindia in regard to the surrender of Dharwar.—Trimbukjee Dainglia becomes prime minister.—Mode of letting the districts in farm.—Bajee Rao's neglect of civil government—amasses considerable wealth—perseveres in sequestrating jagheers.—Case of Mahdoo Rao Rastia.—Plan of an extensive confederacy.

—*Endeavours to establish an ascendancy in Guzerat.—Affairs of the Baroda government—Able management of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker.—Claims of the Peishwa—Counter-claims of the Gaekwar.—Attempt at adjustment—fails.—Gungadhur Shastree is deputed to Poona—progress of his Mission—he is murdered by Trimbukjee.—Trimbukjee delivered up to the British government—effects his escape from confinement.—The Peishwa raises troops through Trimbukjee for the purpose of maintaining war secretly against the British government.—Conduct of the resident for defeating this design.—The troops assembled are declared insurgents—pursued, and attacked.—Inter-course suspended.—Proposed preliminary to an adjustment.—Bajee Rao denies all knowledge of Trimbukjee or his adherents—Refuses to comply with the proposed terms.—Poona surrounded.—The Peishwa submits.—New treaty.*

BAJEE RAO was scarcely re-established on his musnud when he evinced the distrust and duplicity of his character towards his new allies, and openly avowed, in regard to many persons subject to his authority, that, in entering on the alliance with the English, a principal inducement was a motive of revenge.

He kept up a correspondence with the chiefs confederated against the British power,* and ascribed his connexion with that government, which to them he reprobated and deplored, to necessity, occasioned by their absence, and to the treachery of the southern jagheerdars. He withheld the services of his troops as much as possible, and prevented

* After Bajee Rao's deposal, it was found that Sindia's villages, within the Peishwa's boundary, ceded by the treaty of Surjee Anjongaom, were all secretly continued to Sindia by Bajee Rao.

the Putwurdhuns from accompanying General Wellesley, by secretly inciting the raja of Kolapoor to invade their jagheer, thereby hoping to make a merit with Sindia, and and afford to himself an opportunity of wreaking his vengeance on the family of Pureshram Bhow, by making it appear that they were enemies to the alliance with the British government, and had forfeited their jagheer by disobedience to him.

These indications spoke very unfavourably to his new allies of what might be expected from the Peishwa in case any reverse should attend the British arms. Bajee Rao, as the reader has had ample occasion to observe, was not deficient in a species of ability, but he had a little talent for government; intrigue was with him a passion; profound in the arts of deceit, he believed all his plans infallible, and at this period no person shared his entire confidence. He aimed at conducting the administration himself; but as his chief business for some time lay with the British resident, with whom it was his plan to avoid all personal discussion where difference of opinion might arise, he found it expedient to intrust the management of that important branch to Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, whom we have already mentioned as the agent of Govind Rao Pingley, the Peishwa's envoy at Hyderabad. Sewdasheo Bhow was subsequently employed, on the part of Sindia and Bajee Rao, to endeavour to engage the Nizam in the proposed confederacy against the British government during the last war with Tippoo, at the moment when the speedy reduction of Seringapatam and the fall of the Sultan crushed their machinations.

Sewdasheo Mankesir was a Deshist Bramin, one of the family of the deshbandya of the village of Taimboornee,

and at one time gained a livelihood by reciting Kuthas* in Poona, before he entered the service of Pingley ; but notwithstanding his humble origin, he was dignified in his manner, polite and affable in conversation, and, as a statesman, possessed of considerable ability. His avowed enmity to the alliance with the English was Bajee Rao's chief motive for selecting him as minister for their affairs ; and during several months the Peishwa was at pains to show that circumstances alone had forced him to sign the articles of the treaty ; but the success of the war, the protection which the presence of the British troops afforded, and the power, the security, and the comforts to which he had hitherto been a stranger, and which he soon experienced in the connection, not only reconciled him to it, but induced him to declare, and probably for a time with sincerity, that he considered the alliance as the most fortunate of events. The forts hitherto in possession of Amrut Rao or Nana Furnuwees were reduced and given up to the Peishwa ; his country, which, for a time after his re-establishment, was overrun by freebooters, and exhausted from the effects of war and famine, even under the disadvantage of a pernicious revenue system, gradually recovered itself in most places ; and his authority, at first scarcely acknowledged beyond the environs of Poona, soon became respected throughout his dominions.

The British force, although seldom required to be put in motion, was the chief cause of strengthening his

* Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir was a great musician and composer ; all the airs of which he is the author are distinguished by a peculiar plain-tiveness, and several of them are well worthy of being preserved. Some of our countrymen at Poona, who have leisure, may be induced to do so, before they are forgotten or corrupted by the general bad taste of the Deccan, which, according to a saying of the natives of Hindostan, is the grave of music.

authority by its presence, and gave a power and stability to his government which he had never known since his first accession to the musnud. Adherents were not long wanting, and a few had been faithful even in his adversity. Khundee Rao Rastia, sur-soobehdar of the Concan from the time of Bajee Rao's flight to his restoration, had shown great fidelity to his cause, and his respectable support was at first of much consequence to the Peishwa; but his influence was undermined by Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, who unjustly represented his being in league with the British resident in every measure proposed; and in a few years, on an accusation, never attempted to be proved, of corrupt practices in his government in the Concan, he was removed from office, and his jagheer was sequestered. The year after the re-

A.D. 1804.

establishment of the Peishwa, Khundee Rao Rastia had an opportunity of performing a service of some importance. When Amrut Rao and Moroba Furnuwees joined General Wellesley, Baba Rao Phurkay went off with the Hoojrat Pagah,* and acted during the war with Rughoojee Bhonslay against the British government. After the peace, Baba Rao returned from Nagpoor, gave his followers the slip, and retired to Merich, where he was protected by Appa Sahib Putwurdhun, the son of Pureshram Bhow. His troops, thus left to themselves, plundered the country and erected the standard of insurrection; Bajee Rao had no disposable force, and the British troops could not at that time be spared to hunt down horse. Khundee Rao Rastia, having formerly served with the men exciting these disturbances, had the

* The Hoojrats, or household troops, were originally the raja's, and afterwards the Peishwa's, personal cavalry. Many of them were, to the east, composed of the immediate dependants of the raja of Satara.

address to effect an arrangement with the whole body, and brought them under the Peishwa's authority, at a critical time, when they might have committed infinite mischief. But Bajee Rao made no permanent provision for the commanders of the army, the soldiery of the country, nor the civil servants of the government. They had served the state under Nana Furnuwees, which was of itself a strong reason with him for excluding them from employment. His total disregard of their claims and their necessities must inevitably have increased the disorders prevalent on his restoration, and under ordinary circumstances, had he persevered in such a line of conduct, it probably would have required the whole power of the British government to keep him on his musnud; but the severe famine of 1804 destroyed vast numbers of men and horses; a provision was thus opened to many of the remaining sillidars by the quantity of land and *wutun*, to which they succeeded by deaths amongst their relations and fellow-villagers; and as Sindia was then exchanging his Rajpoots and Mahomedans for Mahrattas, a great part of those persons who would have joined an insurrection became interested in the tranquillity of the country, or were withdrawn to another scene.

Ballajee Luximon, the *dewan* of Wittul Nursing Vinchorkur, who, during his master's minority, managed the affairs of the jagheer, was a staunch adherent of the family of Rugoba, and one of the very few respectable men who to the last preserved a large share of Bajee Rao's confidence. He was appointed with the fullest powers *sur-soobehdar* of Candeish and Buglana; and a body of the Peishwa's infantry under Munohurgeer Gosacen was sent to support him. But such was the state of those provinces that they were never restored to order

under the Peishwa's government. Holkar's ravages had been followed by various plunderers; and the Bheels, who until 1802 had lived intermixed with the rest of the population, betook themselves to the mountains, and carried on precisely the same system of plunder as is now practised by the brigands of Italy and Spain.

One of the first acts of Ballajee, instigated by the Gosacen, has left a stain on his memory which cannot be effaced. Finding it impracticable to reduce the Bheels by force, he inveigled the whole tribe of them, with their wives and families, to an interview at Kopergaom, on pretence of affording them a settlement, when they were treacherously seized, and most barbarously precipitated into wells, where the whole perished. This inhuman action had the effect, in some degree, of checking the Bheels about Chandore and the southern part of Buglana; but to the northward, and along the Sautpoora mountains, it drove them to desperation, and they continued to molest the country.

During the war between Holkar and the British government, Futih Sing Manay returned to the
A.D. 1805. Peishwa's territory, and recommenced his ravages to the south of the Neera with an army of nearly 10,000 men. But Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, the mootaliq of the Pritee Needhee, assisted by the troops of Chintamun Rao Putwirdhun, planned a judicious attack on his camp, routed his troops, killed Futih Sing Manay, together with a great number of his followers, and completely dispersed them; after which he formally addressed a despatch, stating the particulars, to the Peishwa, who approved of the service performed, and was much gratified by this act of courtesy from the mootaliq of the Pritee Needhee. Bulwunt Rao was at this time chief director of his master's

affairs. Pureshram Sree Newas, the son of the deceased Bowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, was a young man of some spirit, but of weak intellect and of dissolute morals. He was born on the day of his father's death, and during his minority had been kept in a state of tutelage by Nana Furnuwees, and reared with hereditary enmity to the house of Rugonath Rao. Bajee Rao, before his connection with the British government, had, with Sindia's assistance, laid a plan for seizing the Pritee Needhee in his own house at Poona; but it was frustrated by his bravery, and the exertions of one of his adherents, named Doulut Rao Ghatgay, by whose assistance he cut down the persons who laid hold of him, and immediately fled from Poona to his own jagheer at Kurar.

The management of his jagheer was in the hands of his mother, who was assisted by Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, the mootaliq already mentioned. The Pritee Needhee wished to assume the control himself, and he was assured by his mother that he should be placed in authority; but being deceived by false hopes for a period of years, he at last determined on asserting his rights by force. Bajee Rao saw their differences with satisfaction, as he wished for a favourable opportunity of stripping the Pritee Needhee of

A.D. 1806. his possessions; but this extreme measure

he at first would not venture upon, as he apprehended that the Pritee Needhee might be supported by the Purtwurdhuns. Pretending, therefore, to be anxious to mediate between the parties, he decided in favour of Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, in which he was supposed to have been influenced by the good conduct of the mootaliq in suppressing the depredations of Futih Sing Manay. In order to support Bulwunt Rao, he sent a body of his troops under Bappoo Gokla to enforce submission, and the Pritee

Needhee was placed in confinement by his mother in the gurhee of Mussoor. Gokla returned to Poona, the country was tranquillized, the adherents of Pureshram sought safety in concealment, and it was generally supposed that the Pritee Needhee would remain a prisoner for life. But Pureshram Sree Newas had a friend from whom no one expected his succour. His wife, one of the most respectable ladies in the country, perceiving the weakness and violence of her husband's character, had several years before endeavoured to bring him into his mother's views, which so exasperated the Pritee Needhee that he never afterwards would live with her. He chose as his mistress a Telin, or wife of an oil-seller, with whom he cohabited, and, to the great scandal of his caste, as a Bramin, made no secret of the connection. The Telin, after the Pritee Needhee was confined, had the address to obtain possession of the fort of Wassota, situated in a most inaccessible part of the Syhadree mountains, where, having collected some

A.D. 1807.

followers, she headed a party, attacked mussoor, and rescued the prisoner. As soon as the Pritee Needhee found himself at liberty, he hoisted his standard, declared himself the servant of the raja of Satara, and bound by no tie to obey the Punt Purdhan. The inhabitants of the tract between the Neera and Warnah, in which the Pritee Needhee's districts were situated, being prone to insurrection, the standard of rebellion soon found supporters, and some of the old retainers of the Pritee Needhee's family joined him. The temporary power thus obtained by the assemblage of a body of troops was, however, exceedingly abused. He committed great cruelties on such of the adherents of his mother and of Bulwunt Rao as fell into his hands; and he rendered himself odious to the peasantry by a system of

plunder and extortion worthy of the lowest Pindhara. Had the Pritee Needhee possessed moderation and ability equal to his spirit, there were materials for a rebellion in that quarter, which Bajee Rao, unassisted by British troops, could never have suppressed; but, before he had made adequate preparations for resistance, Gokla once more came against him; the few faithful sillidars who accompanied him, recommended his retiring to the hills, and raising the Ramoosees, until, like Chitoor Sing, he could attack with effect. Regardless, however, of this advice, he waited for Gokla, near Wussuntgurrh; a few of his men stood by him, but most of them fled at the first charge.

The Pritee Needhee was supposed to have been killed; he was taken up by his enemies for dead; but although he had lost his hand, and was severely wounded in the head, he recovered, and was ever after, during the reign of Bajee Rao, confined in the city of Poona, where a small portion of his late extensive jagheer was assigned for his support; the remainder, without any separate provision for the opposite party, was sequestered. Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees regretted the opportunity thus afforded to Bajee Rao by their differences when too late; the country was soon reduced, all the garrisons having surrendered excepting the fort of Wassota, which held out for eight months, when the Telin, after a spirited defence, surrendered, in consequence of a fire which destroyed her granary. The jewels and private property of the Pritee Needhee's family were seized by Bapoo Gokla, and never accounted for to the Peishwa. In order to prevent the odium likely to arise from having thus reduced the Pritee Needhee, Bajee Rao allowed Bapoo Gokla to retain possession of the conquered districts, as if they were kept more as a

punishment to the Pritce Needhee than as an advantage to himself. During the period Gokla retained possession of the conquered territory, his exactions were most severe, and, being supported by a large force, they were irresistible. By these means Bappoo Gokla became the wealthiest of the Peishwa's sirdars. He succeeded

A.D. 1803.

to the command of his uncle's troops, when the latter was killed by Dhoondia Waug as already mentioned; but he owed his elevation chiefly to General Wellesley, whom he accompanied in the war of 1803, and, excepting Appa Dessaye Nepankur, was the only good officer in the immediate service of Bajee Rao.

Appa Dessaye's name is Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur; we have already had occasion to mention this person on more than one occasion, but about this period he became more conspicuous from the following circumstances.

About the year 1785, the petty states of Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree, always jealous of each other, went to war, because Luximee Bye, the wife of Kem Sawunt, dessaye of Waree, and niece of Mahadajee Sindia, had obtained some privileges of royalty for her husband from the Moghul emperor, through her uncle's all-powerful influence at the court of Delhi. With a few intermissions, and with various success, this warfare had continued for 23 years, when at last the troops of Kolapoor gained a victory over those of Sawuntwaree in a pitched battle fought at the village of Chowkul, and the fort of Waree was immediately besieged. Kem Sawunt had been dead some years; he had left four widows, the eldest of whom, Luximee Bye, become regent on account of the minority of Kem Sawunt's only son by Dawee Bye, his third wife. Luximee Bye, when her capital was besieged, called in the aid of Wiswas Rao Ghatgay and Appa Dessaye. Wiswas Rao Ghatgay

had been put in possession of two districts, called Chic-kooree and Menowlee, belonging to Kolapoor, by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. His pretended right to dispose of them originated in their having been conquered by the first Mahdoo Rao, and bestowed on the family of Putwurdhun ; and Sindia having authority for possessing himself of the sequestrated jagheer of the Putwurdhuns, Shirzee Rao, who had seized those two districts, made them over to his brother, Wiswas, when he was ordered by his son-in-law to join him in Malwa. Wiswas Rao would have been driven out of them by the raja of Kolapoor, but he was supported by Appa Dessaye, who afterwards took them for himself. The Peishwa, on the plea of wishing to avoid disputes with Sindia, pretended to take no concern in those districts,* but it was on the authority of his secret orders that Appa Dessaye seized them, and Bajee Rao at a subsequent period, in 1812, asserted his own claim to them on grounds which were admitted by the British government.

On the present occasion, when Luximee Bye applied for aid, Appa Dessaye, with the Peishwa's secret concurrence, readily afforded it ; the siege of Waree was raised, and the territory of the Kolapoor raja above the Ghauts was invaded ; so that the Kolapoor troops were recalled from the Concan to defend their own capital. Application was made to the British government for its mediation, but Lord Minto, then governor-general, declined all interference ; and the Peishwa, who was the principal cause of the disturbance, began to hint at his rights of supremacy over all parties—a disposition to encroachment which, if checked by the British authorities on its very first indication, would have been of essential importance to the stability of Bajee Rao's government.

* Colonel Close's despatches, 5th May 1808.

Appa Dessaye, however, made himself complete master of Chickooree and Menowlee, and endeavoured to establish his authority over Sawuntwaree. The son of Kem Sawunt was strangled at the instigation of Appa Dessaye's carcoon, with the concurrence of Luximee Bye, and of Poond Sawunt, the next heir to the principality. But Appa Dessaye did not profit by this atrocious deed. Poond Sawunt, taking advantage of the weak state of Appa Dessaye's troops, the greater part being withdrawn

to maintain the war above the Ghauts,
A.D. 1809. drove them from the country, and
possessed himself of the government.

Luximee Bye died soon after, when Poond Sawunt found a rival, rather than a coadjutor, in the person of Doorga Bye, the second widow of Kem Sawunt, and the daughter of a Mahratta officer named Khanwelkur.

In the meantime the utmost apparent cordiality subsisted between the British resident and the Peishwa's court. Bajee Rao, as often as he could find a pretext, was prosecuting, with inflexible perseverance, his favourite plan of sequestrating the jagheers of all whom he considered the political opponents of his family, and appropriating their revenues to his own use. Whilst thus engaged, Bajee Rao was happy. On every occasion he enlarged on the blessings he enjoyed through his alliance with the British government; he professed the warmest affection and friendship for the resident, Colonel Close; and it is not probable that Bajee Rao, in all he thus expressed, was in a great measure sincere.

Colonel Close was in the habit of receiving all native visitors through an agent, a Parsee, named Khoosroojee, familiarly styled the Moodhec—a person of comprehensive

judgment, and of great address, who soon attained considerable influence with his master. Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir and the Moodhee soon formed a compact, and having united with them Byajee Naik, a Hoojrah, or personal servant of the Peishwa, by whom Byajee was much trusted as a spy, they contrived to persuade Bajee Rao that, by gaining Khoosroojee to his interests, he might command the services of the British residency—a proposal well suited to the mind of Bajee Rao, by whom no means were spared to attain an end so desirable.

The triumvirate, in all probability, participated in the spoils, and all intercourse, public as well as private, went on so agreeably by the agency of those persons that there was no cause of dissatisfaction. Any subject likely to occasion unpleasant discussion was either postponed, or so arranged that, before being brought forward on either side, it was smoothed of its asperities, so that little difficulty remained in the adjustment.

The services of Colonel Close during this year were called for, on a very important occasion to Hyderabad, and he never returned to his situation at Poona. Mr. Henry Russell succeeded to the temporary charge of that residency until the return of Mr. Elphinstone from a

A.D. 1810. mission to Cabul, and the same harmony continued to prevail. Khoosroojee, though

a servant of the British residency, had been permitted to accept the high office of sur-soobehdar of the Carnatic under the Peishwa's government, and he appointed as his deputy a Bramin named Bappoo Sawney.

Mr. Elphinstone had been an assistant to Colonel Close at Poona before he was attached to General Wellesley's staff in the war of 1803, so that he took charge of his

appointment as resident with considerable local information. Being in the habit of communicating with the natives direct, he saw all persons who had business, and discontinued the form of introduction through any one agent. This alteration, superadded to a quarrel which had taken place between Khoosroojee and Sewdashco Bhow Mankesir, was a source of secret vexation and discontent to the former, as it so greatly tended to lessen his importance and his gains ; but Khoosroojee had much personal influence with the Peishwa, which he unfortunately exercised in prejudicing his mind against the resident, by representing him as one who entertained the same sentiments as General Wellesley, whom Bajee Rao hated because he had opposed his schemes of vengeance against Amrut Rao and the family of Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun. Several instances might be adduced of the effect which the Moodhee's insinuations produced on the mind of the Peishwa ; but although many subjects hitherto kept back were now brought into discussion, in hopes of creating necessity of again interposing the agency of the Moodhee, Bajee Rao had soon reason to acknowledge the impartiality of the resident on the subjects from which his chief prejudice against him had arisen.

As soon as he had resumed the lands of the inferior jagheerdars who had ever been disobedient to himself, or who had taken an active part against his father, the Peishwa desired Bappoo Gokla to make over the Pritee Needhee's district to the state, and again brought forward his complaints and claims against other great jagheerdars, particularly the Putwurdhuns, Rastia, and the dessaye of Kittoor.

These persons, presuming on the protection already afforded to them by the British government, neglected to obey the orders of the Peishwa, and omitted to send their

troops, which were now much wanted to defend the country from the Pindharees, whose inroads were every year becoming more powerful and destructive. When Bajee Rao embraced the British alliance, he wrote to the jagheerdars in question to assist the British troops. Most of them, being personally acquainted with General Wellesley, readily obeyed Bajee Rao's orders, co-operated in his re-establishment, and were disposed to forget past injuries, until the rancorous revenge and studied aggressions of Bajee Rao completely alienated their minds. They were only deterred from supporting the Pritee Needhee's rebellion by the fear of the subsidiary force, and, had the interposition of the British government been withheld, they would, when joined to the Pritee Needhee, have probably effected another revolution, as it was estimated they could at that time bring into the field nearly 20,000 horse. In considering a plan of settlement between these jagheerdars and the Peishwa, several modes were discussed at a very early period by the British authorities. To have avowedly withheld support from both parties would have involved the country in war and confusion; to have assisted in the destruction of families, in whose favour so much might be urged, would have been unjust; and it would have been still more so to raise them into independent principalities under the guarantee of the British government. It therefore appear advisable to steer a middle course; and it was determined to enforce the service of their troops as due to the Peishwa, and to cause them to restore all usurped lands; but to guarantee their territory as long as they chose to abide by the tenor of their original engagement to the Poona state.

With this arrangement of the southern Mahratta country, it was resolved to combine the effectual suppression of

piracy in the states of Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree, which, it was foreseen, could never be rooted out until some harbours and fortresses on the coast of Malwan were placed in the hands of the British government.

The Putwurdhuns were very averse to acknowledge fealty to Bajee Rao, but they at last submitted, and complied with the conditions imposed by the British government. The raja of Kolapoor nearly lost his capital by the intrigues of the Peishwa, who secretly encouraged him to resist the demands of the English, hoping that his general, Appa Dessaye, then besieging Kolapoor as if in his own quarrel, might be able to reduce it before the terms were accepted; whilst, on the other hand, in order to cause delay, he declared to the resident that the British government had no right to enter into a treaty with the raja of Kolapoor, who was his subject—an assertion as bold as it was false. Before any of the objects could be effected, Mr. Elphinstone found it necessary to assemble an army at Punderpoor, and move it down to the neighbourhood of the Kistna. In regard to the jagheerdars, besides what has been already stated in the general plan of settlement, Appa Sahib Putwurdhun was obliged to surrender the person of Baba Rao Phurkay—a concession to the Peishwa, on the part of the British government, which was very unpopular in the Mahratta country, and, although it may have been strictly just, the policy of the measure is questionable. Baba Rao was confined by the Peishwa in the fort of Bassein, where he shortly after died. By the terms tendered and accepted by the raja of Kolapoor, he renounced all right to Chickoorree and Menowlee, which were ceded to the Peishwa; but all other places taken from the raja, in consequence of the disputed right to these districts, were restored. To the British govern-

ment the raja ceded the harbour of Malwan, which included the forts and island of Malwan or Sindeedroog and its dependencies ; he also agreed to renounce piracy, to permit no armed vessels to be fitted out, or to enter his ports, on pain of becoming lawful prize to the British government, and to restore wrecks, as well as to assist vessels in distress. He also became bound for himself and his successors to pursue no manner of hostility against any other state without the consent of the British government. The British government renounced its long-existing claims against the raja, and became bound to guarantee his possessions against the aggressions of all foreign powers and states.

Poond Sawunt, dessaye of Sawuntwaree, was at the same time bound down to suppress piracy, to make over the fort of Vingorla and the battery of Gunaramo Tembe, with his port and limits ; and, in case of being guilty of further piratical acts, the forts of Newtee and Rairee were likewise to be required of him. British merchants were to be allowed free ingress and egress to and from the dessaye's territory, on paying the customary duties ; but all articles of consumption required for the British troops, stationed within the territory, were to pass duty free.

Soon after the conclusion of the agreement, Poond Sawunt died, and Doorga Bye became regent. This old lady, regardless of the guarantee of the British government, attacked the possessions of the raja of Kolapoor, took the fort of Burratgurh, which had formerly belonged to Sawuntwaree, and refused to evacuate it. A British detachment from the Madras establishment was brought down to protect the Kolapoor territory, when she withdrew the garrison of Burratgurh, but continued to

brave the threats and despise the arguments which were offered to deter or induce her to refrain from aggression. No retaliation was permitted against Doorga Bye till every reasonable proposal had failed, when the British troops were ordered to occupy some of the districts, with a view of forcing her into terms. No opposition was actually made, but the British troops were kept perpetually on the alert by threatened attacks, and thus was engendered a state of affairs, neither of peace nor of war, but which occasioned all the expense and inconvenience of the latter. Doulut Rao Sindia, though unconnected with the Waree state after the death of Luxmee Bye, interested himself in behalf of Doorga Bye, and much discussion and correspondence resulted from her contumelious behaviour; nor did she desist from her vexatious opposition, until, in consequence of many hostile acts against the British government, her territory was reduced in the beginning of 1819 by a British force; but, after exacting the necessary securities, the principality of Sawuntwaree was left in its original independence.

In the meantime, although Bajee Rao was disappointed in the hope of being able to ruin the southern jagheerdars, they were compelled to bow before him. He could scarcely refrain from insulting the Putwurdhuns when they came to pay their respects, and his exultation at getting Baba Rao Phurkay into his power knew no bounds. He was profuse in his acknowledgments and expressions of gratitude to the governor-general and the resident; but he at the same time declared that he should wish not to have a single Surinjamee horseman* in his service, and proposed raising a brigade of infantry, to be disciplined entirely by European officers, and paid, like

* That is, horse furnished by jagheerdars.

the British sepoys, direct from the treasury. To this proposal the governor-general readily acceded, and

A.D. 1813. Captain John Ford, of the Madras

establishment, who had been long attached to the escort of Colonel Close, was, at the recommendation of Khoosroojee, selected by the Peishwa as commandant of the brigade, and able officers from the line, chosen by Captain Ford, were lent from the Bombay establishment to assist in its formation and discipline. The men, excepting a small proportion of Mahrattas, were chiefly raised in the company's provinces in Hindostan, and, on entering their battalions, swore fidelity to the Peishwa whilst he continued in alliance with the British government.*

The cantonment allotted for this brigade was about four miles to the north-west of Poona. One brigade of British troops was stationed on a spot originally selected for the protection of the city in its immediate vicinity; and the rest of the British subsidiary force occupied a position about half-way between Poona and Ahmednugur, near the village of Seroor, on the river Ghore.

The Peishwa had soon a fresh instance of the utility of the British force, by finding it necessary to call in a part of it against Appa Dessaye, who, although he came to Poona on being ordered, refused to comply with certain claims devolving on the Peishwa by the late settlement, or to give up some territory belonging to the raja of Kolapoor. The British authorities interposed, but Bajee Rao artfully contrived by his intrigues to induce Appa Dessaye to trust to his lenity, and to resist the demands; by which

* Oral information. If I am not mistaken, this condition was proposed and insisted upon by the Hindostan sepoys themselves, without its being suggested by their officers.

insidious conduct the dessaye was led on to forfeit one-fourth of his jagheer to the Peishwa.

We have already alluded to the quarrel between Khoosroojee Moodhee and Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir. Their differences likewise originated in the intrigues of the Peishwa, who, having been informed of their collusion, concluded, with some justice, that such a cable might as often act against him as for him, and he therefore determined on creating a division between them. It was with this view that he conferred the appointment of sursoobehdar of the Carnatic on the Moodhee in preference to Sewdasheo Bhow, who would have been much gratified by it. The Moodhee was thus secured in Bajee Rao's interests, but the envy of Mankesir was excited, and he in a short time informed the Peishwa of the corrupt practices of the Moodhee in the affairs of his government. These charges Bajee Rao secretly advised his minister to prefer to the resident, which was accordingly done; and as the Moodhee was a servant of the British government, they would have been immediately investigated, but the Peishwa's object being answered by the accusation from Mankesir,* he interfered to prevent the inquiry, and, as it related to an affair connected with his government, the proceedings were quashed at his request.† This intrigue answered its purpose by incensing Khoosroojee against the minister; and as *friendship*, according to the interpretation of the court of Bajee Rao, was to aid and to conceal the acquisition of corrupt emolument, the Peishwa secured the good-will of Khoosroojee; but the nature of

* The accusation was not made by Mankesir himself, but by three persons employed by him and the Peishwa.

† The above is from native information of respectability; but I am not certain of the date, or whether Mr. Russell or Mr. Elphinstone was resident at the time. I think the former.

the Moodhee's confidential situation at the residency being incompatible with his appointment as governor of a Mahratta province, he was afterwards required by Mr. Elphinstone to resign the one or the other, and he accordingly relinquished the latter.* Trimbukjee Dainglia was immediately appointed to the vacant office. Trimbukjee was originally a jasoos, or spy, and brought himself to the Peishwa's notice, when he fled to Mhar from the power of Holkar, by carrying a letter to Poona, and bringing back a reply in a very short space of time. Being afterwards entertained on the personal establishment of the Peishwa, his activity, intelligence, and vigour soon became conspicuous ; and by unceasing diligence, and, above all, by being pander to his vices, never hesitating to fulfil his wishes whatever they might be,† he gradually gained the confidence of his master, and was the only man who ever obtained it. When Gunput Rao Phansay, the respectable commandant of the Peishwa's artillery, was deprived of his jagheer, Trimbukjee was appointed commandant in his stead. He at first courted Mankesir and Khoosroojee ; but having discovered their collusion, he disclosed it to the Peishwa, and though it did not, for some time, become apparent, he entirely supplanted Mankesir in his master's councils, and retained Khoosroojee in the manner already described.

Bajee Rao's success in bringing his jagheerdars under his authority encouraged him in more extensive plans for aggrandizing his power. He occasionally mentioned his claims on the Nizam, but as often as the resident prepared for entering on the investigation, Bajee Rao found some

* Native information.

† Trimbukjee once told Mr. Elphinstone in conversation—"If my master order me, I will kill a cow"—a declaration of servile devotedness, equally strong and impious.

excuse for delay. He likewise spoke, at first distantly, of his claims on Sindia and Holkar, although sensible that they were dissolved by treaties to which he was himself a party; and he pressed, with seeming earnestness, early settlement of the debts due to him by the Gaekwar—a subject which had already for several years occupied attention, and to which we shall presently advert.

Unfortunately for Bajee Rao, the low favourite whom he had chosen, and who had much of the character of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, entertained a strong prejudice against Europeans, and his arrogant presumption and unprincipled mind were equal to any attempt. Bajee Rao, at first, in wishing to extend his power, entertained no hostile designs against the British government; but, elated by his increasing consequence, without reflecting from whence it was derived, and flattered by the suggestions of Trimbukjee, who tried to persuade him that he would recover by the force of his wisdom all that his ancestors had gained by their swords, he became irritated by opposition to his wishes, and was hurried forward, until he was overwhelmed in the intrigues and crimes which Dainglia

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led him on to perpetrate. In frequent consultations with the Moodhee and Trimbukjee, they advised him, before entering on the more important discussions with the British government, to increase his military establishment, which, without any design or appearance of hostility, would, they represented, tend to render him more respectable in the eyes of all India, and give weight to arguments with his allies. Of the benefit derived by the British government from the treaty of Bassein, the Moodhee, perhaps from conviction, impressed Bajee Rao with the most exaggerated opinion; and he may have thought, from the evident desire of conciliation which

existed in the councils of the British government, that much would be conceded to avert a war. The annual inroads of the Pindharees, and a pilgrimage undertaken by Bajee Rao, for the second time, to a celebrated temple in the Carnatic, furnished ample excuse for raising troops, had a pretext been wanting, but the fact was, the resident had been constantly pressing on the attention of the minister the inadequate force maintained by the Peishwa for the protection of his country. Up to 1812, exclusive of the troops maintained by the jagheerdars and the Sebundeas, or irregular infantry, employed in collecting the revenue, his army amounted to no more than 2,500 horse and 3,000 infantry. Four thousand horse were that year added to the establishment, and several hundreds each year subsequently; but instead of continuing to increase the levies of horse so useful to check the Pindharees, a large body of Gosaeen infantry was now entertained at Trimbukjee's suggestion; and Arabs, whose enlistment Bajee Rao had at one time not only prohibited, but had begged of the Bombay government to arrest on their route from the coast to his dominions, now met with every encouragement. An opportunity of exercising the new levies soon occurred by the refusal of Bappoo Sindia, killidar of Dharwar, to surrender that fortress. Having come to pay his respects to the Peishwa on his route to the Carnatic, Bajee Rao desired him to give up the fort to Trimbukjee. "If your highness," replied the killidar, "will send a gentleman to relieve me in the command, or if you will send a carcoon in your own name to whom I can commit my charge, your servant will present the keys to him, but I will never give over the fort of Dharwar to such a person as Trimbukjee Dainglia." In consequence of this speech, as soon as he had reached the door of the Peishwa's tent, he was arrested,

bound, and tortured by Trimbukjee, until a promise of surrender was extorted. His carcoon, a Bramin on whom the killidar could rely, was despatched with Trimbukjee, who, accompanied by a body of troops, proceeded to take possession ; but, on approaching the gate, the carcoon begged permission to go on a few minutes in advance of the party, that he might speak to the garrison, and make some arrangements, when, no sooner had he got inside, than he shut the gate, and, on pretence of being detained by the garrison, opened a fire on Trimbukjee and his followers, who were obliged to retire with precipitation. This insult could not be resented at the time, nor until the Peishwa's return to Poona, when Dharwar was invested ; but the faithful carcoon did not surrender until an order was obtained from his imprisoned master, through the interposition of Bappoo Gokla.

About this period the conduct of Khoosroojee Moodhee, which from the first had not escaped the resident's observation, became such as to render it necessary to remove him from Poona, in order to prevent, as far as possible, the bad effects of the dangerous opinions which he inculcated. His past services entitled him to all due consideration from the British government ; and it would have been both difficult and ill-judged to have proved the circumstances by which he had forfeited his claim to its reward. A liberal provision was therefore made for him in his native province, Guzerat ; but, about the eve of his intended departure, he died by poison. Whether it was administered by others, or taken wilfully or accidentally by himself, could never be discovered, although the case underwent a long and strict investigation. If he knew more secrets with respect to foreign intrigues than Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee Dainglia thought fit to trust to any third person beyond

their own power, his death may be imputed to their machinations ; but it was the general opinion of the people at Poona that he had poisoned himself through a fear of the loss of reputation, when, by removal from power and office, his corrupt practices might become public. It is, however, remarkable that, in succession to this general report, the Peishwa, who had before quashed the proceedings against him, now became his accuser ; and Bappoo Sawney, the deputy of the deceased, was called upon by Bajee Rao to account for the defalcation, bribery, and corruption of his master. During the proceedings Bappoo Sawney died suddenly—of fright, it was said, at what he might expect if proved delinquency threw him into the

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power of Trimbukjee Dainglia. This person, who had been for some time the chief director of the Peishwa's councils, was at last appointed his minister in the transaction of affairs with the British Government. He studied his master's humours, and attained entire ascendancy over his mind ; his measures were vigorous, though marked by ignorance, violence, and treachery. His punishments were at once lenient and severe ; robbery and murder might be compensated by a small fine, but a failure in a revenue contract was an unpardonable offence.

The Peishwa farmed his districts to the highest bidder ; and those who failed in their contracts were compelled to surrender their whole property with that of their securities ; and should all be insufficient, they were thrown into hill-forts, and treated with the greatest rigour. On one occasion, Trimbukjee, before his power was completely established, being enraged at some delay on the part of a banker who had become security for a revenue contractor, used him in the harshest manner, and at last ordered the

banker to be dragged before him, when he struck him a violent blow on the head, which, owing to a heavy ring on his finger, proved instantly fatal; but, although the person thus deprived of life was a Bramin of respectability,* no notice was taken of the circumstance.

These severities to the contractors did not deter others from adventuring on the same course; for Bajee Rao, who let the districts himself, was an adept in the art of flattery, and his manner plausible to a degree which few could resist. His court, which was gay and licentious beyond that of any other Peishwa, soon became agreeable to the generality of Bramins in Poona, and a high offer for a district was a sure way to the temporary notice of the prince. All his expenditure was regulated by contract. The net revenue of the state was about 120 lakhs of rupees, of which Bajee Rao saved annually about 50 lakhs, and had, at this period, collected treasure exceeding 50 millions of rupees. Whilst thus intent on amassing wealth, his time was divided in the encouragement of the grossest debauchery, and the practice of the most absurd superstitions. He aspired to a character for sanctity; was rigid in the observance of every form required by the rules of caste; and the murder of Narain Rao, attributed to his parents, was a subject of inquietude and remorse. To atone for their crime, he planted several hundred thousand mango trees about Poona, gave largesses to Bramins and religious establishments, and was particularly generous to the temple at Punderpoor. As an instance of his superstition may be mentioned a dream of one of his religious attendants, who declared he saw the ghost of Narain Rao, and that it had ordered a dinner for one hundred thousand Bramins—an entertainment which was immediately provided.

* The banker's name was Sukharam Naik Loondee.

To the complaints of his subjects he never listened ; and if the villagers endeavoured to approach his presence, they were driven away by the attendants. The farmers of the districts had generally the superintendence of civil and criminal justice, and their powers in this respect enabled them to increase their collections by fines and exactions. There was a nominal court of justice at Poona under a Shastree, who had a very large establishment. It was supported entirely by the corrupt emoluments which power enabled its members to draw from the public, and was so notoriously corrupt that the poorer suitor, unless he had interest, or could bribe some great man of whom the Shastree stood in awe, was certain to lose his cause.

Defective as the system was under Mahdoo Rao Bullal, the Shastree who then superintended and directed the Panchayets was a person of strict integrity, and that Peishwa's reign was always referred to as the times when a poor man had justice ; even the administration of Nana Furnuwees was spoken of with applause ; but Bajee Rao, the only Peishwa who had full leisure to amend the civil government, had neither ability nor inclination for the task.

He persevered in his plan of sequestrating jagheers, and Mahdoo Rao Rastia having failed to produce his quota of horse for muster, the Peishwa represented to the British resident this departure from what was stipulated as wilful disobedience to his authority. The agreement in question being one of those concluded through the interposition of the British government, Rastia was called upon by the resident to fulfil his engagement with the Peishwa, otherwise he must abide by the consequences. Rastia hesitated, declared his inability to furnish so many horse, owing to the disobedience of the Duflays, who were jagheerdars under him, and, by the Peishwa's usual artifice, was secretly

encouraged to believe that, by trusting to his lenity, more favourable terms might be obtained. It was in vain that the resident represented his situation in its true colours, and warned him of his ruin; he steadfastly refused compliance, and was stripped by the Peishwa of all his possessions.

Every day made it more evident that the Peishwa's government was now aiming at the revival of the old Mahratta policy, and was running a course equally incompatible with the Peishwa's alliance and his political existence, unless it were expected that he could overturn the British government. By Trimbukjee's advice he had sent agents in the preceding year* to the courts of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay; he also despatched an envoy† to Holkar, with whose court Bajee Rao had never before held any friendly communication; but, what was still more extraordinary, he sent an agent‡ to reside with the Pindharees, and had a secret interview at Kopergaom with some of their chiefs. The object of his missions to the Mahratta courts above named was to negotiate a secret treaty of general confederacy and support, which was actually concluded. The declared intention seems to have been for the purpose of strengthening themselves, and uniting together in case the British government should meditate further encroachment on any of the states concerned, or to act offensively against the British should an opportunity arise, either in consequence of their expected failure in the Nepaul war, then going forward, or on any future occasion; but those of his countrymen who know Bajee Rao best are of opinion that, notwithstanding these extensive

* Trimbukjee is supposed to have held communication with Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay as far back as 1811, no doubt with his master's approbation.

† The envoy was a Bramin, named Gunnesh Punt.

‡ This agent was a Mahratta, his name Kistnaje Gackwar.

and apparently well-ordered intrigues, he had neither a fixed plan, nor any serious intention of making war upon the English at this period ; certain it is, however, that his measures were such as would have subjected him to the loss of his musnud, had the facts been formally substantiated and strict justice enforced.

His next scheme was to establish his ascendancy in Guzerat. Like his claims on the Nizam, he frequently expressed a wish to have his affairs with the Gaekwar settled ; but as often as the wish was met by the British government, he contrived to delay the adjustment. There had been no settlement between the Gaekwar and the Peishwa since the accession of Govind Rao. On the suppression of the rebellion of Abba Shelookur, the Baroda government agreed, as already mentioned, to hold Amedabad in farm from the Peishwa, including the tribute of Kattywar, with Pitlaud, Nappar, Coura-Ranpoor, Dhundooka, Gogo, and some rights in Cambay, for the annual sum of five lakhs of rupees. When the Bombay government sent the detachment into Guzerat to support the party of Rowjee Appajee at Baroda, the government was fast approaching to that state of anarchy and confusion in which the dominions of Sindia and Holkar were afterwards involved. This fine province was in a great degree preserved from similar misery by the active interference of the British government under the able arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, the resident. The revenues of the state amounted to 55 lakhs of rupees, and its expenditure to 82. The power of the government was, as we have seen, in the hands of a body of Arab mercenaries, and the divisions in the family of Gaekwar afforded a wide field of hope and of profit to military adventurers of all descriptions, who abound in that quarter. The Arabs

were driven out; the debts, exclusive of the heavy balance due to the Peishwa, were compromised for a sum less than 42 lakhs; and money was raised on the security, or advanced from the treasury, of the British government for its liquidation. Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, whose rebellion brought the English permanently to Baroda, went off from Neriad, as the reader may recollect, about the time when the Arabs were besieged in Baroda. He was afterwards, when nearly famished, taken prisoner by Babajee, commander of the Gaekwar's troops, delivered over to the charge of the British government, and long kept a prisoner at large in the fort of Bombay, or its environs, where he ended his days. Kanhojee surrendered himself in 1808, and at first was allowed his liberty and an ample pension; but his natural turbulence and love of intrigue could ill-brook the undisturbed calm of such a life. In a short time he forfeited the advantages he enjoyed, engaged in plots against the existing government, and was finally conveyed to Madras as a state prisoner.

The collection of the tribute in Kattywar required a considerable force every year from Baroda. The Mahrattas give the name of Kattywar to the whole western peninsula of Guzerat, although strictly applicable to one district only of that extensive tract which derives its name from the Kattees, a very peculiar race, who worship the sun. The whole region is inhabited by a warlike people, chiefly Jarejah Rajpoots, who are under separate chiefs, and whose internal divisions had early made them an easy prey to the plundering bands of Kantajee Kudum Banday and Dummajee Gaekwar. The resident, attended by a British force, repeatedly accompanied the Gaekwar's army, and contributed much to tranquillize the province, and to

improve its revenues. He also humanely exerted himself, though in the end with little success, to suppress the barbarous practice of female infanticide, to which the Jarejah Rajpoots are prone. From all these circumstances the Baroda government fell much under the control of the British resident; but as Lieutenant-Colonel Walker was enabled to direct its principal acts without paralyzing its internal authority, much benefit resulted to the country from his superintendency.

The ministry was chiefly composed of a set of Purvoes, a caste frequently remarkable for great fidelity and bravery, and, when poor, they are often frugal to parsimony; but it may be observed of the Purvoes, that wherever they attain power, and can command wealth, they are lavish and improvident. The head of this ministry was Rowjee Appajee, who died in July 1803; but having previously adopted his nephew, Seetaram Rowjee, as his son, he was, with the consent of the resident, appointed his successor. After a patient trial of his ability and resources, Seetaram was found incompetent to the duty, and his uncle Babajee, hitherto at the head of the army, was invited to assist him. Futih Sing, the brother of the Gaekwar, and the heir apparent, whose liberty had been purchased from one of Holkar's commanders who carried him off from Poona in 1803, was also at the same time brought into the administration. Futih Sing chose as his secretary Gungadhur Shastree, originally in the service of the Phurkay family at Poona, and a man of considerable activity and address, who had been very useful to the resident in the important measures he had effected. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker placed the highest confidence in the integrity and fidelity of the Shastree, and upon the death of Babajee, and great misconduct on the part of Seetaram, Gungadhur

Shastree, supported, as he was, both by Futih Sing and the resident, soon became prime minister in all but the name.

The first arrangement of any importance which took place between the government of Poona and that of Baroda, after the treaty of Bassein, was the settlement of the farm of Ahmedabad and its dependencies.

The former agreement was made in October 1800, and the term of its duration was to have been five years; but as Ranpoor, Gogo, Dhundooka, and the Peishwa's rights in Cambay were ceded to the British government by the treaty of Bassein, the Gaekwar was anxious to obtain a perpetual lease of the remainder, as the evils divided authority would be avoided, and his own districts become more valuable in consequence. The British government was equally desirous of having the farm continued, both for the reasons mentioned, and because much confusion and oppression were likely to be averted by the arrangement. The Peishwa, on these representations, and upon condition of receiving five and a half lakhs of rupees for the remaining districts, consented, without difficulty, to allow the Gaekwar to retain them for ten years, from June 1804, and a new agreement was concluded accordingly. But at the expiration of the period, the Peishwa's views were entirely altered, and five times the amount of the sum realized from the districts could not compensate, in his estimation, for the advantages of an increased political influence on the side of Guzerat; nothing could induce him to renew the lease. Long, however, before the period of renewal, the question of his claims upon the Gaekwar had become a subject of attention with the British authorities. The governor-general deemed it advisable to allow the two states to settle their affairs by direct negotiation, and to desire that the arbitration of the British government

should not be resorted to, except in the event of a failure on their part to effect an accommodation. At an early stage of the discussions, an agent of the Gaekwar government, named Bappoo Myraul, was sent to Poona. The debts of the Gaekwar to the Peishwa, according to the statements of the latter, which appear to have been correct, amounted to nearly a crore of rupees ; but, as the chief cause of the embarrassments of the Baroda government originated in the attachment of the family to the cause of his father, Bajee Rao generously acceded to the relinquishment of 60 lakhs of rupees of this demand. The Baroda government, without claiming exemption as matter of favour, advanced counter-claims on the following grounds.

When Dummajee gave up half of Guzerat to Ballajee Bajee Rao, in 1751, he retained his rights in Baroach undivided, and the Peishwa got Jumbooseer and some other districts as an equivalent for his share. By the treaty of Baroda, in 1775, Rugonath Rao obtained from Futih Sing Gaekwar the cession of his rights in Baroach for the East India Company ; and by the treaty of Poorundhur, although the Poona ministry had no power to alienate Baroach from the Gaekwar, it was wholly ceded to the British government. It was in vain that Futih Sing demanded his rights in Baroach from the English who kept them, or from the Peishwa who had given them away ; and although, when the war was renewed, General Goddard put Futih Sing in possession of several of the Peishwa's districts, he was compelled to relinquish them by the treaty of Salbye. Mahadajee Sindia, on the conclusion of that pacification, obtained Baroach from the British government : with Sindia's successor it remained, until it fell, by right of conquest, to the English in 1803 ; and the Gaekwar now advanced a demand on the Peishwa for the

amount of his share of its revenue since the treaty of Poorundhur.

His other counter-claims were on account of expenses incurred in reducing the rebellion of Aba Shelookur, and in maintaining an extraordinary number of troops for the defence of the Peishwa's, as well as of his own, possessions in Guzerat. These intricate claims occasioned infinite discussion ; and when Bajee Rao adopted the plans of Trimbukjee, he threw every obstacle in the way of a settlement, because the outstanding demands on Baroda and Hyderabad were reserved as a means of communicating with these courts ; from which, owing to the nature of their engagements with the British government, his intrigues might otherwise have been excluded. Bappoo Myraul, the Gaekwar's agent at Poona, a sensible, upright man, and of a cautious, observant disposition, was soon found unfit for the Peishwa's purpose. Some other agent must be sent with whom the settlement could be conducted. The Gaekwar's government, therefore, resolved on sending Gungadhur Shastree, both for the adjustment of the accounts, and for obtaining a renewal of the lease of the Peishwa's share of Guzerat.

Accordingly the Shastree proceeded to Poona ; but such

A.D. 1814. was the general dread of the violent and unprincipled conduct of the powerful

Trimbukjee towards all who opposed his wishes, that the Gaekwar asked and obtained the formal guarantee of his minister's safety from the British government. As early as September 1811, it had been proposed to send Gungadhur Shastree to Poona, the proposal was at that time readily and distinctly acceded to by the Peishwa ; but on the Shastree's arrival, in 1814, Bajee Rao objected to him, and even refused to see him, on the plea of his having been insolent to him when a carcoon in the service of

Phurkay. The fact was, the Baroda minister, Seetaram Rowjee, jealous of the Shastree, and already seduced by the Peishwa, represented the Shastree as a person wholly in the interests of the English.

It must be explained that Bajee Rao, on the decline of Seetaram Rowjee's influence at Baroda, attempted, with success, to gain him to his views; and on the resident's discovering the intrigue, and protesting against it, the Peishwa first denied, and afterwards justified, the correspondence, by endeavouring to prove his right to appoint the dewan at Baroda, according to the ancient practice in the plenitude of the Peishwa's power. Such a right, in regard to the Senaputtee or his mootaliq, Gaekwar, never did exist of the part of the Peishwa; but, without reference to the alleged right, or the object of the intrigue, the reasons urged did not appear sufficient, in Mr. Elphinstone's opinion, for the Peishwa's refusing to transact business with the accredited agent of a government in alliance with the nation which he represented, especially after having once assented to his mission: the Peishwa's objections were therefore overruled.

The proposed renewal of the lease of Ahmedabad, for reasons already explained, was positively rejected by the Peishwa; and Trimbukjee, having obtained the appointment of sur-soobehdar, prepared his troops and agents, who, in the Peishwa's name, took possession of the districts in Guzerat, and very soon commenced a systematic plan of insurrection and intrigue, which threatened to throw the whole country into confusion and disorder.* No better

* In the rains of 1815, the British troops in the cantonment at Kaira, their usual strength being much reduced at the time, were for several nights in expectation of being attacked in their lines by the Koolees, who are very numerous in that quarter, and were excited against the British government by Trimbukjee's agents.

success attended the other objects of the mission to Poona ; and the Shastree, at last, with the concurrence of the resident, determined to return to Baroda, and leave the questions to the arbitration of the British government.

This determination produced a marked change towards the Shastree in the conduct and demeanour of the Peishwa and Trimbukjee, who, foreseeing that they should thus be shut out from Baroda, resolved to spare no pains in gaining the Shastree to their interests. It was just at this period that Trimbukjee was appointed to carry on the communications between his master and the British government.

The Shastree was induced to postpone his departure, and every means was employed to conciliate his regard and confidence. Trimbukjee assailed him on the side of his vanity, which was the weak point of the Shastree's character, and persuaded him that the Peishwa, in admiration of his talents, both throughout the negotiation in which he was then opposed to his government, and in regard to what he had effected at Baroda, had resolved to appoint him his own minister. As a proof of the sincerity of this proposal, the Peishwa offered his sister-in-law in marriage to the Shastree's son, and acceded to an adjustment of the Gaekwar's affairs for a territorial cession, on a plan suggested by the Shastree, though without consulting his own court or obtaining the sanction of the British authority. Every arrangement was made for the intended nuptials, when the Shastree, having received no reply from the Gaekwar respecting the territorial cession, became apprehensive that it might be supposed he was neglecting his master's interests in forwarding his own, hesitated and suspended the solemnization of the marriage, after great expense had been incurred by preparations. This conduct

was deeply resented ; and the refusal of the Shastree to permit his wife to visit the Peishwa's palace, or to witness the scenes of gross debauchery to which every lady who entered it was subjected, was an offence which Bajee Rao never forgave in him or in any other person. Trimbukjee, however, affected to treat the Shastree with more cordiality and friendship than ever.

The Peishwa proceeded on a pilgrimage to Punderpoor, and the Shastree accompanied him, although his colleague, Bappoo Myraul, warned him of his danger, and begged that he might at least be permitted to attend him ; but the infatuated man would neither listen to his advice, nor allow him to be of the party. At Punderpoor, on the night of the 14th July, Gungadhur Shastree, who had that day dined with the Peishwa, was invited by Trimbukjee to repair to the temple, for the purpose of paying his devotions on an occasion of particular solemnity. The Shastree, being a little indisposed, excused himself, but upon earnest and reiterated entreaties he at last complied. With a few unarmed attendants, he proceeded to the temple, where he performed his devotions, conversed with Trimbukjee, and payed his respects to the Peishwa, who was seated in the upper veranda of the temple, and on that occasion treated him with particular condescension.

The unfortunate Shastree, who, like many others, could never resist the agreeable manners of Bajee Rao, quitted his presence in the highest spirits, and set out on his return ; but he had scarcely proceeded 300 yards when he was attacked in the street, and almost literally cut in pieces. Trimbukjee Dainglia hired the assassins ; two agents of Sectaram Rowjee from Baroda assisted in pointing out the Shastree ; and the Peishwa, if he did not instigate, approved of the murder, which was rendered peculiarly

atrocious in a Hindoo, by being not only perpetrated on a Bramin, but upon the consecrated ground of Punderpoor, a place of extraordinary sanctity. As Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee denied all knowledge or participation in the deed, the resident, who at the Peishwa's request had not accompanied him to Punderpoor, called for an immediate inquiry into the circumstances for the satisfaction of the British government: but no investigation took place. The general voice of the country pronounced Trimbukjee the perpetrator of the murder; Bappoo Myraul openly accused him of it, and the resident instituted a very minute and strict inquiry, which clearly established his guilt. The Peishwa was called upon to place him under restraint, and afterwards to deliver him up to the British government; but he refused compliance, evaded the demand, and for a time seemed resolved to stand or fall with his favourite. Being, however, unprepared for extremities, and the British troops being assembled at Poona, his natural timidity prevailed over every other sentiment, and on the 25th September he delivered up Trimbukjee, whom he had previously sent into confinement in the fort of Wussuntgurh. The two agents of Seetaram, being deeply implicated, were seized at the same time, and delivered to the Gaekwar, by whom they were confined in hill-forts. Seetaram, who, in conjunction with the agents of Trimbukjee, had been levying troops whilst the Peishwa hesitated to deliver up his favourite, was removed from the administration at Baroda, and taken into custody by the British government. This measure was much against the inclination of the regent Futih Sing, who on this occasion betrayed symptoms of being himself swayed by the intrigues of the court of Poona.

Trimbukjee was confined by the British government in the fort of Tannah, on Salsette, whence
A.D. 1816. he effected his escape over the wall between seven and eight o'clock of the evening of the 12th September.* The guard over Trimbukjee, owing probably to excessive precaution, had no mixture of sepoy upon it, but was composed entirely of Europeans. From this circumstance, the Peishwa was able to communicate with Trimbukjee, and, for some days previous to his making the attempt, several of his friends and servants were waiting in the neighbourhood with full expectation of his joining them. The principal agent of communication was a Mahratta horsekeeper, in the service of one of the officers in the garrison, who passing and re-passing the window of Trimbukjee's place of confinement, when in the act of airing his master's horse, sung the information he wished to convey, in an apparently careless manner, which the Europeans, from want of sufficient knowledge of the language, could not detect. The difficulties of this escape were exaggerated into an exploit worthy of Sivajee, and greatly contributed to raise the fame of Trimbukjee amongst his countrymen, with whom it gained him a degree of popularity which he had never enjoyed while in power. He confided his safety to the Bheels, Ramoosees, and Mangs, and resided chiefly in the hills about Nassuck and Sungumnere, sometimes in Candeish and Buglana, and frequently amongst the Mahdeo hills towards Satara, but never in the original haunts of Sivajee, where he would not have been safe. This circumstance is to be accounted for in his having treacherously seized Chitoor Sing,

* Trimbukjee, in conversation with different officers on his guard at Tannah, before he had any hopes of escape, admitted the murder, but said he had merely obeyed his master's orders.

who was extremely popular in that part of the Mahratta country.

Chitoor Sing, since we had last occasion to mention him, after the battle of Poona in 1802 had served in most parts of India. He was conspicuous in the charge made upon the 74th regiment at the battle of Assaye,* and was afterwards in the armies of Holkar, Umcer Khan, and the Rajpoots. In 1812 he was returning home through Candeish, when Trimbukjee seduced him to a conference, took him prisoner, loaded him with irons, and threw him into the fort of Kangooree in the Concan. Many vain attempts were made by his partizans to effect his rescue, till at last a Gosacen of the same name, aided by some of the Ramoosee chiefs, taking advantage of the interest felt for him in the country, gave out that Chitoor Sing had escaped, and obtained possession of the fort of Pruchheetgurh, by a daring and well-planned enterprize, suggested, it is said, by a traditionary account of one of Sivajee's exploits.† They afterwards took many other forts, and raised a formidable insurrection, which, though generally kept in check by the troops of Bappoo Gokla, was never reduced by the Peishwa's government. Their real object was plunder, but their avowed purpose was the re-establishment of the Mahratta sovereignty, and the release of the raja of Satara; and had Trimbukjee Dainglia fallen into their hands, they would have put him to death; Chitoor Sing lingered in prison at Kangooree, where he died in the end of April 1818. His brother Shao died at Satara, 3rd May 1808, and was succeeded by his son, Pertab Siew, or Sing, the present raja, then in his sixteenth year.

* I know this circumstance from Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, who was himself in that charge, and with Chitoor Sing.

† The manner of it has already been explained in a note on Sivajee's life, chapter 4, page 118.

However strong the suspicion of the Peishwa's connivance at the escape and concealment of Trimbukjee, there was no proof of the fact; and as it was thought he would rest satisfied in having effected his freedom, little notice was taken of the circumstance. Sewdasheo Bhow Maukesir was again called into the Peishwa's councils; Moro Dixit, a student of Bassein, and Chimnajee Narain, both Concanist Bramins, who, like most of Bajee Rao's courtiers, had gained the favour of their prince by the dishonour of their families, were likewise employed in the administration; and Captain Ford, the commandant of the regular brigade, in whom the Peishwa placed considerable confidence, because his prosperity depended on the stability of his government, was frequently the channel of communication between the British residency and the Peishwa's ministers. The utmost cordiality seemed to prevail between the court and the residency at Poona; but nothing could be more deceitful on the part of Bajee Rao. He was now engaged in the most active negotiations with Sindia, Holkar, the raja of Nagpoor, Umeer Khan, and the Pindharees against the British government; he made great additions to his army, and supplied Trimbukjee with large sums of money, directing him to raise troops at different places, in his own territory, which, even if discovered by the British government, might appear to be plundering

Pindharees or insurgents. The resident,
A.D. 1817.

who had early and exact information of Trimbukjee's secret proceedings, applied to the minister to ascertain whether the assembly of such troops was authorised or not by the Peishwa; and he was assured, not only that it was not authorised, but that no such assembly existed. Mr. Elphinstone was therefore bound to consider it an insurrection; he told the minister that

such levies were going forward ; that the principal body was assembling near Nattapoota, a village south of the Neera, within 50 miles of Poona, and he begged that immediate steps might be taken for its dispersion. Although the minister continued to deny the existence of any assembly of troops, a part of Bappoo Gokla's horse was sent down, as was pretended, for the resident's satisfaction. They quietly occupied a position in the very district where insurgents were collecting, but declared they could hear nothing of them. The Peishwa also persisted in denying all knowledge of Trimbukjee, or of an insurrection, and called on the resident, if he really did believe such an absurd report, to take his own measures for suppressing it. It was by this time known to the resident that the Peishwa, during a visit to the country, had invited, and positively given Trimbukjee an audience at Phoolshuhur, within 17 miles of Poona ; but what made this meeting the more remarkable is the fact, afterwards ascertained, that Trimbukjee came there attended by a large body of horse, who surrounded the village during the interview. The subsidiary force was then in an advanced position, near Jaffeirabad, for the purpose of protecting the country from the ravages of the Pindharees, and of assisting in giving effect to political measures to the northward ; but it was now, with the consent of the governor-general, ordered to act against the insurgents. Whilst two detachments of the Madras army advanced to the frontiers of the Nizam's territory—the one to Tooljapoor, the other to Beder—Colonel Lionel Smith, who commanded the Poona subsidiary, marched to the Neera with a light division, leaving his reserve to follow at leisure. The insurgents had moved from Nattapoota to Jhutt : but, on Colonel Smith's approach,

they countermarched, and passed by a rugged and unfrequented route through the Mahdeo hills ; Colonel Smith followed them, but they had gained many hours' march before the division got into their tract ; the pursuit, however, was taken up by a party of infantry from the reserve, under Major Smith of the Madras native infantry, who, after a persevering march, surprised and killed several of them ; but they had previously marked their course by several acts of atrocity, particularly by the murder of Lieutenant Warre of the Madras artillery. The object of this body in moving to the northward was to join another party, assembled in Candeish under Trimbukjee's relation, Godajee Dainglia ; but, before their arrival, Lieutenant Evan Davies, of the Bombay establishment, at the head of a body of the Nizam's horse, had attacked and dispersed the troops of Godajee.

The existence of the insurrection could be no longer denied by the Peishwa ; orders were therefore issued to the jagheerdar of Vinchoor to act against them ; and some time after, a letter from the Vinchorkur, with a fictitious account of their attack and dispersion, was sent for the perusal of the resident, and the officer commanding the subsidiary force.

In the meantime the Peishwa continued to levy troops, both cavalry and infantry ; every endeavour was used to induce him to desist ; he was warned of the consequences of such proceedings, and of the dangerous course he had followed in abetting the insurgents, and thus evincing intentions decidedly hostile to the British government. But he still persevered ; the language of his ministers assumed a peremptory tone, and they demanded from the resident whether he intended war or peace. Mr. Elphinstone, in order that nothing might be wanting to

bring the Peishwa to a sense of his situation, had suspended the intercourse between the residency and the Poona court about the time when Colonel Smith proceeded against the insurgents; he now, in expectation of receiving instructions from the governor-general, directed Colonel Smith to move towards Poona with the light division, acquainting the Peishwa with his having done so; the plan he pursued was to proceed gradually, giving the Peishwa time to correct his errors, if so disposed, at the same time relaxing nothing of the steadiness and dignity which became the representative of the British nation. Many reasons, however, combined to render it advisable to bring matters to an issue. The insurgents gained ground in Candeish: a fort fell into their hands; the Peishwa's levies, and the repairs of his forts, which had been going on for some time, proceeded with great activity, and as the rainy season approached, it was apprehended the Peishwa might betake himself to a hill-fort, inaccessible at that season, and commence a war which must be protracted, and would probably encourage all the Mahratta powers to unite in his cause. At this important crisis the communication between Calcutta and Poona was interrupted by disturbances in Kuttack; but, in the absence of the expected instructions, Mr. Elphinstone had fortunately received a private letter from the secretary to the governor-general, which mentioned the surrender of Trimbukjee Dainglia as an indispensable preliminary to any new settlement whatever. On this information he determined to act without delay. Having intimated a desire to communicate with the minister, the Peishwa requested to see him, and throughout a long conference displayed an unusual degree of coolness and self-possession. He entered into a warm and most eloquent defence of himself:

reverted, as usual, to his obligations to the British government, and spoke with so much apparent reason and candour of his own situation, and of the consequences of the conduct and views imputed to him, that any person who had not considered the weight of the evidence, and fully understood the character of Bajee Rao, must have felt disposed to give credit to the soundness of his arguments, even if he had been inclined to doubt the sincerity of his protestations. But whilst his actions contradicted his words, Mr. Elphinstone was not to be deceived; he tried, however, by every means, both during the conference and subsequently, to induce the Peishwa to prove the sincerity of his professions, and avert the danger by which he was threatened; he distinctly told him that Trimbukjee Dainglia must be delivered up, or not suffered to remain in his territory, and that the consequences of a refusal must involve the state in immediate hostilities. At last, after several days had passed in this manner, the resident formally demanded the seizure of Trimbukjee in the space of one month, and the immediate delivery of three principal forts—Singurh, Poorundhur, and Raigurh—as a pledge for the fulfilment of the demand. Bajee Rao, still under an impression of the high importance of his alliance to the British government, believed that the resident would not proceed to extremities; and he hoped that, without making such a humiliating concession, or surrendering pledges so important, he should be able to temporize until the season was advanced, and should find time to call into operation, with full effect, the extensive confederacy planned by himself and his favourite. Even when Mr. Elphinstone, on the 7th of May, intimated his determination to surround the city of Poona, Bajee Rao still refused compliance with the terms required. At last,

at one o'clock in the morning, the Peishwa sent a messenger in hopes that the resident might be induced to postpone

May 8.

or to relinquish his intention : and it was only on finding him steady to his purpose that the messenger told him he was instructed to comply with his demands. During the discussion the day had dawned ; the troops were moving round the city, and had completely surrounded it before the resident could reach the head of the line. They were withdrawn as soon as the order for the surrender of the forts was sent out : and the Peishwa, as if at length sensible to his situation, and resolved to give up his favourite, issued a proclamation, offering rewards for the seizure of some of Trimbukjee's adherents, and a sum of two lakhs of rupees, and an enam village of 1,000 rupees a year, to any person who should bring in Trimbukjee Dainglia, dead or alive. He likewise seized some of Trimbukjee's adherents, sequestered the property of others concerned in the insurrection, and manifested an apparently strong desire to comply with the recommendation of his allies. Although these proceedings did not deceive his own subjects, and the proclamation, without the Peishwa's cordial concurrence, was of little importance to the apprehension of Trimbukjee, still it seemed reasonable to admit these acts as a concession of that preliminary, without which no proposals for present satisfaction or future security would have been received by the British authorities.

The instructions of the governor-general, which reached Poona on the 10th of May, were framed for the purpose of circumscribing the Peishwa's power, of imposing such restrictions as should prevent the evils apprehended from the course of policy pursued by the Court of Poona for

several years, and of obviating inconveniencies found to exist in the performance of the articles of the treaty of Bassein.

A new treaty was therefore drawn up, by which, in order to mark the foundation of the whole proceedings, the Peishwa was compelled to admit the guilt of Trimbukjee Dainglia as the murderer of Gangadhur Shastree, the accredited agent of the Gaekwar state, residing under the guarantee of the British Government within the Peishwa's territory, and his consequent obligation to seize and deliver him up to the British Government; until the accomplishment of which, the family of Trimbukjee Dainglia were to be given over as hostages.

The Peishwa engaged to have no communication with any foreign power whatever, neither to send nor to receive wukeels, and, as head of the Mahratta empire, renounced all rights beyond the boundary of his own dominions between the Toongbuddra and Nerbuddah; he relinquished all future demands on the Gaekwar, and agreed to compromise all past claims on him for the annual sum of four lakhs of rupees. He also agreed to let the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gaekwar for four and a half lakhs of rupees a year, exclusive of the tribute of Kattywar and his other rights in Guzerat, which were dismembered by another article. Instead of furnishing the contingent of 5,000 horse and 3,000 infantry required by the treaty of Bassein, he agreed to cede territory yielding 34 lakhs of rupees for that purpose. This cession included Dharwar and Kooshgul with some undefined districts in the Carnatic, the Concan north of Bombay, and the Peishwa's revenue in Guzerat, except Ahmedabad and Oolpar; but Ahmedabad was subsequently included. The Peishwa also ceded the fort of Ahmednugur, together with all his rights north

of the Nerbuddah; he recognised the settlement with the jagheerdars concluded in 1812; and, at the recommendation of the British government, restored the jagheer of the unfortunate Mahdoo Rao Rastia; finally, he renounced Mailghut, a possession on the Nizam's frontier, which the Peishwa's troops had occupied in 1811.

In consequence of this treaty, by which important advantages were secured to the Gaekwar's government, a new arrangement was concluded with him, which had for its object the consolidation of the territories of the respective governments, and also to impose on the Gaekwar a more adequate proportion of the military charges of the province of Guzerat than he had been hitherto called upon to bear; for, although his irregular troops were maintained at a great expense, they were found wanting in efficiency, and the duty, as well as extra charges of field service, fell upon the British government. It was therefore proposed that a part of the irregulars should be discharged, that the subsidiary force maintained by the Gaekwar should receive an addition of 1,000 regular infantry and two regiments of cavalry; and that districts, lying conveniently for the meditated consolidation, should be assigned to the British government for defraying the additional expense. To this plan the Baroda government acceded, and a treaty to that effect was concluded on the 6th November.*

* The above chapter is on the authority of English records and oral information, Mahratta MSS. and personal observation.

CHAP. XXIV.

FROM A.D. 1814 TO A.D. 1817.

The Marquis of Hastings assumes charge of the government of British India.—State of India from the increase of predatory power.—Patans and Pindharees.—Plan for improving the defensive military positions.—Failure of the negotiations with Bhopaul and Jeypoor—defensive alliance embraced by Appa Sahib, the régent at Nagpoor—Appa Sahib falls into the views of the Poona court—murders Pursajee.—Progress of the Pindharees.—Plans of the Marquis of Hastings for the suppression of the predatory system—political and military arrangements.—Sindia is forced into the governor-general's views—progress of the negotiations with the Rajpoots, Umeer Khan, the chiefs in Bundelcund, and the Nabob of Bhopaul.

IN October 1813 the Marquis of Hastings, then Earl of Moira, assumed charge of the government of British India as successor to Lord Minto.

In addition to affairs immediately pressed upon his notice, the new governor-general instituted
 A.D. 1814. inquiries into every department of the state, extending his interrogatories to the public character and services of individuals, by which he not only collected a mass of information, but awakened a lively attention in the minds of the officers throughout the vast army of British India, and inspired them, by this obvious desire to ascertain

real merit, with the hope of honor and reward both for past and future exertions.

The defective nature of the political arrangements concluded by the British authorities in 1805-6 and become very evident from the state of anarchy existing in Malwa and Rajpootana ; and the necessity of suppressing the spreading hordes of Patans and Pindharees was universally acknowledged. The numbers of these marauders had augmented to about 50,000 men, of whom about one-half were Pindharee horse. Both the one and the other were systematic plunderers ; but the Patans were associated under Umeer Khan for the purpose of invading and plundering such states as they could overpower or intimidate, whilst the object of the Pindharees was universal rapine.

The Patans, therefore, required infantry and guns, and in this respect no native army in India was more efficient : their artillery was excellent ; and they had some of the oldest of Holkar's battalions as the foundation of their infantry, which was estimated at about 10,000 and their cavalry at 15,000 men. They were also distinguished from Pindharees by having a fixed rate of monthly pay, though it was seldom punctually received.

These plunderers, especially the Pindharees, were always gaining an accession of strength as the countries around them became exhausted ; for not only did every lawless man, who could command a horse and a spear, join them, but the more peaceable part of the community were driven for subsistence into the same course of life ; so that additional wants and accumulating strength tended of themselves to enlarge the sphere of Pindharee operations, without other less apparent sources of augmentation, derived from the secret support and encouragement of various principal chiefs of the Mahratta empire.

Representations of the growth and formidable nature of this predatory power were early made to the Court of Directors ; but as the question seemed to involve a revision of their political relations with several of the native states, years had elapsed before any latitude was granted for departing from the defensive system of policy pursued since the settlement of 1805-6.

The authorities at home, however, regretting the manner in which some of the Rajpoot states had been thrown off, were desirous of repairing what was still in their power, by taking the raja of Jeypoor under British protection, and orders to that effect were received at Bengal in 1814 ; but as the measure was part of a plan which the Marquis of Hastings had in view for effecting a complete arrangement, he postponed attempting it until a more favourable season.

As a prelude to the great object contemplated, it being supposed that Rughoojee Bhonslay, from his dread of the Pindharees, and from a sense of the gratuitous aid which had been more than once afforded when Nagpoor was threatened, might now be induced to enter on a defensive alliance with the British government, proposals to that effect were made to him ; but a long negotiation through the resident, Mr. Jenkins, ended in a positive rejection of the terms.

The chief end of these overtures, in the present instance, was with a view of connecting the chain of military posts between the frontier of the British possessions in Bundelcund and the territory of their ally, the Nizam. The same object was attainable by taking Govind Rao Nana, the chief of Sagur, and Wuzeer Mohummud, nabob of Bhopaul, under British protection ; but being by this time involved in hostility with the Goorkhas of Nepaul, Lord Hastings

intended to postpone the offer of protection to the principalities in question, when he obtained information that a negotiation for a treaty, offensive and defensive, was in progress betwixt Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay, and also between Sindia and the ministers of Toolsee Bye Holkar :* he further learnt that Sindia, who had made great efforts against Bhopaul the preceding year, was determined to renew the siege; that in its exhausted state even the heroism of Wuzeer Mohummed† must prove unavailing; and finally, that this chief earnestly solicited to be taken under British protection.

From these circumstances, Lord Hastings determined on adopting the proposed measure, and directed certain terms to be offered, which comprehended the free ingress, egress, and residence of British troops within the nabob's territory, and the surrender from Bhopaul of a fort as a present depôt. To support the negotiations, the troops in Bundelcund were reinforced, the Hyderabad subsidiary moved from Jaulna to Elichpoor, the Poona subsidiary from Seroor to Jaffeirabad, a large reserve was formed in the Deccan, and the army of Guzerat occupied a position at Soneepoor, on the right bank of the Myhie.

Wuzeer Mohummud appeared most ready to embrace the terms, and it was in consequence intimated to Sindia, by the resident in his camp, that the principality of Bhopaul was under British protection.

A.D. 1815. Sindia protested most vehemently against the measure, declared the nabob to be his dependant, and, in defiance of the assembled armies,

* These negotiations, of which the governor-general had obtained intelligence, were the prelude to the treaty of confederacy, of which the first article expressed the determination of these princes to serve and obey the Poishwa.

† See Sir John Malcolm's Central India for an interesting and animated account of the defence of Bhopaul.

threatened an immediate attack upon him. His battalions advanced, and although under a certain assurance that an attack on Bhopaul would occasion an immediate rupture with the English, Sindia, for a time, seemed quite determined to risk the event; but his action fell short of his words, and ultimately his army was withdrawn. His conduct was to be accounted for in the unfavourable commencement and brilliant termination of the Nepaul war; but the first impressions throughout India respecting that warfare inspired hopes in all who wished the overthrow of the British power. Of that number, the Peishwa, from the time he was guided by the councils of Trimbukjee Dainglia, and especially after having instigated and participated in his crimes, may be considered the chief; it was, however, at one time supposed that the plan of the general confederacy already mentioned did not originate with the Mahrattas, but was suggested through Sindia by the Nepaulese.

The Peishwa and Rughoojee Bhonslay assented, with seeming cordiality, to the proposed connection of the British government with Bhopaul; but no agreement ever took place with Wuzcer Mohummud. As long as he was threatened by Sindia, he not only appeared to accede to the terms, but gave out that he was under the protection of the British; but when the danger subsided, he objected to the surrender of a fort, and the negotiation terminated. The descendant, however, of the nabob of Bhopaul, who in 1779 dared, in defiance of Mahratta hostility, to befriend the English detachment under General Goddard, could be forgiven for an evasion, by which, if he refused protection, he also preserved independence. The failure of this arrangement prevented the prosecution of any plan of settlement with Govind Rao Nana at this period.

In the ensuing year, after the termination of the war in Nepaul, the raja of Jeypoor, being much
 A.D. 1816. pressed by Umeer Khan, applied for protection from the British government, which Lord Hastings, with a view to the general plan of settlement, was willing to afford ; but the raja broke off the negotiation as soon as he had induced Umeer Khan to withdraw, and, like Wuzer Mohummud, showed that necessity alone prompted his application.

The nabob of Bhopaul, however, died on the 17th March 1816, and Rughoojee Bhonslay on the 22nd
 March 17—22. of the same month. Wuzer Mohummud was succeeded as nabob of Bhopaul by his son Wuzer Mohummud, and Rughoojee Bhonslay was succeeded by his only son Pursajee. But Pursajee, whose intellects were always weak, fell into a state of idiotism immediately afterwards ; and his cousin Moodajee, usually styled Appa Sahib, the son of Venkajee Munnya Bappoo, who commanded at the battle of Argaom, was chosen regent, although not without considerable opposition. To secure an ascendancy, by no means fully established, Appa Sahib applied to the British resident to be admitted to the defensive alliance, before proposed to Rughoojee, which was promptly acceded to, and a treaty was signed 27th May 1816. A stipulated money payment,* calculated to defray the additional expense of field charges for one regiment of cavalry and 6,000 infantry, was to be paid by the Nagpoor government, and a contingent of 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot was to be maintained by the terms of the alliance. A subsidiary force was immediately formed, and until Appa Sahib was secured in the government, the whole continued in the neighbourhood of the capital, it being

* Of seven and a half lakhs of rupees annually.

agreed that, when the troops were required in advance, or even on ordinary occasions, two battalions only should remain at Nagpoor. By the end of October 1816, Appa Sahib had completely established his authority, but being immediately assailed by the intrigues of the Peishwa, he

A.D. 1817. very soon came into the views of the Poona court; being, however, apprehensive that if he threw off the support of the British government during the life-time of Pursajee, a party
February 1. might endanger his power, he one night caused Pursajee to be secretly strangled, and on the following morning it was announced and believed that he had been found dead in his bed.

In the meantime the aggressions of the Pindharcies increased, nor could the British government defend its territory from their ravages, although large armies, at a vast expense, were annually called into the field. During the season of 1815-16, or from October till May inclusive of those years, the Pindharcies pushed their depredations to a great extent, and were very successful in eluding the parties sent in pursuit of them. In the ensuing seasons they were less fortunate in their escapes: the British detachments, performing extraordinary marches, frequently came up with them, sometimes fell upon them accidentally, and cut off many of their parties. The Pindharcies never fought, and seldom defended themselves against British troops; but these successes, though in many instances highly creditable to the zeal and perseverance of the army, were but a mere palliative to this growing and deep-seated evil. It was observable that for several years the territory of the Mahrattas was in general respected, and their ravages directed principally against that of the Nizam and the British government.

To prevent suspicion from this circumstance, the Peishwa sent a party of horse to plunder in his own country, who gave themselves out as Pindharees ;* and Sindia professed the greatest desire to suppress them ; but his commanders openly countenanced them, and it was manifest that both Sindia and Holkar were not only unwilling but unable to restrain their dependants.

The subsidiary treaty with Nagpoor, and the acquisition of the Peishwa's rights by the treaty of 1817 over his remaining tributaries in Bundelcund, greatly improved the defensive means hitherto adopted by the British government ; but the governor-general, before receiving authority from England, had come to the resolution, as early as December 1816, of effectually suppressing the Pindharees ; various reasons, however, induced him to defer carrying his plan into effect until the close of the ensuing rains ; and in the meantime the Court of Directors had sanctioned offensive operations to the extent of driving the Pindharees from their haunts on the banks of the Nerbuddah and from Malwa.

The views of the Marquis of Hastings were more enlarged ; he aimed at their complete suppression by eradicating the predatory system from Central India, so as to carry peace to those desolated provinces, and security to the rest of the country. Berar was supposed to be settled by the late subsidiary alliance ; and the Peishwa, crippled by the treaty of Poona, might, it was hoped, see the neces-

* The fact here recorded is stated on good authority, but it was not suspected or known till after the war ; the party was sent by Trimbukjee in the end of 1816, or very early in 1817, into the southern Concan, where they plundered and committed very great excesses. Having dispersed, they afterwards re-assembled in the neighbourhood of Nattapoota. They halted one night in Satara on their way down, of which place some of them, I believe, were natives, at all events they were afterwards well known there.

sity of refraining from hostilities, secret or avowed, if he wished to retain the territory still left to him. The plan, therefore, of the governor-general embraced principally the possessions of Sindia, Holkar, the Rajpoots, the nabob of Bhopaul, and the principalities of Bundeleund. The former treaties with Sindia and Holkar became virtually annulled from the period when their dependants began to ravage the territory of the British government. Many proofs of secret hostilities, particularly on the part of Sindia, had come to the knowledge of the governor-general, besides the treaty of confederacy by which all the Mahrattas engaged to serve and obey the Peishwa ; he therefore determined on submitting a plan of a treaty of concert and alliance to those two states,—to declare the treaties of 1805 annulled, so that he might be at liberty to admit the claims of every state, tributary or otherwise, that had any pretensions to independence ; and to guarantee rights and possessions in all instances where the state or principality agreed to make common cause against the predatory system ; but he resolved to admit of no neutrality. He adopted as a principle not to disturb occupancy, but to treat with the existing government or chiefs who might be in possession of the country at the time. Thus Umeer Khan, though an undeserving instance of the operation of this general benefit, if he agreed to the proposals, and dismissed his patans, was to be guaranteed in the jagheer which he held from Holkar. On these principles, and to the above effect, as soon as the military preparations were in sufficient progress, orders were despatched to the various political agents.

The military plan was equally simple and comprehensive. Armies were to be assembled around the territories described, to close in by simultaneous movements to a

common centre, so as to hem-in the Pindharees and their abettors at all points; taking care to provide efficient means for resisting or following up any bodies of the enemy who might pass through the advancing divisions. For this purpose five divisions were prepared in the Deccan, and placed under the orders of Sir Thomas Hislop, commander-in-chief of the Madras army. One division was held ready in Guzerat, and four divisions, with two in reserve, were to co-operate from Bengal under the personal command of the Marquis of Hastings, who took the field that he might be on the scene of operations, and superintend the execution of his arrangements. Sir John Malcolm was appointed political agent of the governor-general with the army of the Deccan, and had also command of one of the divisions destined for active operations in the field. The preparations in the south, as the troops had so far to march, were necessarily public, but those to the northward of Bundelcund were managed with secrecy, so as not to give the alarm to Sindia, until he should find himself compelled to submit to the intended propositions, or obliged to commence war under great disadvantage.

The forces of the Deccan, including a sixth or reserve division formed at Adonee under Brigadier-General Pritzler the Guzerat division under Brigadier-General Grant Keir, and the troops left for the protection of Poona, Hyderabad, and Nagpoor, amounted to upwards of 57,000 regulars, of which number 5,255 were cavalry. The army which took the field in Bengal consisted of about 34,000 regulars, of which the cavalry amounted to nearly 5,000. Besides these, there were 13,000 irregular horse on the strength of the Deccan army, and nearly 10,000 with the army of Bengal, many of them good troops.

The 1st division of the army of the Deccan under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, preceded by the 3rd division under Sir John Malcolm, was destined to advance into Malwa, and cross the Nerbuddah at Hindia. The 5th division, consisting of the Nagpoor subsidiary force under Colonel Adams, was to advance by Hooshingabad. The 2nd division under Brigadier-General Doveton, and the 4th division under Brigadier-General Smith, were to occupy positions, the former in Berar, and the latter in Candeish, and to act according to circumstances. The army of Guzerat was to advance by Dohud into Malwa.

The four principal Bengal divisions were to be assembled at Rewaree, Agra, Sikundra near Kalpee, and at Kalinjer, in Bundelcund. The two divisions in reserve were intended as detachments of observation ; the one was stationed under Brigadier-General Toone on the upper Saone, the other under Brigadier-General Hardyman in Rewah, on the upper Nerbuddah. The division from Bundelcund, under the command of General Marshall, was to advance with the Deccan army against the Pindharees. The division from Rewaree, the most northern point, was under the command of Major-General Ochterlony, and was intended to expedite the arrangements with the Rajpoots, and to co-operate in overawing the Patans or attacking the Pindharees. The main body, to be assembled at Sikundra, was under the personal command of the Marquis of Hastings, and was prepared with considerable celerity and secrecy by the middle of October. It was destined to cross the Jumna by a bridge of boats a little above Kalpee to march due west, and to occupy, in the first instance, a position south of Gwalior, whilst the division from Agra, under Major-General Donkin, took up its station at Dholpoor, immediately to the northward. This judicious manœuvre, which gave the

command of Sindia's camp with the best part of his artillery, was executed with great success ; it disarmed one important member of a hostile confederacy formed against the British government, and compelled Sindia to sign a treaty, which, however unpalatable at the moment, was really ensuring his safety.

In September it was intimated to Sindia through Captain Close, the resident in his camp, that the army of the Deccan was about to advance for the extirpation of the Pindharees, and, as matter of form, passports were requested for the free ingress and egress of the British troops through his territory. At this period Sindia's army at Gwalior was more than usually turbulent—a circumstance principally attributable to a strong excitement caused by reports of the Peishwa's determination to break with the English, and a general hope that their master was about to join him. Sindia, in reply to the application for passports, stated that he had not given up his intention of punishing the Pindharees, and requested that the troops might be stopped ; but this being declared impossible after what had happened in the last two years, the passports were granted. Before the middle of October the views of the governor-general were completely unfolded to Sindia by a paper prepared and sent from the camp at Sikundra. It contained remonstrances on his evasive conduct for having harboured freebooters, who had plundered the British territory at the very time when he was pledging himself to punish their depredations, and it combated the plea he had advanced of inability to suppress them ; if, however, that plea were admitted as personal exoneration, it constituted a virtual dissolution of the treaty, and more especially annulled those stipulations in regard to his dependants in Rajpootana ; because, if unable to restrain such dependants, when they

committed aggressions on the British government, the treaties which bound that government to regard them as the subjects of Sindia could no longer be considered in force. The paper in question further declared that the British government had no other view than the effectual extinction of all predatory associations, and Captain Close was authorised to communicate the mode in which Sindia's aid was solicited for that purpose. He was required to place his troops at the disposal of the British government, to be stationary or employed at its option, with a British officer superintending each of the principal divisions; and any of Sindia's officers supporting or harbouring freebooters were to be dealt with as rebels. A contingent of 5,000 horse, to be employed under the direction of British officers against the Pindharees, and funds allotted for its expenses for three years, from the pension payable by the British government and the tribute demandable from Boondee and Joudpoor. The lands recovered from the Pindharees belonging to Sindia to be restored to him, and to the rightful owners, in all cases where they co-operated for their suppression; where they did not, the whole to be given up to Sindia. As a security for the fulfilment of the proposed terms, the forts of Hindia and Asseergurh were demanded, but Sindia's flag was to be allowed to fly, and a few of his troops permitted to remain in each of them. The tribute due to Sindia by the Rajpoot principalities was not to be affected by any agreements which the British government might make with them; on the contrary, its due receipt was to be guaranteed to him. A treaty to this effect was signed by Sindia on the 5th November, and ratified by the governor-general on the following day. Hindia was given up according to the terms of the treaty; but Jeswunt Rao Lar, the killidar of Asseergurh, refused to

obey the order of surrender. The three principal divisions of Sindia's army were thus stationed—the first at Ajimere under Bappoojee Sindia, the same person who treacherously deserted on Monson's retreat ; the second at Jawud under Jeswunt Rao Bhow ; and the third at Bhadurgurh under Colonel Jean Baptiste. The British officers chosen to superintend those divisions were, in their respective order, Major Ludlow, Captain Caulfield, and Major Bunce.

Soon after Sindia had signed the treaty, General Donkin's division proceeded to the westward for the purpose of co-operating in the general plan, but the Marquis of Hastings continued to move about to the southward of Gwalior, to observe the motions of Sindia, who, though compelled to accept the terms imposed, was watching the progress of events in the Deccan, intriguing with the Peishwa, and endeavouring to stir up the Goorkhas of Nepaul to make common cause with the Mahrattas.

In the meantime the political agents of the British government were actively engaged in negotiations with the petty states. The raja of Kerowlee, a dependant of the Peishwa, to whom the raja had paid a small tribute of 25,000 rupees a year, was the first to accept the proffered protection. He acknowledged the supremacy of the British government, was guaranteed in his possessions, and in his particular case the tribute was remitted. He agreed to furnish troops to the extent of his means. This agreement was signed on the 9th November, and on the same day Umeer Khan's agent at Delhi accepted the terms offered for his master. His jagheer was guaranteed and taken under British protection, on condition of disbanding his followers, except a small number for the internal management of his jagheer, which were to attend on the requisition of the British government ; he was also to

relinquish all connection with freebooters, and to give up his artillery for an equitable pecuniary compensation. After the conclusion of the treaty with Sindia, Captain Tod, assistant to the resident in Sindia's camp, was sent on a political mission to the Rajpoot states. The raj-rana, Zalim Sing of Kotah, who governed the principality in the name of his imprisoned sovereign, with all the prudence and vigour of the ablest of the Mahratta Peishwas, immediately acceded to the terms proposed, blocked up the passes in his country, and furnished a contingent to act with the British troops. A treaty was afterwards concluded with him on the 26th December.

In Bundelcund, Govind Rao Nana had signed a treaty on the 1st November, by which his tribute and military service, transferred from the Peishwa to the British government by the treaty of Poona, was commuted for the cession of a part of the district of Mahabuk, which lay within the British frontier in Bundelcund. Winaek Rao, the chief who had possession of Sagur, refused the proffered terms. The raja of Simpthur and the soobehdar of Jhansee readily accepted the terms of protection and guarantee; and the nabob of Bhopaul not only accepted them, but entered most heartily into the cause. The political arrangements in Bundelcund were conducted by Mr. Wauchope; those already mentioned as concluded with the rajas of Kerowlee and Kotah, and Umeer Khan were framed by Mr. Metcalfe, the resident at Delhi; but that of Umeer Khan, though signed by his agent on the 9th November, was not ratified by himself for some time, as the crafty Patan was then engaged in other negotiations with the Peishwa's agent in his camp, and, like Sindia, was watching the important events which were passing at Poona and Nagpoor.*

* In addition to the authorities quoted for the preceding chapter, I have to acknowledge my obligations to Mr. Prinsep's narrative.

CHAP. XXV.

A.D. 1817 AND A.D. 1818.

The Peishwa proceeds to Punderpoor—pretended reduction of his military establishment.—Poona auxiliary force.—Sir John Malcolm, political agent of the governor-general, arrives at Poona—interview with the Peishwa at Maholy—is deceived by Bajee Rao—system recommended in consequence.—Advance of the divisions of the Deccan army.—Peishwa's proceedings at Maholy—invests Bappoo Gokla with full powers—plan for corrupting the troops—fidelity of the sepoy—murder of the resident prevented by Gokla.—Festival of the Dussera—alarming appearances at Poona—Peishwa hesitates—arrival of the European regiment.—British troops take up a new position—are suddenly attacked by the Peishwa's army—battle of Khirkee—residency plundered and burnt—violent proceedings of the Peishwa—remonstrances.—Interview between the resident's moonshee and Gokla.—General Smith returns to Poona—flight of the Peishwa.—Poona is occupied—pursuit of the Peishwa—defence of Korygaom.—The Peishwa continues his flight—pursuit taken up by General Pritzler—resumed by General Smith.—Mr. Elphinstone is appointed commissioner, and two divisions of the army of the Deccan placed at his disposal.—Capture of Satara.—The Satara proclamation—new distribution of the force.—General Smith surprises the Peishwa's army at Ashtah—death of Gokla—rescue of the raja of Satara.—Affairs of Nagpoor—treacherous attack on the British troops—Battle of Seetabuldee—arrival

of General Doveton.—Appa Sahib surrenders himself—his guns are stormed and taken—attack on Nagpoor repulsed—Arabs capitulate—operations of General Hardyman, and reduction of the northern districts.—Appa Sahib is reinstated.—Revert to affairs in Malwa and Hindostan.

IN the month of July, as soon as the arrangements
 A.D. 1817. resulting from the treaty of Poona were
 put in a train of adjustment, the Peishwa left his capital, and proceeded on his annual pilgrimage to the temples of Punderpoor, unaccompanied by the resident, which promised to have a good effect in marking the restoration of confidence on the part of the British government. He immediately reduced his military establishment, chiefly his cavalry; but it was subsequently discovered that he had given every sillidar seven months' pay, with orders to remain at his village, and to hold himself in readiness to return when called upon, with as many of his friends as he could collect.

The regular battalions raised by the Peishwa were transferred as part of the contingent, which was placed under the direction of the British Government, and now termed the Poona auxiliary force; but at Bajee Rao's particular request, that he might be able to confer the command on Captain Ford, one of the battalions was to be retained in his own pay, and in lieu of it a new corps was to be recruited. Every exertion was made to raise the stipulated number of horse; but the Peishwa's emissaries opposed the recruiting by every means they could devise. From Punderpoor, the Peishwa, instead of returning to Poona, proceeded to Maholy, village near Satara, and a sacred place at the junction of the Yena and Kistna. During his stay there, Sir John Malcolm arrived

at Poona, having, on his appointment as political agent to the governor-general, with his usual great activity, visited all the native courts in the Deccan, for the purpose of consulting with the residents previously to entering on the scene of operations in Malwa; and the Peishwa, on hearing of his arrival, invited him to a conference at Maholy.

In the course of conversation, the Peishwa complained much of the degraded state in which he was left by the late treaty, lamented the loss of that friendship which had hitherto been only productive of benefit, but enlarged on the gratitude which he felt, and must ever feel, for the protection and support he had experienced from the British government. Sir John Malcolm endeavoured to soothe him, explained in a general manner the plans of the Marquis of Hastings for the suppression of the Pindharees, and strongly recommended him to adopt a line of policy calculated to assure the British government of his sincere desire to promote the alliance, and secure its friendship: that the restoration of what was already forfeited he must not expect, but, by pursuing the course now recommended, and aiding the operations with his utmost means, he might rely on the justice and liberality of the governor-general for obtaining considerable acquisitions as a recompense for the fidelity of which he boasted, and which he might now display. The Peishwa's professions were most cordial, and communicated, as usual, with so great an appearance of candour and good sense, that Sir John Malcolm was completely deceived, and returned to Poona in the full conviction that Bajee Rao would now heartily engage in the British cause, and that, by encouraging him to raise troops, and treating him with perfect confidence, he would prove a faithful ally. Mr. Elphinstone, though he expressed his opinions would not oppose

the liberal system recommended by Sir John Malcolm; but he contemplated and foretold a different result, especially on considering the tempting opportunity which would be afforded by the advance of General Smith's division to the frontier, and the exposed state of the handful of troops at Poona.

The forts of Singurh, Raigurh, and Poorundhur were restored to the Peishwa during the month of August. The excessive heavy rains of this season, prolonged to an unusually late date, delayed the advance of the whole Deccan army. Brigadier-General Smith had transported his division across the Ghore by the 9th October, and by the 20th occupied convenient positions close to the Chandore range of hills, with a view of advancing into Candeish, as soon as it should appear requisite. A battalion of light infantry, with some auxiliary horse, were left between Seroor and Ahmednugur; one auxiliary battalion was stationed for the protection of the Seroor cantonment, and the Peishwa's own corps, consisting of from 400 to 500 men, remained at Dhapooree, in its first cantonment, a few miles to the north-west of Poona. The company's European regiment from Bombay was to be held in readiness to join the brigade at Poona about the end of October.

The Peishwa did not return to his capital until the end of September. During his stay at Maholy he was most actively engaged in those schemes he had long meditated against the British government; but, by the advice of Bappoo Gokla, he had determined on changing his plans of covert hostility to an open attack, as soon as he should be prepared. The recommendation of Sir John Malcolm to recruit his army, for the purpose of aiding in the Pindharee war, afforded an excellent cloak

to his designs. Gokla was now the leader of all his measures, and Bajee Rao was induced to give him a formal writing under his own seal, which he confirmed on oath, binding himself to be implicitly directed by his counsel, and investing him with the full powers of his government. This measure seems to have been adopted not merely as a security to Gokla, but as a means of allaying the mistrust which the sillidars entertained towards Bajee Rao, and was the condition on which several of the jagheerdars pledged themselves to stand by him. This circumstance, though reported in the country, was not fully ascertained until after the commencement of hostilities. Bappoo Gokla received ten millions of rupees—nearly a million sterling—to assist in the expense of preparation. From the time of his first determination to break with the English, Bajee Rao restored the lands of many of his jagheerdars, and for several years had been endeavouring to render himself more popular with all classes of his subjects. He unfolded his intention of going to war with the English to the raja of Satara ; and, whilst he exacted from him and his mother an oath of secrecy and support, he sent them and all their family into strict confinement in Wassota. His recruiting went forward with remarkable activity ; his forts also were garrisoned, stored, and repaired ; and orders were issued to prepare his fleet. Many Bheels and Ramoosees were engaged in his interest by Trimbukjee Dainglia ; and especial missions were despatched to Nagpoor and the camps of Sindia, Holkar, and Umcer Khan ; but the schemes which he personally directed were the seduction of the native troops and the assassination of the resident. His plan of corrupting the troops extended even to the European officers ; and the agent employed for the latter purpose was Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, who for many

years had resided at Poona, was intimately acquainted with many of the officers, and, since the treaty of Surjee Angengaom, had received a pension of 1,000 rupees a month from the British government.* Jeswunt Rao had experienced much kindness from Mr. Elphinstone; but at this period, in consequence of some petty intrigues in which he had made an improper use of his name, the resident was obliged to treat him with unusual reserve. Bajee Rao, judging the opportunity favourable, sent for Jeswunt Rao, and, after many promises, exacted an oath of secrecy, and communicated the plan for corrupting the European officers—a commission which Jeswunt Rao, although he well knew its futility, like a true Mahratta readily undertook, upon receiving an advance of 50,000 rupees. So far he kept his oath as to say nothing of these circumstances;† but Jeswunt Rao had a great personal regard for Mr. Elphinstone, and, throughout the rise and progress of the Peishwa's preparations, gave early and constant warning of what might be expected. Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray was the only man of family who at the rupture openly espoused the British cause; but, of all its adherents, none was of so much importance, or rendered himself so eminently useful, as a Bramin named Ballajee

* It may be here mentioned that Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray had a just claim to the fort and valley of Sondoor, held by his brother Khundee Rao Ghorepuray, but which Jeswunt Rao had made over to the Peishwa in exchange for other villages. The British government approved of the transaction, and promised, at the time the transfer was made, to put the Peishwa in possession of Sondoor, but various causes prevented the fulfilment of this promise until the end of October of this year, when Sondoor surrendered to a part of the reserve under Colonel Thomas Munro, detached from the force of Brigadier-General Pritzler for the express purpose.

† Independently of its having been found in the Peishwa's accounts, I became acquainted with the circumstances from an individual then high in Bajee Rao's confidence, whose name it would be improper to publish.

Punt Nathoo,* whose vigilance, judgment, fidelity, and firmness at that trying period entitle him to be mentioned in this place.

The reports of corrupting the troops were brought from all quarters ; some of the sepoys indignantly refused what to them were splendid offers ; and others, pretending to acquiesce, communicated the circumstances to their officers ; but the extent of the intrigues could not be ascertained, and they at last became alarming, even to those who knew the fidelity of the Bombay sepoys, from the circumstance of the Peishwa's having many of their families and relations in his power, against whom he commenced a system of persecution, which he threatened to perpetuate if the sepoys refused to desert the British service.

It was the Peishwa's wish, previous to the commencement of hostilities, to invite Mr. Elphinstone to a conference, and murder him ; but this plan was opposed by Gokla, who, though he concurred in that of corrupting the sepoys, and was most sanguine in his belief of his complete success, disdained to perpetrate so base a crime, especially as Mr. Elphinstone had more than once proved himself his friend. But Bajee Rao was unwilling to relinquish a favorite scheme of personal revenge, and proposed to assassinate the resident as he rode out ; or, should that

* At my particular request, he wrote a very correct and voluminous history of his own times, in which he quotes his authorities. It was translated for me by my friend Mr. William Richard Morris, of the Bombay civil service, whose valuable assistance I have already acknowledged ; but the original MS. is in possession of its author, who, for various prudential reasons, was desirous of retaining it. Ballajee Punt Nathoo was the carcoon of the ill-requitted Khundee Rao Rastia, who at his death appointed him guardian to his children. He endeavoured to interest Colonel Close in their behalf, was in the habit of coming much to the residency, and at last attached himself to Mr. Elphinstone, openly embraced the British cause, and proved himself well entitled to the munificent reward which was conferred upon him before Mr. Elphinstone assumed the government of Bombay.

fail, to get Trimbukjee, with a body of Bheels, to endeavour to surprise the residency by night, whilst a simultaneous attack should be made on the cantonment.

The last interview which took place between Mr. Elphinstone and the Peishwa was on the
 October 1 4. 14th of October, when, although the latter adverted to the loss of territory and reputation he had suffered by the late treaty, he continued to express grateful acknowledgments for the former friendship of the British government. On Mr. Elphinstone's mentioning how anxiously the advance of the troops was desired, Bajee Rao repeated the assurances which he had of late frequently made through his ministers, that his troops should be sent to the frontier to co-operate against the Pindharees immediately after the Dussera.

The festival of the Dussera took place on the 19th
 October 19. October, and was the most splendid military spectacle ever witnessed since the accession of Bajee Rao. Two circumstances were particularly observable on this occasion ; a marked degree of slight towards the resident, and at the moment of the Peishwa's quitting the ground, a large compact mass of horse, under an officer named Naroo Punt Aptey, galloped down, as if they had intended to charge the flank of the British troops, but wheeled off as they came close up. The intention of this manœuvre was to show sepoys their insignificance when compared to this host of Mahratta spears, and might be supposed to have its effect in aiding the Peishwa's intrigues. It would have been difficult to convince the Mahrattas, in that vaunting moment, that of the three weak battalions then peaceably and unsuspectingly standing before them, one should, in less than three months, repulse their whole army.

After the Dussera every day became more interesting, and by the 25th parties of troops were
October 25. coming into Poona from all quarters, by day and by night. General Smith's force was now at a distance, and the European regiment from Bombay could hardly be expected in less than ten days. The position occupied by the brigade almost joined the northern environs of Poona; it had been originally taken up by Sir Arthur Wellesley for the protection of the city, but circumstances were now reversed. Gardens and inclosures, with high prickly-pear hedges, ran in many places within half musket-shot of the lines, affording not only every advantage for the attack of the Arabs and irregulars, but, in case of disaffection amongst the sepoys, every facility to desert. Small parties of horse came out, and encamped round the British cantonment, and in a few days were augmented to large bodies, whilst a strong corps of Gosaeen infantry occupied a position on one of the flanks. The Sungum being at some distance from the cantonment, the Vinchorkur's horse, with some infantry and guns, encamped between the residency and the village of Bambooree: but besides these preparations, all reports concurred in representing that an immediate attack was meditated.

For several nights the Peishwa and his advisers had deliberated on the advantage of surprising the troops before the arrival of the European regiment; and for this purpose, on the 28th October, their guns were yoked, their horses saddled, and their infantry in readiness. This intelligence was brought to Mr. Elphinstone a little before midnight of the 28th, and for a moment it became a question whether self-defence, under all circumstances, did not require that the attack should be anticipated. It was an hour of anxiety: the British cantonment and the

residency were perfectly still, and the inhabitants slept in the complete repose inspired by confidence in that profound peace to which they had been long accustomed ; but in the Peishwa's camp, south of the town, all was noise and uproar. Mr. Elphinstone had as yet betrayed no suspicion of the Peishwa's treachery, and, as he now stood listening on the terrace,* he probably thought that, in thus exposing the troops to be cut off without even the satisfaction of dying with their arms in their hands, he had followed the system of confidence, so strongly recommended, to a culpable extremity : but other motives influenced his conduct at this important moment. He was aware how little faith the other Mahratta princes placed in Bajee Rao, and that Sindia, who knew him well, would hesitate to engage in hostilities until the Peishwa had fairly committed himself. Apprized of the governor-general's secret plans, and his intended movements on Gwalior, which many circumstances might have concurred to postpone, Mr. Elphinstone had studiously avoided every appearance which might affect the negotiations in Hindostan, or, by any preparation and apparent alarm on his part, give Sindia's secret emissaries at Poona reason to believe that war was inevitable. To have sent to the cantonment at that hour would have occasioned considerable stir ; and in the meantime, by the reports of the spies, the Peishwa was evidently deliberating ; the din in the city was dying away ; the night was passing ; and the motives which had hitherto prevented preparation, determined Mr. Elphinstone to defer it some hours longer. Major J. A. Wilson, the officer in command

* As I was the only person with Mr. Elphinstone during that night, though I here narrate simply what I saw and heard, some apology to him may be necessary for publishing without his sanction what relates to him personally, but I trust that the occasion is sufficiently interesting to the public, and honorable to him, to authorize my having done so.

of the European regiment on its march from Bombay, had already been made acquainted with the critical state of affairs, and was hastening forward.

Next morning, however, the officer in command of the
October 29. brigade at Poona was requested to keep the men ready in their lines, but with as

little appearance of bustle as possible. At three o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Elphinstone sent a message to the Peishwa, mentioning that his highness's horsemen were crowding in upon the position of the brigade; that such a mode of encamping had never been practised or permitted by British troops, and therefore the commanding officer confined his men to their cantonment until those of his highness should be withdrawn, lest, by their contiguity, disputes might arise between them. This message was delivered by Captain Ford, and created a great sensation. Gokla recommended that the attack should not be delayed, the Peishwa hesitated, stating that he wished a little more time to make sure of corrupting the sepoys; the European regiment was still, as he believed, at a great distance, and every hour was adding to his army; another night was thus wasted in consultation, and at four o'clock of the

October 30. following afternoon, the European regiment by great exertions marched into the cantonment. Mr. Elphinstone now determined on removing the troops from their present very bad position to another in many respects more eligible, at the village of Khirkee, four miles distant, which had been early pointed out by General Smith as the proper one to be occupied in case of an apprehended rupture. The troops accordingly

November 1. took up their ground at Khirkee on the 1st November, and the residency being close to the town, 250 men were sent for its protection.

The Peishwa was apprized of the intended movement ; but his army supposed that the British troops had withdrawn from fear, and was much encouraged in consequence. The cantonment was plundered ; an officer,* on his route to Bombay, was attacked, wounded, and robbed in open day ; the language of the Peishwa's ministers was that of perfect slight ; his troops everywhere began to insult individuals as they passed ; and they continued to push forward their parties as if in defiance. They proposed forming a camp betwixt the old cantonment and the new position, and a party of horse moved down for the purpose. A second message was therefore sent to the Peishwa, begging that the motives of the movement might not be misconstrued ; for, if the British troops were pressed upon as in the old position, those of his highness must be treated as enemies. The Peishwa now believed, from the reports of his emissaries, that the sepoys were completely seduced.†

November 4,

On the 4th November, Moro Dixit, the minister who had formed an attachment to Major Ford, and was anxious to save him, communicated this circumstance, and that his master was determined to cut off the British detachment without sparing a man.‡ He advised

* Lieutenant Shaw. Veeram Sing, a horseman of Bajee Rao's personal retinue, was the individual who speared him.

† Many of the sepoys behaved with admirable fidelity ; one native officer, Jemadar Shaik Hoossein, of the 2nd battalion 6th regiment, on being tampered with, encouraged the overtures, by the advice of his adjutant, Lieutenant Robert Billamore, who was instructed on the subject. The Peishwa sent for the jemadar, made him great promises, and desired a carcoon to give him 10,000 rupees, but the latter gave the jemadar one-half, and kept the other himself. The jemadar brought the money to his officer in a bag of rice, just before hostilities commenced.

‡ Dr. Coats and Captain Ford, the latter only if he stood neutral, were to be the sole exceptions. Dr. Coats had attended the Peishwa in an illness, had gratuitously performed many cures amongst the people of the country, and had spread vaccination for many miles around ; the anecdote proves that Bajee Rao was not wholly devoid of gratitude.

him to stand neuter, when his property should be spared and his family protected; but on Captain Ford's telling him he would immediately join his countrymen, he took an affectionate leave of him, promising, at all events, that he would do his best to befriend his family; but as there was, he observed, no saying what turn the war might ultimately take, he exacted a like promise from Captain Ford, which was readily granted. Until this communication was made, Captain Ford, though in daily intercourse with the city, and made acquainted with the circumstances by Mr. Elphinstone, was perfectly confident that the Peishwa had no intention of going to war, and his astonishment and alarm were proportionally great. The Peishwa's reason for still wishing to procrastinate was the expected arrival of the Petwurdhuns and Appa Dessaye Nepankur; matters, however, were brought to a crisis before they could join his army. General Smith, who continued in the position already described, on hearing what had taken place, was prepared to expect a rupture; and therefore, without waiting for orders from Sir Thomas Hislop, concentrated his force at Phooltamba, on the Godavery, and ordered the light battalion to fall back to Seroor; it was also settled between him and the resident that, in case the communication were interrupted, the general might

November 3. conclude that the troops at Poona were attacked. On the 3rd November Mr.

Elphinstone directed the light battalion and a party of auxiliary horse, stationed at Seroor, to move to Poona.

As soon as the news of these arrangements reached the

November 5. Peishwa, he determined to delay the attack no longer. His preparations began about

seven o'clock on the morning of the 5th; but in the early part of the day he sent out several messages calculated to

hull the resident's suspicions ; such as, that his troops were alarmed by hearing that those at Khirkee were under arms ; that he was about to perform a religious ceremony at the temple of Parbuttee, and that the troops were drawn out, in honor of the occasion, to form a street as he passed. In the afternoon, when all was in readiness, the whole of his principal officers having assembled at his palace, Wittoojee Gaekwar, a personal servant of the Peishwa, was despatched to Mr. Elphinstone, by Gokla's advice, to inform him that the assembly of troops at Poona was very offensive to the Peishwa ; to desire him to send away the European regiment, to reduce the native brigade to its usual strength, when it must occupy a position which the Peishwa would point out, and that if these demands were not complied with, he could withdraw from Poona and never return. Mr. Elphinstone denied the Peishwa's right to require the removal of the European regiment, explained the reason of his having called in the light battalion, and recommended that the Peishwa should send his troops to the frontier as he had promised, in which case all cause of complaint would be removed : there was a good deal more passed, as the conversation on the part of the messenger was intended to engage as much attention as possible ; but he at last withdrew, warning the resident of the bad consequences of his refusal. In the meantime the Peishwa's officers at the palace were despatched to their troops ; Bajee Rao in person proceeded to the Parbuttee ;* and Wittoojee Gaekwar had scarcely quitted the residency when intelligence was brought that the army was moving out on the west side of the city. There was a momentary consultation about defending the residency, but it was instantly abandoned as impracticable, and it was determined to retire

* Situated on a hill on the south side of Poona, and already mentioned.

to Khirkee, for which purpose the nature of the ground afforded great facility. The river Moola betwixt the Sungum and the village of Khirkee forms two curves like the letter S inverted. The residency and the village were both on the same side of the river, but at the former there was a ford, and near the latter a bridge ; so that the party, by crossing at the ford, had the river between them and the Peishwa's troops the greater part of the way. From the residency no part of the Mahratta army was visible excepting bodies of infantry, which were assembling along the tops of the adjoining heights, with the intention of cutting off the residency from the camp, and, having this object in view, they did not molest individuals. On ascending one of the eminences on which they were forming, the plain beneath presented at that moment a most imposing spectacle. This plain, then covered with grain, terminates on the west by a range of small hills, while on the east it is bounded by the city of Poona, and the small hills already partially occupied by the infantry. A mass of cavalry covered nearly the whole extent of it, and towards the city endless streams of horsemen were pouring from every avenue.*

Mr. Elphinstone had personally reconnoitred the ground in front of the village of Khirkee, and ascertained that

* Those only who have witnessed the Bore in the Gulf of Cambay, and have seen in perfection the approach of that roaring tide, can form the exact idea presented to the author at sight of the Peishwa's army. It was towards the afternoon of a very sultry day ; there was a dead calm, and no sound was heard except the rushing, the trampling and neighing of the horses, and the rumbling of the gun-wheels. The effect was heightened by seeing the peaceful peasantry flying from their work in the fields, the bullocks breaking from their yokes, the wild antelopes startled from sleep, bounding off, and then turning for a moment to gaze on this tremendous inundation, which swept all before it, levelled the hedges and standing corn, and completely overwhelmed every ordinary barrier as it moved.

there was a ford between that village and Dhapooree, which, although difficult, was practicable for six-pounders, three of which, manned by native artillerymen, belonged to the auxiliary force, and was attached to Captain Ford's corps. It had been arranged, in case of an attack, that Captain Ford was to join the brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Burr; and Mr. Elphinstone had been at pains to explain to all concerned the advantage of always acting on the offensive against Mahrattas. When the party was fording at the residency, a messenger was despatched to warn the troops of the approach of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, the officer in command, wished to have acted on the defensive; but as the message required him to move down and attack the Peishwa's army, he immediately sent the battalion companies of the 2nd battalion 6th regiment to protect the stores, ammunition, and followers in the village of Khirkee, left his camp standing, and instantly marched down by the high road for about a mile; then, wheeling to the right, he moved in the direction of Dhapooree, to facilitate the junction of Captain Ford's corps, and bring his front parallel to that of the enemy. In a few minutes the expected corps was seen approaching; the resident's party had joined, and Colonel Burr advanced to the attack. The Mahrattas, who had sent on their skirmishers, some of whom had already suffered from the fire of the light infantry, were surprised by this forward movement in troops whom they had been encouraged to believe were already spiritless; and a damp, which had been spreading over the whole army by the accidental breaking of the staff of the Juree Putka before they left the city, was now much increased. Gokla, with the true spirit of a soldier, was riding from rank to rank, animating, encouraging, and taunting as he thought

most effectual ; but the Peishwa's heart failed him, and, after the troops had advanced, he sent a message to Gokla, desiring him "to be sure not to fire the first gun." At this moment the British troops were halted, their guns were unlimbering,—it was the pause of preparation and of anxiety on both sides ; but Gokla, observing the messenger from the Peishwa, and suspecting the nature of his errand, instantly commenced the attack by opening a battery of nine guns, detaching a strong corps of rocket-camels to the right, and pushing forward his cavalry to the right and left. The British troops were soon nearly surrounded by horse ; but the Mahratta infantry, owing to this rapid advance, were left considerably in the rear, except a regular battalion under a Portuguese, named De Pento, which had marched by a shorter route, concealed for a time under cover of the enclosures, and were now forming, with apparent steadiness, immediately in front of the 1st battalion 7th regiment, and the grenadiers of the 2nd battalion 6th : no sooner, however, were there red coats and colours exposed to view of the English sepoy, than the latter, with one accord, pushed forward to close, and in their eagerness got detached from the rest of the line. Gokla, hoping that they might either be disposed to come over, or that he might be able to take advantage of their impetuosity, prepared a select body of 6,000 horse, which, accompanied by the Juree Putka, and headed by several persons of distinction, had been held in reserve near his left, and were now ordered to charge.* The Mahratta guns ceased firing to let them pass ; and they came down at speed, in a diagonal direction

* Naroo Punt Apty, Mahdoo Rao Rastia, and Aba Poorundhuree were all in this charge. Gokla advanced a considerable distance with them, until his horse was wounded : he told Naroo Punt that most of the sepoy were friendly, and would fire over his head.

across the British front. Giving their fire, and receiving that of the line, they rode right at the 7th. Colonel Burr took his post with the colours of that corps; it had long been his own battalion, he had "formed and led" it for many years; he was then suffering under a severe and incurable malady,* but he showed his wonted coolness and firmness in this moment of peril. He was the first to perceive the moving mass: he had just time to stop the pursuit of De Pento's battalion, already routed, and to call to the men, who could not be dressed in line, to reserve their fire, and prove themselves worthy of all his care. Fortunately there was a deep slough, of which neither party were aware, immediately in front of the British left. The foremost of the horses rolled over, and many, before they could be pulled up, tumbled over those in front; the fire, hitherto reserved, was now given with great effect, numbers fell, the confusion became extreme, and the force of the charge was completely checked: a very small proportion came in contact with the bayonets, a few continued the attack in the rear, but many turned back; some galloped round the left as if to plunder the camp, but they were driven off by a few shots from two iron guns at Khirkee, and the sepoys had nearly repulsed the attack before a company of Europeans could arrive to their support. This failure completely disconcerted the Mahrattas; they began to drive off their guns; their infantry retired from the distant position they occupied, and upon the advance of the British line the whole field was cleared. The brigade returned to its position at

* Colonel Burr had lost the use of his side from a paralytic stroke, and both mind and body were impaired, but he was foremost in the post of honor. On this occasion, two of his attendants were shot by his side, his horse's head was grazed by a ball, and another went through his hat.

Khirkée after night-fall, and the light battalion and auxiliary horse joined it next morning. The report of their arrival, and the effect of the forward movement, deterred Gokla from renewing the attack. The Mahrattas in Captain Ford's battalion deserted, and a part of the newly-raised auxiliary horse were, at their own desire, permitted to quit the British camp; but not one sepoy of the regular service left his colours. The number of the British troops engaged at the affair of Khirkée, including Captain Ford's battalion, was 2,800 rank and file, of whom about 800 were Europeans. Their loss was comparatively trifling, amounting only to 86 men in killed and wounded, 50 of whom were of the sepoys on the left. The Mahratta army consisted of 18,000 horse and 8,000 foot with 14 guns.* They suffered considerably, having lost 500 men in killed and wounded; and though the proportion of horses killed on the spot was inconsiderable, a very great number were disabled. Amongst the sufferers was the minister Moro Dixit, who, by rather a strange fatality, was mortally wounded by a grape shot from one of the guns attached to the battalion of his friend Captain Ford.

Hostilities were no sooner commenced than the ferocious and vindictive character of Bajee Rao's previous orders became apparent from the proceedings in every direction, probably before he had time to stop them. The residency was plundered and burnt, and of the resident's library and private apartment not one stone was left upon another; the families and followers of the troops who fell into the hands of the Mahrattas were robbed, beaten, and frequently mutilated; the gardens were destroyed, the trees were

* This number is given from the actual returns, and does not include 5,000 horse and 2,000 foot stationed with the Peishwa at Parbuttee, so that Bajee Rao had already collected 33,000 men at Poona.

torn from the roots, and the graves were dug up. An engineer officer on survey was attacked and killed; two brother, of the name of Vaughan, one of them a captain in the Madras army, were taken while travelling between Bombay and Poona, near the village of Tullygaom, and though they made no resistance, were most barbarously hanged under the superintendence of a Bramin, named Babjee Punt Gokla.* These atrocities, excepting the plunder of the adherents and servants of the British government, were not perpetrated under Bappoo Gokla's sanction; but as he had been intrusted with the entire powers of the state, Mr. Elphinstone took the first opportunity of intimating to him that any individual, however exalted his rank, who might order the death of a British prisoner, should answer for it in his own person.

Two officers, Cornets Hunter and Morrison, of the Madras establishment, on the route from Hyderabad to Poona with a small escort, were attacked when they approached the latter place, and after a manful resistance, being compelled to surrender, they were confined in a hill-fort; some small parties who stood on the defensive in various situations, and surrendered on terms, were permitted to join the British camp. Amongst this number was the resident's moonshee, who, having a party of Arabs in his pay, defended his house in the city for several days, until Gokla interposed, and sent for him. During their interview, at which several persons were present, Gokla showed him the Peishwa's paper investing him with the full powers of his government, and, after some conversation, observed—"I have given you

* This person is now a prisoner, in a wooden cage, in the fort of Singurh. Bajee Rao disavowed the murder of the Vaughans, but acknowledged that the residency was destroyed by his orders.

protection because your master was an old friend of mine ; we are now enemies ; the trial we have already had" (alluding to the action of the 5th) "has not turned out as I expected, but tell him we shall persevere ; we may have taken our shrouds about our heads, but we are determined to die with our swords in our hands."

As soon as General Smith found the communication cut off, he advanced on Poona. From the time his division quitted Seroor, he was followed by flying parties of Mahrattas, who, owing to his want of cavalry, harassed his march. He arrived on the evening of

Nov. 13—15.

the 13th, and preparations were made to attack the Peishwa before day-light of the 15th. His army, having obtained a considerable addition by the junction of most of the southern jagheerdars, had come out a few days before, and encamped with its

November 10.

left on the late cantonment of the British troops, and its right stretching along the Hyderabad road for several miles. The intended attack, however, on the morning of the 15th, was postponed by General Smith in consequence of unforeseen difficulties at the ford. About sunset on the evening of the 16th an advanced brigade was ordered to cross the ford, and take up a position to the east of the Peishwa's army, at the village of Ghorepuray, for the purpose of co-operating in an intended attack on the ensuing morning : it was opposed by a body of the Peishwa's infantry, supported by parties of horse and two guns ; but having succeeded in getting to its station, though with the loss of 84 men killed and wounded, it was no longer molested during the night. In the morning, when General Smith moved towards the camp, he found it abandoned, and that the Peishwa had fled towards Satara. During the day the city was

surrendered, and the greatest care being taken on this, as on every occasion, by General Smith for the protection of the peaceable part of the community, order and tranquillity were soon re-established. General Smith remained at Poona for five days, during which time the communication with Bombay was opened, and a party being detached for the purpose, succeeded in capturing several guns in the neighbourhood of the fort of Singurh. Some of the inhabitants of Poona, who fled, as usual, with their property towards the hill-forts, were sufferers on this occasion, as a great quantity of baggage was taken at the same time with the guns, and became the booty of the army.

On the 22nd November, General Smith, having been joined by a regiment of native cavalry, commenced pursuing the Peishwa, who remained at Maholy; and, during his stay there, sent a party to Wassota, for the purpose of bringing the raja of Satara, his mother, and brothers to his camp, but he had quitted Maholy prior to the raja's arrival, owing to the approach of General Smith, before whom he fled to Punderpoor, and thence, turning up the bank of the Beema, he continued his flight until he ascended the Lag Ghaut, north of Joonere, where he occupied a position at Bamunwaree. This part of the country is exceedingly strong, with mountains on all sides, and the passes were stockaded by Trimbukjee Dainglia, who here joined the Peishwa with a reinforcement. The raja and his family were brought into his camp whilst on the route from Punderpoor. General Smith followed the Peishwa until he was past Poona, when he proceeded to Seroor: he there deposited his battering train and heavy baggage, and left a battalion of native infantry and a body of auxiliary horse to reinforce the station; he then proceeded by Ahmednugur down the Nimbadewra Ghaut, and up

the bank of Paira to Sungumnere. Finding he had got to the northward of the Peishwa, he ascended the Wursura Ghaut, and here he divided his force, sending back a part by Ahmednugur, and, with a light division, continuing the pursuit of the Peishwa, who fled to the southward as soon as he heard of General Smith's arrival at Sungumnere, giving out that he intended to attack Poona. Great exertions were, therefore, made to come up with him; but, in the meantime, the most remarkable event of the war took place from the following circumstances. General Pritzler, it must be premised, was at this time advancing with the reserve division of the Deccan army from Adonee towards Punderpoor, for the purpose of co-operating in the pursuit of the Peishwa, and Smith, deeming it probable that he should get to the northward of the Peishwa, as in fact he did, and that the Mahratta army, afraid of being driven back upon Pritzler, might descend into the Concan, where there was a small force fitted out by the Bombay government, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prother, employed in reducing the country, and which might thus be exposed to be cut off, it became necessary to provide against such an event. Accordingly Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, who was stationed at Poona, was directed, in case he should have positive information that the Peishwa had descended into the Concan, to detach the 2nd battalion 6th regiment from his own immediate command, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Prother: and in that case he was authorized to call in to Poona the 2nd battalion 1st regiment, lately left by General Smith to reinforce the cantonment at Seroor. But when the Peishwa commenced his flight to the southward, Colonel Burr, hearing that he meditated an attack on Poona, sent off an express for the 2nd battalion 1st regiment to reinforce himself.

The battalion, on receipt of this application, commenced its march from Seroor on the last day of December 31. the year, at eight o'clock in the evening. It consisted of little more than 500 rank and file, and was supported by two six-pounders, well manned by 24 Europeans of the Madras artillery, under a sergeant and a lieutenant. It was also accompanied by 300 of the newly-raised irregular horse, and the whole were under the command of Captain Francis Staunton. Having Jan. 1, 1818. marched all night, by ten o'clock on the morning of New Year's Day, Captain Staunton reached the high ground above the village of Korygaom, on the Beema, where he beheld the whole of the Mahratta horse, consisting of about 25,000, on the opposite side of the river. He continued his march towards the bank, and the Peishwa's troops believed that he intended to ford, but as soon as he had gained the neighbourhood of the village, he immediately took post in it. Korygaom is a moderate sized village, immediately overhanging the steep bank of the Beema; but owing to the immense beds of the Indian rivers, which are never filled except during the rains, the channel occupied but a small part of the space between the banks, so that the village was 50 or 60 yards from the water. There is a mud wall which, at one time, probably surrounded the village, but it is now full of large breaches on the side next the river, and on the east it is completely open.* Most of the Peishwa's infantry, in number about 5,000, had gone on in advance towards the Bhore Ghaut, east of Poona; but on first descrying the battalion, immediate orders were sent to recal them.

* I write this description of the village from recollection; I have not seen it for seven or eight years: not indeed since the morning after Captain Staunton evacuated it, when though I carefully examined that scene of rescent and desperate conflict, I at that time had no intention of publishing an account of it.

As soon as they arrived, three bodies of 600 choice men in each, consisting of Arabs, Gosaeens, and regular infantry, mixed together, advanced on three different points, under cover of the bank of the river, and supported by two guns, to storm the village. A continued shower of rockets was at the same time poured into it, and many of the houses were set on fire. Captain Staunton had selected a commanding position for the guns; but unfortunately the interior of the village was not sufficiently reconnoitred, as there was a strong square enclosure commanding most of the streets, of which the enemy obtained possession, and whence they could not be dislodged. The village was immediately surrounded by horse and foot, and the storming party was supported by fresh troops. All access to the river was speedily cut off; Captain Staunton was destitute of provisions, and this detachment, already fatigued from want of rest and a long night march, now under a burning sun, without food or water, began a struggle as trying as ever was maintained by the British in India. Every foot of ground was disputed, several streets were taken and re-taken, but more than half the European officers being wounded, the Arabs made themselves masters of a small temple, towards the east side of the village, generally used as a choultry, where three of the officers were lying wounded. Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, one of their number, got up, and went out, but was immediately stabbed by the Arabs, and his body cruelly mangled. Lieutenant Swanston, who had two severe wounds, had the presence of mind to advise his remaining companion to suffer the Arabs to rifle them unresistingly, which they did, but committed no further violence; and, in the meantime, a party of the battalion, under Lieutenant Jones and Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie,

arrived to their rescue, re-took the choultry, avenged the death of Mr. Wingate, and carried their companions to a place of greater safety. The sufferings of the wounded became extreme from thirst; and the men who continued to conflict were fainting, or nearly frantic, from the dreadful privation of water. Some of the artillerymen, all of whom bore a very conspicuous part in this glorious defence, proposed to Captain Staunton that they should surrender if terms could be obtained. His determined refusal did not satisfy them, but Lieutenant Chisholm, their officer, being killed, the enemy, encouraged by this circumstance, rushed upon one of the guns and took it. Lieutenant Thomas Pattinson, adjutant of the battalion, lying mortally wounded, being shot through the body, no sooner heard that the gun was taken, than, getting up, he called to the grenadiers "once more to follow him," and, seizing a musket by the muzzle, rushed into the middle of the Arabs, striking them down right and left,* until a second ball through his body completely disabled him. Lieutenant Pattinson had been nobly seconded; the sepoy, thus led, were irresistible, the gun was re-taken, and the dead Arabs, literally lying above each other, proved how desperately it had been defended. The body of Lieutenant Chisholm was found by his gun with the head cut off; Captain Staunton judiciously took advantage of the circumstance by pointing it out to the men, and telling them "such was the way all would be served, who fell dead or alive into the hands of the Mahrattas," on which they

* Lieutenant Pattinson was a very powerful man, being 6 feet 7 inches in height; nothing could exceed his heroic conduct on the memorable occasion where he received his wounds; he did not expire until the regiment reached Seroor, but unfortunately, in his last moments, he laboured under an impression that his corps had been defeated, which caused him great distress.

declared "they would die to a man," and the conflict was resumed by all with the most determined valour. Captain Staunton, Lieutenant Jones, and Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie were the only officers who remained fit for duty, and manfully persevered in continuing the defence. Their situation towards evening was very hopeless ; Captain Staunton had apprized Colonel Burr of the difficulties he laboured under, and an unavailing attempt from Poona had been made for his relief. As the night fell, however, the vigour of the attack relaxed, and the men were able to procure a supply of water. By nine o'clock at night the firing ceased, and the village was evacuated by the Peishwa's troops.* Next morning the Mahratta

January 2.

army was still hovering round the village, and Captain Staunton opened his guns upon them as soon as he could see. They appeared to draw off in the direction of Poona ; but they had heard of General Smith's approach, who was hastening forward with a very small force, in hopes that the Peishwa might be encouraged to make a stand ; but Captain Staunton, not knowing of General Smith's advance, and having reason to believe the enemy was in wait for him on the route to Poona, gave out that it was his intention to proceed thither. As soon as it was dark, however, taking as many of the wounded with him as he could carry, he moved out of the village at first in the direction of Poona, then, changing his route, he retreated to Scroor, where he arrived next morning, with the loss of 175 men in killed and wounded, of whom 20 were of the small detachment of artillery. Besides these, about

* To commemorate this glorious defence, a monument was erected by government, recording the names of those who fell ; the corps was made grenadiers, as their 1st battalion had been for the defence of Mangalore, and "*Mangalore and Korygaom*" became the animating motto of the regiment.

one-third of the auxiliary horse were killed, wounded, and missing.* The Mahrattas lost 500 or 600 men, and have the generosity, on all occasions, to do justice to the heroic defenders of Korygaom. During the conflict the Peishwa sat on a rising ground on the opposite side of the river, about two miles distant. Gokla, Appa Dessaye, and Trimbukjee directed the attacks, and at one time Trimbukjee entered the village. Bajee Rao frequently expressed his impatience, and asked his commanders "where were now their boasts of defeating the English when they could not overcome one battalion?" The raja of Satara was with the Peishwa, and having put up an aftabgeer, or screen from the sun, the latter begged he would put it down, "otherwise the English would send a cannon-ball through it."

After leaving Korygaom, the Peishwa fled towards the Carnatic, followed by General Pritzler, who took up the pursuit near the Salpee Ghaut. On Bajee Rao's arrival on the Gutpurba, he was surprised to find a part of the country already in possession of the British government. It appeared that Brigadier-General Munro, who had been originally sent up by the Madras government as commissioner to receive charge of the districts in the Carnatic,

* There were eight European officers on this memorable defence.

2ND BATTALION 1ST REGIMENT.

Captain Staunton.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Pattinson, died of his wounds.

Lieutenant Conellan, wounded.

Lieutenant Jones.

Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, killed.

ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant Chisholm, killed.

Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie.

AUXILIARY HORSE.

Lieutenant Swanston, wounded.

ceded by the treaty of Poona in June 1817, had collected a few regulars in addition to his own escort, and, by his personal influence and experience, had raised the native population, who were averse to the Mahrattas, as they had been to Tippoo, and eagerly desired a change of government.

The Peishwa, in pursuing the southern route, was supposed to have some hope of being joined by the raja of Mysore ; but, disappointed in this respect, and alarmed at the progress of General Munro, he turned suddenly round, passed General Pritzler, and re-crossed the Kistna, where General Smith, having arrived with the light division, pressed him very hard, until he got down

the Salpee Ghaut, and went off in the
January 29. direction of Sholapoor. General Smith's division was then halted for the purpose of allowing General Pritzler to join, in order to form a new distribution of the force, according to a plan proposed by Mr. Elphinstone, who now took upon him the direction of affairs, by authority received from the governor-general.

When the Marquis of Hastings heard of the Peishwa's treachery, superadded to the numerous proofs of his insidious and persevering intrigues against the British government, he determined to put an end to the dynasty of his family, and to annex his dominions to the company's territory, merely reserving a small tract, sufficient for the comfort and dignity of the imprisoned raja of Satara, which might serve as a counterpoise to the remaining influence of the Bramins, conciliate the Mahratta nation, and leave an opening for the employment of many persons, in their own way, whom it would have been expensive to subsist, and who could not obtain a livelihood under the English administration. Instructions to this

effect were transmitted to Mr. Elphinstone, vesting him with full powers as sole commissioner for the settlement of the territory to be conquered. The 4th and 6th divisions of the Deccan army, under Generals Smith and Pritzler, were withdrawn from Sir Thomas Hislop's control, and placed at the disposal of the commissioner. These instructions were received by Mr. Elphinstone early in January, but various reasons induced him to reserve their promulgation for a short period, until it could be done under impressions more favourable to the British cause than existed at the moment; and he then followed up, in a manner which should convince the Mahratta nation of the advantages of submission, and the hopelessness of resistance. Hitherto the pursuit of the Peishwa had been productive of nothing important, excepting the political effect of holding him up as a fugitive. Whenever Bajee Rao was pressed, Gokla, with all the light troops, hovered round the pursuing divisions, firing long shots with their matchlocks, throwing rockets in favourable situations, and cutting off cattle and baggage. Some skirmishes took place in consequence, and the Mahrattas frequently suffered from the shrapnell shells of the horse artillery; but these affairs were attended with no advantageous result to either party.

The two divisions having united at Rehmutoor, the whole force, under the command of
 February 7. General Smith, proceeded to Satara, which it was thought advisable to reduce, on account of the importance attached to the possession of that fortress in the minds of the Mahratta people. It scarcely made any resistance, and was surrendered on the evening of the
 February 10. 10th February, when the British colours were hoisted, but next day they were

hauled down, and the Bhugwa Jenda, or standard of Sivajee and his descendants, was, with due forms, hoisted in its place. A manifesto was at the same time published by the commissioner, in the name of the British government, succinctly representing the whole conduct of Bajee Rao, and stating the reasons of its being deemed incumbent on the British to deprive him of public authority ; to exclude him and his family from all concern in Deccan affairs ; to take possession of his territory, and to govern the whole under the authority of the company, excepting a small tract to be reserved for the raja of Satara. It was declared that there should be no interference with the tenets of any religious sect ; that all *wutun*, enam lands, established pensions, and annual allowances should be respected and continued, provided the owners withdrew from the service of Bajee Rao, and retired to their habitations in two months from that date. Farming of revenue was to be abolished, and the hereditary district and village officers were called upon to reserve the revenue, otherwise they would be compelled to make good the payments ; and should they or any other *wutundars* afford aid or pay money to the deposed Peishwa, their *wutuns* were declared liable to confiscation. No notice was taken of jagheers, as it was soon understood they would be kept or restored according to the readiness with which the holders under the Peishwa should tender their allegiance to the new government, and, whilst retained, they became a powerful security for the fidelity of the claimants.

The reader who has perused the foregoing pages with attention will be able to judge of the merits of this proclamation, and how well it was calculated to the end in view, especially when seconded by strenuous and persevering exertions on part of the military.

A new distribution of the two divisions of the army was immediately formed—one for the purpose of pursuing Bajee Rao, the other for besieging his forts. General Smith chose the former, as promising the most active service, and marched with two regiments of cavalry, a squadron of the 22nd dragoons, 1,200 auxiliary horse, and 2,500 infantry, in quest of the Peishwa. General Pritzler, in the meantime, attacked the strong hill-forts immediately south of Poona, whilst a small force, originally sent back by Sir Thomas Hislop, under Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon, to occupy the intended position of the 44th division in Candeish, had moved down at Mr. Elphinstone's request, and laid siege to Chakun. Other divisions were likewise occupying the country; General Munro in the Carnatic was eminently successful; the small force of Lieutenant-Colonel Prother, already mentioned, had taken many forts in the Concan; and another small detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy, likewise fitted out by the exertions of Sir Evan Nepean, governor of Bombay, had commenced operations in the Concan, south of Bancoote.

Whilst the new arrangement of the divisions and the reduction of Satara were in progress, Bajee Rao remained in the neighbourhood of Sholapoor, where he exacted large sums of money from the carcoon of the late Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir. That minister died at Poona a short time before the breaking out of the war, and with the general respect of all parties. During the short time he was employed after the surrender of Trimbukjee, he honorably endeavoured to convince Bajee Rao of the futility and wickedness of the course he meditated; and that there now was neither honor nor safety to the Mahratta nation, excepting by a faithful adherence to that alliance, which,

when contracted, might, in his opinion, have been avoided. The Peishwa deceived him respecting the secret insurrection; and though so well acquainted with Bajee Rao's character, when the facts were forced upon his conviction, he gave vent to expressions of indignation and disgust at the unparalleled deceit and treachery of his master.

At Sholapoor Bajee Rao was joined by a body of horse from Nagpoor under Gunput Rao, to whom we shall hereafter revert. In the meantime General Smith was marching towards the Mahratta army; the Peishwa decamped and moved to the westward, as Gokla conceived he should have no difficulty in passing the British detachment, and avoiding them or not as he thought proper.

On the 19th General Smith arrived at February 19. Yellapoor; he heard that the Peishwa was on the route from Sholapoor towards Punderpoor. He therefore marched all that night in hopes of coming upon him; but before morning he learnt that he had gone to the northward, and was encamped at Ashtah. Taking, therefore, the cavalry and horse artillery, desiring the remainder to follow as expeditiously as they could, General Smith pushed forward, and came in sight of the Mahrattas about half-past eight, just as they were moving off the ground. The Peishwa sent Gokla a taunting message for having thus allowed the army to be surprised, to which the latter replied that he might rest assured his rear should be guarded. Gokla, having desired Appa Dessaye Nepankur, who was at the head of about 4,000 men, to support him, waited with 500 horse for the approach of the cavalry, who were then advancing in three columns, the dragoons being in the centre, the 7th on the right, and the 2nd regiment on the left. Gokla's friends advised him to retire for support, and return better prepared to meet them; but

to this he objected, and merely replied, "whatever is to be done, must be done here." As the British troops came near, the Mahrattas fired a volley with little effect; and 300 of them, with Gokla at their head, came galloping down diagonally across the front, wheeled suddenly round on the flank of the 7th regiment of cavalry, as they were forming after crossing a ravine, and, driving upon them with their spears, occasioned considerable confusion; but Captain Dawes, of the 22nd dragoons, instantly throwing back a troop of his men, charged along the rear of the 7th, and, dashing into the middle of the Mahrattas, in a few minutes dispersed them in flight. Gokla fell on this occasion by the hand of a dragoon; and, though supposed to have been wounded before he came in contact with his antagonist, fought bravely to the last, literally dying, as he had pledged himself, with his sword in his hand. Govind Rao Ghorepuray and Anund Rao Babur, both persons of distinction, were killed with him. The Mahrattas were pursued for some miles; several elephants, a quantity of baggage, and a few horses were taken; but the most important result was the capture of the raja of Satara with his mother and brothers, who on this occasion, to their great joy, were rescued from the power of Bajee Rao, and the thraldom of the Concanee Bramins. Prior to this event, the Mahrattas had resolved to stand a general action, as soon as Ramdeen, a partizan of Holkar's should arrive. For this purpose the Peishwa's infantry and guns, before left at Nepanee, had arrived at Kurar; but the unexpected attack of General Smith and the death of Gokla completely disconcerted their arrangements. The affair of Ashtah, trifling as it was, had a very material effect in hastening the termination of the war, and these advantages were purchased with the loss of only one man killed, and

18 or 20 wounded ; amongst the latter was General Smith. The Mahrattas, in the charge and during the pursuit, lost about 100 men. The raja of Satara, having been made

over to the care of Mr. Elphinstone, General Smith proceeded to Seroor, and thence resumed the pursuit. Bajee Rao remained for a time at

March 4. Kopergaom, where he was joined by the
March 12. expected Ramdeen, and deserted by his lukewarm friends the Putwurdhuns. He next continued his route towards Chandore, intending ultimately to proceed to Nagpoor, where events, as interesting as those already detailed, had taken place before this period.

We left Appa Sahib in February 1817 established in the regency. It was not discovered at the time that he had been accessory to the death of the Raja Pursajee ; and he was therefore proclaimed his successor by the name of Moodajee Bhonslay. The emissaries of the Peishwa were so successful at Nagpoor that, until the feigned insurrection, set up by Bajee Rao under Trimbukjee, was checked, Appa Sahib had pledged himself to take part in the warfare begun in that insidious manner ; but, on hearing of the Peishwa's submission, he completely changed his conduct, and, although he continued in constant correspondence with Poona, the resident did not anticipate any more serious departure from the terms of his alliance, until it was known that the Peishwa had attacked the British troops. Upon this intelligence Appa Sahib secretly determined to make common cause with him, and immediately exerted himself, by every means in his power, to augment his military establishment. Mr. Jenkins, on perceiving these preparations, sent to Colonel Adams, requesting that a brigade of his division might be left to the southward of the Nerbuddah, and that a part of it

should be held ready to march on Nagpoor. This application, however, was merely precautionary; Appa Sahib betrayed no other indication of hostile designs; on the contrary, he was profuse in his professions of friendship, and inveighed bitterly against the conduct of Bajee Rao in treacherously attacking the English; but on the night of

the 24th November he sent to inform Mr. November 24.

Jenkins that a khillut had arrived for him from the Peishwa, who had also sent him a Juree Putka, and conferred on him the title of Senaputtee; that he intended to go in state to his camp to receive these honors next day, and invited the resident to be present at the ceremony. Mr. Jenkins' remonstrances against such a proceeding were, of course, of no avail; the insignia were received, and Appa Sahib's troops immediately took up positions in the vicinity of the residency, so threatening that Mr. Jenkins was induced to call in the brigade from its cantonment, about three miles westward of the city. Next day appearances were so hostile that preparations

for defending the residency became necessary, and an express was despatched to November 26.

call in the 2nd division of the Deccan army, under General Doveton. The whole force at Nagpoor consisted of a brigade of two battalions of Madras native infantry, the 1st battalion 20th regiment, and 1st battalion 24th regiment, both considerably reduced by sickness; the resident's escort of two companies of native infantry, three troops of the 6th regiment of Bengal native cavalry, and four six-pounders manned by Europeans of the Madras artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Hopeton Scott was the senior officer.

The residency lies to the west of the city of Nagpoor, and is separated from it by a rocky hill, running north and south, called Sectabuldee. At each extremity of this

hill, and distant about 30 yards from each other, are two eminences ; that to the north, which is close to the residency, is considerably larger and a little higher than that to the south ; but the base of the latter, being close to the huts of a village ; communicating with the suburbs, and affording facility to the approach of irregulars, was a most important point, and was occupied by 300 men of the 24th regiment, under Captain Sadler, supported by a six-pounder. The three troops of cavalry under Captain Fitzgerald occupied the enclosures surrounding the residency, being behind and partly to the right of the larger hill, upon which the remainder of the force was posted. In the evening, as the British pickets were about to be placed, a party was fired upon from the village, at the bottom of the lower hill ; but, under the possibility of a mistake, they forbore returning it, until, upon a continuance of the aggression, they gave their fire, and retired upon the smaller hill, under a heavy discharge of matchlocks, which became the general signal for an attack on the British position. A smart fire was maintained on both sides till two o'clock in the morning, when it slackened on the part of the Mahrattas, but was renewed with great fury with cannon and musketry at daylight. The heaviest loss which the British had hitherto sustained was at the smaller hill. Frequent attempts had been made by the Arabs to carry it, and that post had been, in consequence of the slaughter, repeatedly reinforced. At last, by the accidental explosion of a tumbril, some confusion was created, of which the Arabs took immediate advantage, charged up the hill sword in hand, carried it, and immediately turned the gun against the larger hill, where the casualties became distressingly severe. Emboldened by their success, the enemy's horse and foot closed in from every direction, and

prepared for a general assault. To add to this appalling crisis, the Arabs got into the huts of the British troops, and the shrieks of the women and children reached the ears of the sepoy. The residency grounds, where Captain Fitzgerald was posted, were also attacked; guns were brought up, and bodies of horse threatened to break in. Captain Fitzgerald had repeatedly applied for permission to charge, and was as often prevented by orders from the commanding officer; but, seeing the impending destruction, he made a last attempt to obtain leave. Colonel Scott's reply was—"Tell him to charge at his peril." "At my peril be it," said the gallant Fitzgerald on receiving this answer, and immediately gave the word to advance. As soon as he could form clear of the enclosures, he charged the principal body of horse, drove them from two guns by which they were supported, pursued them to some distance, cut a body of infantry accompanying them to pieces, and brought back with him the captured guns. The infantry posted on the hill witnessed this exploit with loud huzzas; the greatest animation was kindled amongst them: it was proposed to storm the smaller hill as soon as the cavalry returned, but another explosion of ammunition having taken place amongst the Arabs on the south hill, the same accident by which it had been lost, men and officers, mingling together, rushed forward: irresistible under such an impulse, they carried everything before them, pursued the Arabs down the hill, took two of their guns, spiked them, and returned to their posts. The Arabs again assembled, and evinced a determination to recover their ground; but as they were preparing to advance, a troop of cavalry, under Cornet Smith, charged round the base of the hill, took them in flank, and dispersed them. The British troops now advanced from the hills, drove the infantry from

the adjoining huts, and by noon this trying conflict, only equalled during the war by the defence of Korygaom, had wholly ceased. Instances of heroism equal to that of Pattinson are adducible, particularly that of Lieutenant John Grant, adjutant of the 24th regiment, who, though impeded by two severe wounds, was foremost in the storm of the smaller hill, and received a third and mortal wound as the post was carried.

The British had not 1,400 men fit for duty in the defence of Seetabuldee, whereas the army of Appa Sahib amounted to 18,000 men, half of whom were infantry, and of these 3,000 or 4,000 were Arabs, who fought with much resolution. The British lost 333 in killed and wounded, amongst whom 12 were European officers.* The Mahrattas lost about an equal number. The disproportion at Nagpoor was not much greater than at Poona; but the presence of an European regiment, and the advantage of acting offensively, gave a very different character to the contest.

Appa Sahib being foiled in his treacherous attempt, sent wukeels to express his sorrow, and to disavow his having authorized the attack; but Mr. Jenkins refused to treat with him under present circumstances, until he disbanded his troops, though he agreed to a suspension of hostilities. Reinforcements poured into Nagpoor from all quarters. Lieutenant-Colonel Gahan with a brigade

from Colonel Adams' division appeared
November 29. on the 29th, Major Pitman arrived with

December 5. a detachment on the 5th December, and

General Doveton, with the whole 2nd division, had reached Nagpoor before the middle of that month. On the morn-

ing of the 15th Mr. Jenkins demanded
December 15. the absolute submission of Appa Sahib,

* Including Mr. Sotheby of the civil service, 1st assistant to the resident, who was killed.

requiring of him to disband his troops, to place his territory at the disposal of the British government, and to surrender himself as a hostage for the performance of these conditions ; but he was at the same time given to understand that, upon compliance, no harder terms should be enforced than a cession of territory equal to meet the expenses of the subsidiary force, and as much control in his internal government as should prevent similar treachery in future. Till four o'clock on the following morning was the time allowed for his acceptance of the terms. At six o'clock it was intimated that the troops would not permit Appa Sahib to come to the residency as he wished ; a respite of three days was requested, but three hours only were granted. When the time expired, the troops advanced ; Appa Sahib then came in, and the army was halted in hopes that his force would be disbanded, and his guns given up. Such of the latter as were in the arsenal were surrendered, but on advancing to take possession of the others, a cannonade was opened upon the British troops. The line was in consequence immediately formed, and the guns were stormed and taken, but with the loss of 141 men in killed and wounded. Two of Appa Sahib's officers, Gunput Rao and Mun Bhut, were the persons who maintained this resistance, and, it was supposed, without their master's orders. Gunput Rao afterwards went off towards the Peishwa's territory, and joined Bajee Rao, as already mentioned, near Sholapoor ; but Mun Bhut, with the Arabs, retired to the fort of Nagpoor, where an attempt was made to storm one of the gates on the 24th December, and repulsed with the loss of 269 men in killed and

December 24.

wounded. The Arabs afterwards offered to surrender, on being permitted to march out with their property, families, and arms—terms which were admitted, because time was of importance, and there was no efficient battering train on the spot.

The reserve division of the Bengal army stationed at Rewah under Brigadier-General Hardyman was ordered down to Nagpoor when the Marquis of Hastings was first apprized of the defection of Appa Sahib ; but the order was not received until the 6th December, so that General Hardyman did not reach the neighbourhood until the whole was settled by General Doveton ; but on the 19th December he routed a body of the enemy assembled at Jubbulpoor, reduced that place, and co-operated with Lieutenant-Colonel M'Morine in occupying the whole of Appa Sahib's northern territory, excepting Choureeagurh and Mundelah. Hostilities at the capital were brought to a conclusion by the capitulation of the Arabs and the surrender of Mun Bhut ; Mr. Jenkins, owing to the interruption of the communication, had received no instructions relative to Appa Sahib in case of submission ; and therefore, in consequence of what had been already proposed, although the terms had not been complied with, Mr. Jenkins, on a consideration of all circumstances, conceived it incumbent on the British government to reinstate Appa Sahib, but deemed it necessary that his government should be most effectually controlled. For this purpose, to secure the subordination of the capital, the Seetabuldee hill was to be fortified ; the British troops to have complete military occupation of the whole country ; and a territorial cession, amounting to about 24 lakhs of rupees, equal to the full charge of the subsidiary force, was demanded. A treaty to this effect was drawn out, and about to be submitted for

the raja's acceptance, when, on the 2nd January, Mr. Jenkins received instructions from the Marquis of Hastings, issued on first hearing of the raja's defection before being informed of what had passed subsequent to the arrival of General Doveton. These instruction forbade any reconciliation with Appa Sahib himself, and directed that the son of the daughter of the late Pursajee, a minor, should be placed on the musnud, and affairs confided to a regency, selected by the British government. Afterwards, however, upon considering the motives which swayed the resident, respect for the moral obligation implied by the terms of his personal surrender induced the governor-general to confirm the treaty* on the terms proposed by Mr. Jenkins.

At this point, therefore, we shall for the present leave the detail of Deccan affairs, and return to the operations which were about to be commenced by the British armies in Central India, when their Mahratta allies at Poona and Nagpoor, taking advantage of the removal of the British troops, treacherously attempted, as we have seen, to annihilate the detachments at their capitals.†

* The treaty was dated 6th January.

† Authorities as for the preceding chapter.

CHAP. XXVI.

A.D. 1817 AND A.D. 1818.

Pindharees.—Divisions close in upon the durras of Khureem Khan and Wasil Mohummud—pursuit of Cheetoo by Sir J. Malcolm.—Cheetoo is protected in Halkar's camp—hostile appearances.—General Malcolm forms a junction with Sir Thomas Hislop—battle of Mehidpoor—treaty with Holkar.—Cheetoo is protected by Jeswunt Rao Bhow, one of Sindia's generals—Jeswunt Rao is in consequence treated as an enemy—Camp attacked, and Jawud stormed by General Browne—destruction of the durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem Khan—and of Cheetoo—dispersion of the Pindharees—and dismemberment of the Patan association.—Treaties with Rajpoots.—Recompence to the raja of Boondee and nabob of Bhopaul.—Sir John Malcolm appointed to the government of Central India.—Operations in Bundelcund.—Storm of Talneir.—Operations against the Peishwa—Affair of Sewnee.—Bajee Rao reduced to great distress—writes to Sir J. Malcolm, who negotiates with him—interview—surrender—terms—remarks.—Seizure of Trimbukjee.—Escape of Appa Sahib.—Seige and capture of Aseergurh.

DURING the rains of 1817, the Pindharees in three separate bodies, or durras, under their
 A.D. 1817. leaders Cheetoo, Khureem Khan, and Wasil Mohummud, occupied positions between Indore and Sagur. Khureem Khan was particularly active in

recruiting his durra, and was anxious to concert some general plan for eluding the coming storm; but the enmity between him and Cheetoo was too rancorous to admit of cordial co-operation, even in self-defence. They were promised assistance by all the native princes, according to their hopes or fears, but none stood forth openly in their favour. The left division of the Bengal army assembled on the 10th October at Kalinjer in Bundelcund under Major-General Marshall, and reached Sagur by the 28th. Whilst on its march, a party of Pindharees from the durra of Wasil Mohummud got in its rear, and began to ravage the territory in Bundelcund: but their progress was arrested by a detachment from the governor-general's division, which obliged them to return to Malwa; and this was the only enterprize attempted by the Pindharees. General Marshall, without noticing this attempted diversion, marched on according to his instructions, and arrived at Rylee on the

November 10. 10th November, where he opened a communication with Colonel Adams, whose division was already in its prescribed position at Hooshingabad. Sir Thomas Hislop by the same time had reached Hurda, and assumed command of the first division of the Deccan army; Sir John Malcolm, with the third division, composed of the Nizam's battalions and the Mysore irregular horse, had arrived in that neighbourhood some time before; and the Guzerat division, having advanced from Baroda, was in its position at Dohud. Everything was now ready for the combined movement, when news of the breaking out of hostilities at Poona reached Sir Thomas Hislop. Conceiving from this intelligence, and from recent accounts of apprehended treachery in the court of Nagpoor, that it would be necessary to support Brigadier-

Generals Smith and Doveton, General Hislop, departing from his instructions, immediately reinforced General Malcolm's division with a brigade of the regular troops, and sent him forward to co-operate against the Pindharees,

November 19. whilst he himself, with the first division, began to retrace his steps towards Burhanpoor. Sir John Malcolm crossed the Nerbuddah on the 16th November, and Colonel Adams on the 14th. By a

November 22. concerted movement with General Marshall, the three divisions respectively reached Ashtah, Rassein, and Ratgurh on the 22nd, and thence, in the same manner, reached Tullain, Bairsea, and Gunj

November 26. Basouda by the 26th. They thus drove the Pindharees from their accustomed haunts, and their lands were either taken possession of, or restored to the agents of Sindia and the nabob of Bhopaul. The durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem Khan united about Seronje, and thence, invited by Sindia, took the route of Gwalior; but Cheetoo went off to the north-west, in hopes of support from Holkar, and from Jeswunt Rao Bhow, one of Sindia's officers stationed, as already noticed, at Jawud. Lord Hastings' camp at this period was at Erich, and he had placed detachments connecting his own with General Marshall's division. Upon ascertaining that Khureem and Wasil Mohummud had come to the northward, one of the detachments moved from Burwa Sagur through Dutteea, across the Sindh, so as to cut them off from Gwalior; and Lord Hastings brought his division within 30 miles of Sindia's camp, which had the effect of completely overaweing that chieftain. The Pindharees, unable to advance to Gwalior, or to return to the southward, whence General Marshall and Colonel Adams were closing in upon them, remained at Shahabad

until General Marshall, though he advanced tardily, was close upon them. They then forced the Lodwana Ghaut, leading into Huraotee, which they were enabled to effect, owing to the misconduct of a party of Zalim Sing's troops posted there ; but General Marshall succeeded in destroying a few of them. They then intended to cross the Chumbul by the Loharee ford ; but they were intercepted by General Donkin ; and Khureem, with Wasil Mohummud, after having burnt their baggage, went off to the southward, at the head of 4,000 of the best-mounted of their followers, with whom they succeeded in passing Colonel Adams' division, and directed their flight westward into Meywar. Of those who were left behind, some were cut off by the troops, and some by the exasperated villagers ; one considerable body, however, got clear off to the southward, and, after traversing the whole Deccan, entered the company's provinces in the Carnatic, where they were annihilated, or completely dispersed, before the end of the ensuing January.

The scene of operations was now changed ; General Marshall was posted at Seronje, Colonel Adams moved down upon Gungraur, and General Browne, detached with a part of the Marquis of Hastings' division, also proceeded westward, in a parallel direction to the northward of Colonel Adams ; General Donkin, re-crossing the Chumbul, took post at Shapoorra, west of the Bunass. But whilst such was the progress of the Pindharee warfare in the east of Malwa, more important events were passing to the westward.

When Cheetoo went off towards Holkar's camp, he was pursued by General Malcolm with the third division ; but there being reason to apprehend that hostility was meditated by Holkar's army, Colonel Adams for a time inclined his

march to the west, in order to be able to support Sir John Malcolm; on its being understood, however, that the governor-general disapproved of Sir Thomas Hislop's retrograde movement, and had ordered him on as first directed, Colonel Adams co-operated, as before, against

Khureem and Wasil Mohummud. Sir

December 4.

John Malcolm continued to pursue Cheetoo, until the latter found refuge in Holkar's camp, in the vicinity of Mehidpoor, when the third division halted at Agur on the 4th December.

It has hitherto been quite unnecessary to refer to the everlasting turmoil of Holkar's durbar. The Mahratta faction, which Toolsee Bye, the regent, joined, had, in a moment of superiority over their Patan rivals, put the minister Ballaram Seit to death, which threw the principal power into the hands of Tattya Jogh, and Holkar's hereditary dewan, Gunput Rao, a man of weak intellect, under the guidance of Tattya Jogh; he was also the paramour of Toolsee Bye, over whom her passion gave him entire ascendancy. When the Peishwa's emissaries were negotiating the confederacy against the British government, one of their objects was to reconcile the Patan and Mahratta factions; but at the crisis when the British army crossed the Nerbuddah, there was a division amongst all parties and factions in Holkar's camp. Gunput Rao had been for a time gained over to the Peishwa's cause, and Toolsee Bye had no will but his; Tattya Jogh, suspected of being favourable to a negotiation opened by Mr. Metcalfe on the part of the British government, was placed under restraint, and the war faction, or, in other words, Bajee Rao's influence, predominated. The negotiation alluded to as opened by Mr. Metcalfe was part of the governor-general's plan, who, as will be recollected, intended to

form a treaty with Holkar, nearly similar to that which was concluded with Sindia. The proposals were made to Holkar at the same time that the terms were offered to Umeer Khan ; but no reply was received until the middle of November, when a secret communication from Toolsee Bye, offering to place the young Mulhar Rao and herself under the protection of the British government, was, by the advice of Tattya Jogh, transmitted to Mr. Metcalfe. The regency, however, being under the control of their own soldiery, were obliged to yield to the popular cry in the camp, and to move towards the Deccan, trusting to some favourable opportunity of effecting their purpose, though now obliged to join in the general demonstrations of loyalty in favour of the sovereign Peishwa. But Gunput Rao having, as already mentioned, been gained over, Toolsee Bye likewise seceded from the plan of seeking protection from the British ; and Tattya Jogh, the original proposer of that measure, was placed in confinement. The soldiery were averse to the admission of terms from the British government, because the chiefs knew they must lose the power and consequence which the existing state of anarchy conferred, and the troops apprehended the loss of their bread. Before Holkar's army quitted Rampoorah, some advances were made by the Peishwa's agent, and larger sums were promised as soon as they should cross the Nerbuddah. They were joined by Roshun Beg, one of Holkar's commanders, with 14 battalions before they reached Mehidpoor, and all were apparently enthusiastic in the Peishwa's cause. The arrival of General Malcolm's division in their neighbourhood caused some alteration in the minds of the regency ; but the general indications of hostility were so strong that Sir John Malcolm retired, upon the first division advancing,

to Oojein. The division from Guzerat ought to have been by that time about the same point, but Sir William Grant Keir had fallen back a considerable distance, at the requisition of the Bombay government, as, in consequence of the Peishwa's defection, disturbances were apprehended in Guzerat; but of this movement the governor-general disapproved, and the division was ordered to return for the purpose of co-operating as at first directed.

In the meantime, the first and third divisions, having united, advanced towards Holkar's camp.
December 14. Terms agreeably to Lord Hastings' instructions were offered, and a show of negotiation was kept up by Ghuffoor Khan and the Patan commanders, in the name of Mulhar Rao Holkar; but their horse committed hostilities, molested the foragers, carried off cattle, and at last made a direct attack on a body of the Mysore horse.

December 20. So determined were the Patans to cut off all chance of pacification, that, suspecting the regency of an intention to accept the terms, they confined Gunput Rao, and put Toolsee Bye

December 21. to death. When Sir Thomas Hislop found his parties attacked, he immediately determined on bringing affairs to a crisis. Holkar's troops, estimated at nearly 20,000 men, of whom about one-half were infantry, were posted on the left bank of the Seeprah, and on the opposite side from that on which the British army was advancing. Sir Thomas Hislop had four regiments of native cavalry, two squadrons of dragoons, a battalion of Europeans, and, including the Nizam's corps, seven battalions of native infantry, besides a considerable body of irregular horse. The position of Holkar's troops at the point attacked was exceedingly strong. The ford by which it was determined to cross was about 800 yards from the

enemy's line of infantry, which was drawn up at an angle of the Seeprah, with its left flank protected by the steep bank of that river, and its right covered by a deep ravine ; its front was lined with a formidable artillery, consisting of about 70 pieces, many of them heavy guns, which, being well served, overpowered the light English field-pieces, and occasioned a heavy loss before the British troops, after crossing the ford, had time to form an advance, which they did with all their characteristic bravery. The first and second brigades, gallantly led on by Sir John Malcolm, had the principal duty to perform ; the Madras rifle corps bore a very conspicuous part in the battle, but earned the honor at a high price, having suffered most severely. Holkar's artillerymen stood bravely to their guns, even after their battalions had retired ; but all the cannon were taken, excepting five or six of the lighter pieces, which were carried off by the flying troops. Holkar's horse showed considerable spirit in skirmishing before the British army crossed the river, but fled as soon as the action became general. This victory cost the British troops a loss of 778 men in killed and wounded, of whom 38 were European officers. Holkar's army lost 3,000 men, principally in the pursuit ; but it is creditable to his battalions that two bodies of the infantry effected their retreat when the British general was so strong in cavalry. One of these bodies, under Roshun Beg, reached Rampoorah, where it was attacked and dispersed on the 10th January by the

Jan. 10, 1818. division under General Browne, detached, as already mentioned, from the force under the personal command of Lord Hastings. The other body was under Ramdeen, a person notorious in the intrigues and anarchy of the period, who made good his way to the Deccan, and joined Bajee Rao, as already mentioned.

at Kopergaom. After the battle, Sir John Malcolm, with a light force, followed up the main body of the fugitives on the route towards Mundisore; whilst Sir Thomas Hislop, joined by the Guzerat division, followed in the same direction a few days afterwards. At Mundisore the submission of the young Holkar was tendered, and a treaty was concluded on the 6th of January. By this treaty

Holkar confirmed the agreement with
January 6.

Umeer Khan; ceded several districts in perpetuity to the rana of Kotah, which Zalim Sing had before only rented; transferred his tribute on the Rajpoots to the British government; and also ceded to it his territory north of the Boondée hills, and south of the Sautpoora mountains. He agreed to commit no hostilities, to have no communication with other states, and to entertain in his service no native of Europe or America, without the sanction of the British government; to discharge his superfluous troops, but to maintain a contingent of 3,000 horse, which were to co-operate with the English troops when required. The jagheer of Ghuffoor Khan was to be continued under the guarantee of the British government. A wukeel from Holkar was to reside at Calcutta, and a resident envoy was to be appointed to Holkar's court. The British government became bound to protect the territories of Holkar, and to maintain a field force for that purpose.

Sindia's durbar, after the conclusion of the treaty with Holkar, became perfectly tractable; but some of his officers still showed a determination to support the Pindharees. After the battle of Mehidpoor, Cheetoo proceeded to Jawud, and was admitted into the camp of Jeswunt Rao Bhow, who at first refused to receive Captain Caulfield, the superintending officer appointed to his division.

But afterwards, pretending to comply with whatever was required, he desired Cheetoo to withdraw, and allowed Captain Caulfield to join him. It was found, however, that he harboured and protected the Pindharees, whom he would neither arrest nor expel from his camp; and the Marquis of Hastings at last gave orders that he should be treated as a public enemy. The division under General Browne was sent against him; and here, as at Rampoorah, this division was distinguished by the prompt and efficient manner it performed the required service; the camp of Jeswunt Rao was beat in, his guns were captured, one of

January 28.

the gates of Jawud was blown open, and the town taken on the 28th January. The districts occupied by Jeswunt Rao Bhow had been usurped from the rana of Oudepoor, with whom an agreement, similar in principle to those with the other Rajpoot states, had been concluded by the British government on the 13th January. Kumulnere, Rypoor, and Ramnugur—three forts of some consequence, particularly Kumulnere—being situated in the usurped districts, General Donkin was ordered to reduce them, which was effected with little trouble by the middle of February. When General Donkin's division was broken up, the service in this quarter being by that time completed, a part of it joined Sir David Ochterlony, then engaged in negotiating with the Patans, and aiding in the settlement with the Rajpoots.

In the meantime Cheetoo, with his durra of Pindharees, had gone off in a north-westerly direction, when the pursuit was taken up by the Guzerat division with considerable effect. A part of the durra was destroyed, and several of their parties were overtaken in villages. Cheetoo, finding himself harassed, turned suddenly to the southward, and, by passing through a very difficult country, where

Sir Willam Grant Keir found it impossible to follow him, he effected his escape ; he re-appeared near Dhar, whither he was followed by the Guzerat division by another route. The broken remains of the durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem, at the time when they thought themselves secure from pursuit, were completely surprised in the middle of January by a detachment from Colonel Adams' division, which destroyed a great number of them. Khureem was not with his followers at the time, having been left in a jungle as they were flying through Huraootee ; but he was in Jawud when the town was stormed by General Browne, and escaped on foot with great difficulty. After a variety of adventures, Khureem surrendered himself to Sir John Malcolm on the 15th February ; Namdar Khan came in on the 3rd February, with such of his followers as remained, and many of the principal chiefs followed his example. The only terms required by Namdar Khan were an assurance that he should not be sent to Europe or Calcutta. Many persons belonging to the durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem gave themselves up to Zalim Sing of Kotah, and the small parties dispersed. Wasil Mohummud in person took refuge in Sindia's camp at Gwalior, where the British authorities would not seize him, but caused Sindia to do so, that it might be manifest to all India that an enemy of the British government could nowhere find an asylum. He was not imprisoned, but kept at Ghazeepoor under a strict watch ; and at last, being intercepted in an attempt to escape, he destroyed himself by poison.

Of the Pindharees, Cheetoo's durra alone remains to be accounted for. The main body had
 January 25. hitherto escaped ; but on the 25th January
 it was completely surprised and dispersed by a detachment

from the garrison of Hindia ; and the Bheels and Grassias in the neighbourhood, from whom, it may be recollected, the Pindharees took several districts, being encouraged to attack the fugitives, spared none who fell into their hands. Cheetoo with 200 followers escaped : he endeavoured to make terms for himself through the nabob of Bhopaul, but his demands were extravagant, and, being again pursued, his followers dropped off daily. He afterwards went through a variety of adventures, and we shall again have occasion to mention him ; but at length, hunted from his last asylum, and still bearing up with a spirit and perseverance worthy of the leader of a better band, Cheetoo, when singly pursuing his flight, was devoured by a tiger in the jungles adjoining the fortress of Aseergurh. The Pindharees thus dispersed, without leaders, and without a home or a rendezvous, were afterwards little heard of, though flying parties were seen in the Deccan until the termination of the war with the Peishwa : they mingled with the rest of the population, but the real Pindharees still retain their name, though some of them have become active improving farmers.*

With regard to the Patans, Umeer Khan, after he had made the agreement with Mr. Metcalfe for himself, did not ratify it until he heard of the defence at Seetabuldee, when, considering the Mahratta game as completely lost, he immediately dismissed the Peishwa's agents, retified the engagement with the British government, and endeavoured by every means in his power to fulfil its stipulations.

The advance of Sir David Ochterlony, who judiciously interposed his division between the two principal Patan

* I know personally some of this description settled in the Deccan, and, I dare say, many may be found cultivating the fields in Malwa.

camps, would soon have compelled Umeer Khan to submission, had coercion become necessary ; but his presence in that situation was afterwards very important in enabling Umeer Khan to obtain the promised guns, and to satisfy the turbulent soldiery. The Patans were prevented from trying their strength by the fate of Holkar's troops at Mehidpoor, by the influence and cunning of Umeer Khan, and by the address and firmness of Sir David Ochterlony. Some of them were dismissed with part of their arrears, some of them were taken into the service, and the whole were overawed or conciliated without bloodshed.

The presence of Sir David Ochterlony likewise facilitated the negotiations with the Rajpoots, and enabled the Marquis of Hastings to complete his plans, or put the whole into a train of adjustment by the middle of February. A treaty with Joudpoor was signed on the 6th January, but the negotiation with Jeypoor did not terminate until the 2nd April, when a treaty was concluded. All the other states and principalities, excepting Sagur, of which the British government took possession, accepted the terms offered by the governor-general ; and Sindia having given up the district of Ajimere, and relinquished his tribute on the raja of Boondce, in exchange for part of the lands of the jagheerdar of Vinchoor, situated in Malwa, and forfeited by his adherence to the cause of Bajee Rao, the British government was thus enabled to recompense the hitherto ill-requited raja of Boondce, who behaved so well to the English when retreating under Colonel Monson. Not only was the tribute thus obtained from Sindia relinquished by the British Government, but all the possessions usurped from the raja by Holkar were restored, and Sindia's encroachments, within his frontier, were also recovered for him by negotiation. The record of this

instance of national gratitude will be read by every Briton with satisfaction, and the Marquis of Hastings also had it in his power to confer on the nabob of Bhopaul a reward equally suitable, not only for the friendship of his ancestor towards General Goddard's army, but for the zeal he had himself displayed in the British cause* during the present war, since he acceded to the proffered terms in the month of November. A treaty was concluded with him on the 26th February, by which a small contingent of 600 horse and 400 infantry was all that was required to be furnished for the service of the British government, and five districts† were ceded to him in perpetuity for their support. Some forfeited lands of the Vinchorkur, and a part of the district of Shujawulpoor, were afterwards added; the fort of Islamnuggur, a much-valued possession, was likewise obtained for him from Sindia by negotiation. These cessions placed the principality of Bhopaul on a very respectable footing; and amongst the natives of India, where the recollections of benefits and injuries are treasured up for generations, nothing in the whole administration of the Marquis of Hastings conveyed so deep an impression of the value of British friendship, as the conduct of its government to Boondce and Bhopaul.

The military operations in Central India being completed, Sir John Malcolm remained there as agent for the governor-general; and by the active exertions and conciliatory methods, which during a long career have characterized his services, and which, on the whole, have been surpassed by those of no living servant of the East India Company, that officer introduced order and peace in an extensive tract, where those blessings had been long unknown.

* He sold his jewels to support troops.

† Ashtah, Ichawur, Sehar, Dowaha, and Dawapana.

The division under General Marshall was ordered from Seronje into Bundelcund ; and, after reducing Sagur, took Dhamounce and Mundelah, belonging to the territory of Nagpoor, the killidars of which had refused to surrender, in consequence of secret orders from Appa Sahib. At the same time that General Marshall was sent into Bundelcund, the greater part of the first, third, and fifth divisions were placed at the disposal of Mr. Elphinstone, to assist in the more important revolution going forward in the Deccan.

Sir Thomas Hislop, as commander-in-chief at Madras, proceeded to Fort St. George ; but, on his way to the southward, he took possession of those places in his immediate route which were ceded to the British government by Holkar. The killidar of Talnier, from a pertinacity common to governors of forts in India, resisted the order of surrender ; and, although warned from the first that he should be treated as a rebel if he refused to obey the orders of his government, he continued to fire upon the British troops. A storming party was therefore sent to force the entrance of the fort, which is by five successive gates ; of these, the first and second were passed without difficulty, and at the third the killidar came out and surrendered himself. He also returned with the party through the third and fourth gates, which were opened, but at the fifth gate there was some demur made by the Arabs when told they must surrender at discretion ; the wicket, however, was at last opened, and a few officers and men had entered, when the Arabs, from some misapprehension, rushed upon them, cut most of them down and, amongst the number, killed Major Gordon and Captain Macgregor. Their companions behind, hearing of what had been perpetrated, with the exasperated feelings of British troops where they suspect treachery.

rushed in as fast as they could gain admittance, and of a garrison of about 300 men, one only, by leaping the wall, escaped with life. Sir Thomas Hislop, under the same impulse by which the troops were actuated, ordered the killidar to be hanged as the cause of all the bloodshed, without reflecting on the probability of his not being, even in the first instance, wholly to blame for his lamentable catastrophe, and that his subsequent conduct entitled him to clemency.

In taking possession of the forts in the territory ceded by Holkar, Sir Thomas Hislop was aided by the second division under General Doveton, who, shortly after the surrender of Nagpoor, had proceeded to the westward, believing that everything in the quarter he had just quitted was finally arranged; but no sooner was Appa Sahib reinstated on his musnud, than he renewed his intrigues, encouraged the savage Goands to revolt, sent secret orders to his killidars to resist the orders of surrender which he had granted in favour of the British government, and applied to Bajee Rao for assistance. An application to this effect had arrived at the time Gunput Rao joined the Peishwa near Sholapoor, and frequent messengers followed, subsequent to the affair of Ashtah, imploring succour.

We left Bajee Rao on the route to Chandore. Before he reached that place, hearing of the approach of the divisions under Sir Thomas Hislop and General Doveton, he returned to Kopergaom; but there, having learnt that General Smith was advancing, he pursued his route to Bheer, and thence, turning off to the eastward, hastened towards Chandah in the territory of Nagpoor, sending Gunput Rao forward to the assistance of his master by a different route.

Sir Thomas Hislop endeavoured to intercept or overtake the Peishwa's army, but, finding they were beyond the reach of pursuit, he continued his march to Poona, and left the conduct of operations to Generals Doveton and Smith. The former took the route by Basum and Kurinja, the latter moved eastward along the line of the Godavery.

In the meantime, Mr. Jenkins, having discovered Appa Sahib's extraordinary treachery, arrested
March 15. him; and preparations being made to oppose the advancing succour, Gunput Rao's party was met on the banks of the Wurdah, and driven back by a detachment under Colonel Scott.

April 3. Colonel Adams with his division also arrived on the banks of the Wurdah in a few days; and Bajee Rao, uncertain how to proceed, halted at Pander Koura to the west of the Wurdah. There
April 6. he was hemmed in by the divisions of

Doveton and Adams, and, in endeavouring to avoid the former, was driven upon the latter near Sewnee, where a considerable number of his followers were
April 18. killed. Many of his jagheerdars had quitted his standard before this event, and most of them took advantage of the opportunity to disperse to their homes. The Peishwa's brother, Chimnaje Appa, fled to the southward with Appa Dessaye Nепankur and Naroo Punt Apty, and surrendered himself to a party detached to intercept him by General Smith. Colonel Adams, as soon as the pursuit ceased, proceeded against Chandah, which was held by the partizans of Appa Sahib, and after a short siege carried the place by assault. Bajee Rao, followed by General Doveton, fled in great consternation to the northward, and for six days his army suffered

severely from fatigue and privation. He had faint hopes of aid from Sindia ; but all he now desired was a good opportunity of throwing himself in the way of the British general. He had made many overtures to Mr. Elphinstone, but as they always implied an ability to treat, he was distinctly told his submission only could be accepted. He again despatched agents to Mr. Elphinstone and to the resident at Nagpoor, but continued his route, forded the Taptee on the 5th May, and advanced towards Sindwa, where he intended to cross the Nerbuddah ; but finding that point guarded, and that Sir John Malcolm had made every preparation to intercept him, he sent forward an agent, Anund Rao Chundawurkur with a letter to that officer, and retired to wait the result at Dholkote, in the neighbourhood of Asseergurh. That fortress, though stipulated to be given up by Sindia in the treaty of the 5th November, was still held by his killidar, Jeswunt Rao Lar, who had always refused to surrender. Here Bajee Rao, with about 8,000 men, remained in a state of the utmost disquietude and alarm ; he was unacquainted with the country, and, excepting the Vinchorkur and Aba Poorundhuree, abandoned by almost every person of consequence in the Mahratta country ; the fords and passes to the northward were guarded, and troops were closing in upon him on every side. His Agent reached General Malcolm's camp at Mhow, near Indore, on the 16th May. On receiving the Peishwa's overtures, Sir John Malcolm, who had been furnished with a copy of the governor-general's instructions to the commissioner in the Deccan, resolved to make the Peishwa's letter the basis of a negotiation for his surrender. Accordingly two of his political assistants, Lieutenants Low and M'Donald, were despatched towards the camp of Bajee Rao, instructed to

open a negotiation, requiring him to renounce all sovereignty for himself and family for ever in the Deccan, to which he was never to return; and to surrender Trimbukjee and the murderers of the Vaughans. After these preliminaries, Lieutenant Low was to insist upon his immediately separating himself from Ramdeen, and all proscribed rebels and Pindharees, and advance to meet Sir John Malcolm, who in such case promised to become the medium of an adjustment with the British government, and obtain for him a liberal maintenance at such holy city as he might select for his future residence. The governor-general did not approve of any deputation to Bajee Rao, both because it had a tendency to cramp the military operations against him, and conveyed an impression of the Peishwa's being in a condition to treat, when he was, in fact, eager to submit. Some circumstances proved the justness of these opinions; and, in several respects, there was an inconsiderate zeal evinced in the proceedings on this occasion which has not escaped censure. The Marquis of Hastings, although he had given the outline of the conduct to be observed towards the Peishwa, reserved to himself the particular terms to be granted to him, after obtaining his submission to a justly offended nation; but before his sentiments in regard to the first steps taken by Sir John Malcolm could be received, Bajee Rao, on the 3rd June, after a protracted negotiation, surrendered himself,* on condition that the stipulated maintenance should not be less than eight lakhs of rupees a year, which was promised to him by Sir John Malcolm, from an idea that it should

* Before surrendering himself, he had an interview with Sir J. Malcolm, and in a private conference displayed his usual address and eloquence, appealing to Sir John as the last of his three earliest and best friends—Colonel Close being dead, and General Wellesley (the Duke of Wellington) in a distant land.

not be less than the pension of his brother Amrut Rao. The Marquis of Hastings deemed the amount too great ; and seeing that his deposal was declared, and his country almost entirely reduced, knowing also the intriguing disposition of Bajee Rao, and the amassed treasure which he and his adherents might secrete for purposes hostile to the British government, it was generally considered the extreme of liberality. But there was a conditional promise to Bajee Rao in favour of jagheerdars who had adhered to his cause, and of Bramins and religious establishments supported by his family, which was quite unnecessary, and certainly should have been avoided ; because it implied that Bajee Rao was in a condition to treat, not only for himself, but for others ; it detracted in some degree from the liberality of the British government in the settlement of the conquered territories, and it obtained for Bajee Rao, amongst such of the Mahrattas as were disposed to advocate his cause, praise which he did not merit, and honor which it never could have been the intention of Sir J. Malcolm to confer. Whilst commenting, however, in this instance, on the supposed failings of the politician, justice is due to the generous feelings of the man : Sir J. Malcolm saw the prince whom he had visited nine months before in the midst of a gay court, and in a newly-erected palace on the banks of the Kistna, now a harassed and houseless fugitive ; he forgot the manner in which he had been so grossly deceived ; he thought only of the contrast in the Peishwa's situation, and of the benefits which the British government had derived from its connection with that misguided and unfortunate individual ; and he pitied those faithful adherents who still followed their sovereign in hopeless adversity, and forfeited their all, when, by personal submission, they might have

secured their possessions. The Marquis of Hastings ratified the terms; and Beithoor, a place of sanctity near Cawnpore, was appointed for Bajee Rao's future residence, to which he was immediately conducted.

Ramdeen surrendered on being promised pardon, but Bajee Rao evaded compliance with that part of the stipulated terms which required the surrender of Trimbukjee; he escaped to the southward, and for a time attempted to collect adherents, and conceal himself as before; but Captain Briggs, Mr. Elphinstone's agent in Candeish, discovered the place of his retreat, and by a well-concerted plan sent a party of irregular horse under Lieutenant Swanston,* who seized him in the village of Aheergaom. He was afterwards conveyed to the fort of Chunargurh in Bengal, where he remains a prisoner. The surrender of Bajee Rao was an important event, and was rendered more so by the escape of Appa Sahib—a circumstance which partly actuated Sir John Malcolm during the negotiation.

After the arrest of Appa Sahib by Mr. Jenkins, the governor-general directed that he should be sent to Allahabad, and there confined. He was accordingly sent off from Nagpoor for that purpose; but having corrupted some of the sepoys of a Bengal corps on his guard, and being furnished with a suit of their regimentals, he got off in that disguise on the morning of the 13th May, and fled to the Mahdeo hills between Nagpoor and the Nerbuddah, whence it was impossible to dislodge him during the monsoon. Here he was joined by Chheetoo Pindharee; and the person of Appa Sahib became a rallying-point for all the disbanded and broken troops of the country. The unfortunate negligence which occasioned

* The same officer who assisted in the defence, and was severely wounded, at Korygaom.

his escape was productive of much harassing service, owing to insurrections in various quarters.

The grandson of the late Rughoojee Bhonslay, a minor named Goozur, was in the meantime adopted by the widow of the late Rughoojee, and, assuming the name of his grandfather, was seated on the musnud. The widow was considered regent; but for the present, and during the minority, the whole administration was committed to the charge of the resident, who, in the raja's name, directed every department under the immediate superintendence of officers appointed by himself.

The season was considerably advanced before troops could be spared to co-operate in a combined attack upon the position of Appa Sahib; it was hoped he might be taken; but being assisted by the skill and intelligence of Cheetoo, he passed one of the parties which was hemming him in, and though subsequently exposed to imminent danger from a guard of British troops, he succeeded in gaining the fort or neighbourhood of Aseergurh.

That celebrated fortress was besieged by General Doveton, Sir John Malcolm co-operating with a force from Malwa. After a respectable defence during about 20 days, it surrendered on the 9th of April 1819. Appa Sahib, if he ever had been in the fort, made his escape. He afterwards sought refuge amongst the Seiks, where he still is; and no desire being evinced by the British government to receive his submission, he has sunk into the insignificance to be expected from a person of his weak and treacherous character. The dreadful fate of Cheetoo, as he attempted to fly from Aseergurh, has been already told.*

* Authorities as in the preceding.

CHAP. XXVII.

A.D. 1818 AND A.D. 1819.

The final reduction and settlement of the Peishwa's territory—Capture of the principal forts by General Pritzler.—The raja of Satara placed on his throne.—Successes of General Munro—attack and dispersion of the remaining infantry at Sholapoor.—Reduction of the Concan accomplished by the Bombay government—Appointment of officers to the civil government of the country—instructions—procedure.—The capture of Mallygaom and Prucheetgurh completes the reduction of the Peishwa's territory—mode of preventing insurrection—of settling the Bheels—detection of a conspiracy.—Claims—the Nizam—jagheerdars.—Judicial and revenue administration—Punchayets—rewards—charitable donations.—Hindoo college.—Remarks on the settlement.

IN the preceding chapter we were drawn forward to mention the last event of the war, whilst the reduction and settlement of the Peishwa's territory

A.D. 1818.

remains to be briefly explained. By the 10th of April the strong forts of Singurh, Poorundhur, and Wassota, with many others, had been taken by the besieging force under General Pritzler. Though places of that remarkable strength which has been already described, none of them made a good defence, none stood the assault, and as their previous history was scarcely known, their capture excited less interest, even among the besiegers,

than it otherwise was calculated to produce. An exception must be made in regard to Wassota; the wild country through which the troops advanced for about 20 miles, far exceeded in sublimity and grandeur any pre-conceived ideas the British officers might have formed of those vast mountains, dells, and forests, which they were told existed in the Ghaut-Mahta. The necessary artillery was transported with extraordinary labour, through thick jungles and deep valleys, where natural barriers presented themselves in every succeeding hill, at which a handful of men might have arrested a host; and when at last brought to the point of bombardment, intense interest was excited for the two officers, Cornets Hunter and Morrison, who, the reader may recollect, were taken prisoners at the commencement of the war, and were now in confinement in this fortress. The wives and families of the raja of Satara and his brothers were also in Wassota, and these princes were present in the British camp. The obstinacy of the killidar, who at first would listen to no terms of surrender,

April 5. was in this instance a cause of general regret. At length the mortars opened;

and though the peal of every salvo as it reverberated from the surrounding rocks carried with it an anxiety for the fate of the prisoners, the bombardment was kept up for about 20 hours, with such effect that the killidar capitulated, and fortunately none of the captives suffered. The two British officers were found in a dress of coarse unbleached cotton, made into a form neither European nor Indian, but partaking of the nature of both; their beards had grown, and their appearance was, as may be imagined, extraordinary; but their health was perfectly good. They had been kept in ignorance of the advance of their countrymen, or the state of the war; the firing, in driving in the

outposts, was represented by their guard as the attack of some insurgents in the neighbourhood; the bursting of the shells over their heads was the first intimation of approaching deliverance, and the most joyful sound that had reached their ears for five dreary months. They had been at first used very harshly in the fort of Kangooree; but they were removed to Wassota by Gokla's orders, and a letter, in his own hand-writing to the killidar, desiring him to treat the two poor Europeans well, was one of several instances of a like generous character, tending to prove that Gokla had no participation in the cruelties of his master, and at that moment excited some feeling of pity for his fate. On most occasions the captive officers had been humanely treated by the native soldiery, and they met with some remarkable acts of disinterested kindness and sympathy.

Shortly after the reduction of Wassota, the raja of Satara was with great pomp seated on his throne by the commissioner, when he published two proclamations—the one announcing his connexion with the British government, the other making over entire powers for the arrangement and government of his country to the author of this work, who was the agent selected by Mr. Elphinstone for that purpose. In the first proclamation the raja dwelt on the injuries received from Bajee Rao; amongst these was an order, the existence of which was confirmed by the killidar of Wassota, to put the whole family to death, rather than suffer them to fall into the hands of the British government. The raja Pertab Siew (or Sing) was in his 27th year, naturally intelligent and well-disposed, but bred amongst intrigues, surrounded by men of profligate character, and ignorant of everything except the etiquette and parade

of a court. His whole family entertained the most extravagant ideas of their own consequence, and their expectations were proportionate; so that for a time the bounty which they experienced was not duly appreciated.

As it was inconvenient to reduce the whole of that strong country at this period, a battalion of sepoys and 500 auxiliary horse were left for the protection of the raja and the defence of the fort. After these arrangements,

April 13. a part of the besieging division was detached to assist in the capture of the

forts to the northward of Poona, and General Pritzler proceeded to the Carnatic to place himself under the orders of General Munro. That gallant officer with a mere handful of men had taken a number of very strong forts, amongst others Badamee, which he carried by assault. Having added to his limited means, by raising a great body of irregulars, he had already possessed himself of the country in that quarter. On being reinforced, he immediately marched to the northward against the remainder of Bajee Rao's infantry, which, in number about 4,500, with 13 guns, were levying contributions, under Gunput Rao Phansay, in the Nizam's districts near Beejapoor. On hearing of General Munro's approach, they retreated under the walls of the strong fort of Sholapoor, where they were followed up, attacked, routed, and pursued with great slaughter. The pettah of Sholapoor had been previously carried by escalade; and the fort, after a short siege, surrendered. As General Munro advanced from the Carnatic, he sent his irregulars to the right and left of his column of march, who occupied the villages, fought with spirit on several occasions, stormed fortified places, and took possession in name of "Thomas Munro Buhadur."

The Bombay government having conquered the Concan by its own exertions, Mr. Elphinstone did not interfere in its settlement, especially as few of the difficulties to be apprehended above the Ghauts existed in the low country. Mr. Pelly and Mr. Marriott were appointed to the charge of the civil duties—the former in the southern, the latter in the northern, Concan, or to the territory south and north of river Penn. Raigurh, famous as the capital of Sivajee, and a place as impregnable as Gibraltar, surrendered to Colonel Prother on the 7th May : it contained the Peishwa's elder wife, Waranussee Bye : a fortunate shell having set fire to her habitation and destroyed it, she prevailed on the Arab killidar to capitulate. Waranussee Bye was allowed to retire to Waee near Satara, where she resided for nine or ten months, until it was discovered that her being there facilitated Bajee Rao's persevering intrigues, when, with a suitable escort, she was despatched to join her husband at Beithoor.

In regard to the settlement above the Ghauts, General Munro, as we have seen, took possession of the Carnatic, which he subsequently made over to Mr. Chaplin, an experienced civil servant of the Madras establishment, who was appointed, under Mr. Elphinstone, principal collector of the Mahratta country south of the Kistna, and political agent with the raja of Kolapoor and the southern jagheerdars.

To the management of the provinces extending from the Kistna to the Nerbuddah, Mr. Elphinstone, at different periods during the progress of the conquest, appointed four subordinate agents. The territory reserved for the raja of Satara was the tract between the Warnah and the Neera, extending from the base of the Syhadree mountains on the west to Punderpoor on the east, or nearly to

the Nizam's boundary. Until reduced, and some progress made in its settlement, the Satara country was managed entirely as a British province. Captain Henry Dundas Robertson had charge of the city and district of Poona, of which he was collector of the revenue, judge, and magistrate. His district lay between the Neera and Beema. From the Beema to the Chandore hills was intrusted to Captain Henry Pottinger, with the same authority as was delegated to Captain Robertson; and Captain John Briggs, in the province of Candesh, in addition to the duties of those officers, was agent for effecting a settlement with the Bheels.

With each of those officers, whose authority nearly resembled that of the great sur-soobehdars under the Peishwa's government, experienced natives were appointed to conduct the numerous subordinate situations, with permanent salaries, on a scale of liberality which rendered their offices, both in regard to power and emolument, exceedingly respectable.

To get possession of the country ; to prevent the revenue of the current year, or the treasures of the Peishwa, from being made applicable to purposes of hostility ; to protect and conciliate the inhabitants ; to attempt no innovations ; and to endeavour to show the people that they were to expect no change, but the better administration of their own laws, were the primary objects to which the commissioner directed the attention of his agents. As the country was drained of British troops, the greater part of which had proceeded in pursuit of the flying Peishwa, the means of those agents were at first limited ; but by raising irregulars, taking such places as they could reduce, destroying or executing straggling plunderers, especially when they were found torturing or murdering the villagers, opening negotiations with the killidars of the

stronger forts, and representing the hopelessness of resistance, the country, with the assistance of such regulars as could be spared, fell almost as fast as men could be collected to keep possession. It not unfrequently happened that irregulars, who had left Bajee Rao's service a few days or hours before, entered that of the British government; and instances are adducible where, having quitted the Peishwa, they were enlisted, subsisted, supplied with ammunition, and fighting for the new government within little more than 24 hours; so readily do the irregular troops of India transfer their allegiance to the prevailing power. To these men the new conquests were frequently of necessity intrusted, and they proved in no instance treacherous or disobedient.

By the month of May a small detachment of regulars from Poona under Major Eldridge had obtained possession of the numerous hill-forts between the city and the Ahmednugur hills, some of which are as strong as any in the world. The defences are entirely composed of solid rock, in which caves are hewn that rendered the garrison safe from the effect of shells, and a very few resolute men could maintain an assault against any numbers.

Another small detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowell was equally successful in reducing the forts in the Chandore range; and by the end of May the Arabs in Candeish, and the insurgents under the pretended Chitoor Sing in the Satara territory, were the only opponents of the British government within the dominions of the late Peishwa.

On the 13th June the Arab garrison of the strong fort of Mallygaom surrendered to Colonel
June 13. M'Dowell, after a very obstinate defence, during which they repulsed an assault, and occasioned a

loss to the besiegers of upwards of 200 men in killed and wounded. In the opposite quarter of the country, and on the ensuing day, the fort of Pruchheetgürh and the pretended Chitoor Sing were taken by a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham.* These events, except a few detached expeditions in the ensuing season, and the siege of Aseergürh already mentioned, put an end to military operations in the Mahratta territory.

The progress of the settlement went forward as rapidly as the conquest. After the first instructions were in train, the next object was to obtain full information respecting individuals, that their claims to consideration might be fully understood. Inquiries were also circulated by the commissioner to his agents, and by them to their subordinate agents, on the usages and laws of the country, in which all the intelligent part of the community were called upon for their opinions. A mass of valuable information was thus speedily collected, and from the judicious nature of the queries, so far from alarming the inhabitants—an inconvenience to which such interrogatories are particularly liable in India—these, on the contrary, being committed to men who

* Pruchheetgürh, in a most inaccessible situation, was taken by an enterprize successful from its apparent impracticability. The fort was commanded by an adjoining hill, from which a brisk fire soon drove the besieged from the gate, to seek shelter behind some stone houses in the fort; upon which Captain Spiller suggested the possibility of blowing a hole in the gate with musketry. This strange breach was effected under a heavy fire from his companions, which prevented the besieged from suspecting what was going forward at the gate. Captain Spiller went in first, but a grenadier sepoy, who attempted to follow, could not get through owing to his cartridge-box; Captian Spiller was therefore obliged to return until he had made the entrance sufficiently large, by which time he was joined by Colonel Cunningham and Assistant-Surgeon Radford, when they got in, one by one, concealing themselves in the gateway until their party had entered. They then rushed upon the garrison, completely surprised them, and carried the place without the loss of a man.

knew the natives, tended to gain their confidence, and were in this respect useful to the new government. To keep down insurrection, to settle claims and rewards consequent upon such a revolution, to make some provision for all who suffered, and to better the condition of those whom the voice of the community pointed out as fit objects of bounty, were a part of the duties which devolved upon the commissioner.

In regard to insurrection, vigilance was enjoined and strictly maintained by a system of private intelligence, which the Mahrattas consider necessary to good government; and which the state of the country, as well as the usage of the people, rendered necessary; armed men travelling without passports were required to deposit their weapons, and the hoarded resources of the late government were seized wherever found; but as it was not intended to disarm the Mahrattas, still less to create a vexatious search, which might in the slightest degree interfere with private property, or even to exact from inoffensive individuals all that they were known to possess belonging to Bajee Rao, great relaxation in these respects soon took place. After the first year, no passport was required from any body of armed men not exceeding 25, and no search for treasure was authorized without previously obtaining satisfactory testimony in regard to the information concerning it. A strong military force occupied positions at Belgaom, Kuladgee, Kurar, Satara, Sholapoor, Poona, Seroor, Joonere, Ahmednugur, and Mallygaom, and numbers of the enemy's irregular infantry were employed in the British service. The ranks of the auxiliary horse were already filled by men enlisted beyond the borders of the Mahratta country; but more than half the horses which returned from Bajee Rao's army

died in the course of six months from the fatigue they had undergone.

The Bheels in the mountains adjoining Candeish continued to disturb the country for some time after the new government was established. The plan adopted for settling them was to appropriate waste lands for such as chose to cultivate them, and to grant to every chief an allowance for a certain number of men, for which they became bound to restrain the excesses of the rest. To force them to accept of these terms, their supplies, which were drawn from the plains, were stopped, parties issuing out to plunder were cut off, and vigorous attacks were made on the points in the hills occupied by the refractory chiefs. These measures at length reduced them to submission, but it must be the work of many years to reform their habits.

There were few attempts at insurrection; one conspiracy was detected, which had for its object the release of the pretended Chitoor Sing, the murder of all the Europeans at Poona and Satara, the surprise of some of the principal forts, and the possession of the person of the raja of Satara. The persons concerned were men of desperate fortunes among the unemployed soldiery: many of them were apprehended and tried; and the ringleaders, some of whom were Bramins, were blown from guns—an example which, though severe, had a great effect in restraining that intriguing race, and preventing similar attempts in the country.

As to claims, the most important upon the British government were those which regarded the settlement with its ally, the Nizam; but no arrangement of their mutual affairs could be made, until it had been fully ascertained what surplus revenue the British government should derive from the conquest. The advantages immediately gained

by the Nizam were exemption from debts amounting to about 60 millions of rupees ; and which, on the most moderate estimate, he could not have settled with the Peishwa without making a cession of territory equal to 10 lakhs of rupees a year. The shares of revenue within the boundary of the soobehdar of the Deccan, which the Peishwa or his subjects had enjoyed up to the breaking out of the war, and of which the Nizam now retained the collections, were more than equal to 12 lakhs of rupees a year, and the cessions which fell to him from the governments of Holkar and the raja of Nagpoor amounted to nearly six more ; so that the Nizam obtained an addition of at least 28 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue.

Though the British government gained much by additional strength and security, it was doubtful how far its income was benefited by the conquest. The provision for the raja of Satara was completed by a treaty dated 25th September 1819, by which he agreed to hold his territory in subordinate co-operation to the British government ; neither to increase nor diminish his military force without its sanction ; and, as a fundamental condition, he was positively prohibited from holding any intercourse with persons not his own subjects, except through the resident at his court. The company charged itself with the defence of his territory, which for a time was to be governed under an agent of that government, until the raja and his people were made acquainted with business.*

* The plan followed in the raja's country was simply to amend the native system, and to place the routine of business in that train, which it was possible might be preserved after the interference of the British government was withdrawn. The raja himself was taught to expect power according to his ability to exercise it, and in a short time laboured as assiduously as any carcoon under his government. The entire powers of the state were formally delivered over to him on the 5th April 1822, at which period the boon thus conferred by the British nation on

Next to the provision for the raja of Satara was a reward to the raja of Kolapoor, who, on the first declaration of hostilities, espoused the British cause. The much-desired districts of Chickoorce and Menowlee, with the history of which the reader is already acquainted, were therefore restored to him—a recompense equal to his highest expectation.

The next claims were those of the jagheerdars ; but it may be first proper to mention that every species of hereditary right not jagheer, all other rent-free lands, all established pensions, charitable and religious assignments and endowments, were restored ; and that every promise held out by the proclamation of Satara was fulfilled without reserve or modification, excepting with respect to the Dukshina, which will be subsequently explained. In regard to jagheers, there were various points for consideration. In the first instance, unless specially exempted, every jagheer was taken possession of, like the territory in the immediate occupation of the Peishwa's agents,—and all jagheers falling within the Nizam's boundary were declared to be irrecoverably lost to their late owners. Jagheers also, which had been sequestered by the former government, were not restored. Certain jagheerdars, whom we shall designate of the first class, were the old *mankurees*, or native chiefs of the country, whom the reader has it in his power to trace from the earliest history of Maharashtra, such as the Nimbalkurs of Phultun, the Duflays of Jhutt, the Ghorepurays of Moodhole, &c., &c. Others, in the second class, were the old

the descendant of Sivajee was certainly appreciated by the country generally, as well as by his relations and himself ; but time must prove whether this liberal experiment on the part of the authorities of the East India Company will be attended with any lasting good effect to the governors or the governed.

aristocracy of Sivajee and his descendants, such as the Purdhans, the Pritee Needhee, Angria, and the raja of Akulkote. A third class was that which was raised by the Peishwas, some of whom had established claims by their early submission, or former services to the British government; but even of those dependants of the Peishwa, who had adhered to him to the last, it was, as remarked, "politic and humane to allow them a liberal maintenance, but it was neither required by humanity nor policy to give such persons the command of troops, paid from the revenue which had fallen into the hands of their conquerors."*

The various claims of each of these classes being considered, the first, or old hereditary jagheerdars, had the whole of their lands restored. Of the second class, the Punt Suchew was the only one of the Purdhans to whom the Peishwa had left a vestige of power: he was one of the first who joined the British cause after the proclamation of Satara, and his territory, valued at three lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, and which includes the spot where Sivajee first established himself, was immediately placed in his own hands. The Pritee Needhee took the first opportunity of escaping from the Peishwa's camp, and the lands held in his name, which were assigned for his maintenance, but never committed to his own management, were given up. The raja of Akulkote was one of those jagheerdars who, from the first, would have resisted Bajee Rao's authority, had he not been overawed by the subsidiary force; he joined in the war with reluctance, quitted the Peishwa early, and his jagheer was immediately relinquished. Of the third class of the jagheerdars, the Putwurdhuns were the most

* Elphinstone's despatches.

conspicuous; Gunput Rao Putwurdhun of Tasgaom, one of the surviving sons of Pureshram Bhow, never joined the Peishwa, and took an early opportunity, before the Satara proclamation, of assuring Mr. Elphinstone of his determination not to do so; his lands were confirmed to him. The other members of this powerful family left Bajee Rao about the end of February: a like favourable consideration was shown to them. Appa Dessaye Nepankur did not join to Peishwa till late; he never acted with vigour against the British troops, and on one occasion behaved remarkably well to some prisoners. He, as well as the Putwurdhuns and Rastia maintained a communication with Mr. Elphinstone throughout the war; but as he did not quit the Peishwa standard until a late period, he lost a part of his jagheer by the restoration of Chickoorree and Menowlee to Kolapoor, and he likewise lost considerably by revenues within the territory of the Nizam; but for these last he was at a subsequent period partly compensated, and the rest of his jagheer was restored. Mahdoo Rao Rastia had less reason than any other jagheerdar for those ideas of honor which induced many of them to adhere to the falling fortunes of him whom they considered the chief of the Hindoos. He quitted Bajee Rao after the affair of Sewnee, and thus lost the claim of fidelity to the Peishwa, or of gratitude to the British government. All jagheers granted under the Mahratta governments are for personal support, or the maintenance of troops; and each chief has a certain portion of his jagheer allotted for the former purpose. To such persons as had forfeited all claim, like Rastia, and even to those who rather feared persecution than expected favour, their personal estates were in every instance restored. The Pritee Needhee, the Punt Suchew, the raja

of Akulkote, the Duflays, and the Nimbalkurs were, at their own request, placed under the raja's government, and their lands guaranteed to them. To all the great jagheerdars the same powers were permitted within their own territory as had always existed; and even towards those chiefs who had lost their lands, great delicacy, and as little interference as possible, were enjoined. The equitable and enlightened law which levels all distinctions would have been intolerable to men's minds in the existing state of the Mahratta country, and would have been as little relished by the lower as by the higher classes of society.

The punchayet was the ordinary tribunal for the decision of civil suits, and it is that which gives, and, if judiciously administered, probably always will give, more satisfaction, and be, in their own opinion, of greater benefit, to the natives of Maharashtra than any other mode of trial. The English officers of government, who had been accustomed to the courts of Udalut, could not reconcile themselves to the corruption, delay, and apparent injustice of some of their decisions; but, in commenting on the evils of the Mahratta system, it is to be feared they forgot the many defects of their own. Although punchayets are continued under the provisional government which is still maintained in the conquered territory, it is to be apprehended they can neither exist, nor have a fair trial, where, whilst some are prejudiced, others, overwhelmed by business of various kinds, are discouraged by the difficulties they find in the system; and a few (though I do believe such selfishness in the present state of feeling to be rare), considering it at variance with the interest of the civil service, only strive to discover objections, which in some shape may be found to every form of administration, but which time and vigilance would, in this instance,

in a great measure remove. On the temper, zeal, and perseverance of the government officers, much must depend : punchayets, where neglected or merely tolerated, cannot prosper ; they require a pure and steady superintendence, with all the weight of authority to correct and amend the faults of the people which are confounded with the defects of the system. A very active able agency would at first be necessary after a plan of reform had been digested ; but once instituted, carefully watched and encouraged at the outset, and carried on for a time, much less interference would become requisite on the part of government ; and not only would the natives be called upon to administer justice in the form most popular among them, but, leaving advantages to policy out of the question, the punchayet might be made a powerful instrument for improving the minds and amending the morals of the natives of India. At present, even in the Mahratta country, those who have a suit will frequently solicit the decision of an English judge ; but the same persons, if intelligent men, when exempt from the impulse which influences their opinions under such circumstances, will invariably declare that the punchayet, in civil cases, is far better suited to the country at large than any mode of decision by individuals.

The criminal law in the conquered territory was administered, as it usually had been, by the decision of individual judges, assisted by Hindoo authority in regulating the measure of punishment ; but the evidence and sentences, in all important cases, were subject to the approval of the commissioner before being carried into execution. Punchayets in criminal cases had been known in the Satara country constituted of the servants of government. The same mode was revived in that territory, but

punchayets in criminal cases might be chosen from the body of the people, although the advantages of a trial by jury would not be at first appreciated, and would require to be introduced by persons thoroughly acquainted with the natives.

The revenue system, of settling with the people through the agents of government, instead of renting the districts, was the means of abolishing many grievances; but in the Peishwa's country, especially in the villages, where a portion of the inhabitants were composed of the soldiery, there was not so much oppression as might have been expected.

The mode of settlement for the jagheerdars has led to a brief notice of the revenue and judicial system, and, in regard to the latter, has called forth reflections which have been seldom intruded on the reader in the plain narrative now about to be concluded.

Mr. Elphinstone took charge of the government of Bombay on the 1st November 1819, and Mr. Chaplin succeeded him as commissioner for the conquered territory; but liberal pensions in land or money were previously granted to those adherents of the British government whose services during the revolution had merited such rewards. The ministers of the late government wholly unprovided for, and those of the times of Nana Furnuwees, who were pining in want, had also pecuniary assignments for their maintenance during life. Chiefs, not jagheerdars, who were reduced to absolute indigence, had also a provision according to circumstances.

The Dukshina, as the reader may remember, was a charitable institution, originally established by Dhabaray Senaputtee, and perpetuated by the first Bajee Rao and his successors. The great Madhoo Rao confined the

donations principally to poor Bramins, whose proficiency in science and mythology entitled them to distinction; and the rewards were conferred in proportion to their acquirements, moral conduct, and sanctity. During the reign of the second Bajee Rao, though a portion was always reserved as the reward of learning, it degenerated into an indiscriminate distribution, dictated by the superstitious idea of feeding and bestowing on Bramins as an atonement for sin. Many poor Bramins, however, had become greatly dependent on this charity, and therefore to have stopped it at once would have been inconsistent with the human munificence which pervaded every act of the British government in the conquered territory; but to have continued that promiscuous alms to all Bramins, who chose to collect at Poona for the purpose, would have been a wasteful, and in many respects a useless and pernicious, expenditure. It was at first, therefore, bestowed under certain limitations; the portion assigned to men of learning was duly distributed; and that the benefit to the country might be rendered more essentially important, as the donations at the Dukshina were circumscribed, a Hindoo college was instituted at Poona, where the minds of the youth might acquire such instruction in their own way as they are disposed to receive in mathematics, astronomy, medicine, &c.; and pains were taken to erase from their elementary books of ethics such principles of morality as have a dangerous or a doubtful tendency. Though the institution of the college, which was committed to Mr. Chaplin, was at first regarded with some signs of distrust, before the end of 1822 there were 143 Bramins, students or candidates for admission, even before fit teachers for all the branches had been found.

The saving to the British government from the revenues of the Peishwa's territory, after all these arrangements were completed, became very inconsiderable; but by lapses of lives of the pensioners, effectual protection to the country, fortunate seasons, and progressive improvement of agriculture, the revenue in three years increased upwards of 17 lakhs of rupees.

Thus was completed, under the direction of the Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone, this important change in the government of the Mahratta country; the liberality of the settlement authorised by the Marquis of Hastings far exceeded the expectations of the people, and more was in consequence done for the tranquillity of the Deccan in 18 months than had ever followed a revolution in that disturbed country after a period of many years. The name of Elphinstone was deservedly associated with the acts of the British government; and the memory of benefits conferred by him on the inhabitants of Maharashtra will probably survive future revolutions, and will do much in the meantime to preserve the existence of British India.*

* Authorities as in the preceding.

THE END.

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THE following Index is also frequently a Glossary. In regard to such words as may not be translated, the reader will always find their explanation in the text or note of the page in which the word is first mentioned.

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- Jowlee, i. 116. Taken by Sivajee, i. 125
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- Jummabundee, i. 30
- Jugpal, i. 72, 75, 77, 82
- Jungum, i. 10, 27
- Junkojee Sindia put to death, i. 619
- Juree Putka, the golden pennon. A Mahratta standard, carried only by the most distinguished officers of the empire. It is always followed and surrounded by choice troops. It was first used by Suntajee Ghorepuray, having been confided to his charge by Raja Ram, i. 315
- Jatra, i. 587
- Juwan Murd Khan Babey, i. 547
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- Kalhee Yoog, the iron age of the Hindoos.
- Kallian. There are two places and provinces of that name; the one is on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions, the other is in the Concan. When there is any doubt of the one being mistaken for the other, the author has followed the

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